CSMN, Georg Morgenstiernes hus (map)
The course will discuss the nature of conceptual development in general, and specific instances from various domains (science, social/political, and formal disciplines), with an ambition to inform philosophical methodology. Core topics include purposes, aims and mechanisms for developing/revising/engineering concepts, and development of causal concepts as an illustration.
Instructor: Professor Gideon Rosen, Princeton University
The focus of this course will be the view that communication involves inference to the best explanation of an utterance, where in normal cases the best explanation is that the speaker intended to inform the hearer of an intention to inform the hearer of something. This view derives from Grice's work on speaker meaning (1957) and on conversational maxims and implicatures (1975).
We will look at criticisms of this view which aim to show that (all or some) communication is not inferential, or does not involve the recovery of speaker intentions. We will also look at what this view of communication assumes about inference and about metarepresentation, and more broadly, at the explanatory role in cognitive science of talk about inferences over representations.