Nominal predicates are special in that they license an apparent animate denotation for demonstrative pronouns, which normally denote inanimate entities. For example, while the demonstrative pronouns in (1) cannot refer to animate entities, the sentences in (2) are fully acceptable.

1. a. # That [NP came up to me after class].
   b. # That [AP on the porch].
   c. # That is [AP tall].

This paper focuses on sentences like (2), which were first classified by Higgins (1973) as identificational as they are typically used in introductions and presentational contexts. We argue that these are a special case of predicational sentences in which both the demonstrative and the nominal predicate have an intensional meaning.

The basic meaning. (2a) can be used in a context where the addressee knows Rosa but cannot identify her (c1), maybe because she is in a dark street, or in a context where (2a) is used to teach the addressee who Rosa is (c2). In both cases, the sentence associates a specific instantiation of Rosa (a stage of Rosa to use Carlson's 1977 terms) with the individual Rosa. This also happens with a nonhuman in (3).

3. That is a tiger.

By uttering (3) in a context where the interlocutors encounter a tiger that is hard to classify (c1), e.g. an albino tiger, the speaker provides a sort for a previously unclassified entity. Alternatively, the speaker could be teaching someone, e.g. a two-year-old, what a tiger is (c2). Perceiving a scene containing a stage of a tiger, the toddler is expected to extract those perceptual properties of the scene that are most likely to allow her to identify other tigers in other contexts. Note that the linguistic message does not tell the addressee which perceptual properties are relevant; the addressee has to extract these properties herself. Evidence for this comes from cases where the addressee has extracted the wrong bundle of perceptual properties, e.g. if having stripes is not taken to be such a relevant property, the child may later wrongly classify a leopard as a tiger. Nonetheless, certain bundles of perceptual properties seem to be cognitively salient.

Previous analyses. In Higgins' (1973) analysis of (2) as identificational, the demonstrative pronoun is taken to referential, but this does not explain why the same pronouns cannot refer to animates in (1). Mikkelsen (2004) analyzed the demonstratives in (2) as denoting properties, arguing that (2) are predicational sentences. However, the sentences pattern with predicational sentences, and not with specificational sentences on most of Higgins' diagnostics, such as gapping (a) and VP ellipsis (b) (but not predicate coordination, c: see below).

4. a. That is Rosa and that – Mathilda.
   b. That is Rosa and that is too. (pointing at pictures)
   c. *That is Rosa and is tall.

5. What Rosa is is interesting and what Mathilda is is important. (predicational & specificational)
   a. What Rosa is is interesting and what Mathilda is – important. (predicational only)
   b. What Rosa is is interesting and what Mathilda is is too. (predicational only)
   c. What Rosa is is interesting and important too. (predicational only)

We take (4) as evidence that (2) express predication, and draw on ideas from Carlson (1991) in suggesting that the apparently animate demonstrative in fact denotes an individual concept that relates the perceptual properties of what is demonstrated – a stage – to an entity. This meaning for the demonstrative means that the same perceptual properties would identify a tiger in all worlds.

The postcopular expression. Gupta (1980) argues that while nominals differ from other predicates in that they not only express a principle of application determining which entities in a possible world have a particular property, but also a principle of identity allowing interpreters to track entities across worlds: tiger allows identifying the same tiger across possible worlds. Technically, instead of a function from worlds into sets of entities, Gupta-nouns denote functions from worlds into sets of individual concepts, and these are separated by definition, i.e. two tigers in a certain world cannot collapse into a single tiger in another world. Gupta argues for this meaning for (certain) nouns in order to explain why only nominals combine with quantifiers, and he claims that these are crucially never predicative. We depart from Gupta and argue that this is exactly the meaning of predicates in identificational sentences (Note that this accounts for the ungrammaticality of 4c due to type mismatch).

That is a tiger. The meaning of (3) is given in (6-8)

6. [[tiger]] (type <s,<<s,e,>,t>>): The function from worlds to individual concepts i such that: (i) i(w) is a tiger; and (ii) for all w', w": if i(w') and i(w") are defined, then i(w') is the same tiger as i(w") (Gupta meaning).

7. [[that]] (type <s,e>); i (a free variable over individual concepts)

8. [[that is a tiger]] M,w,g: true iff [[that]] M,w,g ∈ [[tiger]] M,w,g: true iff
a. \((g(i))(w)\) is a tiger

b. For all \(w, w''\) if \((g(i))(w')\) and \((g(i))(w'')\) are defined, then \((g(i))(w)\) is the same tiger as \((g(i))(w'')\).

Intuitively, the sentence conveys the information that the individual concept constructed by the interpreter on the basis of salient perceptual properties of the perceived entity is one that allows the perceived entity to be classified as a tiger and tracked across worlds as a tiger. In c1, this meaning may lead the interpreter to draw additional inferences about the intended denotation of that, i.e. about the perceptual properties that allow classifying the demonstrated entity as a tiger. In c2, the sentence may lead the interpreter to draw additional inferences about the meaning of tiger, i.e. the nature of the individual concepts denoted by tiger (a parallel interpretation is available for 2b; definites imply uniqueness within a world and not across worlds).

**That is a pedestrian.** Gupta (1980) argues that stage-level nouns like pedestrian do not denote Gupta-nouns, because they do not seem to provide suitable restrictions for quantifiers, as in the infelicitous (9a). (9b), however, shows that quantifying over pedestrians is possible given the right predicate.

(9) a. #Every pedestrian loves his mother.
   b. Every pedestrian will be fined if he crosses at a red light.

This contrast shows that, contra Gupta, stage-level nouns may be separated under certain circumstances (although examples like 10 may be better analyzed as quantifying over event, see Krifka 1990). Notice that **That is a pedestrian** is perfectly felicitous, as long as it is uttered in a context where the speaker points at someone who is clearly traveling by foot. That is, while any stage of a tiger contains perceptual properties that allow us to classify the entity as a tiger, classifying a person as a pedestrian can only be done in stages where a person is clearly exhibiting pedestrian properties. This is captured by relativizing state-level predicate nominals to times, in addition to worlds.

**That is Rosa.** A standard theory of proper names is consistent with proper names denoting Gupta-nouns, provided that the denotation is a singleton set containing a rigid individual concept, as in (10).

(10) \([\text{Rosa}]_{M,w,\bar{g}}\), the function from worlds to individual concepts \(i\) such that

a. For all worlds \(w\), if \(i(w)\) is defined, \(i(w) = \text{rosa}\)

b. For all worlds \(w\) and individual concepts \(i\) and \(j\), if \(i(w)=j(w)=\text{rosa}\), then \(i=j\).

The speaker of (2a), we claim, expects the interpreter to extract from a stage of Rosa the individual concept that tracks Rosa across worlds, locations and times. Of course, Rosa's identity does not depend on any of her perceptual properties--she could dye her hair, undergo plastic surgery, wear a disguise and still be Rosa. This introduces a tension between the interpretation of the proper name and the interpreter's ability to extract an individual concept from the perceptual properties of a stage of Rosa. Note, however, that if Rosa's appearance changes dramatically, we do not expect someone who interprets (2a) in a particular context to be able to identify Rosa in her new look. We thus conclude that since the rigid individual concept is not available to interlocutors, they are expected to use the perceptual properties of the demonstrated stage of Rosa to make the best possible approximation of the individual concept denoted by the proper name Rosa.

**That is tall revisited.** (1c) becomes acceptable in a context where interlocutors have been arguing about what counts as "tall": the speaker may point at a basketball player and utter (1c) to explain her standard of tallness. In this special circumstance the meaning of the adjective tall is coerced into a Gupta-noun.

(11) \([\text{tall}]_{M,w,\bar{g}}\). The function from worlds \(w\) to individual concepts \(i\) such that

a. \(i(w)\) is tall, and

b. For all \(w', w''\), if \(i(w')\) and \(i(w'')\) are defined, \(i(w')\) is the same instantiation of tallness as \(i(w'')\)

The coerced denotation is one that allows entities to be tracked across worlds as examples of tallness; the other properties of the entities tracked in this way do not necessarily stay constant.

**Conclusions and implications.** Taking identificational sentences as a special, intensionalized case of predication makes concrete Higgins' (1973) original intuition that these sentences have a special identifying function. More broadly, analyzing nominal predicates in identificational sentences as Gupta-nouns raises the question of whether all predicate nominals denote Gupta-nouns or whether some nominal predicates denote "standard" predicates. Answering this question requires going beyond identificational questions and has the potential to shed light on the typology of copular sentences.

**References**


