



The Research Council  
of Norway

# CSMN

CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF MIND IN NATURE

# Annual Report 2010



Table of Contents		
Editorial	4	
Organisation chart - list of members	7	
Presentation of new team members	8	
Presentation of the Affiliate Program	10	
Cooperation with host institution	13	
Gender equity	15	
Internal activities	16	
Linguistic Agency activities	18	
Moral Agency activities	22	
Rational Agency activities	26	
Honorary rewards	32	
Public outreach	35	
Annual Lecture on Mind in Nature: Philip Pettit	38	
Midway-evaluation and reapplication	40	
International collaboration	42	
Graduate conference	43	
Long term guest researchers	44	
Interview with Rachel Severson	46	
Seminar in Helsinki	49	





# Editorial

2010 has been a good year for CSMN, both in our core research activity and also in that this fall has been marked by the fact that we have had our midterm evaluation as well as worked out a reapplication for new funding.

By Professor Olav Gjelsvik, Director of the CSMN

2010 has been an extremely busy year, and also a year with significant changes at CSMN. The main task, besides all the regular academic tasks (I shall return to those), has been the midway-evaluation and re-application. This work dominated the life of CSMN core group from August until December 1st, when we submitted the report and the new plans. We all felt we had done a good job; we had provided a detailed account of what we had done, what we ourselves take to be a fair assessment of our achievements, and also worked out plans for our activities all the way up to 2017. As this editorial is being written, we are preparing the presentation for the evaluation panel NFR has appointed. We are cautiously optimistic. The Norwegian Research Council will decide on renewal for the 8 centres in our generation of centres in June 2011.

CSMN has experienced significant changes in 2010. Ulla Heli took over from Jan Halvor Undlien

as administrative leader, and later in the year Lina Tosterud took maternity leave, and was replaced by Jon Furholt. Ulla has contributed very positively to the internal life of the centre, and so has Jon. Of course we miss those who left us, permanently or temporarily, but we also enjoy very much working with Ulla and Jon. We are very grateful for their contributions and for their commitment to CSMN.

The next big change is the change in governance structure, and the change in leadership. CSMN now has both a director and a co-director, and a CSMN Board. The Board oversees the implementation of the Consortium agreement between Arché (St Andrews), Cappe (Canberra/Australia) and CSMN, and also functions as a scientific advisory board. The three previous intellectual auditors, Onora O'Neill, Timothy Williamson and John Dupré, have generously agreed to serve on the Board, together with Jessica Brown from Arché and Christian



Barry from CAPPE. Camilla Serck-Hanssen is the chairperson, all of them have been duly appointed by the Rector of The University of Oslo.

In May 2010 Christel Fricke stepped down as Director. Olav Gjelsvik has been appointed Director, and Carsten Hansen Co-Director by the Rector. CSMN is very grateful for all the work Christel has laid down for CSMN. She now continues her work as Research Director for Moral Agency.

CSMN is prepared for all outcomes in the renewal process, but we are dead keen on being renewed. Many of our research plans make best sense in a 10-year perspective; the very idea of such centres is partly to create an environment where one can concentrate on long-term academic work without having to apply for fresh money every so often. This has appealed to us, and we have taken that



to heart. We want to finish what we have started, and we want to finish at least as well as we have started. Considering the latter, our own judgment is that we have started very well. *Maybe* we could have started better; we definitely could have started a lot worse. We are hopeful about the renewal, and in that spirit we are looking forward to a fascinating and interesting new development of CSMN later this year and in 2012, when the new CSMN will re-establish itself, with new PhD fellows and new postdocs, on the shoulders of the old one that will remain a foundation. Within that foundation we will keep in touch with all partners and friends we have made on the way. There have been many high-quality events at CSMN in 2010. The conference on Self-Knowledge and Rational Agency was clearly one of the highlights; there is a separate presentation of that. CSMN has had many long-term visitors in addition to the core group members, including Vivienne Brown, Alison Jaggar, Peter Railton, Helen Steward, Theresa Tobin, Maria Carrasco, Michael Morreau, Andrew Reisner, Julian Fink, Thiago Galery, Marius Dumitru, Antti Kuusela, James Konow, Tom Hodgson, Rani Lill Anjum, Thomas Zuradski, Rachel Severson and Adrian Kuzniar. They have all contributed very much to the happy atmosphere of the intellectual life of CSMN.

Herman Cappelen has stayed with us for

several long periods, and all of the autumn semester. In May Cappelen received a research prize from the University of Oslo (see separate entry). Thomas Pogge collaborated with the group led by Andreas Føllesdal at the Centre for Advanced Study at the Norwegian Academy of Science, and stayed in Oslo in May and June. Deirdre Wilson and Jennifer Hornsby have also made the extremely beneficial presence felt at CSMN.

#### *CSMN assessed*

We believe that we are making an important contribution by establishing a new line of approach to studies of human normativity, a line that takes us much beyond traditional discussions and into new intellectual territory. A philosophically based, but interdisciplinary and problem-oriented (rather than theory-driven) approach to the study of normative structures has not been tried before. We believe this is due, in large part, to the amount of time and resources needed to put an interdisciplinary approach to normativity on a firm footing. This is not a task that can be carried out by a few dedicated individuals. Rather, it requires an investment on the scale of a Centre, with its corresponding resources and timeframe. Norway has taken on this task, and is first country in the world with a centre for systematic, integrated study of human normativity and its place in nature.

It is also fair to say that in just three years, CSMN has established itself as one of the world's leading interdisciplinary philosophical research centres and made Oslo known around the world as having a vibrant research community in these fields. Centre members and their collaborators have published a large number of books and articles on topics directly related to CSMN's core areas of research. Some of this work has already had significant impact on international debates in a variety of fields; it is fair to say that this is most significant in the area of linguistic agency, perhaps because interdisciplinarity was more firmly established in this area when we started out. On the other hand, concrete results are coming around world health (a normative concept) and also about how we ought to address the climate change challenge. CSMN has, in short, fostered an environment in which philosophers from different sub-disciplines collaborate and where philosophers engage extensively with linguists, economists, psychologists, and members of other disciplines. Our more than 200 visitors from around the world include a significant number of the leading contributors to the topics within the centre's remit. We have co-organized events and collaborated with more than 25 of the world's leading academic institutions and thus significantly increased the international profile of IFIKK and the University of Oslo.




#### Consortium board:

Prof. Camilla Serck-Hanssen, Chairman (IFIKK, University of Oslo)  
Prof. Jessica Brown, Consortium partner (Arché, University of St. Andrews)  
Christian Barry, Consortium partner (CAPPE, Canberra)  
Anne Marit Eide, Faculty Director (Faculty of Humanities, University of Oslo)  
Prof. Raino Malnes (Faculty of Social Science, University of Oslo)  
Prof. Timothy Williamson (University of Oxford)  
Prof. Onora O'Neill (University of Cambridge)  
Prof. John Dupré (University of Exeter)  
Eline Busck-Gundersen, Temporary staff (University of Oslo)



# CSMN structure



# New team members



## Andreas Stokke

Andreas Stokke joined the Linguistic Agency project at CSMN as a postdoc in October 2010. Previously he did his PhD at Arché, University of St Andrews, where he worked within Arché's Contextualism and Relativism Project.

Andreas work focuses mainly on philosophy of language and its intersection with formal semantics and pragmatics. His PhD dissertation was on indexicality and presupposition and treated topics such as the influence on reference-determination by speaker intentions, descriptive indexicals, phi-features and their influence on reference, and the relation between dynamic and static semantics.

The research project with which Andreas joins Linguistic Agency concerns Free Indirect Discourse (FID), and he is currently working on different topics in this area, such as the role of gender features of pronouns in FID and the relation between FID and other non-standard modes of discourse. He is also working on lying and asserting and on metasemantics.

Andreas has previously been a visitor at CSMN in Feb-Mar and Oct-Dec 2009. During these visits he organized reading groups on presuppositions and dynamic semantics. Currently he is co-convenor of CSMN's Language and Rationality Seminar, and is involved in organizing a number of workshops and conferences to take place at CSMN in 2011-12.







# The CSMN Affiliate Program

CSMN welcomes researchers on PhD and post. doc levels to follow the research which is done at the centre. The Centre has thus several affiliated researchers who all work on topics relevant to centre activities. CSMN has a total of 17 affiliates.

The *CSMN Affiliate Program* is open to PhD Fellows and Post-Doctoral Fellows at the University of Oslo whose work falls within CSMN's broad remit. By drawing researchers from across the University into the activities of CSMN, the Affiliate Program enriches the working environment for individual researchers while at the same time enhancing the research power of CSMN. There are various running seminar series at CSMN, and affiliates are encouraged to present their work in progress at these and other events hosted by CSMN. They may also apply for funding for their own conference travel. Affiliates actively participate in the co-organization of workshops and conferences, and some have also co-taught seminars CSMN researchers.

One researcher taking an active part in CSMN community is Anders Strand. Anders defended his PhD in the spring of 2008, on the topic of mental causation. He became an affiliate soon after his defence, and believes that the formal association with CSMN may have contributed to the success of his application for a four-year Post-doctoral Fellowship in philosophy of science. "Connection to a strong research environment is one parameter of evaluation, and I believe that my CSMN affiliation gave me an edge on that score," Anders says. He has no doubt that his post-doctoral years have been enhanced by CSMN activities and opportunities. "But most of all, it's the people. Being around a bunch of enthusiastic and talented post-docs and PhDs with

overlapping interests makes academic life both more fun and more productive.

CSMN currently has 9 female and 12 male affiliates, from 8 different departments. 12 are PhD fellows while 6 hold post-doctoral appointments. There are 3 new affiliates in 2010.


Bjørn Ramberg



## New affiliates in 2010:



Ayna Johansen



Paula Rubio Fernandez

## List of affiliates:

Kim Angell  
Frank Barel  
Lene Bomann-Larsen  
Einar Duenger Bøhn (Bohn)  
Jakob Elster  
Espen Gamlund  
Robert Huseby  
Terje Lohndal  
Jorid Moen  
Astrid Nome  
Gry Oftedal  
Jon Anstein Olsen  
Tor Otterholt  
Anders Strand



Marit Lobben







# The view from the hosting department

## Mathilde Skoie on CSMN's cooperation with IFIKK, the hosting department

CSMN continues to be an extremely important and valuable part of the Department of philosophy, classics, history of art and ideas (IFIKK). The doors of our department are filled with CSMN posters announcing activities open to all staff and students. CSMN members have contributed to the teaching on all levels – Professor Olav Gjelsvik has even given lectures in the special Norwegian compulsory course in philosophy given to all students at the University (examen philosophicum). CSMN staff continue to be involved in regular departmental positions and fora: Professor Carsten Hansen has continued to chair our PhD programme in philosophy and we have regarded this a successful way of achieving integration between the PhD students inside and outside CSMN. And together with Professor Christel Fricke, Carsten Hansen has been a member of our strategic committee in philosophy. Another way of providing integration is the appointment of Camilla Serck-Hanssen as chair of the new CSMN-board. She is also a member of the IFIKK board which is responsible for the CSMN budgets.

Two events may act as particularly good illustrations of how the department has benefitted from the centre in 2010. In the spring the department on behalf of the University of Oslo signed an agreement for a double badged degree in philosophy with St.Andrews based on the contacts made in the centre. This is the very first of its kind at the University of Oslo and we already have two candidates in the programme. This spring the department also advertised two positions in philosophy. We got an all-time high amount of highly qualified applicants and most of these mentioned the opportunity to work with CSMN as a major attraction.

Since IFIKK considers CSMN so important to our academic life, we have this year collaborated tightly with the core group and invested considerable administrative support in the midway-evaluation – and reapplication process. We sincerely hope this work will prove fruitful and that CSMN will continue to contribute to the life in our new home.



Mathilde Skoie  
Head of Department







# Gender equity

Philosophy everywhere is still troubled with a very low percentage of female scholars, and it is clear that active measures on several levels are needed in order to assure gender equity. CSMN is actively addressing the question.

CSMN is committed to taking steps towards equal opportunity. At the end of 2010 a group of affiliates, junior staff and visitors gathered to discuss what could be done to increase the participation and visibility of female philosophers in the daily life and events at the CSMN. We shared the impression that the development in this area had not been satisfactory in 2010. We agreed that there are many things which can be done: especially things that pertain to the daily routines and how we organize research and activities at the CSMN.

We also agreed that members at CSMN have a potential for learning more about the contemporary research there is on this topic, both in order to better understand some of the complex mechanisms behind the phenomena and to better see why inequality is a problem for philosophical research. As a result, the CSMN Action group was founded. One of the goals of the group is to come up with suggestions about initiatives and measures that can be taken in order to increase the number of women present in the day-to-day activities of CSMN, as well as increasing the visibility of the women who are currently a part of the project.

For these aims to be achieved, the group are dependent on the backing and support of CSMN as a whole. At the December staff meeting, the group therefore suggested two measures to be implemented: a) that the CSMN should have as its ideal a 50/50 participation among its contributors (speakers and commentators) on all its events and b) that there should be NO all-male (or all-female) events. The first was accepted as a goal.

Trine Antonsen and Georg Kj  ll

# Internal activities

## The Language and Rationality seminar (L&R seminar)

CSMN's Language and Rationality Semnar is a weekly forum, bringing together our Linguistic and Rational Agency projects. In 2010, we have had 29 talks altogether, covering a diverse range of topics, ranging from descriptive indexicals and linguistic presupposition, through norms of assertion, to the nature of belief and requirements of rationality.

Although the majority of presenters have come from the CSMN's own ranks, or from our partners at Arché, we have also had the pleasure of welcoming a number of visitors from elsewhere, including Torstein Fretheim (Trondheim), Julian

Fink (Vienna), George Rey and Terje Lohndal (both Maryland), Jesper Kallestrup (Edinburgh), Catherine Felix (Lund), Attila Tanyi (Konstanz), and Henk Zeevat (Amsterdam). Throughout the year, discussion at the seminar has been lively, with many fruitful interchanges between different perspectives, both within and across the Linguistic and Rational Agency camps.

Conveners of the seminar for spring 2010 were Heine Holmen and Nicholas Allott and for the autumn Nicholas Allott and Andreas Stokke. The current conveners, Andreas Stokke and Anders Nes, plan to keep broadly the same format for 2011.

Anders Nes and Andreas Stokke

## Moral Philosophy Club

The Moral Philosophy Club is the regular meeting place for the Moral Agency people and for affiliates from the Ethics Program, but others with an interest in moral philosophy are also welcome to attend. It is intended to be a friendly and constructive forum in which we present and discuss work in progress. Participation is by membership or invitation. It has so far worked well in accordance with these intentions. Lene Bomann-Larsen took over as convener in January 2010. In the spring semester, we had, in addition to internal presenters, four external presenters: Peter Railton, Michael Morreau, Endre Stavang and



Attila Tanyi. Einar Duenger Bohn took over as convener in august 2010. That following semester we also had, in addition to internal presenters, two external presenters: Fonna Forman-Barzilai and MPC alumnus Jon A. Lindstrøm. Long-term visitor Tomasz Zuradzki presented as well. Throughout the year we covered topics ranging from applied ethics to metaethics. With a few exceptions, the format of the sessions has stayed the same: we send out the piece to be presented the week before, read it, before discussion at the meeting.

Lene Bomann-Larsen and Einar Bøhn

## CSMN Colloquium

Unless other CSMN events are unfolding, Wednesday mornings are reserved for

the CSMN colloquium. This is a forum for presentations and discussions that may bear on work done in all three branches of CSMN. Both regular personnel and visitors are encouraged to use the colloquium as a setting for trying out new ideas and developing work in progress. Discussion is informal in tone, levity is permitted and frequently in evidence, but not to the detriment of academic engagement and excitement. (At times autocratic exercise of power by the Chair is required.) We had 10 meetings during the spring of 2010, starting with Georg Kjøll (CSMN) on semantic normativity and the language of thought and ending with a joint talk by Allison Jaggar (Colorado/CSMN) and Theresa Tobin: "Dislocating Moral Authority: Justifying Moral Claims in a Diverse and Unequal World. During the fall, CSMN staff were dedicating

their efforts to drafting the application for centre renewal. We nevertheless had eight meetings, including talks by various visitors; Stephen Morse (Pennsylvania), Rachel Severson (Washington), María Alejandra Carrasco (Santiago de Chile), Vivienne Brown (Open University, UK).

Details of past talks and the current program are posted on our web page: [http://www.csmn.uio.no/events/csmn\\_colloquium/](http://www.csmn.uio.no/events/csmn_colloquium/)

Bjørn Ramberg



# Linguistic Agency

Linguistic agency is central to human action, and is governed by rules and norms that need to be analysed and articulated. This branch of CSMN has worked with several aspects of these subjects, both empirically and in relation to more structural systems of agency.

## Context and Communication Sub-Project

### Output

In 2009, Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne published *Relativism and Monadic Truth* (Oxford University Press). The book immediately triggered a great deal of discussion, and in 2010, two of the world's leading philosophy journals, *Analysis* and *Philosophical Studies* invited seven philosophers to comment on it, with Cappelen and Hawthorne writing replies. The commentators were John MacFarlane, Peter Laserson, Brian Weatherson, Mark Richard, Michael Glanzberg, and Scott Soames. Both journals also published a précis of the book.

The American Philosophical Association's Central Division organized an 'author meets critics' session on the book at the annual meeting in Chicago in March 2010. The critics were Andy Egan, Scott Soames, and Adam Sennet/Ernest Lepore. Cappelen and Hawthorne responded. A

symposium on *Relativism and Monadic Truth* was also organized at New York Institute of Philosophy, at NYU.

Cappelen, in collaboration with Professor Jessica Brown, published a collection of essays on the nature of assertion, *Assertion: New Philosophical Essays* (Oxford University Press). The book sprang out of a conference jointly organized by Arché and CSMN, and contains 14 cutting-edge papers on the role of assertion in epistemology and philosophy of language. Professors Brown and Cappelen wrote the introduction and Cappelen contributed a paper, 'Against Assertion'.

In 2010, a new book by Cappelen, *Philosophy without Intuitions*, was accepted for publication with Oxford University Press. The monograph addresses a range of foundational issues in philosophical methodology. The manuscript was presented and discussed at a very lively and productive PhD course at CSMN, co-taught with Professor Olav Gjelsvik.

### Events

The main event organized by Context and Communication in 2010 was a mini-course and workshop on first-person (*de se*) thought and content at the University of Oslo. The event had more than 30 participants (PhD students and junior researchers) from around the world. The topic was the nature of first-person thought and content, the role of such thoughts in articulating reasons for action, and the semantics of constructions that denote a first-person point of view (or other kinds of essential indexicality). The talks presented were the following: Dilip Ninan (Arché): Why Centred Worlds? Andy Egan (Rutgers/Arché): "Three Grades of Self-Involvement, Part 1: Self-Locating Content in Thought". Pranav Anand (UC Santa Cruz): The Cross-Linguistic Manifestations of De Se Expressions. Mike Titelbaum (Wisconsin-Madison): Bayesian De Se Updating, Part 1. James Higginbotham (USC): Indexicals and Cross-Reference. Mike Titelbaum: Bayesian De Se Updating, Part 2. Dilip Ninan: Self-Location and Other-Location. Seth Yalcin (UC Berkeley): Orientation. Andy

Egan: Three Grades of Self-Involvement, Part 2: Self-Locating Content in Language. François Recanati (Arché/Institut Jean Nicod): Implicit Self-Ascription, Part 1. James Higginbotham: First-Personal Perspectives. Pranav Anand: On the Grain Size of De Se Expression. Herman Cappelen (Arché/CSMN) and Josh Dever (Texas): De Se: The Center Will Not Hold. Peter Ludlow (Northwestern): Attitudes De Se, De Nunc, and De Hic. François Recanati: Implicit Self-Ascription, Part 2

Other events worth noting were two workshops on contextualism and relativism, at the University of Oslo. The keynote speaker for the first of these was Cian Dorr, and for the second Andy Egan. Individual talks were given at CSMN by Ernest Lepore, Peter Pagin, and Matthew McGrath.

## New Postdoc: Dr. Andreas Stokke

In 2010, Linguistic Agency advertised for a 2-year postdoctoral position. The competition for this position was fierce, with more than 60 applicants. The committee interviewed four candidates, and offered the position to Dr. Andreas Stokke. Dr. Stokke got his PhD from the University of St Andrews, with a dissertation entitled: *Indexicality and Presupposition – Explorations beyond Truth-Conditional Information*. The committee and the rest of CSMN were delighted that Dr. Stokke accepted the offer and are confident he will make an excellent addition to CSMN in general and Linguistic Agency in particular.

## Metarepresentation Sub-Project

### Output

In 2010, Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber completed *Meaning and Relevance* (forthcoming with Cambridge University Press), a successor to their influential *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*, which updates the theory of communication presented in their earlier book and explores its consequences for various areas of research. Along with several collaborators (Fabrice Clément, Christophe Heintz, Olivier Mascaro, Olivier Morin, Hugo Mercier and Gloria Origgi) they also published a programmatic paper on 'Epistemic Vigilance' (*Mind & Language* 25.4) arguing that the massive dependence of humans on communicated information creates a vulnerability to misinformation





which is addressed by several mechanisms for epistemic vigilance, targeted either at the speaker (who to believe) or at the communicated content (what to believe).

Robyn Carston's work was the subject of a collection of papers by leading pragmatic theorists and philosophers of language, *Explicit Communication: Robyn Carston's Pragmatics* (Palgrave, 2010). The book ends with a chapter in which Carston updates her account, responds to critics and explores directions for future research. Her presentation to the Aristotelian Society, 'Metaphor: ad hoc concepts, literal meaning and mental images' (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 110(3)) outlines one important direction for future research on metaphor, which she is exploring and extending in current work.

Members of the Metarepresentation sub-project also contributed on the experimental

side. Coralie Chevallier, Francesca Happé, Ira Noveck and Deirdre Wilson published a paper on 'Scalar inferences in Asperger Syndrome' in *Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders* 40 (9), and Dan Sperber and Hugo Mercier completed a target article for *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* (forthcoming in 2011) showing how their argumentative theory of reasoning explains a wide range of experimental results in the psychology of reasoning.

Postdoctoral fellows and PhDs also made important contributions in 2010. Nicholas Allott's book *Key Terms in Pragmatics* (Continuum, 2010) introduces key theoretical concepts from pragmatics and contains insightful reflections on key thinkers and approaches. Georg Kjoll's paper 'Content similarity and communicative success' in *International Review of Pragmatics*, 2 (1) is a response to Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore's earlier paper 'Relevance theory and

shared content'. Georg Kjoll also completed his PhD thesis on *Word Meaning, Concepts and the Representation of Abstract Entities from the Perspective of Radical Pragmatics and Semantic Externalism*, which will be examined in 2011. Our affiliate PhD student Ingrid Lossius Falkum also completed her University College London PhD on *The Semantics and Pragmatics of Polysemy: A Relevance-Theoretic Account*, and has been awarded a postdoctoral fellowship by the Research Council Norway, to be held at CSMN.

## Events

The main event organised by the Metarepresentation sub-project in 2010 was an Oslo workshop on Word Meaning organised by Robyn Carston and Deirdre Wilson (with help from Nicholas Allott, Georg Kjoll and Ingrid Lossius Falkum), on the nature of word meaning and its relation to concepts. The keynote speaker was Paul Pietroski (University of Maryland), and invited main speakers were Kjell Johan Sæbø (Oslo). Roberto de Almeida (Concordia University, Canada), Emma Borg (Reading), Ruth Kempson (King's College London), Timothy Pritchard (King's College London) and Deirdre Wilson (University College London and CSMN, Oslo). Commentators were Robyn Carston (University College London and CSMN, Oslo), Paul Elbourne (Queen Mary, University of London), Herman Cappelen (Arche, St Andrews and CSMN, Oslo), Barry Smith (Birkbeck College and School of Advanced Study, London), Mark Textor (King's College London), Georg Kjoll (CSMN, Oslo) and Nicholas Allott (CSMN, Oslo).

Members of the Metarepresentation sub-project also put on a semester-long MA course on Pragmatics and Relevance Theory, organised by Nicholas Allott, with contributions from Georg Kjoll, Ingrid Lossius Falkum and Deirdre Wilson.



## Universal Grammar in First-Language Acquisition

Research in this sub-project has focused on two main areas: recursion and complexity as universal features of human language, and the acquisition and historical transmission of phonologically empty items. A debate has reemerged in linguistics about the relationship between linguistic complexity on the one hand and literacy and cultural complexity on the other. Jan Terje Faarlund has conducted fieldwork and completed a book manuscript on the syntactic structures of a native American language, *The Grammar of Chiapas Zoque* (forthcoming), demonstrating that there is no such necessary correlation. Data from this project have been presented at conferences on language complexity and language contact during 2010. Phonologically empty items (e.g. subjects in languages like Latin and Spanish, and definite determiners in languages like Latin and Russian) tend to be replaced by overt items through the history of some languages. How to understand the acquisition of such items, on the one hand, and their replacement by overt items, on the other, is the topic of ongoing work in this sub-project. Preliminary results are presented in various papers (e.g. J.T. Faarlund, 'On the history of definiteness marking in Scandinavian', *Journal of Linguistics* 2009), and a monograph is in progress. Theories of syntactic change in a wider perspective are discussed in Faarlund's chapter on 'Word Order' in the *Continuum Companion to Historical Linguistics* (2010). Our affiliate Terje Lohndahl is steadily publishing numerous papers on theoretical and formal issues relating to universal grammar and the nature of human language.

Herman Cappelen



# Moral Agency

The Moral agency branch of CSMN has focused on five different research areas during the last year, and has maintained and expanded international collaboration with researchers and with CAPPE research centre in Australia. It has also embarked on interdisciplinary studies of normativity and rational moral behaviour.

In 2010, the members of the moral agency team worked in 5 interrelated areas: (1) With the mid-term evaluation of CSMN coming up, getting the results of our research ready for publication had the highest priority. (2) After signing the consortium agreement with Arché and CAPPE, Christel Fricke visited CAPPE in March. (3) The team hosted and participated in 18 conferences, workshops and guest lectures, with all in all 77 speakers, 24 of them women. The ambition was in all cases to bring together scholars from different disciplines, be it within philosophy or within academia at large. (4) We received four long term visitors (all of them female scholars!) and two scholars who stayed for shorter periods of time. (5) We collaborated extensively with CAPPE and other local and international research institutions, including the Ethics Program, ESOP, The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, the Stanford based McCoy Family Centre for Ethics in Society, as well as with several young scholars affiliated with CSMN.

Christel Fricke finally submitted two volumes with collected essays to the respective publishers: The Ethics of Forgiveness has been published by Routledge (with the date

of 2011). And Adam Smith and the Conditions of a Moral Society has been published as a special set of contributions of The Adam Smith Review, 6 (with the date of 2011).

Further members of our team also had a very high level of production. (For details see list of publications.)

In March 2010, Christel Fricke visited the CAPPE centre based in Canberra/Australia. She met colleagues in Canberra, explored further prospects of cooperation between the two consortium partners, and lectured on forgiveness and dignity. John Weckert from CAPPE accepted an invitation to give a lecture in Oslo and visited CSMN in June. In the meantime, Gerhard Overland (CSMN) and Christian Barry (CAPPE) have cooperated successfully in raising funding for two research projects, one on 'Responding to Local Poverty', funded by the Norwegian Research Council, through the Norwegian Programme for Research Cooperation with India (INDNOR), the other on 'Who owns it?— Land claims in Latin America: their moral legitimacy and implications' funded also by the Norwegian Research Council.

One focus of the conferences we hosted in 2010 has been the analysis of the meaning and reference of concepts which play a crucial role in our evaluative and normative judgments, and in our moral judgments in particular, namely dispositional and response-dependent concepts. Eline Busck-Gunderson has organized three conferences, one on Dispositions, one on Response Dependence, and one on Agency and Dispositions (the latter two in cooperation with the RA team and with Jennifer Hornsby in particular). The world leading scholars in the debate, including Philip Pettit and Crispin Wright, came to Oslo in order to contribute to these conferences.

In May and June, Thomas Pogge stayed in Oslo not only as a member of CSMN but also as a special guest of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. The main focus of his work in and from Oslo was to further promote the 'Health Impact Fund' which was originally launched in Oslo in 2008.

In October, we hosted the third conference on the Nature of Social and Moral Norms in Intentional Action, again bringing together

social scientists and philosophers. (For details see p. 54.)

In cooperation with the LA team and with Jan Terje Faarlund in particular, we hosted a workshop on Universal Moral Grammar, exploring the scope and limits of the analogy between the originally Chomskyan and by now well-established claim that there are genetically determined basic structures of natural languages on the one hand and the more recently and still quite hypothetical claim that there might be genetically determined basic structures of otherwise divergent moral cultures.

Peter Railton visited CSMN in June and gave several lectures on normative theory in general and moral theory in particular, with a special focus on the nature of values and valuing. As during his former visits, he brought together the whole of the CSMN team.

Christel Fricke gave an introductory lecture on Frans de Waal's 2009 book on *The Age of Empathy* – Frans de Waal having been invited for the Kristine Bonnevie Lecture 2011 by Nils Christian Steenseth (CEES).







De Waal argues that not only human beings, but also our closest relatives, the apes, have a disposition for empathic feelings and behavioral responses. Empathy plays an important part in understanding the natural moral dispositions of human beings. Fricke raised questions about how far reaching are the consequences one can plausibly draw from this finding concerning the question how we should organize our societies. Evidence for people being naturally provided with empathy should not be misinterpreted as support for the claim that human beings are by nature moral beings. Human morality is a cultural achievement, even though we would probably not have it unless we had a natural disposition for empathy. Therefore, following the suggestion of culture skeptics like Frans de Waal and trying to learn from the

apes how to shape our society might not be the way to go.

Finally, we were involved in several cooperative projects. Two of them addressed ethical aspects of our concern for the environment and of climate change. In cooperation with the Ethics Program and with CSMN affiliate Espen Gamlund in particular, we co-hosted a workshop on Confronting Environmental Values. As partners of ESOP, PRIO and the Stanford based McCoy Family Centre for Ethics and the Environment, we co-hosted two conferences on Climate Change and Distributive Justice (one in Stanford and the other one in Oslo).

A third cooperative project was dedicated to Neuroscience and the Law. Project

leaders were Lene Bormann-Larson and Jakob Elster, both CSMN affiliates who had obtained funding for this project from the Norwegian Research Council. They organized 3 conferences on the topic which CSMN co-hosted. These conferences brought Stephen J. Morse (Pennsylvania) several times to Oslo, and he has now agreed to join the CSMN team.

Cooperation both on the personal and on the institutional level played a very important part in our activities, and I would like to take the opportunity of thanking all those who helped CSMN and the MA team in particular to organize and co-host so many events.

Christel Fricke





# Rational Agency

The question of rational agency touches upon a vast number of different philosophical problems. This branch of CSMN's research has in 2010 manifested its work in seven different events which all cover important parts of the research, in addition to seminars connected to this year's annual lecture.

## Principal Events in 2010

The Rational Agency branch of CSMN organized seven main events in 2010. Each pursued lines of investigation drawn up in its three main sub-projects. The largest event, in terms of number of speakers as well as the audience, was the conference 'Self-knowledge and Rational Agency', held in June and organized by Timothy Chan. Taken severally, the topics of self-knowledge and rational agency are venerable issues in the philosophy of mind and action. In recent years, however, a fruitful line of research has emerged, which attempts to understand the connections between the two. The questions here were addressed in depth by a number of leading authorities. Though this was perhaps the most salient event, the other workshops and conferences were, on the whole, equally successful in terms of pursuing topics of central concern to CSMN. Issues about the nature of dispositions, and their relation to agency and meaning, were pursued in depth both at our first major event of the year, the (large) 'Workshop on Dispositions', held in March, as well as the later one day conference, 'Agency and Dispositions' in honour of Philip Pettit. The workshop 'The Theoretical and the Practical' was devoted to a number of fascinating issues, including questions concerning the character of instrumental reasoning and the existence and

nature of reason relations. Our final event of the year – the Leeds-CSMN workshop on Knowledge and Agency – marked the start of what we hope will be an ongoing, and widening, collaboration between CSMN and the Philosophy Department at the University of Leeds.

### 1. Workshop on Dispositions

22-23 March, University of Oslo

- Stephen Mumford (Nottingham) (with Rani Anjum): Causal Dispositionalism versus Counterfactual Dependence
- Rani Anjum (CSMN/Nottingham) (with Stephen Mumford): Dispositions and Modality
- Eline Busck Gundersen (CSMN/Aarhus): The Metaphysical Modesty of Conditional Accounts of Dispositions
- Barbara Vetter (Oxford): Dispositions Without the Stimulus
- Jennifer McKittrick (Nebraska-Lincoln): Dispositional Essentialism without Necessitarianism,
- Lars Bo Gundersen (Aarhus): Tracking, Epistemic Dispositions and the Conditional Analysis,
- Anders Strand (Oslo): The Ontological Innocence of Second-Order Property Designators,
- Sungho Choi (Kyung Hee, Seoul): Finkish Dispositions and Contextualism

### 2. Workshop on Present Issues in Epistemology

26 April, University of Oslo

- Jesper Kallestrup (Edinburgh) 'Incompatibilism and Semantic Circularity'
- Lars Bo Gundersen (Århus) 'Tracking and transmission of knowledge'
- Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (København) 'Perspectives on disagreement'

### 3. The Theoretical and the Practical

28 May University of Oslo

- John Broome (Oxford) 'Instrumental Reasoning'
- John Skorupski (St Andrews) 'Do Reason Relations exist?'
- Sarah Stroud (McGill) 'Is Practical Deliberation Essentially First-Personal?'
- Andrew Reisner (McGill) 'Robust Naturalism, Normative Realism, and Reductive Explanation.'

### 4. Conference: Self-Knowledge and Rational Agency

9-11 June, University of Oslo

- Richard Moran (Harvard): "Self-knowledge and the Forms of Activity and Passivity" Commentator: Endre Begby (CSMN)





- Robert Stalnaker (MIT):  
'One more attempt to put Sleeping Beauty to rest'  
Commentator: Mikkel Gerken (Copenhagen)
- Quassim Cassam (Warwick):  
'Knowing What You Believe'  
Commentator: Frank Barel (Oslo)
- André Gallois (Syracuse):  
'Transparent Reasoning'  
Commentator: Jonathan Way (Stirling)
- Adrian Haddock (Stirling): 'The knowledge that a man has of his intentional actions'

- Commentator: Hong Yu Wong (Birkbeck)
- Pamela Hieronymi (UCLA):  
'Reflection and Responsibility'  
Commentator: Conor McHugh (Jean Nicod)
- Crispin Wright (NYU/Aberdeen):  
'McKinsey One More Time'  
Commentator: Anna-Sara Malmgren (U of Texas, Austin)
- Fred Dretske (Duke): 'Awareness & Authority: Skeptical Doubts about Self Knowledge'  
Commentator: Heather Logue (Leeds)


- Round-up Session, Chair: Jennifer Hornsby (CSMN/Birkbeck)

## 5. Workshop: The Guise of the Good

June 14th, University of Oslo

- Pamela Hieronymi (UCLA): On the Will as Reason
- Heine Holmen (CSMN): Actions, Reasons and Intelligibility
- Anders Nes (CSMN): Instrumental Reasoning from Admittedly Bad Ends.





## 6. Agency and Dispositions - A One Day Conference With Philip Pettit

30th August 2010, University of Oslo

- Philip Pettit (Princeton): 'Assent and the Upgrading of Belief'
- Helen Steward (Leeds): 'Agency, Properties and Causation'
- Rowland Stout (University College Dublin): 'The Reach of Agency'
- Jussi Haukioja (NTNU/Turku): 'Dispositions and the Constitution of Meaning'

## 7. Leeds-CSMN workshop on Knowledge and Agency

September 9, 2010, University of Leeds.

- Jason Turner, University of Leeds, Free Will and Metasemantics: Revisiting the

### Paradigm Case Argument

- Olav Gjelsvik, CSMN, Oslo, Knowing What you Do.
- Wouter Kalf, University of Leeds, Are there categorical moral reasons for action if the most plausible Humean theory of reasons is true?
- Carsten Hansen, CSMN, Oslo, Deflationism, the Aim of Belief and Our Use of "true"
- Pekka Vayrynen, University of Leeds, Thick Concepts and Presupposition
- Bjørn Ramberg, CSMN, Oslo, Animal Subjectivity: Neo-Pragmatism's Struggle with the Mental.

## Publications 2010

The published output this year was quite high. In many cases, it will be clear how the publications represent the culmination of work begun in previous years. The OUP-volume, *The Thief of Time*, for example, is a collection of papers, given at the conference on procrastination held in July 2008. Another volume, *Anscombe's Intention*, originated in two conferences, the first of which was held in 2008, and is scheduled to be published by Harvard University Press in May 2011. Similarly, we expect that work based on the workshops and conferences listed above will be published in the foreseeable future.

Carsten Hansen

















# Honorary rewards

## Research prize to Herman Cappelen

In May 2010 Herman Cappelen was awarded a research prize from the Foundation "Professor Ingerid Dal og søster Ulrikke Greve Dals legat til støtte av humanistisk forskning" at the University of Oslo. This is a foundation that awards a prize when they find someone worthy in at least one of 3 fields: Theoretical Mathematics, Comparative Linguistics, or Rationalistic Philosophy. What comes under these headings is for a committee to judge. No prize is awarded without intensive international refereeing of the highest standards.

There was a nice prize ceremony in the University Library in Oslo. The Pro-Rector of the University of Oslo, philosopher Inga Bostad, gave a speech and presented Herman with the prize. Herman gave a condensed presentation of his research which provided the grounds on which the prize had been awarded. It was a nice occasion for everyone present, Herman's family, as well as many CSMN people, and Oslo philosophers. We enjoyed a light lunch together - in addition to enjoying the speeches and the whole occasion very much. CSMN warmly congratulates Herman on his fantastic research achievements the last few years.







# Public outreach

The CSMN has had a number of events in 2010 directed towards a broader audience, for example a discussion on the Health Impact Fund, “Making new medicines accessible for all”, a seminar on “The Feminization of Global Poverty” and the lecture “I Shall Not Hate”.

In 2010, the MA team of CSMN organized three events at Literaturhuset in Oslo, presenting the research we are involved in to a larger audience.

In May, Thomas Pogge invited a group of politicians and human rights activists to join him for a panel discussion of his *Health Impact Fund* (which was launched in Oslo in 2008). The aim was to discuss the various challenges that have to be met in order to finally get this project on the agenda of international politics.

The *Health Impact Fund*, or HIF, is a proposed

international agency funded by governments that would pioneer a new way of paying for new medicines: The HIF would give pharmaceutical innovators the option to register any product which would then be sold worldwide at manufacturing cost. They would be rewarded on the basis of the health impact of the product. The main purposes of the HIF are to provide access to new medicines that would otherwise be greatly marked up, stimulate innovators to promote the optimal use of their registered products, and incentivize the development of new medicines for heretofore

neglected diseases. The HIF would protect poor patients through new, low-cost medicines while also benefiting more affluent patients and taxpayers as well as innovative pharmaceutical companies.

The discussion critically examined the HIF as an exemplar of global institutional reform: Is the HIF a plausible component of the effort in Europe—to play a more constructive role in securing a minimum level of basic health care in all countries? What are the obstacles on the road to implementing





the HIF, and how can it be advanced? How would the creation of the HIF engender change beyond its particular focus? Would the creation of a systemic health impact assessment agency spur comprehensive reform of the larger global health system?

Panel members included:

- Sophie Bloemen (HAI /Health Action International, Netherlands)
- Godelieve van Heteren (Director of Europa Arena, Netherlands)
- Thomas Pogge (Yale University/CSMN)
- Göran Tomson (Karolinska institutet, University of Stockholm)
- Sigrun Møgedal (Chair) (Ambassador, HIV/AIDS and Global Health Initiatives; Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Special Adviser - Foreign Policy and Global Health)



In June 2010, Izzeldin Abuelaish attended a conference at the Norwegian Academy of Science and we took the opportunity to invite him for a public lecture addressing the topic of forgiveness from his particular point of view.

Izzeldin Abuelaish is a medical doctor from Gaza whose three daughters were killed during the Israeli War on Gaza in January 2009. Under the title 'I shall not hate', he published a book in which he tells about his youth and education in Gaza and finally shares the tragic story of the death of his daughters. Rather than calling for revenge, he stresses the need for forgiveness between Israelis and Palestinians and provides an example of how this can be achieved. His voice is unique in stressing the cultural similarities between the Israeli and Palestinian people rather than pointing to the



differences between them that dominate the political debate.

His lecture provided an example of the possibility of forgiveness even under very difficult political and personal conditions where much suffering was imposed and had to be endured. Christel Fricke was preparing a volume with essays on *The Ethics of Forgiveness* for publication with Routledge, so the topic had been on the agenda of CSMN.

While visiting CSMN in June 2010, Alison Jaggar invited Elisabeth L'Orange Fürst (SAI, UiO) and Aud Talle (SAI, UiO) to join her for a panel discussion on 'The Feminization of Global Poverty: How Can Philosophy Help?'.

It is often said that global poverty wears a



woman's face. But what standards or metrics are used to identify the poor? Who selects those standards? How is this selection justified?

In her opening talk Jaggar sketched some of the ways in which existing poverty metrics obscure the full extent of gendered poverty. She then described one of her current research projects whose aim is to develop an alternative poverty metric. The new metric is supposed to be more sensitive to the gendered dimensions of poverty and capable of revealing them more accurately.

Underlying this project is the idea that determining who is rich and who is poor is not exclusively a matter for economics and the social sciences. It involves more than merely observing the world to discover who has plenty and who is deprived. Identifying the rich and poor also relies on value judgments about which things people need in order to be able to avoid poverty and how much of these things they need. Answers to these questions are used to guide policies regarding welfare payments and foreign aid. These answers should be informed by normative thought and moral reasoning that is sound and transparent. However, many existing poverty metrics are arbitrary and lack any clear moral justification. Moral philosophy is needed to explain how poverty metrics may be justified and who should have the authority to determine those metrics.

Christel Fricke





# Annual Lecture: Philip Pettit

On August 31 professor Philip Pettit from Princeton University held the CSMN's Annual Lecture on Mind in Nature. The title of his talk was Freedom: An Essentially Public Good.

The 2010 CSMN Annual Lecture on Mind in Nature was given by Philip Pettit (Laurance S. Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values, Princeton University), and his topic was: Freedom: An Essentially Public Good.

Philip Pettit works in moral and political theory and on background issues in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics, and is one of the most broadminded and fascinating thinkers at work today. His lecture was very well attended; we had to move rooms to the largest auditorium in the University Library (Georg Sverdrups Hus) for everyone to get a seat. During his visit in Oslo Pettit also participated in a one-day event on agency, and a two-day event on response dependent concept, both areas where he has been one of the main contributors to ongoing research.

In his lecture, professor Pettit asked whether there are goods that are essentially public and political in their origin. His answer was, yes there are. The prime example is in fact civic freedom: We each individually depend on what we can only achieve together in order to enjoy the status of free persons.

In order to arrive at his answer, professor Pettit took the audience through a fascinating tour of the history of political thought, and also through some of the basic motivations for the political thinking in the tradition of Republicanism. Inside this framework of Republicanism he established by an intriguing line of argument the following: We have to act together to set up a public, robust system of protective and empowering law in order to make civic freedom available for you or for anyone else. The independence of

the free person is therefore an essentially public good.

The lecture was extremely well received, and was followed by a very good discussion period where many people in the audience engaged in interesting discussions with professor Pettit. Everybody who considered the question thought this was the most interesting discussion period we have ever had in connection with the annual CSMN lecture on mind in nature. Of course the credit for this goes to Philip Pettit for making his thoughts available in such a form that the audience engaged so deeply with his thinking.

Olav Gjelsvik





# Midway evaluation and reapplication

The members of the CSMN has been engaged in the huge project of Midway evaluation and reapplication, a communication with the Norwegian Research Council for the continuation of the Centre's activities. This process has been very valuable for the Centre and has enabled it to reformulate its mission and the means to achieve new goals, as well as address the functioning of the Centre.

The Norwegian Centres of Excellence scheme requires that every centre be subjected to a comprehensive midway evaluation. On the basis of this multi-stage assessment, the Research Council of Norway makes its decision as to whether the individual centre is allowed to continue for the maximal 10-year period, or will be wound up after 5 years. For CSMN, the evaluation process began in 2010, and the final decision as to its future is expected in June 2011.

The aim of the evaluation is to assess the scientific quality and performance of CSMN – both in absolute terms and in relation to the centre's original research plans as outlined in our application. The evaluation process is now in its final stages. In the first stage, CSMN, together with its host institution IFIKK,

was asked to prepare a number of documents to be used in the evaluation. Here we were asked to provide key financial, administrative and organisational data, a list of publications up to the midway evaluation, and raw data about the conferences, workshops and other activities arranged by the centre in the same period. Based on this information, CSMN was then asked to prepare a 'self-evaluation' – a document giving an extensive analysis of the research performed, scientific achievements, publication records, researcher training and recruitment, as well of organisational aspects including governance, national and international collaboration, and of any important social or cultural dividends. As part of the assessment of the first 3 ½ years of activity at CSMN, IFIKK reported on the experience gained from hosting a Centre of

Excellence, scientifically as well as from an administrative point of view. In the final document, CSMN set out a detailed plan for the second five year period.

The initial stage began in the late Spring, and the documents were presented to the Research Council on December 1<sup>st</sup>. It involved a concerted effort by all of CSMN's core group members, as well as its administrative staff. A draft of our documents were shown to our intellectual auditors, professors John Dupre, Onora O'Neill, and Timothy Williamson. Their detailed feedback and comments were immensely helpful. There is no getting around the fact that the mid-way evaluation involved a lot of work. However, it has also been extremely useful. And we have no doubt that the lessons learned will be put



to very good use if – as we hope – CSMN is renewed for the full 10 year period.

The documents prepared in the first stage of the process served as input to the second stage, which was an assessment of CSMN by three international experts, whose identities are not known to us. Their evaluation was made available in mid-February. Happily, their over-all assesment was the highest possible, namely ‘expectionally good’. According to the Research Council, the criteria for this ranking are: ‘International front

position, undertaking original research and publishing in the best international journals. High productivity. Very positive overall impression of research group/ centre and leadership’.

The third stage in the assessment involved a meeting with an interdisciplinary, international committee with a broad scientific representation set up by the Research Council, held on March 15<sup>th</sup>. CSMN was represented by Olav Gjelsvik, Ulla Heli, Deirdre Wilson, as well as Bjørn

Haugstad, research director of the University of Oslo. Our impression of the meeting was that it too went well, and we are hopeful that when the Research Council makes its final decision, in June 2011, it will be that CSMN is allowed to continue for the full 10 year period.

Carsten Hansen





# International Collaboration

Since the beginning the CSMN has strived to be open towards international research, and the Centre is trying to implement this wish in the very structure of our activities.

A high priority from the start has been to establish CSMN in the global research community. In the initial three-year period we organized more than 60 workshops and conferences, and brought more than 200 of the world's leading researchers in our fields to Oslo and Norway. At the same time, core members of CSMN have given talks at more than 20 departments and research institutes around the world. This effort has clearly paid off: CSMN now has high international visibility and is a focus of wide-ranging research networks. Each of our nine subprojects has established collaborations with individuals, groups, or institutions, with research coordinators from Rutgers University, University of Michigan, University College London, University of Colorado, Boulder and the University of St Andrews.

Another important aspect of our success is that interest in long-term visits to CSMN is strong and growing among both junior

researchers and established scholars. To date we have had long-term (3 weeks or more) visitors from members of 12 departments in the US, Europe and Canada. These international visitors have integrated well with daily life at CSMN, and their contributions both to research output and to our role as a centre of local academic activity have been a key element in our success.

Our most important cooperation at the institutional level is the consortium agreement between CSMN, the Arché philosophical research centre at the University of St Andrews and CAPPE at Australian National University. The three institutions now have a joint Board; they have some closely aligned research projects, they co-organize events, and there is extensive exchange of personnel. The resulting collaborations have enriched our research and raised our international profile: for instance, the Linguistic Agency branch at CSMN has collaborated extensively with

the Contextualism and Relativism project at Arché, and the synergy between staff and students has had enormous impact on our work. Similarly, the Distributive and Political Justice project of the CSMN Moral Agency branch has extensive collaboration with CAPPE-based researchers. To complement the consortium agreement, the Universities of Oslo and St Andrews have developed a joint PhD program in philosophy where students split their time between the two institutions and end up with a double-badged degree. CSMN also cooperates with Arché in organizing a yearly graduate conference—this year more than 200 students from around the world submitted papers. Only six submissions are accepted, so this is an exceptionally competitive event and speaks to CSMN's international recognition.



# Graduate Conference

The Graduate Conference (AC-GC-IV) was organized for the fourth time as a joint event between the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature and Arché Philosophical Research Centre.

The fourth annual CSMN/Arché Graduate Conference was held at the University of Oslo on November 6-7, with the aim of showcasing international graduate work in contemporary analytic philosophy. This year, we received a record number of 219 submissions, which indicates that the annual joint conference has been able to gather significant international attention. Six of these submissions were finally selected after a blind review process, and were invited to speak at the conference. The six speakers were Thomas Brouwer (University of Leeds), Jeremy Goodman (University of Oxford), Milena Ivanova (University of Bristol), Philippe A. Luson (New York University), Zachary Miller (Rutgers University), Nathaniel Sharadin (The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill). The topics included epistemology, logic, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of action. During the conference all graduate

speakers received comments by a respondent who was a member of Arché or CSMN.

In addition to the six graduate speakers, we invited three distinguished keynote speakers: Timothy Williams (University of Oxford), Ruth Chang (University of Rutgers), and Stephen Yablo (MIT). The keynotes provided challenging talks and gave invaluable feedback to the graduate speakers.

The conference proved to be a great success. We had two full days of constant philosophical activity. A conference dinner was held both Saturday as well as a smaller dinner on Sunday, enabling the participants to continue their discussions and form valuable connections. Both graduate and keynote speakers commented that the conference had been a

very enjoyable experience, and it was even said to be the most impressive graduate conference that one keynote speaker had visited. We therefore think that the conference has contributed to gather positive attention to the activities of Arché and CSMN, and that our research centres will continue to be important venues for international graduate students to present their work.

The event was organized by Andrea Onofri (Arché), Margot Strohming (Arché), Kari Refsdal (CSMN), and Mathias S. Sagdahl (CSMN). The organizers also received generous help from the administrative staff at CSMN and Arché. A total of 40 people registered for the conference.

Mathias S. Sagdahl





# Long term guests

The CSMN is highly internationally oriented and we receive about 200 researchers every year from all over the world. The Centre have enjoyed visits from some of these researchers for longer periods of time and our long time visitors have not only participated in academic endeavours, but have put their significant mark on the Centre's daily life.

As in previous years, team member Alison Jaggar (Colorado), together with Theresa Tobin (Marquette) spent a month at CSMN, continuing their work on a joint book project which aims at providing an account of strategies of moral reasoning capable of being used to address moral disagreements among people who have diverse cultural identities and are systematically unequal in social power. Underlying is the idea that the most influential moral theories like utilitarianism or various versions of deontological ethics attribute a central role in moral reasoning, judgment and decision making to abstract principles which present morality in ideal terms. Applying such principles to singular cases, however, does not allow the moral judge to be sensitive to the particular circumstances of moral agents. Moral egalitarianism, as ideally desirable as it may be, does not pay justice to the actual differences between people and may lead

to unfair treatment of those who lack social power.

Following an invitation by the Ethics Program, Alison Jaggar and Theresa Tobin taught a Graduate Course on their ongoing research, entitled Ethics Across Borders.

Alison Jaggar also organized a public panel discussion on The Feminization of Poverty. (See p. 35.)

Prof. Maria Alejandra Carrasco (Santiago/ Pontifica Universidad Católica de Chile) visited CSMN between August and November. She gave several lectures, two of them co-hosted by the series of guest lectures organized by the department of philosophy (Filosofisk seminar) and by the seminar in science studies (Seminar I vitenskapsteori) respectively. Carrasco is interested in ethical

practice and in the way moral theory should take it into account. One source of her philosophical inspiration is the work of Adam Smith and his philosophical departure from other philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment like Francis Hutcheson and David Hume. Her particular interest is in the steps that takes us from behavioral psychology to normative moral theory.

In October, CSMN had two further scholars visiting, both with a strong interest in Adam Smith and his moral and political thought. Vivienne Brown (The Open University) came for her second visit at CSMN. And Fonna Forman-Barzilai (San Diego) who recently took over the responsibility for editing the The Adam Smith Review from Vivienne Brown, joined the team for a short visit, giving a lecture on her 2010 book Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy.

Christel Fricke

Michael Morreau, Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, visited the CSMN twice in 2010. He works in Philosophical Logic and the Philosophy of Language, and has also worked in Artificial Intelligence. He has written on the semantics and pragmatics of natural language, most recently on vagueness, as well as on theoretical and practical reasoning. While visiting the CSMN in 2010, he completed a project on the notion of overall similarity (Morreau, Michael 2010) He is currently busy with a project on the aggregation of theoretical

virtues such as simplicity and fit to available data. Together with professor Carsten Hansen, he is exploring the consequences of this work for interpretationist accounts of intentionality.

Rational Agency also had assistant professor Andrew Reisner from McGill University as a visiting scholar during spring 2010. He presented his work at the CSMN conference The Theoretical and the Practical in May. His current research falls into two distinct areas; on normativity and rationality with a special emphasis on the question of what kind of

role, if any, pragmatism about reasons for propositional attitudes has to play in our overall theories of normativity and rationality, respectively. The second area of Reisner's current research is in metaethics. His primary interest in metaethics is methodological in the sense that he is increasingly sceptical that we can learn much of philosophical interest (outside of concerns in the philosophy of language) from language. He also has an interest in substantive questions about the metaphysics of normative properties.

Ulla Heli



A both pleasant and important part of life at the CSMN is to have visitors from abroad. In 2010, we had 24 visitors, who put together accounted for almost five full-time man years of research output. We provide a working community for young scientists, and in 2010 there were 7 PhD students in addition to our own 6, who came to CSMN to work for a longer period. Also several well-established scientists have visited us and participated in the center's academic activities in 2010.

List of visitors:

Vivienne Brown	Professor	The Open University, Milton Keynes, UK
James Konow	Professor	Department of Economics, Loyola Marymount University, US
Theresa Tobin	assistant professor	Marquette University, US
Maria Carrasco	professor	Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Michael Morreau	professor	University of Maryland
Andrew Reisner	assistant professor	McGill University, Canada
Stephen Morse	professor	University of Pennsylvania Law School, US
Pamela Hieronimy	professor	University of California Los Angeles, US
Richard Holton	professor	Massachusetts Institute of Technology, US
Richard Moran	professor	Harvard University, US
Philip Pettit	professor	Princeton University, US
Peter Railton	professor	University of Michigan, US
Robert Stalnaker	professor	Massachusetts Institute of Technology, US
Sarah Stroud	professor	McGill University, Canada
Crispin Wright	professor	New York University, US
Catherine Wilson	professor	University of Aberdeen, Scotland
Holly Anderson	phd student	University of Pittsburgh
Julian Fink	phd student	Oxford University, UK
Thiago Galery	phd student	University College of London, UK
Thomas Hodgson	phd student	University of St. Andrew, Scotland
Antti Kuusela	phd student	University of Helsinki, Finland
Rachel Severson	phd student	University of Washington, US
Thomas Zuradzky	phd student	Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland
Rani Lill Anjum	phd	University of Tromsø, Norway



# Interview with Rachel Severson

Our international collaborators and guests come from a variety of different academic disciplines and have interesting research backgrounds. We will hear more from one of them, Rachel Severson, developmental psychologist.

## What is your research about?

My research investigates children's moral conceptions of biological (e.g., humans, animals, plants) and technological entities that mimic or represent biological forms (e.g., humanoid robots, animal robots). I am particularly interested in (a) how children's understanding may change as a function of development, culture, and experience; (b) the role of pretense and imagination in children's attributions, especially to robots; and (c) whether a new ontological category is emerging that moves beyond long-standing canonical categories (e.g., between alive and not alive).

## What first drew you to the CSMN, and to Norway?

I was particularly drawn to CSMN because of the interdisciplinary focus on philosophical and psychological questions. Many philosophical questions can be informed by empirical research and, in turn, psychological questions can be informed

by philosophy. To paraphrase Kant, "Theory without data is empty, data without theory is blind." CSMN provides a unique space to cultivate intellectual exchanges that are highly collaborative and integrative.

Norway is well known for its breathtaking natural environment: Deep fjords rimmed by dramatic mountains and plunging glacier-fed waterfalls. The long polar night and its opposite, the midnight sun. I was drawn to be in a place and culture where I could enjoy a rich outdoor life -- to ski, hike, and sail -- and Norway has this abundance!

## You have external funding for your research stay. Can you tell what kind of arrangement you have and how this works?

I have a Fulbright Fellowship through the U.S.-Norway Fulbright Foundation and U.S. Department of State. It is a 10-month fellowship for the 2010-2011 academic year. Fulbright Fellowships go both ways, sending Americans to Norway and Norwegians to the U.S.



## What are the differences between the lives of researchers here in Norway and the ones in the US? Do you think they are significantly different?

When I was in grad school in the U.S. my advisor told me that academic life is very flexible, you can work whichever 80 hours of the week you want to! Perhaps this is the biggest difference between the life of a researcher in the U.S. and Norway. People here work very hard, but then they leave work and enjoy other parts of life such as family, the outdoors, and recreation. Quality of life is very important in Norway and I think that research and scholarly work can really benefit from having a balanced life.

The CSMN covers a range of different topics and fields. How do you feel that your work fits into all this?

It has been really interesting to see all the connections between my interests and the various interests represented at CSMN. I am part of the Moral Agency group, and my work fits nicely into this agency since it is in the realm of moral development while also expanding into other topics such as moral conceptions of non-human others (e.g., animals and robots). I have also had really interesting and fruitful discussions with people in the other agencies. It is tremendously fun to find these unexpected connections. Perhaps it shouldn't be so surprising since CSMN

has an overarching theme that weaves together the various interests, topics, and fields.

**It is increasingly difficult for scholars to get jobs and funding for their research. What do you think about the CSMN as a spring board for young researchers as yourself?**

I think CSMN can offer wonderful opportunities for young researchers to gain more experience and to develop professional relationships and collaborations, both of which increase one's competitiveness for grants and jobs. I have been grateful for the professional

relationships I have developed at CSMN and with others outside of CSMN through CSMN's conferences and workshops. My host at CSMN, Christal Fricke, has been incredibly supportive of my success as a scholar and I feel that I am better positioned as a result of my time at CSMN.

**What are your plans for the future?**

I am applying for post-doc positions in the U.S. and Norway, so it remains to be seen what will be next in my immediate future.







# Seminar in Helsinki

In August CSMN staff, left for a internal seminar in Helsinki, an alternative to the scheduled trip to Rome.

Eyjafjallajökull's eruption put paid to the CSMN's planned annual trip to Rome, in 2010. The many of hours Lina Tosterud, Kari Refsdal and Heine Holmen had put into organizing our trip, and the exciting plans they had come up with, thus sadly came to naught. It did not prove feasible, at that stage, to arrange a full-scale "replacement" trip later the same year, involving the centre's entire staff. Instead, we settled on a slightly downscaled outing: a three-day trip to Helsinki, in late August, for our junior staff, i.e. PhD students and postdocs, benignly chaperoned by Ulla Heli.

Accommodated near the Helsinki harbour, our days at Helsinki were largely filled with presentations and discussion. Most speakers took the opportunity to present in-progress work, in what proved to be an intimate, friendly, and vivacious atmosphere. Topics covered included problems of mental causation, difficulties over incommensurabilities of value in practical reasoning, and questions about the pragmatics of non-literal interpretations, among much else. There was a widespread sense that the opportunity to discuss each other's work, with the freshness of mind that comes from new surroundings, enhanced our

feeling of contributing to a joint enterprise. The trip organizers, again the indefatigable Kari and Heine, had also found room for a stimulating social programme. In particular, careful research had enabled them to identify some extremely interesting venues for recent Finnish cuisine. Besides the philosophical and linguistic ideas discussed at our academic sessions, the taste of beetroot flavoured ice-cream will surely remain one of the enduring memories from the trip, at least for this traveller.

Anders Nes



# Response dependent concepts

Several response-dependent and response-independent concepts were developed in the 80's and 90's. The goal was to devise new ways to distinguish concepts of subject matters that are intuitively closely related to our sensibilities and responses from concepts of more objective features of the world. The CSMN organised August 26-28 a conference on this subject.

The CSMN/NIP conference on response-dependent concepts took place in Oslo on the 26.-28. August. It was the first in a projected series of conferences on mind and objectivity organized jointly by Northern Institute of Philosophy (Aberdeen) and CSMN.

This conference brought together most of those philosophers whose seminal contributions have shaped the debate on response-dependence. There were also contributions from early career philosophers, including three excellent submitted papers.

The aim of the conference was to revisit, refresh, and refine the discussion of response-dependence. The distinction between response-dependent and independent concepts was introduced in the late 1980's as a way of distinguishing concepts of subject matters closely related to our sensibilities from concepts of more objective features of the world. The distinction originally grew out of

attempts to account for the curious mixture of subjectivity and objectivity at play in moral discourse by the development of analogies between moral features and secondary qualities. But, after a first wave of proposed general characterisations, response-dependence theses were also proposed, widely and controversially, for rule-following and linguistic meaning, mental states such as intention, causation, modality, abstract objects, aesthetic value, colours and social institutions. The notion of response-dependence surfaces in just about any area of philosophical discourse, and has been understood and put to use in so many different ways that an opportunity for stock-taking was long overdue. The distinguished group of speakers and an inquisitive audience explored and clarified the many notions, distinctions, and motivations hidden under the heading of response-dependence. The presentations and discussions shed new light on the most difficult questions at the heart of the debate on response-dependence.

The conference was organized by Crispin Wright (NIP/NYU) and Eline Busck Gundersen (CSMN), with excellent help from colleagues at CSMN. While the initiative came from CSMN's moral agency sub-project, the topics discussed also involved linguistic normativity and many subjects pertaining to rational agency, thus spanning all three branches of CSMN's research. The programme covered a wide range of topics and positions central to the debate on response-dependence, including several papers on response-dependence-based solutions to Wittgensteinian problems about linguistic normativity, several papers on values (moral and otherwise), and papers on issues relevant to response-dependence theses regardless of area.

Several speakers and participants remarked that it was a well organized and intellectually very fruitful conference, where making headway on the subjects discussed took precedence over ego-boosting and the furthering of individual agendas. One of the



speakers, Eyja Brynjarsdottir, enjoyed it enough to return to CSMN as a visiting scholar in 2011.

It is intended that the CSMN/NIP Mind and Objectivity Conference will be an annual event, alternating between Oslo and Aberdeen.

Programme of the conference:

- Kit Fine (New York University): Joint Intention
- Richard Holton (MIT): Could Empirical Work Show that Ethics is Protagorean? And What does That Involve?
- Eline Busck Gundersen (CSMN & Aarhus): Response-Dependence, Reference Fixing and a priori Biconditionals
- Walter Pedriali (NIP): When Authority Gives Out. Kings, Rules, Semantic Properties and Response-Dependence
- Crispin Wright (NYU & NIP): Response-Dependence and Rule-Following Reconsidered
- Alex Miller (Birmingham): Judgement-Dependence, Tacit Knowledge and Linguistic Understanding
- Eyja Brynjarsdottir (Iceland): Response-Dependence and Subjective Properties
- Antti Kauppinen (Amsterdam & Trinity College Dublin): Why We Idealize
- Drew Howat (Sheffield): Shallow vs. Deep Response-Dependence
- Philip Pettit (Princeton): Patterns, Codes and Commensuration
- Joshua Gert (College of William and Mary): Response-Dependence, Harms, and Objective Practical Reasons
- Sonia Sedivy (Toronto): Beauty, Realism and Response-Dependence: The aesthetic presence of the world is inseparable from what we are
- Catherine Wilson (Aberdeen): Response Dependency and Moral Judgement

Eline Busck-Gundersen



# Self-knowledge and rational agency

From the conference on Self-Knowledge and Rational Agency June 9-11 2010 at the University of Oslo.

The conference was the major event organized by the Rational Agency project in 2010. It brought together many of the leading authorities on the topics discussed, including several world-renowned philosophers. The main organizer was Timothy Chan, who was assisted by Jennifer Hornsby, Anders Nes and Olav Gjelsvik. The aim of the conference was to investigate the ways in which the distinctive characteristics of the way we know about our own minds from the first-person perspective may be understood in terms of our nature as agents capable of rational thoughts and action. We are generally authoritative about our own mental states (such as perceptual experience, beliefs, desires and intentions), and need not rely on empirical observations of ourselves or inference to know about them. Someone's belief that she is in a mental state, moreover, is normally good ground for inferring she is indeed in that state. In recent years a fruitful line of research has emerged, which attempts to understand the nature and significance of self-knowledge by exploring its connections with rational agency. The following inter-related questions, among others, were addressed in the talks:

- Does being a rational agent require or imply the ability to know about one's own states of mind in certain special ways?
- Are some characteristics of our self-knowledge of our mental states due to their being responsive to reason, and the roles they play in our reasoning?
- Our privileged access to our current intentions and intentional actions seem to be partly a consequence the fact that we actively decide what we do. How far does this kind of self-knowledge extend, both forward into the world in which we act, and backward into the beliefs and desires that justify the intention and action?
- To what extent, and in what sense, are we active agents responsible for some of the mental states we are in? Is such agency the source of our self-knowledge?
- If so, is the idea that self-knowledge is a substantive cognitive achievement thereby undermined?

There were commentaries to each of the plenary talks, given by invited young researchers selected from a large number of applications. In all there were just over a hundred participants from a dozen countries, who all had the opportunity to

take part in the discussion sessions. One of our distinguished emeritus speakers kindly told us that he thought it was the most interesting and best-organized conference he had been to.

The conference was preceded by a high-profile sister event, the Arché/CSMN Mini-course & Workshop on *De Se* Attitudes, which was organized by Herman Cappelen and Dilip Ninan from our consortium partner Arché Centre. The two events covered related aspects of first-person thoughts, and we decided to hold them back-to-back in Oslo in order to enable interested participants to take part in both, which a large number did. Three of the speakers at the Self-Knowledge conference also kindly stayed on to give an additional talk on the following Monday. Altogether it was an intensive nine-day festival of philosophical investigations, which was found to be immensely rewarding by all who took part.

In order to further disseminate internationally the ideas exchanged at the conference, the talks were recorded and are now freely available to listen to as podcasts on our website.

Timothy Chan



#### Programme of the conference

- Richard Moran (Harvard): 'Self-Knowledge and the Forms of Activity and Passivity'  
Commentator: Endre Begby (CSMN)  
Chair: Olav Gjelsvik (CSMN)
- Robert Stalnaker (MIT): 'One More Attempt to put Sleeping Beauty to Rest'  
Commentator: Mikkel Gerken (Copenhagen)  
Chair: Herman Cappelen (CSMN/Arché)
- Quassim Cassam (Warwick): 'Knowing What You Believe'  
Commentator: Frank Barel (Oslo)  
Chair: David Hunter (Ryerson)
- André Gallois (Syracuse): 'Transparent Reasoning'  
Commentator: Jonathan Way (Stirling)  
Chair: Bjørn Ramberg (CSMN)
- Adrian Haddock (Stirling): 'The Knowledge that a Man has of his Intentional Actions'  
Commentator: Hong Yu Wong (Birkbeck)  
Chair: Carsten Hansen (CSMN)
- Pamela Hieronymi (UCLA): 'Reflection and Responsibility'  
Commentator: Conor McHugh (Jean Nicod)  
Chair: Anders Nes (CSMN)
- Crispin Wright (NYU/Aberdeen): 'McKinsey One More Time'  
Commentator: Anna-Sara Malmgren (U of Texas, Austin)  
Chair: Christel Fricke (CSMN)
- Fred Dretske (Duke): 'Awareness & Authority: Skeptical Doubts about Self Knowledge'  
Commentator: Heather Logue (Leeds)  
Chair: Aidan McGlynn (Aberdeen)



Third CSMN conference on the Nature of Social and Moral Norms in Intentional Action:

# Responsibility: Normative Conceptions and Empirical Findings

On October 14-15 2010, the third conference on the Nature of Social and Moral Norms in Intentional Action took place. The conference was marked by a high interdisciplinary contribution, and bore the title *Responsibility: Normative Conceptions and Empirical Findings*.

In October 2010, the Moral Agency team hosted the third conference on the Nature of Social and Moral Norms in Intentional Action. This time, the particular focus was on *Responsibility: Normative Conceptions and Empirical Findings*, and we invited economists and psychologists with overlapping interests in responsibility to present their recent research. For planning and hosting the conference, we did not only cooperate with Bertil Tungodden and Alexander Cappelen from the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (Bergen), but also with Lene Bormann-Larson and

Jakob Elster, both affiliates of CSMN. Speakers included such prominent researchers as Cristina Bicchieri (Pennsylvania), Mark Fleurbaey (Paris), Joshua Knobe (Yale), Julian LeGrand (LSE), Manuel Vargas (San Francisco) and Dan Winkler (Harvard).

Attributions of responsibility play a large part in the explanation of many of our actions: We punish others (even at cost to ourselves) when we judge them responsible for their anti-social or free-riding behaviour; and we distribute goods with an eye to which choices people are responsible for – both when we distribute rewards according to merit, and when we let people carry the cost of their own choices. One question was how our responsibility

attributions influence our behaviour.

Another question was how to examine the way people determine when others are responsible for their choices. Experimental research suggests that the models people use to attribute responsibility differ from standard philosophical accounts of responsibility; furthermore, responsibility attributions are influenced by various extrinsic factors, such as the emotional state of the judge, or his relationship to the person whose choice he considers responsible.

Christel Fricke





# Events 2010

An overview of events (workshops, conferences, guest speakers) hosted by the CSMN

## Linguistic Agency

Intuition and the Method of Philosophy, 10-12 March Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil  
Arché/CSMN Mini-course & Workshop: De Se Attitudes, 6-9 jun, University of Oslo  
Summer School: "Meaning, Context, Intention", 19-30 jul, Central European University (CEU), Budapest, Hungary  
Workshop on Word Meaning, 2-3 sep, University of Oslo  
Minisymposium on Creole Genesis and Universal Grammar, 27 sep, University of Oslo  
Contextualism and Relativism workshop, 4-5 October, University of Oslo  
Neo-Pragmatism, Language and Culture, 28-29 October, University of Oslo  
Talk by Peter Pagin: The complexity of interpretation, 4 November , University of Oslo  
Talk by Kathrin Glüer: More on Perception and Justification, 4 November , University of Oslo  
Talk by Ernie Lepore: Communication and Knowledge of Language, 15 November , University of Oslo  
Talk by Matthew McGrath, 26 November , University of Oslo  
Visitor talk: Jessica Brown, 30 November , University of Oslo

## Rational Agency

Workshop on Dispositions, 22-23 March, University of Oslo  
Workshop on Present Issues in Epistemology, 26 April, University of Oslo  
The Theoretical and the Practical, 28 May University of Oslo  
Conference: Self-Knowledge and Rational Agency, 9 jun, University of Oslo  
Talks by Richard Moran and Robert Stalnaker, 14 jun, University of Oslo  
Workshop: The Guise of the Good, 14 jun University of Oslo  
NIP/CSMN Conference: Response-Dependent Concepts, 26-28 August, University of Oslo  
Agency and Dispositions - A One Day Conference With Philip Pettit, 30 August, University of Oslo  
Annual Lecture on Mind in Nature , 31 August, University of Oslo  
Leeds-CSMN workshop on Knowledge and Agency, 9-10 sep, Leeds, UK  
Addiction, Choice and Responsible Agency, 16-17 sep, University of Oslo

## Moral Agency

Talk: Benjamin Shaer, 19 February, University of Oslo

PhD seminar: Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning, 15-23 March, University of Oslo

Climate Change and Distributive Justice Workshop, 8-9 April, Stanford University, USA

Making new medicines accessible for all A Discussion of the Health Impact Fund with Panelists and the General Public, 10 May, Amalie Skram, Litteraturhuset

Ethics Across Borders, 31 mai-4 Jun University of Oslo

Moral Philosophy Club: Peter Railton, 1 jun, University of Oslo

Dr Izzeldin Abuelaish 'I shall not hate', 7 jun 18:30 - Amalie Skram, Litteraturhuset

The Feminization of Global Poverty: How Can Philosophy Help?, 15 jun, Nedjma, Litteraturhuset

Talk: Prof John Weckert (CAPPE / ANU), 18 jun, University of Oslo

Confronting Environmental Values, 21-22 Jun, University of Oslo

Talk by Theresa Tobin and Alison Jaggar: Dis-locating Moral Authority: Justifying Moral Claims in a Diverse and Unequal World, 21 jun, University of Oslo

Workshop on Climate Change and Distribution, 22-23 jun, University of Oslo

Stephen J Morse: Lost in Translation? – neuroscience, law, and ethics, 25 August, University of Oslo

Seminar: “Sentenced to treatment – the legitimacy of therapeutic justice and behavior control”, 1-2 sep, University of Oslo

Third CSMN – conference on the Nature of Social and Moral Norms in Intentional Action Title: Responsibility: Normative Conceptions and Empirical Findings, 14-15 October, University of Oslo

Fonna Forman-Barzilai on “Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy”, 26 October, University of Oslo

Workshop on universal moral grammar, 7 December, University of Oslo

Conference: Law and the science of moral judgement, 8-10 December, University of Oslo

## Research School


PhD seminar: Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning 15-23 March, University of Oslo

The Arché/CSMN Graduate Conference, 6-7 November, University of Oslo



# Speakers 2010

There were 187 speakers at CSMN events in 2010. 45 (24%) of these were women.



Adam Rose	Crispin Wright	Jason Turner	Michael Morreau	Robyn Carston
Adrian Haddock	Dan Wikler	Jennifer McKittrick	Michael S. Moore	Rowland Stout
Alan Holland	Daniele Sgravati	Jennifer Nagel	Michael Titelbaum	Ruth Chang
Alex Miller	David Anthoff	Jeremy Goodman	Mikkel Gerken	Ruth Kempson
Alex Voorhoeve	David Schmidtz	Jesper Kallestrup	Milena Ivanova	Salikoko Mufwene
Alexander Cappelen	Deirdre Wilson	Jessica Brown	Narashima Rao	Sarah Stroud
Alison Jaggar	Derek Ball	Jim Fearon	Nathaniel Sharadin	Seth Yalcin
Amy Wax	Derek Bickerton	Johannes Emmerling	Nicholas Allott	Sigrun Møgedal
Anders Nes	Dilip Ninan	John Broome	Nicole Vincent	Sonia Sedivy
Anders Schoubye	Drew Howat	John Mikjail	Nikolaj Jang Pedersen	Sophie Bloemen
Anders Strand	Edmund Henden	John O'Neill	Olav Gjelsvik	Stéphane Zuber
André Gallois	Eline Busck Gundersen	John Skorupski	Ole Hjortland	Stephen Gardnier
Andreas Brekke Carlsson	Elinor Ostrom	John Weckert	Ole Røgeberg	Stephen Morse
Andreas Stokke	Elisabeth L'Orange Fürst	Jon Elster	Pamela Hieronymi	Stephen Mumford
Andrew Reisner	Emma Borg	Jonathan Ichikawa	Paul A. Robinson	Stephen Yablo
Andy Egan	Endre Begbye	Jonathan Way	Paul Elbourne	Sungho Choi
Anna-Sara Malmgren	Ernest Lepore	Jonathan Weinberg	Paul Pietroski	Susan Dwyer
Antti Kauppinen	Espen Gamlund	Joshua Gert	Pekka Vayrynen	Sylvia Terbeck
Arild Vatn	Eyja Brynjarsdottir	Joshua Knobe	Peter Ludlow	Theresa Tobin
Armon Rezai	Fonna Forman-Barzilai	Jostein Rise	Peter Pagin	Thomas Brouwer
Aud Talle	Francois Recanati	Julian Le Grand	Peter Railton	Thomas Pogge
Ayna Johansen	Frank Barel	Jussi Haukioja	Peter Sandøe	Timothy Chan
Barbara Vetter	Frans de Waal	Kari Poikolainen	Peter Vallentyne	Timothy Pritchard
Barry Smith	Fred Dretske	Karine Nyborg	Philip Pettit	Timothy Williamson
Benjamin Shaer	Geir Asheim	Kathrin Glüer	Philippe Lusson	Tom Hodgson
Bertil Tungodden	Georg Kjøll	Kit Fine	Pierre Jacob	Torfinn Huvenes
Bjørn Ramberg	Godlieve van Heteren	Kjell Johan Sabo	Pranav Anand	Vidar Halvorsen
Cameron Hepburn	Göran Tomson	Lars Bo Gundersen	Quassim Cassam	Walter Pedriali
Carsten Hansen	Hans Olav Melberg	Leif Petter Olaussen	Rachel Severson	William Tait
Catherine Wilson	Heather Logue	Lene Bomann-Larsen	Randi Rosenqvist	Wouter Kalf
Cees Withagen	Heine Holmen	Manuel Vargas	Rani Anjum	Zachary Miller
Christel Fricke	Helen Steward	Marc Fleurbaey	Richard Holton	
Christian Gamborg	Helena Siipi	Maria A. Carrasco	Richard Moran	
Christian Gollier	Henry Jackman	Maria Sigurjonsdottir	Richard Tol	
Christian Traeger	Herman Cappelen	Mark Textor	Rick van der Ploeg	
Christina Bicchieri	Hong Yu Wong	Matilda Hellman	Robert Huseby	
Cian Dorr	Izzeldin Abuelaish	Matthew McGrath	Robert Stalnaker	
Clare Palmer	Jakob Elster	Matthias Mahlmann	Roberto de Almeida	
Conor McHugh	James Higinbotham	Michael Hoel	Robin Pierce	



# Talks abroad 2010

Kari Refsdal

*Kant's Theory of Rational Agency as Free Agency*, May 22-26, Pisa, Italy

Rachel Sterken

*Generics, Gen and Pragmatic Enrichment. Workshop on Minimalism and Contextualism*, University of Cambridge

Mathias Sagdahl

*Normative Pluralism and Ought All Things Considered*, June, University of Oxford

Christel Fricke

*The normative constraints of forgiveness*, February 24, Canberra

*Die Wuerde des Menschen und die Todesstrafe*, May 26, International Kant Conference Pisa

*Adam Smith und Immanuel Kant über die Geltung moralische Normen*, June 30, Leipzig

Christel Fricke w/ Steinar Mathisen

*Transsubstantiation of the Commonplace?*, May 28, Conference of the European Society of Aesthetics Udine

Robyn Carston

*The communication of ad hoc concepts*, May

*Metaphor: ad hoc concepts, literal meaning and images*, May

*Lexical pragmatics: the relevance theory approach*, June

*Metaphor and simile: processes and effects*, June

*A dual process account of metaphor (and maybe of simile too)*, June

*Commentator on Emma Borg's 'Minimal word meanings'*, September

Olav Gjelsvik

*Freedom and Rationality*, February

*Experience and Agency*, March

*On Discounting and Economic Thinking*, March

*On Discounting and Economic thinking about Climate Change*, May

*What is Normativity?*, May

*On the relationship between Knowledge and Belief*, June

*Knowing what we do*, September

Jan Terje Faarlund

*Topics in Zoque syntax and morphosyntax*, April 12, Centro de investigaciones y estudios superiores en antropología social del sureste, San Cristobal de las Casas, Mexico

*Degrees of clause cohesion: Complementation and relativization in Chiapas Zoque*, September 2, Societas Linguistica Europaea, Vilnius

Anders Strand

*Functional Stability and System Level Causation*

*Difference making and mental causation*

*Difference making and causal realism*

Endre Begby

*Semantic Minimalism and the ‘Miracle of Communication’*

*Comments on Richard Moran: Self-Knowledge and the Forms of Activity and Passivity*

Terje Lohndal

*Semantic Computations and Truth*

*Freezing Effects and Objects*

*The Edges of the Syntax-Phonology Interface*

*Thematic Separation and Spell-Out*

*Specifiers, Spell-Out and Logical Form*

*Linearizing Empty Edges*

*Simply Agree, not Multiple Agree*

*Empty Edges and Linearization*

Terje Lohndal w/ Samuels and Bridget

*I-Phrases & PF Crashes*

Deirdre Wilson

*Understanding and believing*, November, King’s College, London

*Understanding and believing*, October, University of Edinburgh

*The conceptual-procedural distinction: Past, present and future*, June

*Can pragmatics be systematic?*, June, Jagiellonian University, Krakow

*Parallels and differences in the treatment of metaphor in relevance theory and cognitive linguistics*, June, Jagiellonian University, Krakow

*Relevance theory: Overview and implications*, June, Jagiellonian University, Krakow

*The conceptual-procedural distinction: Past, present and future*, March, UCL, London

Word meaning, concepts and procedures, invited talk, October, Department of Linguistics, University of Edinburgh

Trine Antonsen

*The Ethics of Eating Right*, July 30, European Summer School in Cultural Studies, London



Herman Cappelen

*Meaning, Context, Intentions*, July, Central European University Summer School

*Philosophy without Intuitions*, July, University of st. Andrews, st. Andrews

*Tests for Context Sensitivity*, May, University of Cambridge

*Philosophy without Intuitions*, April, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro

*Author Meets Critic session on Relativism and Monadic Truth*, March, Central APA

Eline Busck Gundersen

*The Metaphysical Modesty of Conditional Accounts of Dispositions*, August, Kyung Hee University

*Response-dependence, Biconditionals and Reference Fixing*, July 10, Dublin

Nicholas Allott w/ Hiroyuki Uchida

*Logic and Communication: Formal Semantics and Pragmatics: Discourse, Context, and Models*, November, University of Latvia

Helen Steward

*Could have done otherwise?*, *Action sentences and Anaphora*, April 8, Leverhulme Philosophy of Action Network in Berne

*Commentary on Jennifer Hornsby's 'Knowledge in Action'*, April 8, Leverhulme Philosophy of Action Network in Berne

*Moral Responsibility and the Concept of Agency*, July 3, British Academy, London

*Agency, Causality and Properties*, September 28, Beijing

Edmund Henden

*Addiction and Autonomy*, September

Jakob Elster

*The Brain and its Law*, February 3, University of Oxford

*How outlandish can imaginary cases be?*, June 16-18, Political Ethics: Its Nature and Its Methods conference, Uppsala

Timothy Chan

*A Disjunctivist Account of Belief*, October, University of Southern Denmark

*Berkeley's Master Argument Epistemically Conceived*, August, CSMN Helsinki Workshop

*The priority of epistemic over prudential justifications of one's current beliefs*, March, University of Geneva

*Negative Haecceity and the Ontology of Properties*, March, University of London

Georg Kj  ll

*What is gained and what is lost by giving up on encoded meaning*, March, University College London

*Semantic externalism and the representation of abstract objects*, August 27, The European Society for Philosophy's Annual Meeting, Ruhr-Universit  t Bochum, Germany

Anders Nes

*Aiming at Good Reasons: On a Commonality between Believing and Acting for Reasons*, March, Geneva

*Inferential Moorean Absurdities about Reasons for Action*, June, Aristotelian society, UCD, Dublin

*'I believe.'* *On Apparently Believing What one Would not, for Epistemic Reasons, Assert*, August, CSMN Helsinki Workshop

Dan Sperber

*Keynote lecture: Linguistic comprehension and epistemic vigilance*, February, Conference on Utterance Interpretation and Cognitive Models, Brussels

*What to believe, how to convince: Issues in the study of comprehension, acceptance, and reasoning*, May, University of Chicago

*The Development of Mindreading, Communication, and Epistemic Vigilance*, May, University of Chicago

*The myth of scalar implicature*, May, University of Chicago

*A pragmatic account of the origin of language*, July, UQAM, Montréal

Alison Jaggar w/ Theresa Tobin

*Morality, Authority and Power: A Proposal for Naturalizing Methodology in Moral Philosophy*, February, Chicago

Alison Jaggar w/ Amandine Catala

*Keynote address: Breaking Up is Hard to Do: The Morality of Redrawing State Borders*, February, Philosophical Collaborations Conference, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale

Alison Jaggar

*Does Global Poverty Wear a Woman's Face?*, July, International Global Ethics Association conference, Bristol

Carsten Hansen

*Minimalism and Truth's Raison d'être*, July 8, Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP) Conference, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia

*Deflationism, the Aim of Belief and Our Use of "true"*, September 9, Leeds-CSMN workshop on Knowledge and Agency, Dept of Philosophy, Leeds, UK

Torfinn Huvenes

*Knowledge Ascriptions and Indirect Speech Reports*, May 21, University of st. Andrews, st. Andrews

*Epistemic Modals, Disagreement and Retraction*, July 5, University of st. Andrews, st. Andrews

Richard Breheny w/ Heather Ferguson

*What do listeners' eyes reveal about communicating false beliefs?*, CUNY 2010: Conference on Human Sentence Processing. New York University

Richard Breheny w/ Heather Ferguson and Napoleon Katsos

*Taking the epistemic step*, CUNY 2010: Conference on Human Sentence Processing. New York University

Richard Breheny

*Implicatures in on-line processing*, March, PsyLingSE Workshop, London

Richard Breheny

*On the cognitive architecture for utterance interpretation*, May, Beyond the words Workshop, University of Leipzig



Richard Breheny w/ C. Schulz, S. Grassman and N. Pouscoulous

*3-year-olds draw inferences based on the expectation of relevance*, May, Euro-Experimental Pragmatics workshop, Leuven

Richard Breheny w/ Ye Tian and Heather Ferguson

*Why we simulate negated information*, September, University of York

Thomas Pogge

*Political Theory Workshop Response to Josh Cohen*, March 31, Yale University

*Is Health Aid as Efficient as it Could Be? Or is this the Wrong Question?*, April 13, Yale MacMillan Center

*Allied for Essential Medicines The Health Impact Fund: Financing New Medicines Accessible to All*, April 19, Yale, Universities

*Socially Responsible Investing & Corporate Financial Reporting: The Need for Transparency*, December 7, Second Yale Conference on Illicit Financial Flows

*Weltgerechtigkeit: Defizite, Verantwortungen, Reformen*, January 21, GIGA: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburger Landesvertretung in Berlin

*Cyrus Vance Lecture 2010 On Patriotism*, January 27, Kent School

*Studienstiftung/Carlo Schmidt Stiftung Weltarmut, Menschenrechte und unsere Verantwortung*, January 28, German Embassy, Washington DC

*The Health Impact Fund: How NOT to Exclude the Poor from Advanced Medicines*, January 29, Rice University Baker Institute

*International Week World Poverty: Explanations, Responsibilities, Reforms*, February 3, University of Alberta

*International & Comparative Law Conference on International Human Rights and Climate Change Poverty, Climate Change, and Overpopulation*, February 12, University of Georgia

*World Poverty, Global Justice, and Human Rights*, February 17, Universidad des los Andes, Bogota

*Medicamentos asequibles*, February 17, Club El Nopal, Bogota

*Filosofía política y economía, Medellín, Fondo para el Impacto en la Salud*, February 19, Universidad de Antioquia, VI Simposio internacional

*Opening Keynote Globalization: The Other Side*, February 21, Harvard College International Relations Week

*Provost's Lecture Human Rights and Global Justice*, March 9, Kansas State University

*The Health Impact Fund*, March 12, University of Witwatersrand, Steven Biko Center of Bioethics, Johannesburg

*Poverty and Justice*, March 14, University of Witwatersrand Conference on Poverty, Charity, and Justice, Johannesburg

*The Health Impact Fund*, March 18, University of Edinburgh Philosophy Society

*Against Human Rights? How Should Human Rights be Conceived*, March 19, University of Stirling Workshop

*Closing Remarks: The MDGs and Wannsee*, March 23, Harvard University Symposium on MDGs and Human Rights

*Human Rights and Human Responsibilities*, March 26, University of Connecticut Faculty Seminar

*Why I am Not a Rawlsian*, March 26, University of Connecticut

*The Human Rights of the Global Poor: What Can We Do?*, April 1, University of Connecticut

*Faculty Seminar Politics as Usual*, April 2, University of Connecticut

*Roebuck Lecture Globalization: The Other Side*, April 7, Wake Forest University

*Global Justice: Practical Steps*, April 8, Vanderbilt University

*The Health Impact Fund: Financing New Medicines Accessible to All*, April 9, University of Tennessee

*The Health Impact Fund: Financing New Medicines Accessible to All*, April 14, University of Pennsylvania Wharton Business School

*Stemming Climate Change and Eradicating Poverty: Competing Imperatives?*, April 15, Penn State College Harold K. Schilling

## Memorial Lectureship

*Environmental Protection and Poverty Eradication: Competing Imperatives?*, April 22, Boston University Karbank Symposium in Environmental Philosophy

*The Role of International Law in Reproducing Massive Poverty*, April 24, University of Pennsylvania Foundations of International Law Conference

*The Health Impact Fund*, May 3, Graduate Institute, Geneva

*The Health Impact Fund - Brauchen wir neue Anreize?*, May 7, Hauptstadtkongress Medizin und Gesundheit, Berlin

*The Health Impact Fund: Financing New Medicines Accessible to All*, May 18, The Hague Peace Palace

*Inaugural Global Justice Lecture World Poverty: What's (to be) Done?*, May 18, The Hague Peace Palace

*Incontro con Thomas Pogge World Poverty and Human Rights*, May 24, Pisa International Kant Congress, Povertà mondiale diritti umani.

*Kants Vision einer gerechten Weltordnung*, May 25, Pisa International Kant Congress, Symposium on Kant's Political Cosmopolitanism

*Questioni di giustizia internazionale: povertà mondiale e responsabilità collettive World Poverty and Human Rights: the Contested Issues*, May 26, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca,

*Incontro formativo: Povertà mondiale e diritti umani World Poverty and Human Rights*, May 27, Università del Piemonte Orientale, Alessandria

*Human Development and Food Security Poverty Measurement and MDG-1*, May 28, Roma Tre Dipartimento de Economia and Master di Primo Levello

*World Poverty and Human Rights*, May 28, Laterza Publisher, Rome

*World Poverty and Human Rights*, May 29, Università di Palermo Dipartimento di studi su Politica, Diritto e Società

*World Poverty and Human Rights*, May 31, Università di Catania

*Kulturen des Wirtschaftens 2: Wirtschaft Wider Willen Die Achillesferse des Homo Oeconomicus*, June 4, Radialsystem V Kulturstiftung Deutschland, Berlin

*Quality of Life from a Philosophical Perspective in Relation to Poverty*, June 8, NWO: The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, The Hague

*Keynote Address Security, Law, Democracy and Justice*, June 10, SELA: Seminario en Latinoamérica de Teoría Constitucional y Política, Santiago

*The Health Impact Fund: Financing New Medicines Accessible to All*, June 14, Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Santiago

*Kant, Rawls, and Global Justice*, June 15, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago

*The Health Impact Fund*, June 21, USAID Staff Briefing, Washington

*Health Impact Fund, World Poverty, Humanitarian Intervention*, June 23, Washington University NIH Seminar

*Global Justice*, June 25, Quinipiac Club, Comenius Lecture

*ASAP Panel: How can Academics have more Impact on Global Poverty?*, July 1, IGEA: International Global Ethics Association, University of Bristol

*The Health Impact Fund: a suitable aim for political reform efforts?*, July 1, St. Anne's College, Oxford, Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Lecture

*Presentation of the Planned Centre of Excellence in Global Institutional Design CEGID: Centre of Excellence for Global Institutional Design*, July 5, Australian Research Council, Canberra

*The Health Impact Fund: How to Structure a Just Market that Protects the Poor*, July 15, Ryerson University, North American Association for Social Philosophy



*The Health Impact Fund: Making New Medicines More Accessible also for the Poor*, July 20, 16th World Congress of Basic and Clinical Pharmacology, Copenhagen

*The Health Impact Fund: How to Make New Medicines Accessible to All*, July 23, Applied Philosophy Conference, Harbin

*The Health Impact Fund*, August 4, Harbin Medical University

*Philosophical Background and Practical Implications of the Health Impact Fund*, August 16, Yonsei University Public Governance and Law (YPGL) Roundtable 2010, Seoul

*World Poverty and Human Rights*, August 20, Joint Seminar of Keio and Senshu Universities, Tokyo

*Measuring Development, Poverty and Gender Equity*, August 23, Joint Seminar of Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) and Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO), Buenos Aires

*Response to Josh Cohen*, August 25, SADAF: Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico, Buenos Aires

*How Supranational Rules Perpetuate World Poverty*, August 26, ACIJ: Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia, Buenos Aires

*Divided against Itself: Aspiration and Reality of International Law*, August 26, Universidad de Buenos Aires Facultad de Derecho

*Human Rights and Global Justice*, August 30, University of Sao Paulo Joint Workshop of CEPID and FAPESP

*The Health Impact Fund: Making New Medicines Accessible for All*, August 30, University of Sao Paulo Joint Workshop of CEPID and FAPESP

*The Other Side of Globalization*, September 9, Stonehill College, Easton

*Philosophical Background and Practical Implications of the Health Impact Fund*, September 10, Stonehill College, Easton

*Keynote Address Financing Pharmaceutical Innovation also for the Poor: the Health Impact Fund*, September 10, Medicines for Neglected Diseases Workshop, Boston University

*Global - Gerecht – Gesund*, September 18, Medico International Conference, Rathaus Schöneberg, Berlin

*Response to Josh Cohen*, September 23, Georgia State University

*Health Impact Fund: A New Way of Stimulating Research & Development for Life-Saving Pharmaceuticals*, September 23, Georgia State University

*How International Nongovernmental Organizations Should Act*, September 24, Georgia State University

*The Health Impact Fund*, October 7, Michigan State University

*Ethics and Development*, October 7, Michigan State University

*Martin Benjamin Distinguished Lecture Human Rights and Global Justice*, October 7, Michigan State University

*Cohen to the Rescue!*, October 8, University of Montana

*The Center of Ethics Environmental Protection and Poverty Eradication: Competing Imperatives?*, October 8, University of Montana

*Reconciling Intellectual Property Rights with Human Rights: the Health Impact Fund*, October 20, CUNY Philosophy Department

*Global Justice, Human Rights, and Negative Duties*, October 22, SUNY Purchase Philosophy Department

*The Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium The Power of Rawls's Theory of Justice*, October 23, College of NJ, Ewing

*Invest in Development Projects or Global Incentive Reforms? The Example of the Health Impact Fund*, October 28, World Bank Development Dialogue on Values and Ethics, Washington

*The Health Impact Fund: a new way of stimulating research & development for life-saving pharmaceuticals*, October 29, Global Health Council, Washington

*Global Justice, Human Rights, and Negative Duties*, October 30, CEIPES: Centro Internazionale per la Promozione dell'Educazione e lo Sviluppo, Nizip

*The Health Impact Fund and Its Justification by Appeal to Human Rights*, November 5, NYU Center of Bioethics

*Making Medicines Accessible For All: The Health Impact Fund as a Model of Structural Reform*, November 5, NYU Center of Bioethics Colloquium

*Fifth Annual Mark L. Shapiro Graduate Philosophy Conference The Power of Rawls's Theory of Justice*, November 13, Brown University

*Law and Philosophy Program and the Rappaport Center for Human Rights and Justice The Health Impact Fund: How to Make New Medicines Accessible to All*, November 18, University of Texas, Austin

*Law and Philosophy Workshop The Power of Rawls's Theory of Justice*, November 19, University of Texas, Austin

*Government celebration of the 100th Anniversary of the Mexican Revolution The Health Impact Fund: How to Make New Medicines Accessible to All*, November 22, Museo de Minería, Mexico City

*Human Rights, Global Justice, and the Health Impact Fund*, November 23, CIDE: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Mexico City

*Theorizing about Social Justice*, November 24, Colegio de México Anglophone

*World Poverty: Responsibilities and Reforms*, November 25, UNAM: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas

*Hacer Justicia a la Humanidad: Problemas de ética práctica*, November 25, FCE: Fondo de la Cultura Económica, Mexico City

*El Fondo para el Impacto sobre la Salud (HIF): Financiación de nuevos medicamentos accesibles para todos*, November 30, Hospital Gandulfo 1st Jornadas interdisciplinarias por el derecho a la salud, Buenos Aires

*Globale Gerechtigkeit: Theorie und Reform*, December 2, Freie Universität Philosophy Department, Berlin

*Der Health Impact Fund: Modell eines globalen öffentlichen Gutes?*, December 3, Irmgard Coninx Stiftung, Berlin

*Global Justice -- What is Missing? What Can Be Done?*, December 6, DIE/GDI: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklung / German Institute for Development, Bonn

*The Health Impact Fund*, December 9, Stanford University Workshop on Alternative Models of Global Health Innovation and Governance

*Stemming Climate Change and Eradicating Poverty: Competing Imperatives?*, December 13, ISSC: International Social Science Council-CIPSH Joint Scientific Symposium, Nagoya

*Weltarmut, Menschenrechte und negative Pflicht*, December 14, Nanzan University, Nagoya

*World Poverty, Human Rights, and Negative Duties*, December 15, Kanda University of International Studies, Tokyo

*Global Justice: What is Missing? What Can Be Done?*, December 16, Renmin University International Studies Department, Beijing

*Explicating Dignity toward a Minimal Conception of Global Justice*, December 17, Beijing University International Conference on Dignity, Equality, and Justice

*The Power of Rawls's Theory of Justice*, December 21, Nanjing University

Bjørn Ramberg

*Turning to Hermeneutics: Pragmatism's Struggle with Subjectivity*, December 2, Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki.

*Method and Metaphysics: Pragmatist Doubts*, April 27, Ethics Research Institute, Universität Zürich.



# CSMN in the press

Jan Terje Faarlund

Interview on language, genes and migration on Verdt å vite NRK P2.

Terje Lohndal with Christine Meklenborg Salvesen

“Ingen lærer språk helt av seg selv” Aftenposten 11 March

“Amerikabrev”, Stat & Styring 1/2010.

“Amerikabrev”, Stat & Styring 2/2010.

“Amerikabrev”, Stat & Styring 3/2010.

Lene Bomann-Larsen

“Rettferdig krig - Fredens venn eller fiende?” Sommer-Melbu 2010 (Cultural event)

”Norske våpenprodusenter ustyrrer amerikanske droner i Afghanistan” (Newssite interview), nrk.no, 3 Sept 2010.

Jakob Elster

Radio interview in “Østlandssendingen” about the ethics of apple theft (“epleslang”), September 13, 2010.

Thomas Pogge

“A novel idea to spur life-saving drugs,” OpEd with Peter Lindsay in Atlantic Journal Constitution, Monday, September 21,

“Salud: a grandes males, grandes remedies,” debate response to Federico Tobar in Clárin, Monday, September 21, 2010

“Los remedios pueden ser accesibles para todos,” OpEd in Clárin, Tuesday, September 1, 2010

“Un plan para cambiar la salud mundial,” Interview with Mariana Carbajal, Página 12, Sunday 29 August  
“HIF Initiator Professor Thomas Pogge from Yale University,” interview with Yonhap News (Seoul), Sunday 15 August  
“Hvordan kan utvikling af nye lægemidler sikres?,” authored with Aidan Hollis, Information, 20 June  
“Ingiustizie globali: il mondo contemporaneo tra ricchezza e miseria,” interview with Giuliano Battiston, Il Manifesto, 20 July  
“Millions Killed by Clever Dilution of Our Promise,” CROP Poverty Brief, August

#### Alison Jaggar

“The Feminization of Global Poverty: How Can Philosophy Help?” Litteraturhuset, Oslo, June 2010.  
“Dis-Locating Moral Authority: Justifying Moral Claims in a Diverse and Unequal World,” with Theresa Tobin  
“Morality, Authority and Power: A Proposal for Naturalizing Methodology in Moral Philosophy,” with Theresa Tobin, Central Division meetings of American Philosophical Association, Chicago, February, 2010.  
“Breaking Up is Hard to Do: The Morality of Redrawing State Borders,” with Amandine Catala, Keynote address, Philosophical Collaborations Conference, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL, February, 2010.  
“Does Global Poverty Wear a Woman’s Face?” International Global Ethics Association conference, Bristol, UK, July, 2010.

#### Espen Gamlund

“Hvorfor skal vi kjøre tog?”, kronikk i Aftenposten 14 September  
“Dyreforsøk i (u)etisk farvann”, kronikk i Bladet Forskningsetikk nr. 2  
“Ut i skogen og opp i trærne”, kronikk skrevet sammen med Siri Kalvig, Bergens Tidene 25 April  
“Egg og samfunn”, kronikk skrevet sammen med HildeValbjørn Hagelin, Klassekampen 6 April



Andreas Føllesdal

Om “Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy” på Fritt Ords møte om Store Norske Leksikon

Om CULCOMs bok om rettferdighet, Universitetsforlaget

“Korsfestelsen av den europeiske menneskerettighetsdomstol” – Verdibørsen

“Modelling regional growth”, The Kathmandu Post - review of “Unleashing Economic Growth: Region-based Urban Development Strategy for Nepal, Aug 6.

“Modelling regional growth” The Kathmandu Post - review of “Unleashing Economic Growth: Region-based Urban Development Strategy for Nepal”

“Rettighetsregimet vokser -” Klassekampen, 22 May

“Uten tillit rakner trygden” MEMU - internmagasin NAV (2): 4-5

“Slik kan Store norske overleve, Del 3.” Morgenbladet, 7 May

“Om politikere som lobbyister.” Dagsnytt 18, 2 February

“Venter på den tunge debatten.” Mandag morgen (3): 24-25

“Webprosjektet må ta ansvar!” Uniforum.no

Andreas Føllesdal with Norheim, Ole Frithjof

“Global helseprioritering”, Aftenposten, 4 June

Andreas Føllesdal with G. Ulfstein

“Verken ‘fundamentalistisk’ eller ‘ekstrem’” Morgenbladet

“Krenkende krusifikser” Morgenbladet

“Korsfestelsen av den europeiske menneskerettighetsdomstol.” Fri tanke - Nettavis for livssyn og livssynspolitik, 5 January

Anders Strand

Argumentasjon om straff, Aftenposten, 3 July

Hans Olav Melberg og Ole Jørgen Røgeberg

“Høye kostnader ved hasjforbud”, Commentary, Dagbladet, 19 March

Hans Olav Melberg

“Hasj: legalisere, avkriminalisere eller rekriminalisere - norsk narkotikapolitikk i et samfunnsvitenskapelig perspektiv”, Arrangert av Samfunnsvitenskapelig Fakultetsforening, 27 April, University of Oslo

Olav Gjelsvik

“On Present Norwegian Research Policy”, Aftenposten 20 July

“Tenke langt, handle rett”, Klassekampen 25 May

## BOOKS

### LATER

What does procrastination tell us about ourselves?

BY JAMES SUROWIECKI

OCTOBER 11, 2010

Some years ago, the economist George Akerlof found himself faced with a simple task: mailing a box of clothes from India, where he was living, to the United States. The clothes belonged to his friend and colleague Joseph Stiglitz, who had left them behind when visiting, so Akerlof was eager to send the box off. But there was a problem. The combination of Indian bureaucracy and what Akerlof called “my own ineptitude in such matters” meant that doing so was going to be a hassle—indeed, he estimated that it would take an entire workday. So he put off dealing with it, week after week. This went on for more than eight months, and it was only shortly before Akerlof himself returned home that he managed to solve his problem: another friend happened to be sending some things back to the U.S., and Akerlof was able to add Stiglitz’s clothes to the shipment. Given the vagaries of intercontinental mail, it’s possible that Akerlof made it back to the States before Stiglitz’s shirts did.

There’s something comforting about this story: even Nobel-winning economists procrastinate! Many of us go through life with an array of undone tasks, large and small, nibbling at our conscience. But Akerlof saw the experience, for all its familiarity, as mysterious. He genuinely intended to send the box to his friend, yet, as he wrote, in a paper called “Procrastination and Obedience” (1991), “each morning for over eight months I woke up and decided that the *next* morning would be the day to send the Stiglitz box.” He was always *about* to send the box, but the moment to act never arrived. Akerlof, who became one of the central figures in behavioral economics, came to the realization that procrastination might be more than just a bad habit. He argued that it revealed something important about the limits of rational thinking and that it could teach useful lessons about phenomena as diverse as substance abuse and savings habits. Since his essay was published, the study of procrastination has become a significant field in academia, with philosophers, psychologists, and economists all weighing in.

Academics, who work for long periods in a self-directed fashion, may be especially prone to putting things off: surveys suggest that the vast majority of college students procrastinate, and articles in the literature of procrastination often allude to the author’s own problems with finishing the piece. (This article will be no exception.) But the academic buzz around the subject isn’t just a case of eggheads rationalizing their slothfulness. As various scholars argue in “The Thief of Time,” edited by Chrisoula Andreou and Mark D. White (Oxford, \$65)—a collection of essays on procrastination, ranging from the resolutely theoretical to the surprisingly practical—the tendency raises fundamental philosophical and psychological issues. You may have thought, the last time you blew off work on a presentation to watch “How I Met Your Mother,” that you were just slacking. But from another angle you were actually engaging in a practice that illuminates the fluidity of human identity and the complicated relationship human beings have to time. Indeed, one essay, by the economist George Ainslie, a central figure in the study of procrastination, argues that dragging our heels is “as fundamental as the shape of time and could well be called the basic impulse.”



Procrastination interests philosophers because of its underlying irrationality.

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#### RELATED LINKS

Ask the Author: Join a live chat with James Surowiecki about procrastination on Monday, October 4th, at 3 P.M. E.T.

#### KEYWORDS

Procrastination; “The Thief of Time” (Oxford, \$65); Chrisoula Andreou; Mark D. White; Essays; George Ainslie; George Akerlof



“We saw the Great Wall and lots of pagodas, and I have a transplanted stomach.”

FROM THE ISSUE | CARTOON BANK | E-MAIL THIS

Ainslie is probably right that procrastination is a basic human impulse, but anxiety about it as a serious problem seems to have emerged in the early modern era. The term itself (derived from a Latin word meaning “to put off for tomorrow”) entered the English language in the sixteenth century, and, by the eighteenth, Samuel Johnson was describing it as “one of the general weaknesses” that “prevail to a greater or less degree in every mind,” and lamenting the tendency in himself: “I could not forbear to

reproach myself for having so long neglected what was unavoidably to be done, and of which every moment’s idleness increased the difficulty.” And the problem seems to be getting worse all the time. According to Piers Steel, a business professor at the University of Calgary, the percentage of people who admitted to difficulties with procrastination quadrupled between 1978 and 2002. In that light, it’s possible to see procrastination as the quintessential modern problem.

It’s also a surprisingly costly one. Each year, Americans waste hundreds of millions of dollars because they don’t file their taxes on time. The Harvard economist David Laibson has shown that American workers have forgone huge amounts of money in matching 401(k) contributions because they never got around to signing up for a retirement plan. Seventy per cent of patients suffering from glaucoma risk blindness because they don’t use their eyedrops regularly. Procrastination also inflicts major costs on businesses and governments. The recent crisis of the euro was exacerbated by the German government’s dithering, and the decline of the American auto industry, exemplified by the bankruptcy of G.M., was due in part to executives’ penchant for delaying tough decisions. (In Alex Taylor’s recent history of G.M., “Sixty to Zero,” one of the key conclusions is “Procrastination doesn’t pay.”)

Philosophers are interested in procrastination for another reason. It’s a powerful example of what the Greeks called *akrasia*—doing something against one’s own better judgment. Piers Steel defines procrastination as willingly deferring something even though you expect the delay to make you worse off. In other words, if you’re simply saying “Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die,” you’re not really procrastinating. Knowingly delaying because you think that’s the most efficient use of your time doesn’t count, either. The essence of procrastination lies in not doing what you think you should be doing, a mental contortion that surely accounts for the great psychic toll the habit takes on people. This is the perplexing thing about procrastinating: although it seems to involve avoiding unpleasant tasks, indulging in it generally doesn’t make people happy. In one study, sixty-five per cent of students surveyed before they started working on a term paper said they would like to avoid procrastinating: they knew both that they wouldn’t do the work on time and that the delay would make them unhappy.



Most of the contributors to the new book agree that this peculiar irrationality stems from our relationship to time—in particular, from a tendency that economists call “hyperbolic discounting.” A two-stage experiment provides a classic illustration: In the first stage, people are offered the choice between a hundred dollars today or a hundred and ten dollars tomorrow; in the second stage, they choose between a hundred dollars a month from now or a hundred and ten dollars a month and a day from now. In substance, the two choices are identical: wait an extra day, get an extra ten bucks. Yet, in the first stage many people choose to take the smaller sum immediately, whereas in the second they prefer to wait one more day and get the extra ten bucks. In other words, hyperbolic discounters are able to make the rational choice when they’re thinking about the future, but, as the present gets closer, short-term considerations overwhelm their long-term goals. A similar phenomenon is at work in an experiment run by a group including the economist George Loewenstein, in which people were asked to pick one movie to watch that night and one to watch at a later date. Not surprisingly, for the movie they wanted to watch immediately, people tended to pick lowbrow comedies and blockbusters, but when asked what movie they wanted to watch later they were more likely to pick serious, important films. The problem, of course, is that when the time comes to watch the serious movie, another frothy one will often seem more appealing. This is why Netflix queues are filled with movies that never get watched: our responsible selves put “Hotel Rwanda” and “The Seventh Seal” in our queue, but when the time comes we end up in front of a rerun of “The Hangover.”

The lesson of these experiments is not that people are shortsighted or shallow but that their preferences aren’t consistent over time. We want to watch the Bergman masterpiece, to give ourselves enough time to write the report properly, to set aside money for retirement. But our desires shift as the long run becomes the short run.

Why does this happen? One common answer is ignorance. Socrates believed that *akrasia* was, strictly speaking, impossible, since we could not want what is bad for us; if we act against our own interests, it must be because we don’t know what’s right. Loewenstein, similarly, is inclined to see the procrastinator as led astray by the “visceral” rewards of the present. As the nineteenth-century Scottish economist John Rae put it, “The prospects of future good, which future years may hold on us, seem at such a moment dull and dubious, and are apt to be slighted, for objects on which the daylight is falling strongly, and showing us in all their freshness just within our grasp.” Loewenstein also suggests that our memory for the intensity of visceral rewards is deficient: when we put off preparing for that meeting by telling ourselves that we’ll do it tomorrow, we fail to take into account that tomorrow the temptation to put off work will be just as strong.

Ignorance might also affect procrastination through what the social scientist Jon Elster calls “the planning fallacy.” Elster thinks that people underestimate the time “it will take them to complete a given task, partly because they fail to take account of how long it has taken them to complete similar projects in the past and partly because they rely on smooth scenarios in which accidents or unforeseen problems never occur.”



“No, no, I like you. I only meant that we have to make you likable to the jury.”

When I was writing this piece, for instance, I had to take my car into the shop, I had to take two unanticipated

trips, a family member fell ill, and so on. Each of these events was, strictly speaking, unexpected, and each took time away from my work. But they were really just the kinds of problems you predictably have to deal with in everyday life. Pretending I wouldn’t have any interruptions to my work was a typical illustration of the planning fallacy.

Still, ignorance can’t be the whole story. In the first place, we often procrastinate not by doing fun tasks but by doing jobs whose only allure is that they aren’t what we should be doing. My apartment, for instance, has rarely looked tidier than it does at the moment. And people do learn from experience: procrastinators know all too well the allures of the salient present, and they want to resist them. They just don’t. A magazine editor I know, for instance, once had a writer tell her at noon on a Wednesday that the time-sensitive piece he was working on would be in her in-box by the time she got back from lunch. She did eventually get the piece—the following Tuesday. So a fuller explanation of procrastination really needs to take account of our attitudes to the tasks being avoided. A useful example can be found in the career of General George McClellan, who led the Army of the Potomac during the early years of the Civil War and was one of the greatest procrastinators of all time. When he took charge of the Union army, McClellan was considered a military genius, but he soon became famous for his chronic hesitancy. In 1862, despite an excellent opportunity to take Richmond from Robert E. Lee’s men, with another Union army attacking in a pincer move, he dillydallied, convinced that he was blocked by hordes of Confederate soldiers, and missed his chance. Later that year, both before and after Antietam, he delayed again, squandering a two-to-one advantage over Lee’s troops. Afterward, Union General-in-Chief Henry Halleck wrote, “There is an immobility here that exceeds all that any man can conceive of. It requires the lever of Archimedes to move this inert mass.”


McClellan’s “immobility” highlights several classic reasons we procrastinate. Although when he took over the Union army he told Lincoln “I can do it all,” he seems to have been unsure that he could do anything. He was perpetually imploring Lincoln for new weapons, and, in the words of one observer, “he felt he never had enough troops, well enough trained or equipped.” Lack of confidence, sometimes alternating with unrealistic dreams of heroic success, often leads to procrastination, and many studies suggest that procrastinators are self-handicappers: rather than risk failure, they prefer to create conditions that make success impossible, a reflex that of course creates a vicious cycle. McClellan was also given to excessive planning, as if only the ideal battle plan were worth acting on. Procrastinators often succumb to this sort of perfectionism.

Viewed this way, procrastination starts to look less like a question of mere ignorance than like a complex mixture of weakness, ambition, and inner conflict. But some of the philosophers in “The Thief of Time” have a more radical explanation for the gap between what we want to do and what we end up doing: the person who makes plans and the person who fails to carry them out are not really the same person: they’re different parts of what the game theorist Thomas Schelling called “the divided self.” Schelling proposes that we think of ourselves not as unified selves but as different beings, jostling, contending, and bargaining for control. Ian McEwan evokes this state in his recent novel “Solar”: “At moments of important decision-making, the mind could be considered as a parliament, a debating chamber. Different factions



contended, short- and long-term interests were entrenched in mutual loathing. Not only were motions tabled and opposed, certain proposals were aired in order to mask others. Sessions could be devious as well as stormy.” Similarly, Otto von Bismarck said, “Faust complained about having two souls in his breast, but I harbor a whole crowd of them and they quarrel. It is like being in a republic.” In that sense, the first step to dealing with procrastination isn’t admitting that you have a problem. It’s admitting that your “you”s have a problem.

If identity is a collection of competing selves, what does each of them represent? The easy answer is that one represents your short-term interests (having fun, putting off work, and so on), while another represents your long-term goals. But, if that’s the case, it’s not obvious how you’d ever get anything done: the short-term self, it seems, would always win out. The philosopher Don Ross offers a persuasive solution to the problem. For Ross, the various parts of the self are all present at once, constantly competing and bargaining with one another—one that wants to work, one that wants to watch television, and so on. The key, for Ross, is that although the television-watching self is interested only in watching TV, it’s interested in watching TV not just now but also in the future. This means that it can be bargained with: working now will let you watch more television down the road. Procrastination, in this reading, is the result of a bargaining process gone wrong.



*"This isn't really about water. This is about what's going on between us."*

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his ship. Ulysses knows that when he hears the Sirens he will be too weak to resist steering the ship onto the rocks in pursuit of them, so he has his men bind him, thereby forcing him to adhere to his long-term aims. Similarly, Thomas Schelling once said that he would be willing to pay extra in advance for a hotel room without a television in it. Today, problem gamblers write contracts with casinos banning them from the premises. And people who are trying to lose weight or finish a project will sometimes make bets with their friends so that if they don’t deliver on their promise it’ll cost them money. In 2008, a Ph.D. candidate at Chapel Hill wrote software that enables people to shut off their access to the Internet for up to eight hours; the program, called Freedom, now has an estimated seventy-five thousand users.

Not everyone in “The Thief of Time” approves of the reliance on the extended will. Mark D. White advances an idealist argument rooted in Kantian ethics: recognizing procrastination as a failure of will, we should seek to strengthen the will rather than relying on external controls that will allow it to atrophy further. This isn’t a completely fruitless task: much recent research suggests that will power is, in some ways, like a muscle and can be made stronger. The same research, though, also

suggests that most of us have a limited amount of will power and that it’s easily exhausted. In one famous study, people who had been asked to restrain themselves from readily available temptation—in this case, a pile of chocolate-chip cookies if they weren’t allowed to touch—had a harder time persisting in a difficult task than people who were allowed to eat the cookies.

Given this tendency, it makes sense that we often rely intuitively on external rules help ourselves out. A few years ago, Dan Ariely, a psychologist at M.I.T., did a fascinating experiment examining one of the most basic external tools for dealing with procrastination: deadlines. Students in a class were assigned three papers for 1 semester, and they were given a choice: they could set separate deadlines for when they had to hand in each of the papers or they could hand them all in together at the end of the semester. There was no benefit to handing the papers in early, since they were all going to be graded at semester’s end, and there was a potential cost to sett the deadlines, since if you missed a deadline your grade would be docked. So the rational thing to do was to hand in all the papers at the end of the semester; that way you’d be free to write the papers sooner but not at risk of a penalty if you didn’t ge around to it. Yet most of the students chose to set separate deadlines for each pape precisely because they knew that they were otherwise unlikely to get around to working on the papers early, which meant they ran the risk of not finishing all three by the end of the semester. This is the essence of the extended will: instead of trusting themselves, the students relied on an outside tool to make themselves do what they actually wanted to do.

Beyond self-binding, there are other ways to avoid dragging your feet, most of whi depend on what psychologists might call reframing the task in front of you. Procrastination is driven, in part, by the gap between effort (which is required now) and reward (which you reap only in the future, if ever). So narrowing that gap, by whatever means necessary, helps. Since open-ended tasks with distant deadlines are much easier to postpone than focussed, short-term projects, dividing projects into smaller, more defined sections helps. That’s why David Allen, the author of the bes selling time-management book “Getting Things Done,” lays great emphasis on classification and definition: the vaguer the task, or the more abstract the thinking requires, the less likely you are to finish it. One German study suggests that just getting people to think about concrete problems (like how to open a bank account) makes them better at finishing their work—even when it deals with a completely different subject. Another way of making procrastination less likely is to reduce th amount of choice we have: often when people are afraid of making the wrong choic they end up doing nothing. So companies might be better off offering their employees fewer investment choices in their 401(k) plans, and making signing up i the plan the default option.

It’s hard to ignore the fact that all these tools are at root about imposing limits and narrowing options—in other words, about a voluntary abnegation of freedom. (Viel Hugo would write naked and tell his valet to hide his clothes so that he’d be unable go outside when he was supposed to be writing.) But before we rush to overcome procrastination we should consider whether it is sometimes an impulse we should heed. The philosopher Mark Kingwell puts it in existential terms: “Procrastination most often arises from a sense that there is too much to do, and hence no single aspect of the to-do worth doing. . . . Underneath this rather antic form of action-as inaction is the much more unsettling question whether anything is worth doing at al In that sense, it might be useful to think about two kinds of procrastination: the kin that is genuinely akratic and the kind that’s telling you that what you’re supposed to be doing has, deep down, no real point. The procrastinator’s challenge, and perhaps the philosopher’s, too, is to figure out which is which. ♦



## Økonomenes kortsiktige råd får oss til å gjøre langt mindre m



Olav Gjelsvik

## MED ANDRE ORD

**Hvordan bør vi handle, ut fra det vi nå vet om konsekvensene av klimagassutslipp?** Hvor omfattende tiltak bør settes i verk? Økonomene gir gjerne råd som får oss til å gjøre langt mindre i møte med klimautslippene enn vi burde og er villige til. En korreksjon er nødvendig.

Det følgende skal dreie seg om hvordan vi bør se på forholdet mellom nåtid og framtid i vår respons på klimautslippene. Utgangspunktet er en nytte-kostnadsanalyse der ethvert valg – for eksempel et bestemt valg av klimatiltak – gis en nåtidig verdi ut fra de fordelene og ulempene valget sannsynligvis vil ha. Konsekvenser fram i tid av valg vi gjør nå nedskrives eller diskonteres. Dersom vi nedskriver lite, det vil si med en lav rate, blir høye kostnader i framtiden også relativt høye kostnader i dag. Nedskriver vi mye, blir store framtidige ulemper små negative verdier i dag. Lav eller høy diskonteringsrate gjør stor forskjell når tidsperspektivet er langt. Høy diskonteringsrate får oss til å nøye oss med små klimatiltak.

**De fleste økonomene** som ytrer seg og har innflytelse, går inn for en relativt høy diskonteringsrate. Det er noen få unntak. Det viktigste er Nicholas Stern, som ledet den store utredningen om klimabeslutninger som ble gjort for den britiske regjeringen (The Stern Review eller Stern-rapporten).

Jeg ser i det følgende bort fra hva vi kan kalle katastrofescenariet. At klimautslippene vil lede til ukjente katastrofale endringer av en type som vil undergrave nytte-kostnadsstilnærminger til klimabeslutninger. De alternative tilnærmingene man da må benytte fører gjerne til at man bør iverksette enda mer omfattende klimatiltak enn Stern foreslår.

Rådet i Stern-rapporten var at man fra 2006 og hvert år framover burde bruke et sted rundt 1 prosent av verdens samlede brutto nasjonalprodukt (BNP) for å hindre klimautslipp. Stern har senere justert dette tallet opp til 2 prosent av BNP i lys av senere funn om omfanget av utslipp og konsekvensene derav. 2 prosent av norsk BNP (i 2009) utgjør rundt 50 milliarder kroner. Norge brukte rundt 10–11 milliarder i siste års statsbudsjett. Miljøinnsatsen til den rødgrønne regjeringen er rundt en femtedel av det Stern tilrår.

**Diskontering, eller nedskrivning**

## FAKTA

## Saken:

■ Økonomer gir gjerne råd om klimatiltak, og verdens regjeringer har hittil tatt imot. Det kan vise seg fatalt, mener Olav Gjelsvik.

■ I denne artikkelen ser han på økonomifagets rolle i møte med miljøkrisen, og argumenter for at økonomene får oss til å foreta oss mindre enn vi burde.

■ Gjelsvik viser gjennom en standard kostnad-nytte-analyse, hvordan fremstående klimakøkonomer slutter fra er til bør og opererer med vilkårlige parametre.

■ Dette er en forkorta og forenkla versjon av en artikkel som kommer i Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift 1–2 2010, som kommer i salg denne uken.

## Forfatteren:


■ Olav Gjelsvik er professor ved Center of Study of Mind in Nature (CSMN), Universitetet i Oslo.

av framtidig verdi når den veies opp mot nåtidig verdi, har vært diskutert i filosofien siden Platon. Enkelt sagt har filosofene gjennom tidene sagt at diskontering av framtidig verdi er galt og irrasjonelt, mens økonomene har sagt at en viss diskontering av verdien av framtidige produkter er rasjonelt nok. Synspunktene er helt forenlige.

Økonomisk metode kan brukes til å studere hvordan folk faktisk diskonterer, det vil si hvordan aktører velger mellom nåværende og framtidige goder eller verdsetter kostnader i framtiden i forhold til kostnader nå. Dersom man i tillegg antar at folk stort sett er «rasjonelle» og at de preferanser som framvises av faktisk adferd er «rasjonelle» preferanser, kan man ut fra observert adferd finne en «rasjonell» diskonteringsfaktor som da blir rettesnor når man veier nåtid mot framtid. Dette kan være fint for forklaring av adferd, og for en rekke økonomiske analyser. Men det er langt fra klart at det uten videre kan benyttes i klimaspørsmålet.

**Det er tre** komponenter i økonomenes diskonteringsrate. Den første komponenten er det filosofene er opptatt av, altså hva vi kan kalle den rene tidspreferanse, preferansen for en spesiell – typisk en nær – tidsplassering. En helt annen faktor er vekst eller fertilitet i økonomien; produkter fram i tid vil produsere billigere. Vi kan i tillegg antas å få litt mindre ut av hver ny enhet når vi blir rikere. Den subjektive nytte av hver ny enhet er relativ til hvor mange enheter vi alt har råd til å kjøpe. Den totale diskonteringsrate er vanligvis sett som summen av den rene tidspreferansen og et produkt av de to andre faktorene.

Stern opererer med en diskonteringsrate på 1,4, mens hans kritikere, for eksempel William Nordhaus og Martin Weitzman opererer med en diskonteringsrate på 6. (I Norge opererer vi til sammenligning med en diskonteringsrate på 4,5 for statlige investeringer.) Forskjellene dem



**I SKILPADDEFART:** En hawksbillskilpadde leter etter et sted å legge eggene sine på de ytre Seychellene.

imellom er sterkt knyttet til at den rene tidspreferansen settes forskjellig. Stern er tilnærmet tidsnøytral, i tråd med gjengse normative oppfatninger. Weitzman og Nordhaus mener derimot at den rene tidspreferanse bør være 2 eller 3 prosent. Deres viktigste argument er at dette synes å være i tråd med faktisk adferd ved investeringsbeslutninger. Dette reiser en rekke spørsmål, blant annet om hvor-

vidt faktisk adferd er uttrykk for slik tidspreferanse eller om dette bare antatt, og om det som i så fall er kjent kan benyttes i et spørsmål som angår forholdet til framtidige mennesker. Ikke til oss selv på et senere tidspunkt.

La meg ta de ulike sidene ved dette punktvís.

a) En vanlig investeringsbeslutning involverer ikke mange generasjoner fram i tid slik klimabeslutninger gjør. Sistnevnte berører et stort antall mennesker gjennom århundrer, vanlige beslutninger angår oss selv til ulike tider. En ren tidspreferanse på tre prosent (Nordhaus) innebærer i realiteten at man halverer nytten av frisk luft til et individ født i 1985 i forhold til den

**«Liv blir ikke mindre verdt når vi blir rikere»**

Under vignetten «Med andre ord» presenterer Klassekampen lengre tekster fra eksterne skribenter, om aktuelle emne innen politikk, vitenskap, kultur og samfunn. Kronikk- og debattredaktør vurderer bidrag til sidene: Send tekster til kronikk@klassekampen.no. Maksimalt lengde: 10.000 teikn inkludert mellomrom. Legg ved billete av artikkelforfatteren. Klassekampen honorerer normalt ikke innsendt stoff.



ed klimautslippene enn vi burde, skriver **Olav Gjelsvik.**

# ungt og ett



Global oppvarming kan få havet til å stige opp mot to meter i dette århundret.

FOTO: ROBERTO SCHMIDT, AFP

nytte et individ født i 1960 har av frisk luft, og man vil måtte legge inn en ytterligere halvering for dem som fødes i dag. Det er opplagt sterke normative grunner til å behandle disse individenes nytte av frisk luft likt.

b) Vi vet at vi ikke kan slutte fra er til bør. I lys av vår omfattende viten om hvor dårlige folk flest er til å ta langsiktige hensyn i sine valg blir dette svært aktuelt. Dersom viljesvakhet i Platons forstand er utbredt, noe det er gode empiriske grunner for å tro, vil en økonom som baserer seg på hva folk gjør måtte se slik irrasjonalitet som rasjonell.

c) Det man har sett på som uttrykk for diskontering i tidligere studier, kan i stedet være en nokså ekstrem risikoversjon, ifølge ny forskning.

Her er tre forskjellige forhold

som støtter Stern. Det er sterke normative grunner i (a) for hans syn, man kan ikke uten videre slutte fra er til bør (b), og man baserer seg kanskje på uriktigheter om hva som er (c) når man slutter fra er til bør i b) og oppnår konklusjoner som bryter med de normative innsiktene i a).

**Det er andre viktige sider ved saken.** Det er en rekke økonomiske og andre forhold som ikke fanges inn av et vanlig BNP-mål. Vi kan ta et helt enkelt eksempel. Det er snakk om å bygge om et vakkert landområde til en flyplass. Verdien av det vakre landskapet går tapt ved en utbygging, men utbyggingen er kanskje meget positiv for BNP. Tapet ved at uberørt natur forsvinner, er ikke med i det BNP-regnskapet Stern, Weitzman

og de andre diskuterer ut fra. Men det vil være mange, kanskje enorme slike tap ved klimaendringene.

Slike tap har to hovedaspekter. Menneskenes berøves på den ene siden goder som svært mange oppfatter som sentrale for å ha gode liv – frisk luft og naturopplevelser. Heri ligger et stort velferdstap. Dette tapet av mulig konsum av natur kan man i prinsippet ta inn i BNP.

Vi kan se på vårt konsum av miljøgoder som frisk luft og natur, og vurdere hva som vil skje med det. Det er rimelig å anta at når disse godene blir mer og mer knappe, og det blir stadig flere mennesker, så vil prisene på konsum av slike goder gå kraftig opp. Det vil innebære at veksten reduseres og at diskonteringsraten må reduseres tilsvarende.

Natur, arter og dyr har også verdi i seg selv, og den verdi naturen har er verken sammenlignbar med økonomiske verdier eller konvertibel til dem. Det samme gjelder menneskers liv, og mange menneskers liv vil gå tapt i klimaskapte katastrofer. Det er rimelig å legge til grunn at verdien av liv vanskelig kan konverteres til penger. (Likevel må vi sette pengemål på menneskeliv ved ulike former for samsfunnsplanlegging.)

**At det finnes helt andre verdier enn de økonomiske** er ikke noe nytt eller radikalt. Når kongen i sin nyttårstale sier at vi skal overlevere kloden til våre etterkommere i den forfatning vi fikk den av vår forfedre, så uttrykker dette en etisk holdning i forhold til naturens verdi, ikke det syn at kloden økonomisk skal være like mye verdt og at det er likegyldig om den er drastisk endret eller ei. De aller fleste mennesker som ikke har altfor mye opplæring i økonomi har ikke problemer med å erkjenne eksistensen og berettigelsen av slike ikke-økonomiske verdier. En annen sak er at dette gjør miljøspørsmålet politisk vanskelig: vi har ikke noen allmenn måte å konvertere disse «andre», ikke-økonomiske verdiene til økonomiske verdier på. Vi må foreta valg som involverer ikke-konvertible, ikke-økonomiske verdier, og vi tror at det er riktige og gale valg også her.

Dersom disse verdiene ikke kan konverteres til andre goder eller inngå i det økonomiske regnskapet, hva så? Jeg tror det eneste vi med rimelighet kan si er at i så fall er faktorene knyttet til økonomisk vekst lik 0 for disse verdiene. Liv blir ikke mindre verdt når vi blir rikere. Økonomisk vekst er rett og slett ikke relevant for slike verdier. Vi sitter derfor bare igjen med den rene tidspreferansen når vi skal beregne mulig diskontering av slike verdier som menneskeliv. Det betyr at i et totalregnskap der ikke-økonomiske verdier også er med, skal den totale diskonteringsfaktoren reduseres tilsvarende.

**Konklusjon: Vi bør følge Sterns** beregning av diskonteringsrate, eller kanskje gå enda lenger ned. Vi må dermed bruke langt større ressurser nå for å hindre klimaendringer enn vi gjør, kanskje større enn selv Stern foreslår. Dersom den normative og øvrige kunnskap vi i dag har om diskontering skal legges til grunn for kunnskapsbasert klimapolitikk, må selve politikken radikaliseres kraftig.

Økonomer mangler gjerne forståelse for at normative syn ligger implisitt i deres anbefalinger. I motsetning til andre økonomer har Stern innsett dette. Under utarbeidelsen av sin rapport samarbeidet han tett med andre disipliner og benyttet tilgjengelig normativ kunnskap i beregning av diskonteringsraten. Andre representanter fra økonomiprofessjonen som ikke inntar en lignende holdning utgjør nå en fare for klimaet. Får de mye makt kan det få helt fatale følger for våre etterkommere og kloden vår.

**Olav Gjelsvik**



## Idee Belønningssystemer

# Rettferdig medisin

Hvert år dør millioner av mennesker fordi de i praksis ikke har råd til medisinen de trenger. Det kan vi gjøre noe med.



ESSAY  
Thomas Pogge

Nyskapning er sentralt i menneskelig fremskritt. Det avverger en hel del slit og strev, sykdom og for tidlig død. Det gir oss fritid, trygghet, sunnhet og forståelse; og det gjør oss i stand til å nyte all verdens mat, kulturer, underholdning og klimaer gjennom reiser og kommunikasjon.

Nyskapning har bedre kår hvis den blir belønnet. Belønning skaper incentiver og bidrar til å dekke omkostningene ved nyskapning. Men hvordan bør den bli belønnet? Den vanligste måten i dag er å gi innovatøren et midlertidig monopol, for eksempel gjennom et patent som gjør ham i stand til å ta så mye han vil for bruk av nyvinningen. Dette er imidlertid ikke alltid en god måte, ettersom den kan føre til at nyvinningen ikke blir brukt ofte nok mens den er patentbeskyttet.

La oss forestille oss en ny, viktig teknologi som reduserer forurensningen ved generering av elektrisitet. Kraftverkene som benytter denne teknologien er kanskje ikke dyrt å bygge enn vanlige kraftverk. Ikke desto mindre blir de dyrere på grunn av avgiften til patentnehaveren. Mange av entreprenørene som bygger kraftverk vil derfor velge ikke å bruke den nye, grønne teknologien. Det resulterer i en forurensning som skader menneskelheten og jorden for øvrig, men som kunne vært unngått.

Det finnes en smartere måte å belønne grønne nyvinninger på. Vi kan betale innovatørene gjennom offentlige fond etter som teknologien forhindrer utslipp. Disse utbetalingene kan legges opp på samme måte som patentsystemet, slik at de opphører etter et antall år. Forurensning sprer seg over hele verden, og derfor bør alle land bidra til finansieringen av en slik ordning – kanskje gjennom et fond landene betaler inn til, alt etter størrelsen på bruttonasjonalproduktet.

Vi kan realisere denne typen intelligent belønning selv om vi ikke endrer patentordningen, som ble gjort verdensomspennende på 1990-tallet gjennom Den internasjonale patentavtalen. Parallelt med dette kan man tilby alternativ belønning som gjør innovatørene i stand til å velge belønning etter utslippsreduksjon dersom de gir tillatelse til fri bruk av teknologien. De alternative belønningene må følgelig være store

nok til å kunne tiltrekke seg de viktige grønne nyvinningene.

Det alternative belønningssystemet fungerer best når bruken av nyvinningen ikke bare kommer brukeren til gode, men også offentligheten, og når et slikt offentlig gode lar seg måle og vurdere. Disse betingelsene er helt klart oppfylt i den grønne teknologiens tilfelle, samt innen to andre områder for nyvinning: jordbruk og farmasi.

Et viktig eksempel innen jordbruk er de nye plantevariantene som kan øke næringsinnholdet per hektar og redusere behovet for skadelige insektmidler og dyr kunstgjødsel. Dagens patent-baserte belønningssystem gjør at jordbrukerne må betale mye for bruken av slike innovative varianter. Mange bønder kan eller vil ikke ta seg råd til så store utgifter for å kunne bruke patentbelagte ideer. Det fører til at bønder over hele verden bruker mer insektmidler og kunstgjødsel enn nødvendig. I tillegg produserer de mindre næringsrik mat enn de kunne gjort, spesielt i u-landene, som nylig førte til at antallet kronisk underernærte mennesker i verden har passert en milliard for første gang i historien.

Hvis vi verdsetter tilgangen på mat og de miljømessige fordelene ved redusert bruk av insektmidler og kunstig gjødsel, bør vi i det minste tilby innovatørene innen jordbruk en mulighet til belønning for slike nyvinninger hvis de tillater fri bruk av oppfinnelsene sine. Denne typen alternative belønningssystemer bør bli finansiert av alle verdens land i fellesskap, fordi alle har fordel av å redusere miljøskadene og fordi vi har felles ansvar for den globale tilgangen på mat.

Medisin er et spesielt prekärt område. Marginalkostnaden for medisin, for eksempel for å produsere 100 tabletter, er typisk svært lav. Like fullt er prisen på patentert medisin vanligvis mye høyere, gjerne opptil 60–100 ganger så høy. Hvert år dør millioner av mennesker fordi de i praksis ikke har råd til medisinen de trenger, på grunn av produksjonskostnadene. De farmasøytiske selskapene forsvarer seg med at de må ta så mye for medisinen for å dekke de høye utgiftene til forskning og utvikling, som i sin tur blir skrudd opp av feilslåtte prosjekter og dyre kliniske eksperimenter. Det sier seg selv at disse selskapene må ha muligheten til å dekke sine egne utgifter. Men kan vi ikke tilby dem alternativ belønning som ikke driver medisinprisen i været og gjør dem for høye for mange av brukerne?

**Vi vil kunne etablere en permanent kilde til ny og prismessig gunstig medisin.**

Et detaljert utkast til denne typen belønningssystem ble presentert i Oslo i august 2008. Det innebar opprettelsen av et nytt internasjonalt organ, Health Impact Fund (Helseinnflytelsesfondet eller HIF). Dette fondet er primært finansiert på regjeringsnivå, og er en mekanisme for fortløpende utbetaling som skal tilby innovatører muligheten til å registrere enhver ny medisin, uten forpliktelser. Ved å registrere produktet tillater innovatøren at det blir tilgjengelig på markedet de første ti årene, overalt hvor det er bruk for det, til lavest mulig pris for produksjon og distribusjon. Innovatøren vil også binde seg til å tillate allmenn produksjon og distribusjon av produktet etter denne tiårsperioden, vederlagsfritt. Til gjengjeld vil vedkommende motta årlige utbetalinger i samme periode, basert på produktets globale innflytelse på allmennheten (health impact). Disse utbetalingene vil være del av en stor årlig utbetaling, som gir alle registrerte produkter en andel tilsvarende den takserte andelen i helsemessig innflytelse for alle produkter i det aktuelle året. Hvis HIF viser seg å fungere i praksis, vil den årlige potten for belønning kunne bli økt for å tiltrekke flere nye medisiner.

HIF vil kunne stimulere utviklingen av nye, allmennnyttige medisiner, ikke minst mot sykdommer som rammer fattige, som tuberkulose, malaria og andre tropiske sykdommer. Disse blir nedprioritert i dag, fordi innovatørene ikke får dekket utgiftene til forskning og utvikling ved salg i fattige land. Muligheten for alternativ belønning basert på global innflytelse på allmennheten vil kunne omdanne hittil oversette sykdommer til lukrative forskningsområder for farmasøytene. Fondet vil også, ved å holde prisene på alle registrerte produkter nede, kunne øke tilgangen til ny medisin. I tillegg vil det motivere registrerte utviklere til å forske seg om på pro-







duktene deres er allment tilgjengelige, kanskje til og med til redusert pris, og at de blir foreskrevet og brukt på best mulig måte. Utviklerne vil kunne tjene penger både på å selge produktet sitt og på å gjøre det mest mulig effektivt for å bedre den globale helsen.

**Dersom en del** av den farmasøytiske forskningen blir betalt av skattefinansierte HIF-belønninger, ville velstående enkeltpersoner og nasjoner bære mye av kostnadene – akkurat som i dag. Men det er noen viktige forskjeller. For det første tjener ikke innovatørene noe på selve salget av medisiner, bare på at medisinen deres faktisk viser seg å være virksom på det angjeldende området. Takket være dette nye incentivet har pasientene større sjanse for å motta medisiner som faktisk vil bedre tilstanden deres. For det andre trenger ikke innovatørene å ekskludere fattige pasienter og prioritere å betjene de velstående. De vil tvert imot tjene like godt på å betjene fattige pasienter til den samme lave prisen. Den helsemessige gevinsten for hver pasient, uansett om de er fattige eller rike, vil bidra like mye til innovatørens belønning.

**HIF vil sørge** for ideelle incentiver bare hvis de potensielle utviklerne blir forsikret om at belønningen faktisk vil komme i løpet av de ti årene etter markedets godkjenning. Fondets grunnsubsidiar lar seg derfor best garantere for av en bred sammenslutning av land. Hvis de regjeringene som representerer en tredjedel av den globale inntekten blir enige om å bidra med bare 0,3 prosent av sine brutto årsinntekter (tre dollar per 10 000 dollar), kunne vi starte HIF med seks milliarder dollar årlig. Dette er et akseptabelt minimum ettersom kostnadene ved å utvikle ny medisiner er høye og forutsetter høye belønninger, og fordi prisen på den anslåtte hel-

sesmessige innflytelsen ikke må legge beslag på mer enn ti prosent av fondets budsjett.

**Fondet vil kunne** skape vedvarende konkurranse blant innovatørene som omfatter alle land og sykdommer, og firmaene vil kunne tjene mer penger jo mer effektivt produktet deres er for allmennhelsen. Innflytelsen på helse lar seg måle i antallet kvalitetsjusterte leveår (QALY) som blir reddet. QALY-systemet blir allerede benyttet av mange private og offentlige assurantører for å fastsette prisen for nye legemidler, så det vil ikke være vanskelig å innføre det i beregningen av HIF-belønninger. Fondet vil vurdere hvor mye den enkelte medisinen kan øke av lengde og kvalitet i et menneskeliv, med utgangspunkt i det farmasøytiske tilbudet før medisinen blir introdusert. Denne vurderingen vil være basert på kliniske forsøk (inkludert pragmatiske forsøk i hverdagslige situasjoner), sporing av tilfeldig utvalgte medisiner (som lar seg identifisere på serienummeret) og statistisk analyse av salgssopplysninger korrelert med data om den globale sykdomsbyrden. Slike anslag vil ikke være perfekte, i hvert fall ikke de første årene. De vil imidlertid være betydelig bedre enn det nåværende systemet med påslag (*mark-ups*) for å påvise sammenheng mellom nye medisiners lønnsomhet og innflytelsen på helsen.

**Med et slikt fond** i ryggen vil innovatørene velge å registrere produkter som i størst mulig grad kan redusere den globale sykdomsbyrden. Produktene med størst helsemessig innflytelse vil generere mest penger, og bidra til helt riktige incentiver for nyskaping. Og ettersom HIF er et valgfritt system, er belønningsraten garantert tilfredsstillende. Dersom belønningen er for stor, vil nye utviklere melde seg på og senke den konstante belønningsraten (antall dollar per QALY). Dette vil berolige kostbetalerne.

**Smuglervarer:** Folk handler ulovlig kopimedisin på Adjame-markedet i Abidjan. Gattesalg av slike medisinforkalkninger er betydelig i Elfenbenskysten. Men ny medisiner som virker kan gøres tilgjengelig for flere, mener moralfilosofen Thomas Pogge.

FOTO: ISSOUP SANOGO/SCANPIX

Dersom utbyttet er for lite, vil belønningsraten opplagt øke etter som firmaene velger å avstå fra HIF-registrering av sine nye produkter til fordel for patentbeskyttet påslag. Dette er betryggende for innovatørene. Konkurransen vil sikre at de registrerte produktene blir belønnet etter en rate som både er fordelaktig for innovatørene og øker effekten av fondet maksimalt.

HIF gir oss et bilde av hvordan et fond som belønner nyvinninger etter deres målbare virkning kan løse tre problemer på en gang, uten at man trenger å endre det globale patentsystemet. Fondet kan umiddelbart gi adgang til nye produkter til overkommelig pris, produkter som ellers ville få et stort påslag i prisen; det vil stimulere innovatørene til å arbeide bevisst for optimal bruk av produktet, og tilskynde utviklingen av nye produkter på områder som hittil har vært nedprioritert på grunn av mangel på incentiver.

**Ved å få** en sammenslutning av land til å subsidiere HIF vil vi kunne etablere en permanent kilde til ny og prismessig gunstig medisiner som vil være optimal også for verdens fattige. Det vil i tillegg kunne tjene som eksempel på hvordan vi kan belønne nyvinninger uten å begrense den optimale bruken av dem, blant annet ved å øke næringsavkastningen i landbruket og redusere forurensende utslipp. Denne typen reformer i belønningen av nyvinninger vil være et langt steg i retning en mer rettferdig verdensøkonomi.

Thomas Pogge er professor i moralfilosofi og politisk filosofi ved Yale University, og forskningsleder for moralfilosofisk enhet ved The Center for the Study of Mind in Nature ved Universitetet i Oslo. Senteret arrangerer debattmøte om Health Impact Fund (Helseinnflytelsesfondet eller HIF) mandag 10. mai. Arrangementet finner sted på Litteraturhuset i Oslo klokken 18.00. ideer@morgenbladet.no



# Fattigdom

Er det å være overarbeidet det samme som å være fattig? Filosof Alison Jaggar vil redefinere fattigdomsbegrepet – og denne gangen skal det gjøres på de fattiges premisser.

## FAKTA

### Dette er saken:

■ Alison Jaggar er professor i filosofi ved University of Colorado og på Center for Study of Mind in Nature (CSMN) i Oslo.

■ Hun har nylig startet et tverrfaglig forskningsprosjekt, FemPov, for å utarbeide nye standarder for å måle fattigdom.

■ Dagens standarder, utarbeidet av Verdensbanken og FN, underkommunisere bredden og dybden av fattigdom generelt, og kvinners fattigdom spesielt, mener Jaggar.

## FILOSOFI

Av Sandra Lillebo (tekst) og Linda Bournane Engelberth (foto)

«Rikdom er kunnskap, ikke penger», står det tagget på en vegg i Gamlebyen i Oslo. Men hva er fattigdom?

«A dollar a day» er den magiske grensen man må komme over, om man ikke skal telle som «absolutt fattig» i FNs statistikker. Men denne grensen sier i realiteten lite om hva fattigdom egentlig er, mener filosofen Alison M. Jaggar. Hun har til daglig tilholdssted ved University of Colorado, men som professor II ved Centre for Study of

verty Index ser for eksempel kun på tverrsnittet av befolkningen innad i hvert land, noe som kan skjule store forskjeller. Hvor fattigdomsgrensen settes, er dessuten helt vilkårlig med tanke på de store forskjellene mellom ulike land. Hvis du bor i et sosialistisk land og får gratis helseomsorg og skolegang, vil man klare seg med en langt lavere inntekt enn om man skal sørge for dette selv. Forskning viser dessuten at IPL underrapporterer omfanget av kvinners fattigdom. Hvis det er slik at kvinner har det meste av forsørgeransvaret, trenger hun også mer penger. Dette sier ikke dagens statistikker noe om, sier hun.

### Poverty Line

En annen svært vanlig målemetode for fattigdom, er den såkalte International Poverty Line (IPL) som er utviklet av Verdensbanken. Også denne har betydelige svakheter, mener Jaggar. Hun fortsetter:

– Men det viktigste slik jeg ser det, er at dagens målestandarder alle er laget av eksperter. Folks liv blir målt opp mot standarder de ikke har vært med på å definere. Det alle tidligere metoder for å måle fattigdom har til felles, er at de ikke tar inn over seg de fattiges perspektiv. De undersøkelsene vi har gjort så langt, er helt tydelige på at svært få går med på å kalle seg fattige. For de aller fleste oppleves det som stigmatiserende å bli definert av et fattigdomsbegrep som mer eller mindre er trukket rett ut av luften.

### Hva er fattigdom?

Forskningsgruppen på åtte, som Alison Jaggar skal lede, består av både moralfilosofer, økonomer og s har dette dreid mot en interesse for begrepene om global rettferdighet sett fra et kjønnsperspektiv.

– Det er mange måter å angripe «rettferdighet»-filosofi. Man kunne gått inn i begreper som frihet eller helse,

## «Hvor fattigdomsgrensen settes, er helt vilkårlig»

ALISON M. JAGGAR, FILOSOF


Mind in Nature på Universitetet i Oslo, tilbringer hun en måned i Oslo hvert år.

### FemPov

Årets besøk benyttet hun blant annet til å holde foredrag på Litteraturhuset om det såkalte FemPov-prosjektet, som har som formål å belyse global fattigdom – fra de fattiges perspektiv. Et viktig poeng for Jaggar er at ekspertveldet som i dag setter standarden den globale fattigdommen måles etter, gjennom sine valg av metoder, underrapporterer om kvinners fattigdom.

– De begrepene vi bruker om fattigdom i dag, viser allerede at fattigdommen er ulikt fordelt med tanke på kjønn. Hvorfor trenger vi en ny metode for å måle den?

– For det første er målestokkene som brukes utilstrekkelige. FNs Human Po-



REDEFINERER FATTIGDOM: – For de aller

men fattigdom er også et av aspektene som må tas med. Poenget mitt er at om man skal kunne avgjøre om noe er rettferdig eller ikke, må man ha en standard å måle rettferdigheten ut fra.

Da hun holdt foredraget «The Feminization of Global Poverty: How Can Philosophy Help?» på Litteraturhuset i forrige uke, stilte hun blant annet spørsmålet om overarbeid – eller «tidsfattigdom» – bør regnes som del av fattigdomsproblematikken.

– Kvinner over hele verden jobber mer enn menn. De gjør ofte det mest stigmatiserende og tyngste arbeidet, som sexarbeid, eller å ta seg av syke, eldre og barn. Hvordan dette henger sammen med fattigdom må testes, og det er noe av det vi vil forsøke å gjøre i FemPov-prosjektet.

sandra.lillebo@klassekampen.no



# m på prøve




flESTE opplever det som stigmatiserende å bli definert av et fattigdomsbegrep som mer eller mindre er trukket rett ut av luften, mener filosofen Alison Jaggar.

Et sterkt drama med  
**COLIN FARRELL, PAZ VEGA og  
CHRISTOPHER LEE**

# TRIAGE

LEV ELLER DØ

 "Bosniske Tanovic, som også står for den kritikerroste NO MAN'S LAND (2001), har med dette truffet blink for annen gang" Natt&Dag

**I SALG PÅ BLU-RAY OG DVD NÅ!**





# Accounts 2010

## Accounts 2010 NOK

Personnel and indirect costs	12 010 000
Research and development	1 044 000
Equipment	81 000
Research activities	5 891 000
Other RCN-projects	3 417 000

<b>Sum expenditures</b>	<b>22 443 000</b>
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# Budget 2011

## Budget 2011 NOK

Personnel and indirect costs	10 960 000
Research and development	1 039 000
Equipment	205 000
Research activities	4 485 000
Other RCN-projects	5 393 000

<b>Sum expected expenditures</b>	<b>22 082 000</b>
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Logo and graphic design by Johan Sæther/Motorfinger ([www.motorfinger.no](http://www.motorfinger.no))  
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Layout by Ellen Evju Jahr.  
Espen Røsbak and Jon Furholt  
Printed at 07 Gruppen AS