Jeg ble ansatt som førsteamanuensis i praktisk filosofi ved IFIKK/CSMN i juli 2014. Hoveddelen av min forskning behandler forskjellige temaer innenfor metaetikk, men jeg har også forfattet artikler i estetikk, eksperimentell filosofi, og normativ etikk. I min avhandling, Moral Reality. A Defence of Moral Realism (2004), forsvarer jeg en naturalistisk, ikke-reduksjonistisk, versjon av moralsk realisme. I senere tid har jeg særlig interessert meg for koblingen mellom moralsk språk og holdninger, samt koblingen mellom normative grunner for handling og rasjonalitet. Jeg har undervist i de fleste emner innenfor praktisk filosofi, inkludert metaetikk, normativ etikk, estetikk, og religionsfilosofi. Tidligere arbeidet jeg ved Universitetet i Lund og Universitetet i Gøteborg.
Caj Sixten Strandberg
Professor
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Filosofi
English version of this page
E-post
c.s.strandberg@ifikk.uio.no
Telefon
+47 22844833
Mobiltelefon
+47 93051886
Rom
432
Treffetider
Etter avtale
Brukernavn
Besøksadresse
Blindernveien 31
Georg Morgenstiernes hus
0313 Oslo
Postadresse
Postboks 1020 Blindern
0315 Oslo
Utvalgte publikasjoner
- ‘Dispositional Moral Properties and Moral Motivation’, Theoria, Vol. LXV, 1999, pp. 171–192.
- ‘Aristotle’s Internalism in the Nicomachean Ethics’, The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 34, 2000, pp. 71–87.
- ‘Two Conceptions of Inequality’, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 30, 2001, pp. 169–199.
- ‘In Defence of the Open Question Argument’, The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 8, 2004, pp. 179–196.
- Moral Reality. A Defence of Moral Realism (Lund University). Dissertation
- ‘Externalism and the Content of Moral Motivation’, Philosophia, Vol. 35, 2007, pp. 249–260, 2007.
- ‘Particularism and Supervenience’, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed. by Russ Shafer-Landau, Vol. 3, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 129–158.
- ‘A Structural Disanalogy between Aesthetic and Ethical Value Judgments’, The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 51, 2011, pp. 51–67.
- ‘The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation’, The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 15, 2011, pp. 341–369.
- ‘A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXXXIV, 2012, pp. 87–122.
- ‘Expressivism and Dispositional Desires’, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 49, 2012, pp. 81–91.
- ‘Recent Work on Motivational Internalism’, Analysis, Vol. 72, 2012, pp. 123–137. Together with F. Björklund, G. Björnsson, J. Eriksson, and Ragnar Francén Olinder.
- ‘An Internalist Dilemma—and an Externalist Solution’, The Journal of Moral Philosophy, Vol. 10, 2013, pp. 25–51.
- ‘Cognitivism’, International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. by Hugh LaFollette, Oxford: Blackwell, 2013, pp. 850–859.
- ‘Properties, Moral’, International Encycolopedia of Ethics, ed. by Hugh LaFollette, Oxford: Blackwell, 2013, pp. 4159–4168.
- ‘Is Moral Internalism Supported by Folk Intuitions?’, Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 26, 2013, pp. 319–335. Together with F. Björklund.
- ‘Moralisk motivation – ett dilemma och dess lösning’, Filosofisk tidskrift, Vol. 1, 2014.
- ‘Options for Hybrid Expressivism’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 1, 2015, pp. 91-111.
- ‘Can the Embedding Problem be Generalized?’, Acta Analytica, Vol. 30, 2015, pp. 1–15.
- Motivational Internalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Edited together with G. Björnsson, R. Francén Olinder, J. Eriksson, and F. Björklund.
- ‘Motivational Internalism and Folk Intuitions’, Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 28, 2015, pp. 715–734. (Together with G. Björnsson, J. Eriksson, R. Francén Olinder, and F. Björklund.)
- Review of Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge (eds.), Having it Both Ways, Ethics, Vol. 126, 2016, pp. 500–505.
- ‘A Puzzle about Reasons and Rationality’, The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 21, 2017, pp. 63–88.
- ‘Aesthetic Internalism and Two Normative Puzzles’, Studi di Estetica, No. 6, 2016, pp. 23–70.
- 'Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons', Dialectica, Vol. 72, 2018, pp. 69-100.
- ‘An Ecumenical Account of Categorical Moral Reasons', Journal of Moral Philosophy, Vol. 16, 2019, pp. 160-188.
- 'Internalism and the Frege-Geach Problem', Belgrade Philosophical Annual, Issue 32, 2019, pp. 67–91.
- 'Moral Blame and Rational Criticism', European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 30, Issue 1, 2022, pp. 345–360.
- 'Realist Dependence and Irrealist Butterflies', Synthese, Vol. 201, Issue 2, 2023.
- 'Neo-Humean Rationality and Two Types of Principles', Analytic Philosophy. Forthcoming.
- 'Moral Properties', The Routledge Handbook of Properties, ed. by Anthony Fisher and Anna-Sofia Maurin, New York: Routledge. Forthcoming.
Publisert
22. aug. 2014 11:00
- Sist endret
22. feb. 2023 18:05