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Editorial

This year, all members of the CSMN team have been working very hard to further build up CSMN, to establish and extend local, national and international cooperation, to publish their research results and make the centre visible and respected in the academic world.

By Christel Fricke, Director of CSMN

CSMN has hosted .... International conferences, seminars and workshops with all in all ... speakers from abroad, of them women. Whereas both the rational agency team and the moral agency team had reduced the events they organized in comparison to 2008, we made linguistic agency a special focus of our activities. The linguistic agency team did indeed make the largest contribution to the events CSMN hosted in 2009. Discussing various aspects of our research with our guests and taking care of them kept the whole team busy. We all owe special thanks to our administrators Jan Halvor Undlien and Lina Tosterud (who took over from Espen Røsbak 1st of April). Their efficiency and patience has made an important contribution to CSMN having gained the reputation of an excellent academic host. Unfortunately, our administrator in chief, Jan Halvor Undlien, has decided to leave us. He has an opportunity to go further up in his career as a university administrator. We wish him all the best.

We are all very happy that, in 2009, Professor Helen Stewart (University of Leeds) became affiliated with CSMN (and with the RA team in particular) in a 20% position as senior researcher. Her research interests lie mainly in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action, and in the metaphysical and ontological issues which bear on these areas. Her present project, a book on the 'Metaphysics of Freedom', is of interest for the members of both the rational agency and moral agency team.

Helen Stewart joined us for our annual gathering in .... as well as Professor Jessica Brown from the Arche Centre (St. Andrews, Scotland) and Seumas Miller from CAPPE (Canberra et al., Australia). Whereas we all enjoyed the discussions and socializing, we felt a little bit undernourished. The place where we went provides food in a way that encourages guests to slim. One morning, on our way back from a skiing trip, we had to stop by a supermarket to buy further provisions. In 2010, we shall have our annual meeting at the Norwegian Institute in Rome where we shall hopefully not have any problems of a similar kind. This trip will also be comforting for our international members who still find the Norwegian winters somewhat long.

Unfortunately Chiara Tabet, Post-Doc in Linguistic Agency, had to give up her academic career and leave us for personal reasons. We were all very concerned and very much regret to have lost her as a member of our team. But there was nothing from our side we could do to help her and make it possible to continue her career. It was great to have her in our team, and I would like to thank her for all she did for the centre while she was a member. She and her husband have moved to her home town, Rome. We are keeping in touch and hope to see her in 2010 during our annual meeting. We are now in a process of hiring a new post-doc in linguistic agency.
In 2009, several of CSMN’s members have received honorary awards: Professor Dagfinn Føllesdal has been appointed Commander of the Royal Norwegian Order of St. Olav for ‘accomplishments on behalf of the father country and humanity’. Jennifer Hornsby has been elected a member of the Norwegian Academy of Science, and the centre leader herself has been elected a member of The Royal Norwegian Society of Science and Letters. Furthermore, core group member Carsten Hansen has been promoted to a professorship at UiO. Congratulations to all.

Professor Vivienne Brown (The Open University, Milton Keynes, UK) came to stay at the centre in May. She used the time mainly to get some work done on rational and collective agency and particularly enjoyed the opportunity of discussing her work with the members of CSMN.

Professor Alison Jaggar (University of Colorado and Professor II at CSMN) and Theresa Tobin (Marquette University) have spent a month with us, working together on a book under the preliminary title ‘Ethics Across Borders: Moral Reasoning in a Diverse and Unequal World’. They have helped us establishing cooperation with the Centre for Gender Research here at the University of Oslo where they presented and discussed their work in progress.

Professor Robyn Carston (King’s College London) visited the Centre in May. In cooperation with core group member Deirdre Wilson, she organized two conferences which brought several of the Paris based members of the CSMN team to Oslo, including Professor Dan Sperber. This was an excellent opportunity to build up new research connections not only for the members of CSMN but also for other colleagues here at UiO, especially in the various branches of linguistics.

Norbert Hornstein, Professor of Linguistics at the University of Maryland, has visited CSMN in October. His main area of research is syntactic theory, but he found much to talk about with all members of CSMN. One afternoon, I found him sitting in our lunch room, enjoying a cup of coffee, saying: ‘One just has to sit here for a while and one gets involved in discussions about all kinds of questions concerning normativity, including those one had never thought of before. It’s great!’

We also had a large number of more junior visitors, including visitors from both our consortium partners. I cannot name them all here. But they all contributed very much to making CSMN an interesting, inspiring, lively and pleasant place to be.

For most of 2009, our consortium partners still were our consortium partners to be. We had to go all the way up to the rector of the University to take the last hurdle of the administrative procedure. But then, in November, the rector signed the agreement. It is a relief to have the consortium agreement finally in place. In 2010, the board can be appointed and start its work.

Team member Georg Kjøll has been particularly active to encourage the CSMN team to make use of new media. Podcasts from events (Georg)

Twitter

2010 will be a particularly important and challenging year for CSMN with the mid-term evaluation and re-application for another 5 years of funding for our research coming up. Our auditors have given us encouraging feedback but they also have made a couple of important suggestions how to structure the team and better present the result of our research. We have a great deal of work before us but the team is in good shape and I am optimistic that we can meet all the challenges.
Top left: Thomas Pogge, Bjørn Ramberg, Anders Strand, Jonas Pfister, Julian Fink, Georg Kjøll, Einar Duenger Bøhn, Herman Cappelen, Carsten Hansen, Jennifer Hornsby, Torfinn HRuvenes, Jan Halvor Undlien, Nicholas Allott

Front left: Deirdre Wilson, Ingrid Lossius Falkum, Mathias Sagdahl, Edmund Henden, Chiara Tabet, Olav Gjelsvik, Timothy Chan, Helen Steward, Chirstel Fricke, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Rachel Sterken, Seumas Miller, ?, Eline Busck Gundersen.

Not present: Robyn Carston, Jan Terje Faarlund, Andreas Føllesdal, Alison Jaggar, Heine Holmen, Ernest Lepore, Raino Malnes, Anders Nes, Peter Railton, Kari Refsdal, Espen Røsbak, Lalaine H. Siruno, Lina Tosterud
CSMN structure

**Director of CSMN**
Christel Fricke

**Core Group:**
Herman Cappelen, Christel Fricke, Olav Gjelsvik, Carsten Hansen, Jennifer Hornsby, Thomas Pogge, Bjørn Ramberg, Deirdre Wilson

**Administration**
Administrative Leader: Jan Halvor Undlien
Administrative Consultant: Espen Røsbak (Jan-Apr), Lina Tosterud (Apr-)

**Linguistic Agency**
Research Directors:
Herman Cappelen, Deirdre Wilson
Research Coordinators:
Robyn Carston, Jan Terje Faarlund, Ernest Lepore, Herman Cappelen, Deirdre Wilson
Affiliated researchers:
Richard Breheny, John Hawthorne, Francois Recanati, Dan Sperber, Jason Stanley
Post Docs:
Chiara Tabet, Nicholas Allott
PhD students:
Rachel Sterken, Georg Kjøll, Torfinn Huvenes

**Rational Agency**
Research Directors:
Olav Gjelsvik, Jennifer Hornsby
Research Coordinators:
Carsten Hansen, Bjørn Ramberg, Olav Gjelsvik, Jennifer Hornsby, Helen Steward
Researcher:
Edmund Henden
Post Docs:
Anders Nes, Timothy Chan, Nicholas Allott
PhD student:
Heine Holmen

**Moral Agency**
Research Directors:
Christel Fricke, Thomas Pogge
Research Coordinators:
Andreas Føllesdal, Alison Jaggar, Raino Malnes, Peter Railton, Christel Fricke, Thomas Pogge
Post Doc:
Eline Busck-Gundersen, Anders Nes
PhD students:
Kari Refsdal, Lalaine H. Siruno

**Cognition and Communication**
Director: Endre Begby

**Addiction, Choice and Responsible Agency**
Research Director: Olav Gjelsvik, Edmund Henden

**Towards a Defensible Platonism**
Dagfinn Føllesdal, Kai Hauser

**Research School**
Director: Olav Gjelsvik
Coordinator: Carsten Hansen
New staff members

Endre Begby
Endre Begby has a PhD in philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh. He works primarily at the intersection of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, with extensions into metaphysics, epistemology, and action theory, and in political philosophy. He also has broad historical interests, in particular in ancient and modern philosophy. Endre’s dissertation, On the Structure of Communicative Understanding (Pittsburgh, 2008), develops a social externalist model of the interrelations between semantic ascription, psychological attribution, and action explanation. In his next large scale project, tentatively entitled Cognition and Communication: New Foundations for Contextualism, he aims to develop this model further to defend a radical form of semantic and psychological contextualism.

He is currently at work on a project entitled Cognition and Communication: New Foundations for Contextualism.

Alison Jaggar
Alison Jaggar is College Professor of Distinction in Philosophy and Women and Gender Studies, University of Colorado. She teaches classes in moral and political philosophy, feminist theory and methodology. Professor Jaggar has received numerous grants and fellowships, including a Rockefeller Foundation Fellowship and two fellowships from the National Endowment for the Humanities.

Jaggar’s books include: Feminist Frameworks, co-edited with Paula Rothenberg. (1978, 2/ e 1984, 3/ 3 1993); Feminist Politics and Human Nature (1983); Gender, Body, Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being and Knowing, co-edited with Susan R. Bordo (1989); Living with Contradictions: Controversies in Feminist Social Ethics, (1994); Morality & Social Justice, co-authored with James Sterba et al (1995); The Blackwell Companion to Feminist Philosophy co-edited with Iris M. Young, (1998); Just Methods (2007); and Abortion: Three Perspectives co-authored with Michael Tooley, Philip Devine and Celia Wolf-Devine (2008). Jaggar is interested in practical reasoning, especially in contexts of inequality and cultural difference, and is co-authoring Ethics Across Borders with Theresa Weynand Tobin. Recently, in addition to publishing a few articles on terrorism, she has become especially interested in global gender justice, and plans several research projects on this topic. Jaggar was a founder member of the Society for Women in Philosophy and is past chair of the American Philosophical Association Committee on the Status of Women.
Edmund Henden
Edmund Henden received his D.Phil. in philosophy from the University of Oxford in 2002, and then from 2002 to 2007 he was a lecturer and postdoctorial research fellow at the University of Oslo. He currently holds an appointment as Research Fellow at CSMN.

Henden works mainly on topics in the philosophy of mind and action, in particular issues relating to practical rationality. He also has research interests in ethics and metaphysics. His work has appeared in Philosophical Psychology, Erkenntnis, Ratio, European Journal of Philosophy, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice and Philosophical Explorations.

Mathias Sagdahl
Mathias got his MA-degree from the University of Oslo in June 2008, and started his PhD at CSMN in February 2009.

Mathias Sagdahl works in the research area of rational agency. The topic of his project is the relationship between rationality and normative facts. Mathias aims to develop and defend a pluralistic account of normativity which includes widespread incommensurability of reasons. An important question he tries to answer is how one can rationally respond to such incommensurable reasons. He argues that this calls for an alternative conception of practical reasoning and the role and nature of rationality.

He has also worked on moral and political philosophy, and is interested in subjects like self-ownership, conscription, and international relations. He will be a visitor at the University of Oxford, starting January 2010.
Rachel Sterken
Rachel Sterken joined the Linguistic Agency in February, 2009. She is writing a dissertation on the semantics, pragmatics and philosophy of genericity. Her research this year has focused on providing accounts of two sorts of recalcitrant cases of genericity -- what are sometimes called “existential generics” and “type B troublesome generics”, respectively. She has presented her work at numerous refereed conferences: the Princeton/Rutgers Graduate Conference, the Yale/UConn Graduate Conference, the Harvard/MIT Graduate Conference, the Society for Exact Philosophy annual meeting and the Genius Genericity Conference held by Institut Jean Nicod.

Rachel did her MSc degree in Logic at the Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) at the University of Amsterdam; and her BSc degree in Mathematics and Philosophy at the University of Toronto.

She is also a member of the Arche Philosophical Research Centre in the Department of Philosophy at the University of St. Andrews

Helen Steward
Helen Steward joined CSMN as a senior researcher in February 2009.

Helen joined the School of Philosophy at the University of Leeds in April 2007, having previously been Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at Balliol College, Oxford. She has also spent time at Berkeley on a Harkness Fellowship and at the Australian National University as a Visiting Fellow. Her research interests lie mainly in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action, and in the metaphysical and ontological issues which bear on these areas (e.g. causation, modality, the event/state distinction). She is working at present on a book entitled ‘A Metaphysics for Freedom’, which argues for a distinctive version of incompatibilism, based on the idea that there is a conflict not only between determinism and free human action, but also between determinism and the activities of a wide variety of animals.
The CSMN Affiliate Program

The Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (CSMN) has invited PhD students and post doctoral fellows at the University of Oslo who work on topics related to our own research to become affiliates of the centre.

The CSMN Affiliate Program should contribute to the achievement of four interrelated goals:

1. Increasing the visibility of all the work done by PhD student and Post Doc researchers at the University of Oslo which contributes to any of the three main research areas identified by CSMN.

2. Making it possible for affiliates to help us strengthen CSMN as an active and stimulating research community at the University of Oslo, and in particular at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences.

3. Achieving a stronger research collaboration with scholars at the University of Oslo.

4. Creating a mechanism by which CSMN is able to support research by PhD students and Post docs whose work contributes to the centre’s progress in its core areas.

PhD students and post doctoral fellows with a formal connection to the University of Oslo can become CSMN affiliates. This only applies to researchers who are carrying out research related to one of CSMN’s sub-projects. Affiliates are invited to participate in all activities of CSMN (conferences, workshops, seminars, etc.).

So far, CSMN has 13 affiliated PhD students and Post Docs, whose backgrounds include philosophy, linguistics, political science, and North America Studies. Unfortunately, only three of them are women. In 2009 we will encourage more female PhD students and Post Docs to become affiliates.

Christel Fricke
Equal opportunities: visions and activities

Two distinguished scholars, Professors Helen Steward and Alison Jaggar, have joined CSMN in a 20% positions as senior researchers. CSMN has received funding for these position for three years from the Research Council of Norway (RCN).

Helen Steward joined the School of Philosophy at the University of Leeds in April 2007, having previously been Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at Balliol College, Oxford. She has also spent time at Berkeley on a Harkness Fellowship and at the Australian National University as a Visiting Fellow. Her research interests lie mainly in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action, and in the metaphysical and ontological issues which bear on these areas (e.g. causation, modality, the event/state distinction).

Alison M. Jaggar joined the faculty at CU Boulder in 1990 and holds a joint appointment with the Women and Gender Studies Program. She was recently named College Professor of Distinction. Her primary areas of interest are: Contemporary social, moral and political philosophy, often from a feminist perspective. She is also interested in moral epistemology, especially in how to justify social criticism in contexts of inequality and cultural difference. More recently, she has been working on some gendered aspects of global justice.

Communication Skills and Media Training Course
On September 14th and 15th 2009, two one-day communication skills and media training courses were arranged for junior and senior members of CSMN. The tutors were Judith Hann and John Exelby, two leading journalists and science communication professionals. The courses focussed on training in writing and editing skills for targeting specific audiences, advice on writing press releases and newspaper articles, and coaching in writing and delivery skills. Participants were asked to write an article about your work for inclusion in a serious newspaper like, in UK terms, the Guardian, The Times or the Daily Telegraph – as well as prepare a talk, again for a non-specialist but intelligent audience.

Plans
In 2010, CSMN plans to host a follow-up visit with Professor Virginia Valian, a leading expert on gender equity in academia and the professions. Virginia Valian is Distinguished Professor at the Department of Psychology, Hunter College, CUNY, and Co-Director of the Gender Equity Project, also at Hunter College. The visit will be co-funded with the Faculty of Humanities and the Oslo University central administration. The model will be the same as last time, with 5-6 seminars and other events targeted towards the different groups financing the event. Topics covered will include organisational challenges connected to the improvement of gender equity, what people in leadership positions can do to address the issue of gender imbalance, mentoring and recruitment and retention.
Cooperation with Arché / St. Andrews

Since its launch, CSMN has collaborated closely with the Arché Philosophical Research Centre at the University of St Andrews. This collaboration has resulted in a coordination of the centres’ general research policies, at a strategic level, and, at the individual level, in a close interaction between researchers in the two centers.

Arché was founded in 1998. It is the leading philosophical research centre in the world dedicated to the core areas of analytical philosophy. Its mission is to conduct and foster collaborative research on fundamental issues in metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophies of logic, language, mathematics and mind, and to provide a dedicated training environment for younger (postdoctoral and postgraduate) researchers.

Arché currently has more than twenty PhD students, eight postdoctoral fellows, six professorial fellows, and three Professorial Chairs.

Professor Cappelen, who is one of the Directors of the linguistic agency project at CSMN, holds an Arché Chair and is currently the Acting Director of Arché.

2009 saw a further strengthening of the ties between the two research centers Arché and CSMN:

The ‘Context and Intention’ workshop brought together researchers from linguistic agency and the contextualism and relativism project at Arché. One of the keynote speakers was Andreas Stokke, a PhD student at St Andrews. Rachel Sterken, a PhD student both at Arché and St Andrews organized and gave a talk at the CSMN hosted conference on Generics.

Semantics and Philosophy in Europe took place in London and was jointly organized by CSMN, Arché and four other European research institutions.

The workshop on Agreement and Disagreement featured Torfinn Huveness, a PhD student at Arché and CSMN, as a keynote speaker.

The Arché Philosophical Methodology Group and the Linguistic Agency group at CSMN jointly organized the linguistics Intuitions workshop that took place in Oslo in October 2009. The third Arche-CSMN graduate conference was a smash success – with about 200 students from around the world submitting papers and featuring Professors Ernie Lepore (Rutgers University) and Susanna Siegal (Harvard University) as keynote speakers.

Herman Cappelen

The CSMN/Arché Graduate Conference 2009 (AC-GC III)

The third annual joint CSMN/Arché Graduate Conference was held this year at the University of St Andrews, Scotland on November 7th-8th, 2009. The conference showcases exceptional graduate student work on CSMN and Arché research topics. Six graduate student speakers were selected by blind-referee from a pool of
186 submissions from all over the world.

The graduate student papers presented were:
'Saving Ordinary Counterfactuals’ Daniel Berntson (Brown University)
‘The Problem of the Basing Relation’ Ian Evans (University of Arizona)
‘Self-Deception, Other-Deception, and the Role of Intention: Toward an Intentionalist Account of Self-Deception’ Amber Griffioen (University of Iowa)
‘Explaining the Abstract/Concrete Paradoxes in Moral Psychology’ Eric Mandelbaum (UNC-Chapel Hill) and Dave Ripley (UNC-Chapel Hill and ENS-Institut Jean-Nicod)
‘Indefinite Divisibility’ Jeff Russell (New York University)
‘Experimental Philosophy and Self-Defeat’ Amia Srinivasan (Oxford University)

Each of the graduate student speakers received valuable feedback on their work from CSMN and Arché respondents, who were:

Yuri Cath (Arché/St Andrews)
Timothy Chan (CSMN/UiO)
Dylan Dodd (Arché/St Andrews)
Einar Duenger Bohn (CSMN/UiO)
Professor Olav Gjelsvik (CSMN/UiO)
Guðmundur Andri Hjálmarsson (Arché/St Andrews)

The two keynote addresses were given by Professors Ernest Lepore (Rutgers/UiO) and Susanna Siegel (Harvard).

Forty-one people signed up to attend, including speakers and respondents. On Saturday night a dinner was held for those speaking, responding, and chairing sessions.

The conference was organised by four PhD students at Arché and CSMN: Paul Dimmock (Arché/St Andrews), Thomas Hodgson (Arché/St Andrews), Dirk Kindermann (Arché/St Andrews), and Rachel Sterken (CSMN/UiO); and by the administrative staff at CSMN and Arché: Lynn Hynd (Arché/St Andrews), Lina Tosterud (CSMN/UiO) and Jan Halvor Undlien (CSMN/UiO).

The event was extremely successful, with lively and well-attended discussions on both days. The speakers received useful feedback and several of them commented on how much they enjoyed the conference. The event also created a large amount of positive exposure amongst young researchers, giving recognition to both CSMN and Arché as centres of excellence fostering graduate level research training.

Rachel Sterken
Internal activities

The CSMN Seminar in Language and Rationality (the L&R Seminar)
The Linguistic Agency and Rational Agency have through both terms of 2009 organized a joint, weekly seminar focusing on issues of interests to members of one or both groups. Our aim has been to host discussions which are research focused at the same time as they have an appeal to scholars and students outside of the presenter’s area of specialization. We strive towards being interdisciplinary and inclusive, and the seminar has been well attended the whole year by CSMN members, affiliates and visitors – as well as attracting interest outside the institute.

The level of activity has been very high, with 23 speakers in the spring term and 13 talks given in the autumn term. We have also organized discussions of recent books and papers and are happy that the seminar has served as a forum for discussion of both unfinished ideas and works by others than speakers themselves. Chiara Tabet and Georg Kjøll were in charge of organization the first half of 2009, while Georg and new PhD Fellow Mathias Sagdahl convened the remaining seminars.

For the future of the seminar we are looking into ways of being an even more productive source for cross-disciplinary feedback and discussion, as well as manners of integrating more people outside CSMN – and in particular students – into our activities.

Georg Kjøll

Moral Philosophy Club
Moral Philosophy Club is organized by people from the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (CSMN) and the Ethics Programme, both hosted by the Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Arts and Ideas, UiO. There are weekly, two-hour sessions, except on dates when there is a clash with other events that are or might be of interest to the members.

In 2009, we’ve had 24 sessions, with topics covering many aspects of moral philosophy. We have carried on with the form with which we started in January 2008: The person who presents distributes his or her paper within Friday, and members read the paper before attending the session the following Tuesday. The idea is that we spend the majority of the time discussing papers – given that one of the purposes of Moral Philosophy Club is to encourage all members to improve their own
and other peoples’ work, this is arguably the best way to spend our time. In the discussions, all attending members – and of course guests, if there are any – are free to ask questions, make critical comments, and come up with suggestions for how the presented paper can be improved. Our discussions are both friendly and highly productive.

The majority of the presented papers this year were submitted by members, that is, people attending on a regular basis. We’ve had one guest presenting, Guy Kahane (the University of Oxford), in March.

From January to May, Eline Busck Gundersen (Post.Doc. at CSMN) was the convener of Moral Philosophy Club. Jakob Elster (Post.Doc. at the Ethics Programme) took over as the convener in August, and has remained so until the end of 2009. In 2010, Lene Bomann-Larsen (Post. Doc. at the Ethics Programme) will take over. All the mentioned conveners have made (and probably will make) an excellent job.

Kari Refsdal

CSMN Colloquium

Wednesday mornings are reserved for the CSMN colloquium, a forum for presentations and discussions that may bear on all three columns of CSMN. During the first part of the Spring Semester of 2009, we carried on the successful format of the previous year, with staff members taking responsibility for presenting and initiating discussion on a paper of particular significance with respect to our core theme—normativity.

As the semester wore on, most sessions were devoted CSMN members or visitors presenting their own work. Speakers from a number of countries and universities covered a wide range of themes, from neuroethics to global inequality, from the psychological reality of language to the role of emotion in cognition and action.

During the Fall Semester of 2009, the series continued, with intentionality, top-down causation and problems in the philosophy of action being among the many topics with connections to research in all main areas of CSMN. In 2009 Anders Ness, Eline Busck Gundersen and Olav Gjelsvik signed off as conveners, with Bjørn Ramberg taking over that responsibility as of the Fall Semester.

Bjørn Ramberg
Linguistic Agency

Linguistic behavior is a form of rational agency. As such it is governed by norms – semantic, syntactic and pragmatic. It is a domain of investigation where the interaction between the empirical study of agency and the study and articulation of the norms that govern those agents has been greatly advanced in the past twenty years. Linguists and philosophers have developed elaborate normative structures that in various ways describe the mechanisms underlying linguistic behavior.

At CSMN we are testing several of these theories against data about linguistic behaviour. Our general aim is to explore ways in which an understanding of language as agency – a manifestation of norms - constrains and is constrained by an understanding of linguistic behaviour in natural- and social-scientific terms.

The Linguistic Agency project continues to organize and be involved in a large number of Events. As in previous years, many of the activities this year have taken place in collaboration with other research institutions such as Arché in St Andrews, University College London, CASTL in Tromsø, Stockholm University, Institut Jean Nicod in Paris, and LOGOS in Barcelona. As an instance of a larger outreach effort, the Linguistic Agency project has had several of its events recorded and broadcasted as part of CSMN’s general podcast service.

In August 2009, the postdoctoral fellow for Communication and Context left the project for health reasons: Chiara Tabet. CSMN is in the process of hiring a replacement. The position was widely advertised and will be filled in January 2010.

The Linguistic Agency project at CSMN consists of three sub-projects:

**The Metarepresentation project.**
*(Wilson, Carston)*
The project focuses on the unique capacity of humans to construct and process metarepresentations (representations of representations). Our research goal is to investigate the possibility that humans have three distinct metarepresentational capacities, underpinning three types of metarepresentational ability: a) A metapsychological (mindreading) ability to construct and process representations of mental states in order to explain and predict behaviour; b) A metacommunicative (pragmatic) ability to construct and process representations of speakers’ meanings during overt communication; c) A metalogical (argumentative) ability to assess the consistency or evidential status of propositional representations in the abstract (without necessarily attributing them to any particular source), which contributes to a more general capacity for ‘epistemic vigilance’ – the capacity to defend oneself against mistakes or deception on the part of communicators. These three abilities interact in complex ways. We aim to investigate how they work, examine their interactions, and consider their implications for the study of linguistic and social norms.

**Overview of Metarepresentations Research and Activities in 2009**
Our research activities in 2009 have focused on two main issues: (a) the relation between the metarepresentational abilities involved in mindreading and overt communication, and (b) the development, use and breakdown of the metarepresentational abilities involved in mindreading, overt communication and epistemic vigilance:

(a) Our hypothesis is that overt communication is governed by a special-purpose principle which applies only to this domain. This conflicts with the standard (Gricean) assumption...
in philosophy and psychology that overt communication is merely an exercise of general mindreading abilities. Publications addressing different aspects of this issue include papers by Robyn Carston, Ingrid Lossius Falkum, Deirdre Wilson, Nicholas Allot, Georg Kjøll and Dan Sperber (see list of publications, p.XXXXX)

(b) Our hypothesis is that general mindreading abilities are available much earlier than is generally assumed (i.e. much earlier than children pass standard false-belief tests), and that standard false-belief tests are more closely linked to the metalogical ability than to mindreading or communicative abilities. Publications on different aspects of this issue include papers by Robyn Carston Deirdre Wilson, Richard Breheny and Dan Sperber (see list of publications, p.XXXXXX):

**Workshops which we organised or took part in include:**

Carston, Wilson and Pagin (University of Stockholm) coorganised a joint CSMN/ University of Stockholm workshop on ‘Pragmatics, Semantics and Systematicity’ (Stockholm, May 2009). Invited talks were given by members of both the Metarepresentation and Context & Communication projects, in all XXX

Carston and Wilson (helped by Allott, Kjøll and Lossius Falkum) organised a CSMN workshop on ‘Metarepresentation and Non-Literal Language’ (University of Oslo, June 2009)

Wilson, Sperber and Carston (helped by Allott, Kjøll and Lossius Falkum) organised a CSMN workshop on ‘Metarepresentation, Communication and Culture’ (University of Oslo, June 2009)

Allott co-organised (with Chan and Gundersen of the Rational Agency project) a CSMN conference on ‘The state of the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics for conditionals’ (University of Oslo, September 2009).

Georg Kjøll gave a presentation at the joint CSMN/ Centre for Subjectivity ResearchWorkshop on ‘The Emergence of Intersubjectivity: developmental, evolutionary and philosophical aspects’ (University of Copenhagen, Denmark, September 2009), in which Robyn Carston, Deirdre Wilson, Ingrid Lossius Falkum and members of both the CSMN Rational Agency and Moral Agency projects also participated.

Ingrid Lossius Falkum and Ernie Lepore taught a joint CSMN Graduate course ‘On Words’ (University of Oslo, January 2009) which brought together themes from the Metarepresentation and Context & Communication projects.

Georg Kjøll played a leading role in organising the CSMN Language and Rationality seminar, at which members of both the Linguistic and Rational Agency projects meet regularly to present and discuss their research.

Nicholas Allott gave several presentations at the CSMN Language and Rationality seminar, gave a talk at the CSMN Colloquium (December 2008), and gave a talk to the CSMN/St Andrew’s postgraduate video seminar.
The Communication and Context project (Cappelen, Lepore)

An area of intense research concerns the ways in which the context of an utterance influences the interpretation and communication of that utterance. CSMN’s work in this area focuses on research done in contemporary semantics and pragmatics. Our four key research questions are:

a) The hypothesis that all effects of context on the proposition intuitively expressed by an uttered sentence are triggered by lexical material in the sentence. The investigation of this hypothesis focuses on quantifier phrases (such as ‘every bottle’ and ‘most students’), adjectives (such as ‘tall’ and ‘large’) and more complicated constructions such as focus, generic statements, adverbs of quantification, and conditionals.

b) The hypothesis that context sensitivity in language can be accommodated by a combination of two views: speech act pluralism and semantic minimalism (Cappelen and Lepore’s view, outlined especially in Innsensitive Semantics, Blackwell, 2004)

c) Further investigation of Cappelen and Lepore’s view requires understanding the nature of so-called minimal propositions and the mechanisms that generate speech act content beyond the semantic content.

d) The connection between context sensitivity and the notion of truth. In relation to this research question, we are exploring the possibility of accounting for some aspects of linguistic context sensitivity by postulating a variety of parameters in the circumstances of evaluation.

The research on the above topics has direct bearing on the study of human metarepresentational capacities, investigated in the first part of this project, and we are pursuing close interaction between the two, as witnessed by some of the activities described in the paragraph below.

Research and Activities in 2009

In January 2009, OUP published the book Relativism and Monadic Truth, coauthored by Cappelen and Hawthorne. Cappelen is about to finish a monograph called Philosophy without Intuitions about philosophical methodology and with an emphasis on the role in intuitions in philosophy of language. Cappelen also has an in progress collaborative project with Francois Recanati called ‘Dialogues on Context and Communication’.

Francois Recanati completed a book, Truth Conditional Pragmatics (in press, OUP 2010), where Recanati argues against the traditional understanding of the semantics/pragmatics divide. This work is of central significance to the research done under the auspices of the Communication and Context project. In
collaboration with Herman Cappelen, Recanati is also working on a book entitled Dialogues on Context and Communication, which they hope to publish in 2010.

Torfinn Huvenes continues to make progress on his PhD thesis. His research focuses on questions about agreement and disagreement. He has given several talks on the topic in 2009.

Workshops and graduate courses that we organized in 2009

Context and Intention Workshop, February 2009, Oslo. The speakers included Emma Borg, Christopher Gauker, Michael Glanzberg and Andreas Stokke

Workshop on Generics, February 2009, Oslo. The speakers included Nicholas Asher, Sarah-Jane Leslie, David Liebesman, Bernhard Nickel, Jeff Pelletier, Rachel Sterken

Semantics and Philosophy in Europe Conference, April 2009. The speakers included Nicholas Allott, Boban Arsenijevic, Gunnar Björnsson, Maria Cieschinger, Cornelia Ebert, Robert Fiengo, Wolfram Hinzen, Eleonora Orlando, Ken Safir, Paolo Santorio, Stephen Schiffer, Benjamin Schnieder, Chiara Tabet, Hiroyuki Uchida, Dan Zeman

Workshop on agreement and disagreement, September 2009. The speakers included Andy Egan, Torfinn Huvenes, Mark Richard, Tamina Stephenson, Isidora Stojanovic

Workshop on Linguistic Intuitions, October 2009. Speakers included Nicholas Allott, Derek Ball, Jessica Brown, Stewart Cohen, Michael Devitt, Michael Glanzberg, Peter Ludlow, Dilip Ninan, Peter Pagin, Jeff Pelletier, Paul Pietroski, Anders Schoubye, Barry Smith, Rachel Sterken

Graduate course on meaning and intuitions: taught by Cappelen, Fodor, Lepore

The Philosophy of Philosophy: taught by Cappelen and Gjelsvik

The Universal Grammar in First Language Acquisition Project (Faarlund, Cappelen)
The main goal of this project is to understand the mechanisms and processes of first language acquisition in human infants. Roughly by the age of four a normally developing child acquires an extremely complex computational system of discrete symbols, known as a grammar. While the acquisition and development of the grammar naturally depends on input from the external world, the fundamental features of the grammar are independent of type of culture and level of ethnological sophistication. The grammar of natural language is highly constrained by universal features, known as universal grammar (UG). Language acquisition is thus an interaction of the genetically determined UG and the culturally determined linguistic
input from the environment. The result is a grammatical norm, a set of conventions, defined by what is learnable within the framework of our biological endowment as humans, and by what is available in our socio-cultural setting. Our goal is therefore to understand the respective roles of UG and linguistic input during acquisition, and to understand the role of acquisition in linguistic (grammatical) change.

Overview of the Universal Grammar Research and Activities in 2009

This sub-project has only one senior researcher, professor Jan Terje Faarlund, who is also the only full-time resident senior linguist at the CSMN. In addition there are two affiliates, Guro Fløgstad, a PhD student in the Department of Linguistics and Scandinavian Studies at the University of Oslo, and Terje Lohndal, a PhD student in the Department of Linguistics at the University of Maryland.

Faarlund is the coordinator of the graduate program in languages and linguistics at the University of Oslo. One challenge is to cater for all the various fields and subdisciplines of linguistics represented among our PhD students. The establishment of CSMN has proven extremely important and helpful in meeting this challenge.

The Universal Grammar project submitted a grant application to the Norwegian Research Council for a project entitled Universal Grammar, Language Acquisition, and Change. The project is related to the relationship between the cultural and communicative skills unique to humans on the one hand, and the genetic and biological basis for those activities on the other.

The Universal Grammar sub-group has contributed to the following PhD courses and Seminars:

- Language and Evolution, is an annual seminar offered jointly by the CSMN, the Faculty of Humanities, and the Department of Biology. The course is organised and taught by professor Erika Hagelberg of the Department of Biology, and Jan Terje Faarlund of the CSMN in the Spring semester.

Theory of Syntax: a two week concentrated course taught by professor Norbert Hornstein from the University of Maryland. (Autumn 2009)

A combined MA and PhD course ”Historical syntax”, taught by Faarlund in the Autumn semester, offered by the Department of Linguistics.

CSMN hosted a workshop on Syntax and Semantics co-organised with the Centre for Advanced Study in Theoretical Linguistics, Tromsø. The workshop lasted one full day in October.

Faarlund was the main organiser of two events at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters: The Academy lecture in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Professor Josiah Ober, Stanford University: ‘Democracy and Dignity’ and Symposium on Evolution – culture – society. Two full days, eight invited speakers from five countries.

Herman Cappelen

Report by Timothy Williamson, auditor

CSMN has hired internal auditors ‘to assess the progress of CSMN in light of the Centre’s goals, suggesting adjustments and improvements to research and related activities’.

Timothy Williamson has written the second auditor report for the sub-project on Linguistic Agency. His overall impression is that The Linguistic Agency subsection of CSMN is ‘extremely positive, with intense research activity and discussion at a high level’. He emphasizes the very large number of publications generated by the LA members and the overall high scientific quality of the events with a good variety of viewpoints represented.

In last year’s report, it was noted that more than half of the sub-project’s workshops were held outside Norway, because the requisite administrative support was not fully in place in Oslo. In 2009, 15 of the 17 events (graduate courses, conferences, workshops and talks) listed under the aegis of the Linguistic Agency sub-project were held at the University of Oslo.

Williamson points out that there still can be room for more interconnections between the three sub-sections of CSMN. He also addresses as an important question the relationship between CSMN and UiO:

“As emphasized in last year’s report, the central challenge is to leverage that success to achieve longer term gains for research in Philosophy and Linguistics in Norway, as judged by the highest international standards of excellence. There are initial signs that the University of Oslo may respond very positively to that challenge.”

Lina Tosterud
Moral Agency

Moral agency is a form of rational agency. It is governed by norms, by norms of rationality in general and by moral norms in particular. Norms of rationality do not underlie historical and cultural variation. Social norms do. The question is whether we can defend any substantive account of moral norms which have authority for all human agents, independently of the particular cultural framework and its social norms that shaped their behavioural habits and, in particular, their motivationally relevant emotions.

Social and Moral Norms in Intentional Action (Fricke, Malnes)
People typically have moral beliefs and moral emotions. Which are these beliefs, how do they evolve, and to what extent do they underlie cultural variation? What role do moral emotions play in practical deliberation and decision making? Any attempt at understanding moral norms as a natural phenomenon (rather than as a mere cultural construction) has to take answers to these questions into account. Whereas philosophers typically raise normative questions about moral norms, research on the social reality of moral beliefs and emotions is done in the various social sciences. Whereas this first branch of the Moral Agency research within CSMN focuses on social scientific research on actual moral practice, it is closely related to the more normatively oriented research of the third branch.

CSMN – NHH cooperation
CSMN and the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH – Bertil Tungodden and Alexander Cappelen) collaborate on a research project which aims at a contribution to a better understanding of how fairness considerations affect individual decision making. CSMN has financed several economic experiments that are part of this project.

The experiment conducted by Bertil Tungodden and Alexander Cappelen in 2008/2009 was designed to study fairness views and beliefs about the trustworthiness of others among convicted prisoners and to compare these views and beliefs to those of males in the same age group drawn from a sample that is representative for the Norwegian population. This is, as far we know, the only economic experiment conducted on convicted criminals which aims to study how fairness views affect their behavior. The results from this experiment have not yet been analyzed.

Interdisciplinary workshop on Adam Smith and the Conditions of a Moral Society
CSMN hosted an interdisciplinary workshop on Adam Smith and the Conditions of a Moral Society, contributing to the celebrations of the 250th anniversary of the first publication of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. Adam Smith’s work on moral philosophy has recently attracted a great deal of attention not only from the side of philosophers but also from the side of various social scientists. This is because Smith has chosen a bottom-up approach to moral theory, trying to understand morality as a natural phenomenon without thereby neglecting the normative questions which moral theory has to address. Even though his aim is normative in kind – he argues for certain kinds of behaviour to be proper or morally right – his theory is extensively informed by observational knowledge on the way people actually behave (and this knowledge has been further confirmed by research in sociology, behavioural psychology and, more recently, by the neurosciences). Smith’s moral philosophy provides an example for an answer to the question how normative moral theory should be informed by what actual people actually believe about morality and what impact their believes have on their social behaviour.

The proceedings of this conference, co-edited by Kalle Moene (ESOP/UiO), Ragnvald Kalleberg (Sociology/UiO) and Raino Malnes (Political Science/UiO), are presently under review for being published in the Adam Smith Review.
Jon Elster (on behalf of this conference): ‘This is what a research centre should do: inspire people to read books that they might not have read otherwise and thereby discover new sources of inspiration for further research.’

Forgiveness as a Moral Phenomenon

Research on actual moral practice cannot ignore the phenomenon of wrongdoing. One essential way of dealing with past wrongdoing and its consequences is to engage in a discourse about forgiveness. In 2008, CSMN had hosted a workshop on Forgiveness as a Moral Phenomenon, co-organized by Christel Fricke and Charles Griswold. Participants of this workshop explored the practice of forgiveness in different contexts, where different kinds of wrongdoing are at stake. In 2009, Christel Fricke worked on the edition of a volume with papers on the topic, including the revised contributions to this conference. She wrote a paper to be included in this volume, exploring the interface of the moral norms governing forgiveness and the psychological reality of actual processes of forgiveness.

The volume has been submitted to Routledge and is at present under review.

Cooperation with the Rational Agency Team

Another event that contributed to the research on actual moral practice and its natural foundations was co-organized by the Rational Agency team of CSMN (Bjørn Ramberg and others) and the Centre for Subjectivity Research in Copenhagen. World leading experimental psychologists Michael Tomasello (Leipzig) and Philippe Rochat (Emory University, Atlanta) presented their recent experiments comparing the behaviour of human infants and apes under certain experimentally defined conditions.

Distributive and Political Justice (Pogge, Jaggar, Follesdal)

According to a now widely spread understanding of morality, a moral agent has to respect all humans as equals. Ever since the French revolution, equality has been on the agenda of political debates. But even though there are some nations, like for example Norway, which have gone far in providing at least equal opportunities for all their citizens, we cannot overlook that, on the global level, there are huge differences both between and within nations not only concerning the opportunities (education and professional careers) people actually have but also concerning their access to goods for satisfying basic needs. A rational agent who takes the demands of morality seriously cannot close her eyes to this global lack of distributive and political justice.

Co-operation with CAPPE: The Health Impact Fund (HIF – Pogge and Hollis)

CSMN is, in cooperation with CAPPE, co-sponsoring the project The Health Impact Fund – Making New Medicines Accessible for All (HIF). In 2009, Thomas Pogge and Aidan Hollis further promoted the HIF which was launched by CSMN in Oslo in 2008.

Co-operation with CAPPE: The Feminization of Poverty (FemPov – Jaggar and Pogge)

In March 2009, CSMN hosted the kick-off workshop for the FemPov project, directed by Alison Jaggar and Thomas Pogge. There is no ‘fact of the matter’ about poverty, if this means that poverty is a feature of the world that can be identified and described independently of human judgments about what constitutes a minimally decent human life. Poverty is a normative concept because
it is inevitably informed by such judgements. But this does not mean that the concept of poverty is arbitrary. Its use must be governed by arguments that engage with the way in which the concept and its affiliates are used in a variety of contexts.

If, as the project assumes and will try to make evident, women and girls are heavily over-represented among the poor, women and girls are systematically disadvantaged compared to men and boys. Therefore a well-constructed poverty index should take account of any systematic biases in the distribution of poverty. The question of the extent to which women and girls are in fact over-represented among the poor, and/or whether there is a trend towards the greater feminisation of poverty, cannot be resolved on the basis of current data.

Alison Jaggar visited CSMN and started, in co-operation with Theresa Tobin, working on a book on ‘Ethics Across Borders: Moral Reasoning in a Diverse and Unequal World’. Both presented their work in progress at a workshop which was co-hosted by the Centre for Gender Research at the UiO.

Co-operation with CAPPE: Seumas Miller visiting CSMN
Seumas Miller (CAPPE/ANU) visited CSMN and spoke at a seminar on ‘Collective Responsibility, Epistemic Action and Climate Change: A Theory and an Application’.

Co-operation with The Norwegian Centre for Human Rights
Andreas Føllesdal co-directed a project at the Centre for Advanced Study, Oslo, on the question ‘Should States Ratify Human Rights Conventions?’ This work continues in 2010.

Naturalizing ‘Needs’
Laleine Siruno writes a PhD thesis exploring whether and how the notion of ‘needs’ can be naturalized. The notion of ‘needs’ plays an essential part in the accounting of global poverty. As noted above, ‘poverty’ is a normative notion, but it is not arbitrary in so far as it is based on a substantive, empirically informed notion of ‘needs’. Laleine Siruno develops a notion of ‘basic needs’ informed by what people need for being in a position to claim their share of global happiness.

In 2009, Laleine Siruno spent all in all 8 months at the University of Oxford (UK), visiting the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics. (Please, check !)

Procedures of Moral Justification (Fricke, Railton)
Is there a substantive account of moral norms which have authority for all human agents, independently of the particular cultural framework to which they belong? How can such an account be justified? Is there something in human nature that enables humans to become moral agents? Ever since the age of the Enlightenment there have been basically two strategies for answering this question: What enables humans to be moral agents has been understood in terms of their emotional nature and capacity of learning or in terms of their rationality. Whereas several versions of the first strategy were adopted by the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, the second strategy was most prominently adopted by Kant. Both strategies remain present in contemporary moral theory, and both strategies have their adherents within CSMN.

Morality as a Demand of Rationality
In her PhD project, Kari Refsdal explores how the Kantian account of moral agency in terms of rational and free agency can be reformulated and defended in terms of the present debate about reasons which are metaphysically real and to which the rational agent responds. She rejects the assumption of there being external reasons a rational agent has to respond to independently of her or his interests, needs or desires. But if moral reasons cannot be understood in terms of external reasons, how can we then account of moral reasons as essentially distinct from any other reasons to which a rational agent responds? Kari spent the spring semester of 2009 at the University of Michigan, working with Peter Railton. She submitted a paper for the International Kant conference in Pisa in 2010 which has been accepted.

Morality as an Emotionally Based Social Need
Christel Fricke’s work on moral theory is inspired by Adam Smith. She understands human rationality basically in terms of instrumental rationality and human motivation in terms of the originally Humean belief-desire psychology. Human morality can be explained in terms of basic human emotional needs: Humans can only live happily within a peaceful community. Nevertheless, their emotions do not naturally motivate them to make the morally right choices. They have to learn to overcome their natural disposition to be overly selfish.
And they actually learn this mainly through interaction and critical mutual feedback. The challenge is how to understand this process of interaction as a process of moral learning. In the framework of Frick’s approach, moral norms are considered as partly determined by nature (including human nature) and partly dependent on social construction. Her bottom-up approach to moral norms is subject to the objection that ‘it takes too many evenings’. But she considers participation in processes of interaction which shape social and moral norms as a necessary condition for actually becoming a moral person.

In 2009, she worked on two editorial projects, an interdisciplinary volume with papers on ‘Forgiveness as a Moral Phenomenon’ (which has been submitted for reviewing at Routledge) and a journal issue with the proceedings of the Adam Smith conference hosted by CSMN in 2009 (submitted for reviewing at the Adam Smith Review). She wrote papers for both editorial projects. She also gave several presentations on topics related to a Smith-inspired moral theory.

Among the leading scholars in whose work the interactive nature of human morality plays an essential part is Stephen Darwall. Stephen Darwall visited CSMN and gave a seminar on ‘The Second Person Standpoint’ and a lecture on ‘Demystifying Promises’.

The Metaphysics of Moral Norms
Eline Busck-Gunderson explores how to understand the metaphysics of moral norms in terms of response-dependence theories. More particularly, she studied the evolution of moral practices and the implications of the evolved nature of moral practices on theories in meta-ethics. Her assumption is that appropriately chosen response-dependence theories are among the theories best placed to accommodate the evolutionary nature of moral practices. She has written two papers which, after reviewing, have been accepted and will be published in 2010.

Hannah Ginsborg visited CSMN and gave a seminar on ‘Primitive Normativity and Scepticism about Rules’ and a lecture on ‘Concepts as Rules: A Kantian Perspective’.

Cooperation with the Rational Agency Team
The rational agency team organized a workshop on Emotions and Agency.

Report by Professor Onora O’Neill, auditor
The CSMN has asked external auditors to comment on the activities and research output of the respective research projects on an annual basis and to suggest revisions of our activities for the coming years. Professor Emerita Onora O’Neill, Baroness O’Neill of Bengarve has written the auditors’ report for the Moral Agency project in 2009. She points out the importance of making more explicit how the various branches of research within Moral Agency interrelate and how exactly they contribute to achieving the overall aim of understanding normativity and its place in nature. Furthermore, she writes: “The publications include high quality academic papers in top international journals; papers in a wide range of less well known journals; papers in conference proceedings, as well as some books and edited books.” O’Neill notes that the quality is “inevitably varied, and this is what one would expect and is needed to reach a wide range of audiences.” O’Neill describes the workshops and conferences as “many of them (are) impressive with distinguished participants and high quality collaborations.” The value of the established international networks is “outstanding” and she points out that this involvement in international networks makes the project as a whole “much less exposed to the problems of sudden and erratic brain drain” than alternative models might lead to.
Rational Agency

The Rational Agency branch of CSMN has been active throughout the year. We have organized six main events (two of them co-hosted with other institutions, and held away from Oslo), and several individual lectures. The lecture by Jerry Fodor on natural selection that we sponsored in September attracted a big audience and caused a big stir.

There have been three main additions to the Rational Agency branch (all funded by the Norwegian Research Council): two new sub-projects started up, and Prof. Helen Steward joined us mid-year a part time senior researcher. The project Addiction, Choice and Moral Responsibility, started 1st April, employs Edmund Henden full time, and provides some limited funding for co-operators Hans Olav Melberg and Ole Røgeberg. The other project, started 1st September; is the post-doctoral project of Endre Begby.

The events have on the whole gone very well. The Agent Causation event in London was very well attended and an enormous success. The event on Rational Self torture was less well attended, but had great talks and very good discussions. The Aim of Belief event was the main event we put on this year; Timothy Chan was its main organiser assisted by Anders Nes and Olav Gjelsvik. We used a call for respondents, which attracted many good applicants, and a demanding review process then led to an extremely good set of commentaries on the talks given at the conference. The result was a major meeting, and Timothy, advised by Jennifer Hornsby, has proposed a volume based on the conference papers to O.U.P.

The event on Emotions and Agency, organised by Carsten Hansen and Jennifer Hornsby, was also of very high quality and deemed to have been a great success. Reports from The Emergence of Intersubjectivity (a conference held in Copenhagen with Bjorn Ramberg as the CSMN organizer) have been hugely positive. The last event of the year (still in the future at the time of writing), The Loss of Sadness, will introduce an interdisciplinary approach to a topic with important normative dimensions.

We are aware that the published output this year is not as strong as it was last year. This is partly owed to the somewhat accidental character of dates of actual publication, owing to the vagaries of journals and presses (we know of many things which are soon forthcoming). But however exactly this may be, we think that it must be part of CSMN’s role to supports its members in their own research. We think then that we should give thought to questions about the appropriate amount of time spent on organizing and participating in events, having it in mind that such organization and participation reduces the research time available for conducting individual research leading to publication. And we should consider the best way of providing one another with support in the processes leading to publications.

We are planning a large conference, modelled on the very successful The Aim of Belief, about Self-Knowledge and Agency in June 2010. We are also planning a meeting around The Addictions in September, and another on aspects of Practical Reasoning to happen when Andrew Reisner, McGill is visiting CSMN in spring/early summer 2010. Philip Pettit is giving the annual lecture, and has agreed to participate in a workshop on dispositions while at CSMN: planning for this is under way. We may decide to confine ourselves to these four public events, with some lectures in addition. Individuals have made their own research plans, and we have made a tentative agreement that in 2010, we shall focus more on collaborations within CSMN.

Principal Events in 2009

1. Agent Causation.
   Co-hosted by Institute of Philosophy, held in London, 30th January.
   John Hyman (Queens, Oxford) ‘The Road to Larissa’. Commentator: Jennifer Hornsby (Birkbeck)
   Tim O’Connor (Indiana): ‘Agent-Causal Power’. Commentator: Hong Yu Wong (London)
   Tom Pink (King’s College London): ‘Power and Responsibility’. Commentator: Olav Gjelsvik (IFIKK, Oslo)
Oslo, 2nd June.
Chrisoula Andreou (University of Utah): ‘The Temptation of Self-Torture’.
Commentator/respondent: Hans Olav Melberg, CSMN
Sergio Tenenbaum (and Diana Raffman) (Toronto): ‘Vagueness and Self-Torture’.
Commentator/respondent: Edmund Henden, CSMN

3. The Aim of Belief.
Oslo 11th–13th June
(See p. XXX)
Pascal Engel (Geneva): Sticking to Normativism about the Aim of Belief.
Respondent: Douglas Edwards (University College Dublin). Chair: Olav Gjelsvik
Paul Horwich (NYU): Belief-Truth Norms.
Respondent: Theodora Achourioti (Amsterdam). Chair: Chiara Tabet (Oslo)
David Papineau (King’s College, London): There are No Norms of Belief. Respondent:
Heine Holmen (Oslo). Chair: Jonathan Knowles (NTNU, Trondheim)
Kathrin Glüer-Pagin & Åsa Wikforss (Stockholm): What is Belief? Respondent:
Anders Nes (Oslo). Chair: David Hunter (Ryerson University)
(Edinburgh). Chair: Nicholas Allott (Oslo)
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (Aarhus): Truth
as the Aim of Epistemic Justification.
Respondent: Timothy Williamson (Oxford) Chair: Eline Busck Gundersen
(Oslo)
(Southampton) Chair: ???
(Geneva) Chair: Jason D’Cruz (Harvard)
Timothy Chan (Oslo): The Logic of Constitutive Norms. Respondent: Jane
Friedman (Oxford) Chair: Christel Fricke (Oslo)

4. Emotions and Agency.
Oslo, 2nd and 3rd September
Karen Jones, ‘Emotions and reason-tracking’
Peter Goldie, ‘Narrative thinking, emotion, and autobiographical memory’
Bennett Helm, ‘Responsibility and Dignity Strawsonian Themes’
Jennifer Whiting, ‘Plato on Agency’
General discussion session introduced by Michael Garnett

5. The Emergence of Intersubjectivity: developmental, evolutionary and philosophical aspects
Co-hosted with CFS (Michael Tomasello and Philippe Rochat), 21st–23rd Sept,
Copenhagen.

Philipppe Rochat (Emory): “Levels of intersubjectivity”
Bjørn Ramberg (Oslo): “Intersubjectivity and pragmatist philosophy of mind.”
Dan Zahavi (Copenhagen): “Empathy, embodiment and interpersonal understanding.”
Andreas Roepstorff (Aarhus): “Mirroring and perspective taking: two complementary processes?”
Joel Krueger (Copenhagen): “Empty heads, social bodies”
Somogy Varga (Copenhagen): “Self, Play and other minds”
Line Ryberg Ingerslev (Copenhagen): “Social experience and play”
Michael Tomasello (Leipzig): “Origins of Shared Intentionality”
Jakob Elster (Oslo): “You don’t know what it’s like! - The role of personal experience in moral argumentation”
Carsten Fogh Nielsen (Copenhagen): “Components of moral agency - prolegomena to a developmental account”
Kristian Bjørkdahl (Oslo): “Building a Larger Loyalty, One Ape at a Time: Field Primatology as Moral Sensitization”
Georg Kjøll (Oslo): “The role of deference and Theory of Mind in conceptual representation and concept acquisition”
Nivedita Gangopadhyay (Copenhagen): “Intersubjectivity and Extended Mind”
6. The Loss of Sadness: Are We Misdiagnosing Normal Emotions as Clinical Depression?
Oslo, November 23rd
Main speaker, Prof Jerome Wakefield, NYU.
Panel with one psychologist, two psychiatrists, one philosopher.

Publications Resulting from Conferences
(Please see list of publications for details concerning actually published material)

We expect that volumes containing papers from some of the conferences listed above will be published, and we can report on publications (some still forthcoming) from conferences in earlier years.

Wanting and Liking
An issue of Inquiry containing the four papers from this February 2008 conference was published earlier this year. This was arranged by Olav Gjelsvik who also did editorial work on the papers together with Jennifer Hornsby.

Human and Non-Human Animal Agency
Jennifer Hornsby is the Guest Editor of a Special Issue of Inquiry containing five papers, drafts of which were all presented at the conference in April 2008.

Quine Centennial
Work is undertaken to publish the papers in a volume, and there is a prospect of a joint publication which includes the contributions from a similar event at Harvard. Dagfinn Føllesdal organizes this from the CSMN end of things. There is no further news at this stage.

Procrastination
Chrisoula Andreou and Mark White have edited a volume of papers of which the June 2008 conference talks that CSMN organized were drafts. This is forthcoming with Oxford University Press, with the title The Thief of Time. It will be published on the internet at the same time as the paper publication very early 2010.

Anscombe’s Intention
This volume of essays, which is being edited by Jennifer Hornsby, Anton Ford (Chicago) and Fred Stoutland (Helsinki) originated in two conferences. The first, in September 2008, was held at the University of Uppsala, sponsored jointly by their five year program Understanding Agency, and the Rational Agency section of the CSMN. The second, in April 2009, was a Lipkind conference at the University of Chicago, in April, 2009, held in honour of the 50th anniversary of Intention (two years late, but such is the way of these things). Although the first, CSMN co-hosted conference was not specifically devoted to Anscombe’s work, its emphasis was on the Aristotelian tradition. Renewed attention to the tradition is surely owed to a revived interest in Intention; and in the event, five of the ten papers were on themes in Anscombe. The volume will contain papers from both conferences, and two solicited papers (one of which, by Haddock, descends from a paper he first gave in Oslo in 2007). Publication will be in 2010 or early 2011.

The Aim of Belief
The proposal for this collection has been submitted to OUP, with Timothy Chan as editor. The collection will contain the original talks for the conference, Timothy Williamson’s reply to one of the papers, and a short paper written by Olav Gjelsvik in response to some of what was presented at the conference.

Report by Professor John Dupré, auditor
The CSMN has asked external auditors to comment on the activities and research output of the respective research projects on an annual basis and to suggest revisions of our activities for the coming years.

This is an extract from his report on the rational agency at the CSMN:

... I think that the RAB (the rational agency branch) is well set to make a central contribution to the CSMN’s achievement of the ultimate goal of the Centres of Excellence, “to stimulate Norwegian research groups to set up centres devoted to long-term basic research of a high international calibre...[and]...raise the quality of Norwegian research”.

Professor John Dupré notes further: “The Scientific Quality of Workshops and Conferences continues to be an extremely impressive aspect of the Centre’s work, and while I certainly recognise the potential conflict between this and individual publication, I hope that there will not be a major diminution in this kind of activity. I mentioned joint publication as a possible route to demonstrate that the whole can be greater than the sum of the parts, but high quality events are also a very effective way of doing this. As last year, RAB organised six conferences, workshops or symposia in the period under review, and again these included a number of leading contributors to the field. And again, these events provided a really impressive range of topics and kinds of event across the subject matter of the group.

With regard to the research goal, the workshops on agent causation and rational self-torture focus centrally on the project of developing an alternative view of agency to the standard
belief desire model and of exploring this in relation to the problem of weakness of will. The major conference on weakness of will should also have central relevance to this project. The new project on addiction has direct and potentially very illuminating implications for the issue of weakness of will. In sum, it is clear that the programme of activities and planned publications remains closely aligned with the original research plans.

The development of international networks looks to be coming on well, and though I don’t see any major new advances in this direction over the last year, I see no reason to revise this judgment. Gjelsvik continues to be very active internationally, for example in his recent review of Danish Philosophy, and in his continuing involvement with the ESF project on Philosophy of Science in a European Context. Also noteworthy is his collaboration with Chrisoula Andreou. Hornsby and Steward constitute an international dimension of the project, and both are well-known and active internationally more widely; they also provide links to major philosophical centres in the UK. Most members of the group have had some significant international activity over the last year. I note, for instance, Hansen’s involvement in a Hong Kong conference organised by the prestigious Arizona Centre for Consciousness Studies and the Australasian Association of Philosophy annual conference, and also his collaboration with Prof. Michael Morreau, mentioned above.

I continue to believe that the project has got off to a very strong start. The events organised continue to be excellent, and should contribute to a growing international awareness of the project. The particular philosophical perspective the RAB is adopting towards its topic is being developed effectively with contributions to all the subthemes. Care will need to be taken to ensure that the low publication level for the last year is a blip not a trend, but there is every reason to expect that this will resolve itself. Mentoring of junior staff to assist their developing publication profiles is very important, and the possibility of joint publications between junior and more senior staff is worth considering as also a way to demonstrate value added by the Centre. The most challenging issue for long term sustainability of a project such as CSMN is developing and retaining junior staff. I imagine that unless Norway is entirely immune from world economic currents this challenge will be becoming greater at this time.
Honorary rewards

St. Olav medal to Dagfinn Føllesdal
Professor Dagfinn Kåre Føllesdal was in 2009 made Kommandør (Commander) in the Norwegian order of St. Olav. This order has several levels, and the rank of commander is high up and carries great honour. The official announcement pointed to Føllesdal’s very significant research contributions to the philosophy of language and the study of the phenomenological tradition in philosophy, to building bridges between various traditions in philosophy, and also his commitment to the study of ethics and the teaching of philosophy in Norway.

There was a very dignified ceremony in the house of The Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters, and CSMN research director Olav Gjelsvik gave a speech where he outlined the significance of Føllesdal’s work for the development of philosophy the last 50 years.

Føllesdal gave a moving speech and thanked many people, most of all his wife Vera.

Jennifer Hornsby new member of The Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters
Jennifer Hornsby was elected foreign member of The Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters. The Academy recognized both her very significant contributions to philosophy in general and to the philosophy action in particular, and also her contributions towards interaction with the Norwegian philosophical community. She came to Oslo to receive the honours and her diploma at the Academy’s ceremony in early May.
Public outreach: Jerry Fodor: ‘What Darwin Got Wrong’

On September 25th the American philosopher and leading cognitive scientist Jerry Fodor held a lecture for a general audience, and chose to discuss what he takes to be a serious flaw in Darwinian thought and Darwinian evolutionary theory.

Fodor reviewed the way that the theory of Natural Selection fits into the overall Darwinist picture of how evolution works. He then gave an argument in support of his view that the theory of Natural Selection is flawed because it depends on arguments from premises of the form ‘creatures with trait “t” are selected’ to conclusions of the form ‘such creatures are selected for having trait “t”’. Such inferences, he maintained, are unwarranted; in fact, they are according to him instances of what he calls intentional fallacies.

The lecture attracted a huge crowd that also contained many well-known creationists. Fodor regretted very much if his argument were taken as supporting things like creationism, it was meant to unravel a real scientific problem, and to do so in a scientific spirit. At no point would he give any support to the unscientific fantasies of creationists. The lecture was followed by a heated discussion session, where it became clear that the leading evolutionary biologists in Norway were not much impressed by his argument. Fodor stood his ground by challenging his critics to say which of his premises should be rejected and for which reason. Fodor received no direct reply to this challenge in the discussion session. It might be fair to say that the event did not by itself further cooperation between philosophers and biologists in Oslo – still the organizers and the participants can make it so.

Olav Gjelsvik Carsten Hansen
Annual Lecture: Onora O’Neill


In her lecture, Onora O’Neill addressed a question which is of fundamental importance for the political practices of communication and decision making, both within the boundaries of a national state and on the level of the global society: Which normative constraints should govern public reason? ‘Public reason’, that is in the first place any discourse that addresses questions of common interest and contributes to processes of political decision making. In so far as the respective decisions are supposed to be legitimate, the exercise of public reason has to meet certain normative constraints.

John Rawls and Juergen Habermas are the most important and best known thinkers who have contributed to the analysis of public reason as bound by norms. According to them, the exercise of public reason is constitutive for deliberative democracies. Under which conditions can decisions achieved by the exercise of public reason rightly claim to be justified? In their answers to these questions, both Habermas and Rawls assume that public reason is essentially dialogic.

According to Habermas, public reason should not be dominated by powerful institutions or exclusive circles. Participation should be open to all competent members of a democratic society, be it a nation or the world society. All participants should be free, free from coercion and free to articulate their interests and concerns.

Rawls conceives of public reason as a dialogue of the public, for the public and about public concerns. It is a process of communication where fellow citizens with varying ethical and political views and social backgrounds engage in a discourse that addresses concerns of the nation to which they all equally belong.

Both Habermas and Rawls emphasize the aspect of ‘public’ rather than that of ‘reason’ in their theories of public reason. They focus on the conditions under which reasoners contribute to public discourse, rather than on the kind of reasoning in which they have to engage or on the conditions of the respective audience. Accordingly, for them, non-public reason, discourses with limited participation or dominated by institutions, is defective as ‘public’ rather than as ‘reason’.
According to O’Neill, both Habermas’ and Rawls’ account of public reason fails to pay sufficient attention to the practical constraints of putting it into practice: It would take too many evenings. And, on the global level, their accounts ignore the fact that most people in the world live under conditions which make their participation in public reason practically impossible – neither the mass-media nor the internet provide access to the public discourse for all. All-inclusive global communication is not feasible.

In order to develop a less costly and less exclusive conception of public reason, O’Neill went back to Kant and his distinction between private and public reason. According to Kant, public reason is not essentially dialogic. Every person who makes use of public reason should respect the norms for effective communication: He or she should address everyone else and speak in the name of everyone else; he or she should respect the values of truth, accuracy and trustworthiness, he or she should not make assumptions which not everyone would endorse and avoid any line of reasoning which not everyone could follow. Obscurity and dogmatism are characteristic features of non-public or private reason.

Against the background of the Kantian notion of public reason, contemporary discourses which claim to be exercises of public reason appear to be defective: They are typically shaped by national or global institutions which are not as such justified. Kant’s famous Categorical Imperative is an example for a procedure of thought that is in accordance to the normative standards of practical reason: ‘So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle in a giving of universal law.’ Reasons for belief and reasons for action equally have to fulfil the standards of public reason.
CSMN in the Press

The members of CSMN contribute to the public debate in Norway and internationally. Below is a selection of press articles both on and by CSMN members.

Thomas Pogge


Georg Kjøll

Interview with Georg Kjøll in Uniforum about international recruiting at the University of Oslo, 16.12.2009

Georg Kjøll submitted a reader’s letter to Uniforum 03.12.2009

Dagfinn Føllesdal


“Israel’s uncertain future” Kronikk [feature article]. Aftenposten, January 23, 2009
New projects


Cognition and Communication: New Foundations for Contextualism
My project weaves together ideas from two major strands in recent philosophy of language and mind, externalism and contextualism. The overarching philosophical motivation is to use externalist insights to outline a new model of communication to serve as the foundation of a radical contextualism.

Externalism and contextualism are among the most hotly debated topics in recent analytic philosophy, yet there has never been a systematic study bringing the two together. My project starts from precisely such a juxtaposition, with the aim of providing a new theoretical footing for contextualism. One motivation for choosing this starting point is that while contextualism remains a very controversial doctrine, externalism has deservedly come to enjoy a status of great philosophical plausibility. Yet, though seldom recognized as such, externalism is at heart a contextualist position. First, I show how we can render contextualism more robust by boosting its scope and ambition: we must take contextualism not merely as a doctrine about semantics, narrowly construed, but also as bearing on psychological content. In spite of its plausibility, such a move is resisted by many contributors on both sides of the contextualism debates. Nonetheless, in resisting this move, contextualists are doing their theory a great disservice, as can be seen by examples from the development of externalism.

Second, I counter the strongest criticism of contextualism, namely that it cannot account for communication. I concede that contextualism is incompatible with a certain widely accepted model of communication. The problem, however, is with this model of communication, not with contextualism itself. I show, on independent grounds, how this model suffers from crucial flaws and should be abandoned. As a result, we are free to construe contextualism as a further argument against this model of communication, not as a theory to be tested against it. Finally, I go on to outline a new model of communication which is not merely compatible with contextualism, but builds on and actively integrates contextualist insights by showing how contextual factors can support communicative understanding when shared, conventional semantic resources come up short.

Endre Begby

Addiction, Choice & Responsible Agency
The project “Addiction, Choice and Responsible Agency” commenced in the spring 2009. CSMN received funding for the project from Norwegian Research Council (NRC) in November, allowing us to add Edmund Henden to our team of researchers.

Addiction is a major challenge conceptually and socially. Conceptually it raises the paradox of why some people act destructively and contrary to their own expressed will. Socially it is challenging because addiction to smoking, alcohol, gambling and illegal drugs causes much suffering. At the centre of our approach to addiction will be a set of conceptual and theoretical issues that lies at the intersection
between economics, philosophy and psychology. A unifying research theme is what it is about addiction, if anything, that produces impaired autonomy and diminished responsibility, and what policy implications, if any, this should have for issues related to e.g., addicts’ capability to give informed consent, the use of force in treatment of addiction, and more generally, the relevance of considerations of harm and paternalistic intervention in society’s reactions to addictive behaviour.

Olav Gjelsvik

John Templeton Foundation Grant #13162, Towards a Defensible Platonism: Outline of an Epistemology for Non-Material Objects

For the three year period April 1, 2009 to March 31, 2012, John Templeton Foundation is supporting the following project that is hosted by CSMN, with Dagfinn Føllesdal and Kai Hauser as co-researchers: “Towards a Defensible Platonism: Outline of an Epistemology for Non-Material Objects.” The support from the Templeton Foundation amounts to $250000 for the three years, while CSMN’s main commitment is to arrange two conferences related to the project, one in the fall of 2010, the second one in the fall of 2011.

The aim of the project is to examine two classical problems in the philosophy of mathematics: what is the ontological status of the entities studied in mathematics, and how can these entities be known? Various schemes, each claiming to bridge the gap, have been devised ranging from nominalism (there are only physical objects) to formalism (mathematicians study possible configurations of signs devoid of meaning), intuitionism (mathematics is about the mental constructions of an idealized subject), conventionalism (mathematical statements are true by convention) and fictionalism (mathematical understanding is akin to understanding the plot in a novel), to name just a few. None of these, however, offers any explanation of why working mathematicians often report that they find themselves compelled to believe that they are dealing with autonomous entities.

The aim of this project is to provide a philosophy of mathematics that can do justice to the way in which mathematics is actually practiced. The key to such a philosophy, in our opinion, lies in its ability to reconcile the objective and subjective aspects of mathematical experience. To that end we employ ideas from Husserl’s phenomenology. Our reason for employing Husserl as our starting point is that Husserl has addressed the questions concerning the epistemological status of non-material objects more clearly and in greater detail than any other philosopher we know of, and his phenomenological approach seems to us more promising than any alternative. Husserl’s suitability for the task was also recognized by Gödel, who studied Husserl very thoroughly. Part of the project is therefore a close study of Gödel’s mathematical and philosophical work. Hauser and Føllesdal’s lectures and publications in connection with the project are listed towards the end of this report, in Talks of CSMN members abroad and Publications.

Dagfinn Føllesdal
Research School Activities

The Research School has had two main kinds of activity: Organising PhD courses and the Arché/CSMN Graduate Conference on the one side, and arranging for various types of visitors at the PhD level on the other, and providing some master stipends.

PhD Courses
These course again comes in two kinds, the course fully and wholly organised by the CSMN Research School, and courses that stem from various kinds of cooperation between the Research School and other activities inside and outside the CSMN. One normal type of cooperation is between CSMN and the PhD programmes at the University of Oslo.

Last year saw a large number of PhD courses where CSMN participated and contributed, and CSMN was therefore very active in providing for good PhD education at the UiO. Some of the courses were also combined MA/PhD courses, and thus served a larger educational purpose.

2009 was much devoted to linguistic agency activities, and this clearly shows in the course.

Words
The course was an intensive course taught by Ernie Lepore and Ingrid Falckum, and was a joint MA/PhD course. It met 7 times.

Intuitions: The Philosophy of Philosophy
This was a combined MA/PhD course about the role of intuitions in philosophy, with special reference to Timothy Williamson’s book The Philosophy of Philosophy. Olav Gjelsvik and Herman Cappelen jointly did the teaching and by Jonathan Weinberg (Indiana), Kirk Ludwig (Florida) and Jonathan Ichikawa (St. Andrews) visited and gave talks in the series. The course met 15 times through the term, and the attendance was high. About 10 people did the MA course.

Language and Evolution
This course was given by Jan Terje Faarlund and Erika Hagelberg, and was a PhD course connection biology and linguistics. They met 8 times in the spring term.

Graduate course on meaning and intuitions.
Ernie Lepore and Herman Cappelen Combined intensive MA/PhD course. It contains 7 meetings in late September.

CSMN/Arché graduate conference. St. Andrews in early November
Invited speakers: Susanna Siegel and Ernie Lepore. There was a striking interest for the graduate conference, nearly 200 applicants, very extensive reviewing, but a great success. Rachel Sterken did a lot of work in organising it.
Several CSMN people attended, Timothy Chan and Olav Gjelsvik as commentators.

Arranging for visitors
The visitors’ programme has been a great success. Many (4) PhD candidates from St. Andrews visited and took part in the Philosophy of Philosophy course. Later CSMN had a visit from Rekha Nath at CAPPE.

Holly Anderson from Pittsburgh, who went on to take up a tenure track position at Simon Fraser in Vancouver, Paal Antonsen from Dublin. Julian Fink from Oxford joined us on NFR money.

MA Stipend
This year’s winner of the CSMN MA stipend was Monica Roland, who finished her MA studies end 2009 with excellent results.
Long term guest researchers

Holly Andersen
Holly Andersen is a student in the History and Philosophy of Science Department at the University of Pittsburgh. She visited CSMN between May and July.

Chrisoula Andreou
Chrisoula Andreou is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Utah. She was a visitor at CSMN in May and June 2009.

Paal Antonsen
Paal Antonsen is a third year PhD student at Trinity College Dublin. He visited CSMN from September-December 2009.

Vivienne Brown
Vivienne Brown is Professor of Intellectual History in the Faculty of Social Sciences at The Open University, Milton Keynes, UK. She visited CSMN between April and July 2009.

Julian Fink
Julian Fink is a fourth year philosophy D.Phil. student at Oxford University. He is visiting CSMN from October 2009 to July 2010.

Guðmundur Andri Hjálmarsson
Guðmundur Andri Hjálmarsson is a third year philosophy Ph.D. student at Arché, the University of St Andrews. He visited CSMN in February and March 2009.

Michael Morreau
Michael Morreau, professor at the Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, visited CSMN for 10 weeks the autumn 2009. During this time he is working on a project, ‘The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Ordinary Objects’.

Rekha Nath
Rekha is a PhD student at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE) at the University of Melbourne. She visited CSMN in March and April 2009.

Jonas Phister
Jonas Pfister joined CSMN in August 2008 as a postdoctoral fellow supported by the Swiss National Foundation. He holds a PhD from the University of Berne. He visited CSMN until July 2009.

Anders Schoubye
Anders is a PhD student in philosophy at the University of St Andrews’s Arché Research Centre for Philosophy of Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology. He visited CSMN in February and March 2009.

Daniele Sgaravatti
Daniele Sgaravatti is a PhD student at Arché, University of St Andrews. He visited CSMN in February and March 2009.

Andreas Stokke
Andreas is a third year PhD student at Arché, University of St Andrews. He visited CSMN in February and March, and from October to December 2009.

Theresa W. Tobin
Theresa W. Tobin is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Marquette University, USA. She visited CSMN between May and June 2009.
CSMN MA-stipend: Monica Roland

Every year CSMN awards a stipend to promising students in the final year of their graduate degree.

– Receiving the stipend felt like a nice recognition and gave a kind of security of being on the right track or at least being on to something, says Monica Roland who received one of this year’s stipends.

Under the supervision of CSMN’s Olav Gjelsvik, Monica just completed her MA-thesis on Harry Frankfurt’s hierarchical account of free will. She thinks there is an inherent tension in Frankfurt’s theory. The coincidence between higher-order volitions and first-order desires seems to be outside the agent’s control. This is an unsatisfactory notion of free will as long as it cannot account for the strongest desire being the strongest desire because of the support of higher-order volition, she argues.

Asked about whether the stipend helped her in any way with writing her thesis, she replied:

– Absolutely. It made it possible for me to take time off from work and to be a full time student for the last semester, which again gave me the opportunity to be fully focused at my project. She also thinks the centre provides a stimulating enviroment: - As a student, it is extremely inspiring to be able to attend talks and workshops with some of the greatest names in philosophy today and to either witness or take part in the discussion.

The presence of CSMN benefits other students as well, she thinks. Far from being a closed ivory tower, it is a place where every interested student can learn and participate. Monica praises the welcoming atmosphere of the centre:

– Among students interested in those areas of philosophy and interrelated sciences, I think the centre is very well regarded and appreciated. All the different seminars and workshops, and the open and friendly atmosphere, no doubt contribute to an inspiring environment, and at most of the events that I’ve attended, like for instance the Jerry Fodor talk on “What Darwin Got Wrong” and “The Aim of Belief”-conference, there have been a lot of students.

Having now finished her graduate degree, she hopes to continue to be able to work with philosophy.

Mathias Sagdahl
Seminar at Rømskog

From March 9-11, all CSMN-members went to Zen Resort & Spa in Rømskog for the annual CSMN-seminar.

If you take the E6 from Oslo to Karihaugen, following the signs to Lillestrøm, then the RV22 to Fetsund, followed by the RV170 to Setskog and the RV21 to Rømskog, and you are lucky, then on the outskirts of Rømskog, a small town not far from the Swedish border, you will find the sign for the Zen Resort & Spa. From the sign a long track leads up through pine woods to the hotel, which is right beside a lake, deeply frozen when we stayed there last February. There was a clash of cultures. Not West meets East, but sceptical, mostly camivorous, wine-drinking Western philosophers encountering vegetarian advocates of a peculiarly Western mix of concepts, meditation and exercises culled from several religions.

Philosophers, we discovered, are stricter about metaphysics: “What’s this ‘Authentic Self’ I’m supposed to be finding?” someone asked.

Zen hoteliers, if metaphysically lax, turned out to be strict about diet. After a full twenty-four hours of vegetarian food one of us cracked and smuggled in a roast chicken on the way back from a skiing trip.

The prospectus of the hotel says, “We are here for adults who are seeking quiet and deeper understanding.” We did our best to deepen our understanding of relativism and contextualism, courtesy of Herman Cappelen; of free will and knowledge, thanks to Olav Gjelsvik and his respondent Thomas Pogge; of assertion and practical reasoning, thanks to Jessica Brown and her respondent Jennifer Hornsby; and of life itself, thanks to the alcohol that Espen magically produced for our after-hours parties.

With a core group meeting and a plenary meeting as well as the seminars and parties, plus impromptu supervisions and debates that kept breaking out over dinner and in the hot baths we could hardly claim to have added to the quiet of the place, but I think that a number of us felt it, looking out over the lake, or walking in the woods.

Nicholas Allot
Linguistic Intuition

One of the central topics in philosophical methodology is the role played by intuitions. What are intuitions? Can intuitions serve as evidence for philosophical theories? This is also an important question in linguistics since it is widely believed that many parts of linguistic theory rely heavily on intuitions as evidence. This is thus yet another field where linguists and philosophers have a joint research interest.

In October 2009, the philosophical methodology project at Arché and the linguistic agency project at CSMN jointly organized a workshop on the nature and role of linguistic intuitions. The workshop’s goal was to explore what linguistic intuitions are and just what roles, if any, they play in our theorizing about syntax, semantics and pragmatics. This is an enormously important topic – if, as is widely assumed, we rely extensively on intuitions when we theorize about language it is important for us to know what they are and whether they are reliable. As Timothy Williamson points out in a related context:

“...there is no agreed or even popular account of how intuition works, no accepted explanation of the hoped-for correlation between our having an intuition that P and its being true that P. Since analytic philosophy prides itself on its rigour, this blank space in its foundations looks like a methodological scandal. “

The workshop took place in Oslo and featured some of the world’s leading philosophers of language as speakers. Each talk had a respondent and these were all members either of Arché or CSMN. The conference concluded with a roundtable discussion chaired by professor Jeffrey Pelletier (Alberta).

Micheal Devitt (CUNY) presented a development of and defense of his influential view that intuitions should not and does not play an important role in linguistics. Rachel Sterken (Arché, CSMN) replied. Peter Pagin (Stockholm) spoke about intuitions and tolerance and Jeff Pelletier (Alberta) responded. Michael Glanzberg (UC Davis) spoke about linguistic intuitions and compositional semantics. Dilip Ninan (Arché) responded. Stewart Cohen (Arizona) spoke about intuitions in epistemology. Jessica Brown (Arché) responded. Peter Ludlow (Northwestern) spoke about intuitions in linguistics and Barry Smith (London) responded. Paul Pietroski (Maryland) spoke about Intuitings, Intuiteds, and I-languages. Derek Ball responded. Finally, Anders Schoubye, a PhD student at Arché, spoke about Intuitions in Question – and a descendent of this paper was recently accepted for publication in Linguistics and Philosophy, a good sign that this was a fruitful event.

Herman Cappelen
Existing indices of poverty and gender equity play a central role in assessing progress in human development, but currently suffer from very significant flaws. Among the most important are:

(1) lack of a moral rationale, which results in some aspects of development or gender inequity being selected in preference to others without a sound justification of the former as being of greater constitutive or instrumental importance;

(2) false universality – a focus on deprivations (e.g. income poverty) that anyone may suffer combined with relative neglect of deprivations that affect males and females differentially;

(3) bias towards the better-off, which manifests itself in

(3a) a focus on indicators that are relevant mostly to the more privileged (e.g. women in parliament, women in higher education, which matter but are less important than gender inequities burdening much larger numbers of more disadvantaged women and girls), and in (3b) implausible aggregation (e.g. ignoring correlations among different aspects of deprivation, or comparing male and female income totals and thereby implicitly giving much greater weight to income inequalities at the top); and

(4) lack of integration, as when several partial indices are presented side-by-side without any guidance for how to resolve conflicts among them about the ranking of programs and policies.

The FemPov project hopes to develop two central insights. The first is that handling distributional issues correctly requires a holistic measure of individual deprivation. It is clearly morally salient whether three deprivations, for example, of income, education, and health care, are all experienced by one person or are spread among three people. The second idea is that a holistic measure of individual deprivation, grounded in a sound conception of basic human needs or requirements or capabilities, can then serve within different aggregation exercises.

To begin developing better indices of poverty and gender equity along these lines, the FemPov project intends to combine the expertise of academics with the expertise of those who suffer the most deprivation and disadvantage-- poor men and women. Morally plausible conceptions of poverty and gender equity must be relatively consistent with what people think a minimally decent life requires and what men and women perceive the greatest gender-based disadvantages to be. In order to learn what poor men and women think about these issues, the FemPov project will engage in participatory research in 6 developing countries with poor people from a variety of geographic and social locations to learn a) how they think about poverty b) which deprivations are most important to them c) how these deprivations are gendered and d) what other forms of gender-based disadvantage are most important to them.

After two phases of fieldwork and two phases of analysis, the FemPov team hopes to develop and test a ‘proto-index’ based on these initial findings, to determine whether better indices can be used in practice, and whether these new indices are indeed more consistent with the beliefs and experiences of severely deprived men and women.

Thomas Pogge
Aim of Belief

Oslo 11th-13th June, University of Oslo. The Aim of Belief event was the major event of the Rational Agency project in 2009.

Timothy Chan was its main organiser, assisted by Anders Nes and Olav Gjelsvik. The topic – how to understand the relationship between belief and truth – is foundational for many key issues in epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, philosophy of language and ethics. While it is generally accepted that belief aims at truth, there are fertile ongoing debates about how this idea is to be fleshed out. Starting from the premise that truth provides a fundamental standard of correctness for belief, some philosophers argue that there is an irreducibly normative dimension in understanding the nature and contents of belief. Opponents of these normative accounts of the aim of belief question whether the putative norm can be spelt out in a plausible way, and argue that the nature of belief can be understood in purely descriptive terms, without invoking any irreducible norms. This many-faceted debate has received increasing attention among many influential philosophers in recent years, and in this conference we were able to bring together most of the authors of seminal works in the literature to share and debate their latest thoughts on the related issues. We used a call for respondents aimed at young researchers and postgraduate students, which attracted many good applicants from ten countries. A demanding review process then led to an extremely good set of commentaries on the talks given at the conference. Many of our speakers remarked that it was an excellent, well-organized, and intellectually very fruitful conference, which contributed significantly to advancing current international research on the topic. The invited speakers have all agreed to contribute their papers to a proposed anthology to be edited by Timothy advised by Jennifer Hornsby, which is now being considered by Oxford University Press. In addition, in order to further disseminate internationally the ideas exchanged at the conference, we made it the first in a series of major CSMN events which were recorded and podcasted on our website. They have been widely downloaded, and the feedbacks we received on this initiative have been extremely appreciative.

Programme of the Conference:

Pascal Engel (Geneva): ‘Sticking to Normativism about the Aim of Belief’. Respondent: Douglas Edwards (University College Dublin). Chair: Olav Gjelsvik


David Papineau (King’s College, London): ‘There are No Norms of Belief’. Respondent: Heine Holmen (Oslo). Chair: Jonathan Knowles (NTNU, Trondheim)

Kathrin Glüer-Pagin & Åsa Wikforss (Stockholm): ‘What is Belief?’ Respondent: Anders Nes (Oslo). Chair: David Hunter (Ryerson University)


Timothy Chan (Oslo): ‘The Structure of Constitutive Norms’. Respondent: Jane Friedman (Oxford) Chair: Christel Fricke (Oslo)
Events 2009

An overview of the events (workshops, conferences, guest speakers) hosted by CSMN in 2009.

Linguistic Agency
Talk by Marco Ruffino, Oslo. February 11.
Context and Intentions, workshop, Oslo. February 14.
Workshop on Generics, Oslo. February 27-28
Semantics and Philosophy in Europe (Colloquium) London. April 16-18
Workshop: Pragmatics, semantics and systematicity, University of Oslo. May 8-9
Workshop: Metarepresentation and non-literal language use, Oslo. June 15-16
Workshop on ‘Metarepresentation, Communication and Culture’, Oslo. June 17-18
Workshop on Agreement & Disagreement, Oslo. September 3-4
Seminar: Jerry Fodor - ‘What Frege got wrong (with some help from Quine)’, Oslo. September 24
Joint Workshop CASTL – CSMN, Oslo. October 6
Linguistic Intuitions Workshop, Oslo. October 15-16
Talk: Thony Gillies, Oslo. October 30
Arché Expressivism Workshop and Mini-Course, St Andrews, Scotland. November 9-13

Moral Agency
Vital Needs, Poverty and Gender Equity Workshop, Oslo. March 12-15
Seminar with Stephen Darwall, Oslo. March 19
Lecture by Stephen Darwall: Demystifying Promises, Oslo. March 20
Seminar with Peter Railton: “Two Cheers for Virtue”. Oslo. May 28
Adam Smith on the Conditions of a Moral Society (Conference) Oslo. August 27-29
Symposium on David Estlund’s book ‘Democratic Authority’, Oslo. December 7-8
Public lecture by David Estlund, Oslo. December 9

Rational Agency
Agent Causation, Conference in conjunction with the Institute of Philosophy, University of London. January 30.
The Aim of Belief (Conference), June 11-13
Conference on Emotions and Agency, Oslo. September 1-2
The Emergence of Intersubjectivity: developmental, evolutionary and philosophical aspects, University of Copenhagen, September 21-23
Conference: The state of the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics for conditionals. Oslo, September 25-26
Jerry Fodor - ‘What Darwin Got Wrong’, Oslo. September 25
Language and Evolution (Lectures), Oslo. October 21
The Loss of Sadness: Are We Misdiagnosing Normal Emotions as Clinical Depression?, Ullevål University Hospital, Oslo. November 23

Research School
Graduate course: On Words, Oslo. January 15-23
Course: The Philosophy of Philosophy, Oslo. Spring 2009
PhD Course: Language and Evolution, Oslo. February 3 and 17, March 3 and 17
Graduate course on meaning and intuitions, Oslo. September 2009
Communications Skills Course, Oslo. September 14-15
CSMN/Arché Graduate Conference 2009, Arhé, University of St Andrews. November 7-8
Speakers 2009

There were 226 speakers at CSMN events in 2009. 65 of these (29%) were women.
Rolf Aaberget
Magnus Aardal
Theodora Achourioti
Myriam Ait Aissa
Sabine Alkire
Nicholas Allott
Alexander Almér
Holly Andersen
Chrisoula Andreou
Paal Antonsen
Boban Arsenijević
Nicholas Asher
Derek Ball
Dan Banik
Stephen Barker
Christian Barry
Nicolas Baumard
Tim Bayne
Endre Begby
Daniel Berntson
Sharon Bessell
Gunnar Björnson
Lene Bomann-Larsen
Emma Borg
Thom Brooks
Vivienne Brown
Jessica Brown
Einar Duenger Bøhn
Pavel Caha
Elizabeth Camp
Herman Cappelen
Andreas Brekke Carlson
Maria Carrasco
Robyn Carston
J.Adam Carter
Fatima Castillo
Yuri Cath
Timothy Chan
Sylvia Chant
Coralie Chevallier
Matthew Chrisman
Maria Cieschinger
Herb Clark
Fabrice Clément
Steward Cohen
John Collins
Jo Crawford
Greg Currie
Thomas Cushman
Jason D'Cruz
Stephen Darwall
Michael Devitt
Dylan Dodd
Kieran Donaghy
John Dupré
Cornelia Ebert
Dorothy Edgington
Douglas Edwards
Andy Egan
Jon Elster
Jakob Elster
Pascal Engel
David Estlund
David Etlin
Ian Evans
Jan Terje Faarlund
Ingrid Lossius Falkum
Davide Fassio
Robert Fiengo
Julian Fink
Sam Fleischacker
Marc Fleurbaey
Jerry Fodor
Hallvard Fossheim
Christel Fricke
Jane Friedman
Andreas Føllesdal
Michael Garnett
Des Gasper
Azar Gat
Christopher Gauker
Alan Gibbard
Thony Gillies
Hannah Ginsborg
Olav Gjelsvik
Michael Glanzberg
Sam Glucksberg
Kathrin Glüer-Pagin
Peter Goldie
Amber Griffioen
Atle Grønn
Lars Bo Gundersen
Eline Busck Gundersen
Alison Hall
Peter Hammerstein
Anandi Hattiangadi
Christophe Heintz
Bennett Helm
Edmund Henden
Lisa Hill
Wolfram Hinzen
Guðmundur Andri Hjálmarsson
Heine Holmen
Norbert Hornstein
Paul Horwich
Janneke Huitink
Janet Hunt
James R Hurford
Tórfinn Huvenes
John Hyman
Jonathan Ichikawa
Alison Jaggar
Benjamin Jarvis
Karen Jones
Guy Kahane
Ragnvald Kallestad
Duncan Kelly
Talks abroad 2009

Allott, Nicholas:

Allott, Nicholas (with H. Uchida):
‘Natural language indicative conditionals are classical’. Peer-reviewed talk, Second Annual Colloquium on ‘Semantics and Philosophy in Europe’, April 2009.

Breheny, Richard:
‘How pragmatic reasoning affects incremental utterance interpretation’. Presented at European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, CEU, Budapest. August 2009
‘How Gricean reasoning affects incremental utterance interpretation’. Invited talk, ExPrag 09, University of Lyon, April 2009
‘On the development of pragmatic abilities’. Invited talk, Workshop on Pragmatic Development, Lyon, April 2009
‘Ad hoc implicatures on-line’. Invited talk, University of Birmingham, January 2009

Breheny, Richard (with Heather Ferguson and Napoleon Katsos):
‘An online investigation into how Gricean pragmatic reasoning affects incremental utterance interpretation’. SALT 19, OSU, Columbus, Ohio, April 2009
‘An online investigation into how Gricean pragmatic reasoning affects incremental utterance interpretation’. Poster, CUNY 09, UC Davis, March 2009
‘Investigating the time course of accessing scalar implicatures - A visual world study’. Poster, CUNY 09, UC Davis, March 2009.

Breheny, Richard (with Heather Ferguson).
‘Tracking the intentions of others on-line: Evidence from visual-world investigations’. Poster, CUNY 09, UC Davis, March 2009

Cappelen, Herman:
‘Tests for Context Sensitivity?’, Tufts University, October 2009
‘Philosophy without Intuitions’, University of Texas Austin, October, 2009
‘Philosophy without Intuitions’, University of Hong Kong, August, 2009
‘Tests for Context Sensitivity?’, Arché Summer School, June 2009
‘The context sensitivity and non-systematicity of pragmatics’, Stockholm University, May 2009
Symposium on ‘Relativism and Monadic Truth’, NYU, New York Institute of Philosophy, March 2009
‘Against Assertion’, DIP Colloquium, University of Amsterdam, ILLC, February 2009
‘Relativism, minimalism, and how to test for context sensitivity’, Grupo de Accion Filosofica, Buenos Aires, January 2009

Carston, Robyn:
‘Relevance theory and the explicit/implicit distinction’. Invited keynote speech, 11th China Pragmatics Association Conference, Wuhan City, Hubei, China, July 2009
‘Pragmatics: Communication and Comprehension in Context’. Invited talk, Department of English, Hong Kong Institute of Education, Hong Kong, July 2009
‘The metaphorical use of language – How distinctive is it?’ Invited talk, Department of Language and Communication Studies, Trondheim, May 2009.
‘Utterance content and the role of pragmatics. Invited talk, Graduate Philosophy Seminar, University of Manchester, March 2009

Carston, Robyn (with Alison Hall).

Chan, Timothy
Response to ‘Explaining the Abstract/Concrete Paradoxes in Moral Psychology’ by Eric Mandelbaum and Dave Ripley, CSMN/Arché Graduate Conference, St Andrews, November 2009.
‘The Trouble with Being Sincere’. Invited talk at Workshop on Judgement.

Faarlund, Jan Terje:
‘The unidirectionality of pro-drop’. XIX. International Conference on Historical Linguistics, Nijmegen, August 2009

Fricke, Christel:
‘Adam Smith’s Theory Moral Norms: Their Reality and Our Knowledge of Them’ Adam Smith Conference in Athens, December 2009.
‘The Artwork: Perception and Substance in the work of Karin Lambrecht.’ Goethe Institut, Porto Alegre, Brazil, November 2009.
‘Adam Smith’s Moral Project’, Department of Philosophy, University of Santiago de Chile, and Department of Philosophy, Pontifical Catholic
University Porto Alegre, Brazil, November 2009.

Føllesdal, Andreas:
‘Should states ratify Human Rights Conventions?’ Minho, Portugal
‘Legitimacy of Intl courts’, Åbo
On ‘Should states ratify human rights conventions?’ , New York University
‘The uneasy fit between international human rights and federations’, ECPR, Potsdam
‘On Multilevel governance, Multilevel Governance and the implementation of the EU, Baltic Sea Group’, Brussels
Panel on Chaim Gans’ Just Zionism, (OUP) , Chair, American Political Science Association, Toronto
Panel on Deliberative Democracy, Chair, American Political Science Association, Toronto
Comments at ‘Conference on Global Health’, Tanzania
‘On Chaim Gans’ Just Zionism, (OUP) Beersheba, Israel
‘Should states ratify human rights conventions?’ Beijing
‘Is Democracy and Human Rights compatible with ’Asian Values’?" Communications University of China, Beijing
‘Are International Human Rights Courts undemocratic and illegitimate?’ - On Jeremy Waldron’s criticism of judicial review’, Helsinki
‘On human rights and religion’, Helsinki
‘On Education and Pluralism’, Martin Chautari, Kathmandu
‘The efficiency of the European Union as a case against democracy’, Seminar on ‘The case for Democracy - from Ancient Athens to the European Union’
‘Global Democracy - a Category Mistake?’ Workshop on Ethical Dimensions of International Institutions, New Orleans
‘Judicial Review in the Nordic Countries’, Workshop, Copenhagen January 2009

Gjelsvik, Olav:
Comments on ‘Intention and Self-deception’. At the Arché/CSMN graduate conference, St. Andrews, November 2009
‘Reason, reasoning, reasoners’.Conference on John Broome’s Philosophy,
University of Geneva, May 2009
Comments on Tom Pink on ‘Power and Responsibility’, at Agency and Causation Conference, University of London, January 2009

Eline Busck-Gundersen:
‘Response-dependence, a priority and reference fixing’ Invited speaker at workshop ‘Dispositions’, Aarhus University, May 2009

Hansen, Carsten:
‘Might Semantic Knowledge be Practical Knowledge?’ at the annual Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, at Massey University, New Zealand, December 2009
‘The Metaphysics of Phenomenal Experience’, at Toward a Science of Consciousness in Hong Kong, June 2009

Henden, Edmund:
‘Psychological Compulsion and the Will’, Conference on Agency and Control, Radboud University Nijmegen, September 2009

Hornsby, Jennifer:
‘Pre-Davidsonian Innocence’. Conference on Anscombe’s Intention, University of Chicago, April 2009
Renewing the Philosophy of Action. ‘Reading Intention’. Leverhulme Meeting, Oxford, March 2009

Jaggar, Alison:
‘Addressing transnational gender injustice: Rethinking some fundamental assumptions of Western political philosophy,’ plenary address at Mid-West Women’s Studies Association, Rutgers University, March, 2009.
‘Hearts Starve as well as Bodies,’ presented to a workshop on the topic of developing a new gender-sensitive poverty metric, funded by CSMN and held in Oslo, Mar 2009

Jaggar, Alison (with Teresa Tobin):

Kjøll, Georg:
‘The role of deference and Theory of Mind in conceptual representation and concept acquisition’, CSMN / Centre for Subjectivity Research Workshop on ‘The Emergence of Intersubjectivity: developmental, evolutionary and philosophical aspects’, Centre for Subjectivity Research,
University of Copenhagen, Denmark, September 2009.
"What notion of content is needed for a theory of communication?". Peerreviewed talk, 17th Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Central European University of Budapest, August 2009.
"What notion of content is needed for a theory of communication?" Peerreviewed talk, International conference on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, University of Lodz, May 2009.

Ramberg, Bjørn:

‘For the sake of his own generation: Rorty on destruction and edification’ Rorty and the Mirror of Nature, Institute of Philosophy, School of Advances Study, University of London, 6th November.
‘The Emergence of Intersubjectivity: developmental, evolutionary and philosophical aspects’. Joint CSMN-CSF workshop, Center for Subjectivity Research (CSF), University of Copenhagen, September 2009
‘Pragmatic hermeneutics? Richard Rorty’s poetics of cultural politics and its consequences in the Humanities’, Center for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF), Bielefeld University, June 2009

Recanati, Francois

‘Singular Thought : In Defence of Acquaintance’, colloque Singular Thought, Université de Barcelone, January 2009
‘Contexte et Contenu’, Grandes Conférences des Archives H. Poincaré, Nancy, February 2009
Quatre conférences invitée dans le cadre de la deuxième Ecole européenne 'Philosophy of Language, Mind and Science', Université de Bochum (Germany), March 2009
Conférence invitée ‘De re and de se’, atelier ‘Self-locating beliefs’, Dept. Philosophie, MIT, September 2009

Sperber, Dan:

‘La vigilance épistémique’. Colloque interdisciplinaire. Université de Lausanne. May 2009
‘Evolutionary approaches to culture: Challenges and solutions’. Conference on ‘The multidisciplinary impact of the theory of evolution and its
‘Epistemic vigilance’ University of Maryland, Cognitive Science Colloquium, February 2009.

Sterken, Rachel:
Presenter, Arche Methodology Project Seminar, University of St Andrews-Arche, October 2009
Invited Speaker, GENIUS Generics Conference, Ecole Normale Superieure-Institute Jean Nicod (Paris), May 2009
Invited Speaker, Society for Exact Philosophy, University of Alberta (Canada), May 2009
Invited Speaker, Harvard-MIT Graduate Philosophy Conference, Harvard University (USA), April 2009
Invited Speaker, Yale-UConn Graduate Philosophy Conference, Yale University (USA), April 2009
Invited Speaker, Princeton-Rutgers Graduate Philosophy Conference, Princeton University (USA), March 2009

Wilson, Deirdre:
‘What would it take for pragmatics to be systematic?’ Invited talk, Relevance Round Table Meeting II, Department of English Studies, University of Warsaw, June 2009.
‘What would it take for pragmatics to be systematic?’ Invited talk, CSMN/University of Stockholm Workshop on Pragmatics, Semantics and Systematicity, University of Stockholm, May 2009
‘Word meaning and communication in relevance theory’. Invited lecture, Ryukoku University, Kyoto, Japan, December 2008.
### Accounts 2009

#### Revenues 2009 NOK

**Revenues accounted for at CSMN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Host institution</td>
<td>7,651,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Council Norway - CoE</td>
<td>8,578,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active partners (to be named)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Templeton Foundation</td>
<td>485,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFR 190393 addiction, choice &amp; responsible agency</td>
<td>1,173,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFR 190857 cognition and communication</td>
<td>333,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other private sources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sum revenues accounted for at CSMN**

18,220,000

**Revenues not accounted for at CSMN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arche-Univ of St. Andrews</td>
<td>550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cappe</td>
<td>220,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UiO staff contribubtion (not accounted for)</td>
<td>4,882,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sum revenues not accounted for at CSMN**

5,652,000

**Sum annual revenues 2009**

23,872,000
## Expenditures 2009 NOK

### Expenditures accounted for at CSMN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel and overhead</td>
<td>12 901 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Salaries and social costs)</td>
<td>11 093 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Overhead)</td>
<td>1 808 000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consultants and ext. services (FoU)</td>
<td>1 439 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific equipement</td>
<td>81 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other operational costs</td>
<td>4 192 000</td>
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</table>

**Sum expenditures accounted for at CSMN**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 613 000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Expenditures not accounted for at CSMN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel and overhead</td>
<td>5 288 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Salaries and social costs)</td>
<td>4 599 000</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Overhead)</td>
<td>689 000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consultants and ext. services (FoU)</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scientific equipement</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other operational costs</td>
<td>440 000</td>
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</table>

**Sum expenditures not accounted for at CSMN**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 728 000</td>
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**Sum expenditures**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 341 000</td>
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</table>

**For transfer 2010 (+/-)**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-393 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Budget 2010

### Revenues 2010 NOK

#### Revenues accounted for at CSMN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Host institution</td>
<td>11 019 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Council Norway - CoE</td>
<td>11 495 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active partners (to be named)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Templeton Foundation</td>
<td>485 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other public sources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFR 190393 addiction, choice &amp; responsible agency</td>
<td>1 453 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFR 190857 cognition and communication</td>
<td>824 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFR 201896 distribution of poverty</td>
<td>1 141 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other private sources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sum revenues accounted for at CSMN**                                    **26 417 000**  

#### Revenues not accounted for at CSMN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arche-Univ of St. Andrews</td>
<td>485 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cappe</td>
<td>220 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UiO staff contrubution (not accounted for)</td>
<td>1 911 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sum revenues not accounted for at CSMN**                                **2 616 000**  

**Sum annual revenues 2010**                                               **29 033 000**
Expenditures 2010 NOK

Expenditures accounted for at CSMN
Personnel and overhead 16 269 000
(Salaries and social costs) 13 986 000
(Overhead) 2 283 000
Consultants and ext. services (FoU) 1 500 000
Scientific equipement 80 000
Other operational costs 7 295 000

Sum expenditures accounted for at CSMN 25 144 000

Expenditures not accounted for at CSMN
Personnel and overhead 1 200 000
(Salaries and social costs) 1 000 000
(Overhead) 200 000
Consultants and ext. services (FoU) 0
Scientific equipement 0
Other operational costs 1 022 000

Sum expenditures not accounted for at CSMN 2 222 000

Sum expenditures 27 366 000

For transfer 2011 (+/-) 1 274 000


Fricke, Christel. (ed) 2009. Questioning Forgiveness. Interdisciplinary essays. [Will be submitted to CUP for reviewing, either late 2009 or early 2010]

Fricke, Christel. 2009. “What we cannot do to each other – On forgiveness and moral vulnerability” In: Christel Fricke (Hg): Questioning Forgiveness. Interdisciplinary essays. [Will be submitted to CUP for reviewing, either late 2009 or early 2010]


Føllesdal, Andreas. 2009. “How to bring normative requirements to bear on institutions,” in Journal of Social Philosophy


Jaggar, Alison. 2009. “L’Imagination au pouvoir: Comparing John Rawls’s method of ideal theory with Iris Marion Young’s method of critical theory,” in Feminist Ethics and Social and Political Theory: Theorizing the Non-Ideal, edited by Lisa Tessman, Dordrecht: Kluwer/ Springer. [This article was also reprinted in Dancing with Iris: Between Embodiment and the Body Politic in Iris Marion Young’s

Malnes, Raino (ed.) 2009. Prekær politikk (Percarious politics), Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk


Malnes, Raino. 2009 “Den politisk maktens metafysikk” (The metaphysics of political power) in Malnes, Raino Malnes and Midgaard, Knut (eds) Politisk tenkning. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget


“Poverty” in Encyclopedia of Sustainability Great Barrington MA: Berkshire Publishing Group


“Why We Need A New Approach to Pharmaceutical Innovation: A Pragmatic Answer to a Moral Question,” coauthored with Doris Schroeder, in Marleen Wynant, ed.: In Sickness and in Health: Added Value and Global Access for Medicines in the Future Brussels: Crosstalk. P. 197-211.


“Wedgewood on Normative Reality”, forthcoming in Philosophical Studies

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Allot, Nicholas (with U. Uchida). 2009. Peer commentary: “Classical logic, conditionals and non-monotonic' reasoning”, in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32(1)


“Darwin og filosofi” (Darwin and Philosophy). In N.Chr.Stenseth, T.Lie and D.O.Hessen (ed) Verden ble aldri den samme. Oslo:
Gyldendal

"Pengar og Fridom" (Money and Freedom) in Maaseide og Skirbekk, Filosofi i Vår Tid. (Philosophy in our Time) Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget.

"Nærsynhet og sofistikasjon" (Myopia and Sophistication) i Rune Slagstad (Ed) Essay for Jon Elster til 70årsdagen, med tilsvar fra forfatteren. (Essays for Jon Elster on his 70th birthday, with replies from Elster,) Forthcoming on Pax forlag (Oslo) in 2009 eller 2010.


Hornsby, Jennifer (Ed) 2009. Special issue of Inquiry (Vol 52.3): “Human and non-Human Animal Agency”

Hornsby, Jennifer (with Jesus H. Aguilar and Andrei A. Buckareff) “Five Questions”, in Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions


LA


Recanati, Francois. 2009. 'De re and de se'.Dialectica 63, pp. 249-269. ‘Anti-Descriptivism, Mental Files, and the Communication of Singular Thoughts’ Manuscrito 32, pp. 1-32


Sperber, Dan (with Hugo Mercier). 2009. ‘Intuitive and reflective inferences,’ in (J. St.B. T. Evans and K. Frankish, eds), In Two Minds: Dual Processes andBeyond, Oxford University Press.


