CSMN, Georg Morgenstiernes hus (map)
Co-Sponsored by SHAPE research seminar (Philosophy Department, Sydney University) and Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (Oslo University)
Conference co-hosted and co-funded by CSMN/Oslo and SCAS/Uppsala
A workshop to launch the 3-year research project 'The Reflective Mind', based at the CSMN and funded by the Research Council of Norway. The workshop brings together presentations on the different aspects of the project.
Human beings, like many other animals, think and act intelligently to achieve their aims. But unlike most – perhaps all – other animals, we are also able to think about thoughts themselves, or ‘metarepresent’, and engage in deliberate, critical reasoning. Both abilities are manifestations of our nature as reflective beings, and arguably central to human nature. Philosophers have long sought to understand each of these two human abilities, but hitherto largely in isolation, as a result leaving many important questions unanswered. The project aims to be a systematic, integrated study of the interconnections between reasoning and metarepresentation, exploring how they are jointly exercised in central domains of mentality, including self-awareness, autonomous action, and communication.
CSMN, Centre for the study of Mind in Nature, and Arché, the Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology (University of St Andrews), are pleased to announce the sixth in a series of annual graduate conferences aimed at showcasing international graduate work in contemporary analytic philosophy.
The central issue that we’ll be trying to address is precisely where intentionality takes serious hold in explanations of early/primitive mental processes, specifically in vision and language acquisition in humans, and in navigation in the birds, the bees and bugs. One main puzzle concerns when a “computational” explanation is genuinely intentional as opposed to being merely a computational system that happens to correlate with survival relevant aspects of the environment (as Tyler Burge has recently argued is all that’s true of the desert ant as opposed to the jumping spider) or connect fortuitously with other systems presumed to be genuinely intentional on independent grounds (e.g., “later,” more central conceptual competencies in humans, as Chomskyans sometimes argue is what happens in the case of natural language syntax).
Four talks that cover a number of areas at the current frontiers of linguistic pragmatics: explicitness/implicitness, translation, utterance production, metaphor, loose talk and indeterminacy.