Popular Music in Germany, 1900-1930: A Case of Americanisation? Uncovering a European Trajectory of Music Production into the Twentieth Century

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Popular Music in Germany, 1900–1930: A Case of Americanisation? Uncovering a European Trajectory of Music Production into the Twentieth Century

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This article discusses the thesis that popular music in early twentieth-century Germany was Americanised by shifting the focus from the meaning and reception of music to the way it was produced and disseminated by professionals, from music publishers and composers to bandleaders and critics. Firstly, it stresses a key difference in the way the music business was modernised on both sides of the Atlantic around 1900. While in the US the sheet-music trade became ‘Taylorised’, the music business in Germany, as elsewhere in Continental Europe, was transformed into a rights industry. Secondly, the paper highlights the prominence of Austrian music producers and their repertoire in Germany and suggests that, at least in a business sense, popular music in Germany was Austrianised rather than Americanised. Thirdly, it proposes that ‘Jazz’ after the First World War was hardly a straightforward import of American culture, but a site where incumbents and newcomers to the music profession struggled for position.

Keywords: music-business history; popular-music publishing; collecting societies; production of culture perspective

Introduction

Following a culture concept that perceives culture as a coherent set of values, norms and beliefs that are shared by social groups and inform individual behaviour,1 historians commonly study the meaning and reception of popular music in the twentieth century as a reflection of collective world views or as a battleground for cultural hegemony. They assume that culture and society developed in lockstep with each other, with culture guiding behaviour and the engagement with reality requiring a calibration of culture. This leads historians to detect political events, economic crises, periods of prosperity and demographic shifts as primary causes for changes in popular culture, as these greater societal trends and caesura are supposed to have forced people to adapt their world views to new realities.

In the case of popular music in the early twentieth century, the First World War is said to have shaken the world views of Europeans and generated a need for new, more democratic and less restrained forms of culture. This need was satisfied, so the argument goes, by Jazz, a kind of music whose ‘joyful energy and exhilaration appealed to those thirsty for release after the tense physical and emotional penury of the war years’, to quote a statement which appears in various formulations in numerous studies on popular music of that period.2 The popularity of American music is also explained in reference to a correspondence between culture and peoples’ needs. Contemporary proponents and opponents of Jazz are said to have grappled with this ‘American sound’ as the ‘sound of...
the modern age’ and used it as a medium to negotiate the hopes and fears of post-war life.\textsuperscript{3} It is argued that the US, as the pioneering liberal-democratic society, the leading industrial nation or ‘Market Empire’, had generated a matching popular culture which became a point of reference for Europeans who were, whether they liked it or not, catching up with ‘modern’ developments.\textsuperscript{4}

The following paper avoids the strong assumption of a correspondence between peoples’ needs and world views on the one side and popular symbolic content on the other, which underlies the usual explanations for cultural change and the alleged Americanisation of popular culture in Europe. Instead, it focuses on the supply side of music and takes into consideration that cultural intermediaries have no insight into future demand, but have to decide on repertoire and ways to disseminate it before audiences may respond to it. Taking the lead from the production of culture perspective,\textsuperscript{5} the article starts from the observation that popular music in the first third of the twentieth century neither emanated from a ‘Zeitgeist’ nor from the cultural practices of ‘the people’, but was composed, printed, promoted, sold and evaluated by specialists such as musicians, music publishers, concert organisers and critics whose actions were shaped primarily by structural constraints such as copyright legislation, distribution media and professional routines. In this way, the article addresses the almost total absence in historical accounts of the actors, structures and processes of the music business that played a central part in the change of the popular repertoire and the transfer of music between America and Europe. Taking into consideration the inherent dynamics of music production leads this paper to new insights into the turning points and periods of popular-music history, as well as the relationship between American and European popular music. The article begins with an analysis of the structural change of the music business that occurred at the turn of the century, when it was transformed from a branch of the book trade into a rights industry (in Continental Europe) and lifted to the level of mass production (in the US). These diversions from the nineteenth-century business model will be referred to as modernisation, as they led the music trade to its present-day form. The article traces developments until the electrification of popular music that came about in the second half of the 1920s with the expansion of radio, the establishment of new recording technologies and the advent of sound film. The focus is on the US and Germany, but connections and similarities with other European cases, most importantly the Austrian one, will be explored.

The first part of the paper compares the music business in the US and Germany at the turn of the century and argues that the music trade in the two countries was modernised in different ways. While in America a new breed of music publishers essentially ‘Taylorised’ sheet-music production by lifting it to the level of standardised mass production and sales, German publishers – like their colleagues in Austria, France and Italy – began to divert from nineteenth-century publishing by licensing performance rights to theatre directors. The second part follows this ‘rights industry’ path and traces the establishment of a regime for the exploitation of performance rights in small venues in Germany. As these developments followed and were set in motion by similar initiatives in France, Italy and Austria, they can be seen as an example of a European trajectory. The analysis highlights the prominence of Austrian protagonists and repertoire in Germany, which supports the argument that popular music in Germany in the period under study was, at least in a business sense, more Austrianised than Americanised. The third part deals with the appropriation of Jazz in Germany. Instead of treating it as a direct expression of American influences, it distinguishes between the different interpretations and uses of Jazz by representatives of the German music business. It argues that the history of early ‘Jazz’ in Germany happened without any substantial connections to developments in the US and
that it has to be understood against the backdrop of early twentieth-century variety theatre. When Germans became aware of American Jazz music in the mid-1920s, the musical establishment employed ‘original’ Jazz from the US as a means to exclude semi-professional musicians from the labour market. In effect, the American model served to tighten rather than stir up musical conventions.

Selling print, exploiting rights: the different origins of the modern popular-music business in Germany and the United States around 1900

Music that was marketed for the biggest possible audience had been written and promoted long before 1900. In the second half of the nineteenth century, there was an international trade in compositions that were printed and sold to amateur musicians, mainly pianists and choirs. The consumption of popular music was to a large extent a participatory activity, as laymen and laywomen purchased musical scores to perform music themselves. This form of music appreciation was serviced by music publishers, whose operations resembled the book trade. In both industries, publishers bought manuscripts or sub-published works from foreign publishing firms, commissioned printers and sold the finished article in specialist shops or via mail order.

In the US and Germany as well as other European countries, the music trade began to depart from this business model around 1900. In the US in the 1890s, a new group of New York-based publishers developed alternative strategies of song promotion and initiated a change in the way popular music was produced and disseminated. Armed with cheaply printed ‘professional copies’ of new titles, these publishers and their promotion men toured the city’s night spots every evening. They befriended waiters, proprietors, conductors and performers and offered drinks, food, favours or money to get their songs played. If they were persuasive enough, they got a rendition of their song by a featured vocalist. If required, they would sing the piece themselves and hopefully engage the audience to join in. To this end, they distributed chorus slips among the tables. The aim of ‘song plugging’, as this form of promotion was called, was to drum melody and words into as many peoples’ ears as possible. If audiences reacted favourably to a song, a small edition was commissioned to be printed for retail. As soon as a substantial demand became discernible, publishers rushed to a printer again and ordered larger editions. These were taken up by ‘jobbers’ who bulk-bought at 50% rebate and sold to retailers at a profit. If demand was slack, as it was mostly the case, publishers dropped the title and promoted the next song, hoping to strike gold this time. In the years before 1920, when increasing paper costs and a printers’ strike forced up the price of sheet music, a top tune like Till We Meet Again (1918) sold up to 3.5 million copies in a few months. Such figures exceeded by far the sales of ‘popular’ hits in the smaller European markets.

The American ‘hit-making apparatus’ (Russell Sanjek) was developed to perfection around 1900 by the brothers Witmark, Leo Feist, Maurice Shapiro, Harry Von Tilzer, Edward Marks and a few other publishers. Their offices where first located around Times Square, from where they moved to 28th and 29th streets between 5th and 6th avenues, an area which became known as ‘Tin Pan Alley’, possibly because of the cacophony of sounds emerging from the publishers’ studios. Many of these men as well as the songwriters they began to employ on a permanent basis were immigrants from Central Europe. Lacking ties to more established trades, they had no inhibitions in handling music which was deemed substandard by the older American publishing firms whose catalogues consisted mainly of European material. Until the 1890s, music from the Old World had made up the overwhelming majority of the titles available in the US, mainly because domestic
publishers could reprint foreign music without having to compensate foreign rights holders. Copyright reforms in 1891 and subsequent bilateral copyright agreements required American publishers to pay royalties to the composers, authors and publishers who held the rights in the countries of origin, which put domestic music on equal terms with imported material. While the older American publishers competed for imported copyrights, the denizens of Tin Pan Alley concentrated fully on popular songs from domestic writers that were initially not taken very seriously by the musical establishment.13

These developments in publishing coincided with the expansion of the department stores that brought a range of consumer goods to the majority of the population. Stores like Woolworth’s turned to selling sheet music in the late 1890s. They used sheet music to attract customers and created special departments where employees continuously played the latest tunes on pianos. The massive turnover of the stores knocked down the standard price of song sheets to 10¢ per copy in 1915. At about that time, department stores accounted for around 200 million copies of sheet music per year, with Woolworth’s alone selling about 150 million copies.14 Tin Pan Alley flourished alongside the department store, which became its most important sales outlet. This collaboration came almost naturally to the new publishers as many of them had a background in sales. Edward Marks had worked as a haberdashery salesman; his partner Joseph Stern and publisher Leo Feist had sold neckties and corsets respectively. Max Dreyfus had peddled picture frames before he started his career in music publishing at Harms. Maurice Shapiro and Louis Bernstein, who founded their company in 1896, also had a past in retailing.15

Another ally of music publishers was vaudeville, which became the primary platform for song promotion in the early twentieth century. Initially, publishers had concentrated on New York venues. To advertise their songs in other places, they had given them to travelling minstrel troupes.16 The creation of the Keith-Albee, the Orpheum and the Western circuits of vaudeville theatres from the 1890s on made nationwide ‘plugging’ more efficient and turned New York favourites into national hits.17 As with retailing, the close proximity between the two economic sectors was partially based on the career trajectories of music publishers. Harry Von Tilzer and several of the Witmark brothers are exemplary of those publishers who had a background in vaudeville.18 Theatre impresarios in turn also benefited from this arrangement. They saved money on their acts as they let music publishers pay for ‘plugs’. To accommodate vaudeville stars, publishers opened branch offices alongside the vaudeville tour. Promotional costs rose, which in turn reduced the chances for newcomers to break into the phalanx of the Alley’s first movers.19

Following copyright reform, the American music business was transformed by publishers, wholesalers, department-store owners and vaudeville entrepreneurs who developed new business strategies that fed into each other. In Germany, the music trade was also modernised, but on a different course, partly because an integration of publishing, retailing and performance as in the US did not occur. This was not for want of trying. Firstly, there were attempts to ‘plug’ songs in concert venues like cabarets, but police controls and censorship made this difficult. Performers and venue proprietors were fined if the police noticed that songs were performed which had not been submitted to the authorities for approval.20 Secondly, those few publishers who engaged in ‘plugging’ had problems getting their songs into retail outlets that could sell them cheaply and in great quantities. Again, this was not due to a lack of interest and initiative. In the 1890s, the department store Wertheim collaborated with publisher Alfred Michow and sold music at prices as low as 10 Pfennig. Like Woolworth’s in the US, Wertheim saw sheet music as a means to attract shoppers and employed a pianist who performed songs all day long.21 However, the Association of German Music Dealers (Verein deutscher Musikalienhändler),
which represented established publishers and specialist retailers, fought music sales in department stores as dumping. The association blacklisted unapproved wholesalers and threatened to exclude publishers and retailers who supplied department stores from regular trade. While these measures did not prevent sheet-music sales at department stores, it drove the middlemen underground and hampered their operations. This situation lasted until 1913, when a court ruling made it illegal to undercut prices for so-called ‘Markenartikel’: goods of a certain category for which prices were set by suppliers. Another court decision granted that boycotts were a legitimate means in market competition, which in turn enabled organised publishers to cut off shops from supply. This forced department stores to finally accept the terms of the music trade association and kept sheet music from becoming a good for mass consumption. Thirdly and in contrast to the US, German variety theatres were managed individually and not integrated into a circuit. This meant that they did not lend themselves to promote songs on a national scale.

The elements of Tin Pan Alley’s ‘hit-making apparatus’ – ‘plugging’ publishers, ‘jobbers’, department stores and variety theatres – were in place in Germany, but remained disconnected and therefore exerted relatively little influence on the course of the music business. Nevertheless, the production of popular music was modernised in Germany about the same time as in the US, albeit on a different route and by different actors.

The first to venture beyond the ‘book-trade model’ of music promotion in the German-speaking countries were ‘publisher-directors’, who simultaneously dealt in copyrights of musical dramas and controlled leading operetta theatres in Vienna or Berlin. Some of these publisher-directors had started as theatrical agents and added a publishing concern to their operations, benefiting from their good contacts within the theatre world. The most prominent example is Adolf Sliwinski, who transformed the company of Felix Bloch Erben into the leading publishing house for musical dramas in Germany. In the early twentieth century, he gained control of theatres in Berlin and Hamburg. Other publisher-directors had a background as theatre directors and ventured into publishing to derive an additional income from the works they brought on stage. This type is represented by Wilhelm Karczag, who bought the Theater an der Wien in 1901 and subsequently acquired control of further operetta stages in the Austrian capital while founding his publishing company to exploit the rights of his productions. Finally, existing publishing houses integrated forward as they bought, leased or financed theatres to promote their catalogues. For instance, the Drei Masken-Verlag, a theatrical-publishing company founded in 1911 in Munich, leased the Münchner Künstlertheater in 1912/13. Soon after, the firm moved to Berlin, where it ran the Theater am Nollendorfplatz and the Neues Schauspielhaus.

Publisher-directors employed metropolitan theatres as promotional tools for their plays. To focus attention on new works, they organised opening nights as lavish affairs and made sure that the theatre was filled to the last seat, giving away free tickets and paying claques if necessary. To mark the premiere as a special event, the composer of the respective operetta conducted the orchestra. Furthermore, the producers used the drawing power of stars, with plays often tailored to their skills. An opening night with a new piece of music, a famous cast and a guest list with prominent names created news. So even though ‘serious’ critics as a rule dismissed operettas as formulaic and of lesser artistic and intellectual value, ‘well-crafted’ at best, the metropolitan press provided coverage. Premieres worked as events, and any review contributed to the popularity of an operetta, making it the talk of town. The fiftieth or hundredth repeat of a play also seemed worth reporting. Metropolitan newspapers registered the successful season of The Merry Widow in provincial Elberfeld, for instance, or a royal visit to the Dollar Princess. The question of
whether or not Leo Fall’s latest work would achieve as many performances as Lehár’s last ‘hit’ was debated like a sporting competition. Operettas went for records in a literal sense. They were compared and ranked, which constantly generated news. This mutual resonance of theatres and the press generated a ‘buzz’ and brought periodicity to popular music, two features that have remained essential for ‘pop’ to this day.

Given that they gained a certain momentum after their launch at a metropolitan stage, new operettas reached the German provinces. Directors of provincial theatres depended on ‘hits’, all the more as from the turn of the century they had experienced increased competition from alternative providers of entertainment, like variety theatres, cabarets and cinemas. A success from the capital promised to attract audiences, and so directors were prepared to pay a premium fee for a drama licence. This put publisher-directors in a powerful position. Sliwinski, for instance, is said to have introduced the musical theatre to block booking, by which he tied the licence of major hits to other works from his catalogue and even dictated the scheduling of plays. This way, he made sure that works with less drawing power would also be staged across the country.29

Successful operettas also travelled abroad. Publishers were interested in licensing their works to as many theatres as possible, including foreign stages. They followed the rationale that as soon as the initial costs of releasing a play were recovered, all further performances generated profits with very few expenses, as the promotion of the respective work in foreign markets was left to local promoters, who passed on a share of their income to the original publisher. A precondition for the transnational licensing business was the establishment of international copyright laws. In Europe, the Berne Convention of 1886 provided the basis on which copyright holders traded. For the US, which did not enter this convention, bilateral agreements were negotiated that granted mutual protection of copyrights in the signatory states. Regarding Germany, the American President and a delegate of the German Emperor signed a proclamation in 1892.30 A similar agreement with Austria came into force only in 1908, and Hungarian works were not covered by it. Initially, this lack of protection added to the attractiveness of musical plays from Hungary as well as Austrian works written before the ratification of the treaty with Austria, as no royalties had to be paid.31 However, the Shubert brothers, who in 1904 controlled about 50 theatres in the US and were the most prolific importers of European operettas to America,32 soon discovered that the absence of protection meant that other producers could stage a foreign hit and thereby crowd the market for Shubert productions. To be able to exploit a play exclusively it had to be protected, and this ‘requires that the title and two copies of the article for which copyright is desired shall be filed and deposited in this office [the Copyright Office in Washington] before publication in this country or elsewhere’, as the US Registrar of Copyrights answered to the request of Shubert’s attorney.33 As a consequence, the Shuberts insisted that their European partners registered their works in compliance with the US copyright laws.

Until the First World War, there was a steady stream of musical plays from Central Europe to the US. Enforced by the success of the Merry Widow and driven by a growing competition among US theatrical entrepreneurs, the American stage in the second half of the 1900s developed a voracious appetite for musical comedies that could be adapted for the domestic audience. The Shuberts employed Gustav Amberg – who had migrated to the US after the Civil War, made a name as a theatre impresario and returned to Europe around 190034 – as their man on the European ground. He travelled between Berlin, Leipzig, Vienna and Budapest to spot promising plays and secure the American stage rights from the respective authors and publishers. In frequent letters to his employers, Amberg describes how leading American producers like Charles Frohman, Henry Savage and Marc...
Klaw tried to get hold of exclusive rights for new plays for America. ‘It is full here with Americans, managers, music publishers [,] conductors, etc., all fishing,’ he reported from Vienna in July 1908. Before the war interrupted the trade, Amberg sent music and books of dozens of German-language plays to his employers who found themselves forced to produce these plays because the usual option contracts required them to do so if they wanted to retain the rights. The scramble among American producers for musical comedies from Central Europe proves the continued importance of this repertoire in the US market in the face of the rise of Tin Pan Alley. However, it has to be stressed that Austrian and German operettas were heavily edited. American producers turned them into variety shows by stripping them of the less catchy songs, adding ‘interpolations’ written by American tunesmiths. These adaptations showed little regard for the original plots (which were threadbare to begin with) and illustrate the different rationales of the business in the two countries. While hit-making in the US was geared towards song promotion and large sales of sheet music to amateur musicians, the aim of operetta publishers was to license musical plays to theatre directors and profit from performance fees. Whereas American publishers ‘Taylorised’ the music trade by lifting it to the levels of mass production, German publishers changed the business into a rights industry.

These different trajectories tend to be overlooked, not least because contemporaries decried this development as an Americanisation of German music. A closer look, however, reveals that the reference to ‘America’ was primarily a shorthand for cultural critics who used it as a blanket condemnation of trends which they thought were in breach of traditions and values of German musical life. Sliwinski in particular attracted that kind of criticism by conspicuously admitting that he had neither an intrinsic interest nor particular expertise in art as such, but was in it for the money. This illustrates an increasing commercialisation of music which was not an ‘American’ invention, but mainly owed to structural changes in publishing, theatre production and the press which domestic entrepreneurs tried to negotiate.

A further reason to not mistake German developments as an imitation of an American model is the marked difference in the popular repertoire between the US and Germany. Operettas, which became the most influential genre in German popular music at the beginning of the twentieth century, consisted of musical texts, topics, images and meanings that stood in contrast to the typical American popular song of that time. Operettas were situation comedies, deriving their twists and turns from unexpected and ultimately resolved changes in social status. Stories were generally set in higher circles where confusions over rank and money led to imbroglios. A majority of operettas intended to show nobility and wealth, and so they were to display a minimum of splendour in decorations, props and clothing as well as music. They were primarily written for the ‘legitimate’ stage and trickled down to variety theatres and dance halls where parts of them were performed by smaller ensembles.

In contrast, Tin Pan Alley specialised in the tearjerker, which dominated the repertoire until the ‘dance craze’ of 1911. Many songs which were ‘plugged’ with great success were lachrymose ballads like the one about The Little Lost Child (1894), in which a policeman picks up a stray little girl and realises that it is his own daughter. The girl had been taken away as a baby by the policeman’s wife who had left him in a bout of jealousy. The mother, who anxiously searches for her daughter, comes to the police station where she finds the girl safe with her father. Brought together by the lost child, the couple is finally reunited. Stories like these stood in contrast to the situation comedies and showy presentation of operettas. They invited listeners to get emotionally involved and were composed with the female pianist in mind, who would reproduce the song in the domestic
drawing room to friends and family. Operettas, on the other hand, created events; they
were public music which appealed to conspicuous consumers of both sexes and offered
them an opportunity to do something fashionable. A further difference is the fact that,
while operettas were launched in ‘legitimate’ theatres, Tin Pan Alley publishers at first
planted the seeds of popularity at the lower end of concert venues, in beer halls and
burlesques, hoping that their songs would percolate from the bottom up.40

Sentimental ballads and operettas flowed from very different musical sources.
Operettas were written by ‘Kapellmeister’ like Franz Lehár, Leo Fall and Oscar Straus,
who inhabited a place between art and popular music. On the one hand, most of them had
received a thorough musical training, and an initial aspiration to succeed in art music was
common among them. On the other, they had acquired a lot of practical experience as band
leaders, arrangers and stage musicians, either working for the army or in theatres.
Conducting and performing at dances or in cabarets, ‘Kapellmeister’ got a close insight
into how audiences reacted to the music they performed. Their double orientation
predestined them to write ‘gehobene Unterhaltungsmusik’, ‘elevated entertainment music’
that combined elements of art music with the experience of catering to the demand for
what can be called utility music.41

The songwriters of Tin Pan Alley were of a different breed altogether. Many
composers and writers would have been considered as mere dilettantes by any
‘Kapellmeister’. The most prominent example is Irving Berlin, who had been working in
a New York restaurant as a singing waiter. He never mastered the piano and wrote his
songs, among them some of the biggest hits of the first half of the twentieth century, on a
transposable instrument so that he did not have to work out different keys.42 To polish
songs and write orchestra parts, publishers gave tunes to arrangers who worked as
freelancers first and were employed on fixed contracts, like the more successful
songwriters, when the publishing houses grew. With songwriting and arranging becoming
a job, employees developed a craftsmen ethos, which had similarities with the attitude of
‘Kapellmeister’, but was devoid of the artistic aspirations that haunted the latter.43

Before the 1920s, only a relatively small number of selected hits from the Alley
reached listeners on the European continent. A look into ‘Hofmeisters Jahresverzeichnis’,
the annual list of new sheet-music releases in Germany, reveals that the share of American
titles among the new tunes was modest and consisted largely of ‘ethnic’ pieces. The 1907
edition, for instance, lists a couple of ‘Indian’ titles like Egbert van Alstyne’s Navaho
(1903), Fred Hager’s Laughing Waters (1903), released under the German title
‘Quellengeister’) and Neil Moret’s Hiawatha (1902) as well as a number of cakewalks,
‘negro’ and ‘plantation’ songs such as Frederick Allen Mills’s At a Georgia
Campmeeting.44 These and similar titles were also widely recorded for gramophone
records and player pianos, as Rainer E. Lotz’s documentation of German ragtime
recordings shows.45 This supports the assumption that American popular tunes of this time
were mainly valued as character pieces that could be used to pepper a musical programme
with something exotic, yet recognisable. Most love songs, sentimental ballads or tunes
taken from the stock of ordinary life which made up the majority of American hits from the
1890s into the 1910s did not, in contrast, cross the Atlantic to reach German listeners.

The beginning of the exploitation of ‘small rights’ and the ‘Austrian Invasion’ of
Germany
In Germany, publisher-directors were the first to generate an income from public
performances of music. The legal basis for this was the copyright law of 1870, which
enabled publishers, authors and composers to exploit the so-called ‘grand rights’ and demand fees from public performances of their works in theatres. The many public performances in cafés, restaurants, beer gardens and concert halls were left free of charge. At the time, it made economic sense to reserve performance rights to theatres only and abandon the ‘small rights’. Publishers thought that any restriction of the public performance of a musical work would curb sheet-music sales on which they exclusively focused as a source of revenue. As a consequence, only about 1000 of the 70,000 to 80,000 original compositions published between 1870 and 1900 came out with a proviso that reserved the rights to perform the piece in public. Dramatic texts were considered to be a different matter. They were written for the stage and as a rule not purchased by a greater number of readers. The same applied to musical plays. Songs, however, were to be sold to sheet-music buyers, and so a fee that could deter performers from playing a tune was seen by publishers as self-defeating. A further reason to not restrict the public performance of music was the practical problems that the collection of performance fees would have encountered. Unlike performances of musical plays in theatres, which could be overlooked by the respective publisher, it was impossible for a single firm to do the same for thousands of wine bars and beer gardens. This required an organisation that was able to register public performances in venues throughout the country, negotiate with their proprietors, collect fees and distribute the income in accordance with a fair and transparent scheme.

Going against common perception and practical problems, a group of publishers and composers as well as the legislator moved to make public performances of copyrighted music subject to fees and form an organisation to collect them. These initiatives were set in motion by developments which had started outside Germany. International agreements put pressure on the German legislature to align domestic copyright to the rules of other countries, mainly France, where a collecting agency, the Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM, Society of Authors, Composers and Music Publishers), had been in existence since 1851. The Berne Convention (1886) allowed SACEM to send collectors to neighbouring countries, which seemed worth the effort, as French music was very popular abroad. The prospect of imminent legal changes and SACEM operating in Germany motivated German publishers to take pre-emptive steps and form a domestic collecting agency, an organisation that was intended to be far more in tune with musical life in Germany. Fees would be much lower than the 10% of a venue’s proceeds that SACEM demanded, amateur choirs and orchestras were to be spared, and a larger share of the income would be distributed to ‘serious’ works than to music of ‘lesser’ artistic value. A group of publishers from Leipzig, represented in the German music-trade association, took the initiative and drove forward the formation of an Anstalt für musikalisches Aufführungsrecht (Institution for Musical Performance Right) in 1897. This body was not only meant to keep SACEM out of the country, but also to forgo a similar move by domestic composers. The latter were taken by surprise and soon began to rally against the Leipziger Anstalt (Leipzig Institution), as the organisation was called. Led by Richard Strauss and his aide Friedrich Rösch, a music man with juridical knowledge, 150 composers primarily of art music affiliated to the Genossenschaft Deutscher Komponisten (GDK, Companionship of German Composers). This body was founded on 30 September 1898 to promote composers’ interests in copyright matters. One day later, the Leipzig Institution went into operation, but the campaign of GDK brought it down before it could establish itself as a force in the music business. Concert promoters, who refused to be ‘taxed’ on music, took the composers’ opposition as a reason to withhold payments, and that meant the end of the publishers’ collecting body.
In 1901, the government ratified a new copyright act, which became effective the following year. The act extended protection against unauthorised public performances to all musical works and rendered an explicit reservation of performance rights unnecessary. This paved the way for the collection of performance fees in Germany, and this time, composers were the first to set up an organisation. Supported by a group of publishers from Berlin, GDK founded a second Anstalt für musikalisches Aufführungsrecht (Afma) in 1903 as a department within its own organisation, which changed its name to Gesellschaft Deutscher Tonsetzer (GDT), substituting ‘Komponisten’, a word of French origin, with the German equivalent ‘Tonsetzer’.

Like the formation of the Leipziger Anstalt, the foundation of Afma was largely motivated by the prospect of a foreign agency collecting fees on German territory. This time it was the Austrian Gesellschaft der Autoren, Komponisten und Musikverleger (AKM, Society of Authors, Composers and Music Publishers) which had announced that it was sending representatives across the border, apparently with the intent to spur the formation of a sister organisation in the neighbouring country. AKM had been founded in 1897 and was led by publishers, authors and composers of whom many had stakes in the operetta business. Publisher Josef Weinberger was elected as President; the other publishers among the 12 members of the executive board were Adolf Robitschek, Bernhard Hermansky (head of Doblinger publishing house) and Vincenz Kratochwil (connected with Bosworth & Co.). Authors were represented by, among others, librettist Victor Léon and composers by Richard Heuberger and Adolf Müller Jr. The strong presence of an operetta interest as well as the leading position of publishers mark AKM out as a very different body to Afma, which was dominated by proponents of art music from the start.

Despite their different orientation, Afma and AKM signed a contract that allowed the German society to represent AKM’s repertoire in Germany and left the collection to Afma for a share of the proceeds. This agreement was terminated by AKM after only a year, but renewed when a group of Leipzig publishers, who had until then opposed Afma, affiliated to it in January 1907. Leipzig publishers, who complained that they were underrepresented on the Afma board, as well as their Austrian colleagues, remained critical of the German collecting organisation but also wanted to be involved in the licensing of performances. So when it seemed that Afma had come to stay, they decided to go along with it, always prepared, however, to ‘jump ship’ if an opportunity arose.

While AKM and Afma found an agreement, proprietors of smaller venues rallied against what they called a ‘tax on music’. A meeting of landlords in Eisenach in 1907, for instance, adopted a resolution that ‘taxable music would not be played, pending further notice’. The Association of Landlords (Gastwirteverband) and the Associated Proprietors of Halls (Saalbesitzerverband) placed advertisements in trade journals that promised composers who were not represented by Afma ample opportunities to promote their works. This invitation was taken up by publishers, authors and composers who stood at the margins of the music trade and began to write songs that were tailored to cabarets and similar venues. Songs like Ach, bitte, ohne Überzieher!!! (‘Oh, please, without overcoat’, the latter word being a slang-expression for condom), which combined innuendo with thigh-slapping humour, were now regularly advertised. The review section of the trade journal Der Artist, which became a regular feature in May 1906 and had at first covered mainly new releases of operettas and other works from the ‘light music’ genre, increasingly turned to irreverent couplets. Advertisements that offered free slips with song lyrics for every large order indicate that such songs were meant to be sung along with. As mentioned above, at the time these songs were not a viable proposition in
economic terms. While they got exposure in venues which boycotted the collecting societies, they lacked access to retail outlets, due to the intervention of the music-trade association. And as they owed their proliferation to their opposition to the ‘music tax’, they could not generate performance royalties either. Nevertheless, as a genre this music had gained a foothold. It was to be exploited economically after the First World War.

Meanwhile, the fragile compromise between AKM and Afma broke up in 1910, when the Austrian society decided to cease the mutual contract by the end of 1911. AKM’s main complaint was that its members received too little money from collections in Germany. In a brochure, AKM informed music users that in 1908 the heirs of Richard Wagner and Johannes Brahms had received 11,000 and 9600 Marks in royalties, while Franz Lehár, Leo Fall and Carl Michael Ziehrer, three Austrian operetta composers whose works were in high demand, got between 340 and 120 Marks from AFMA collections. With the contract between the collecting bodies coming to an end, the Austrian society prepared to take the collection of performance fees into its own hands and appointed Hugo Bryk as its general representative in Germany. Bryk, born 1874 in Vienna, had worked as ‘Kapellmeister’ in the US and several European countries, including the German Reich and its capital, and seemed the ideal person to promote Austrian music in Germany, to where many of his colleagues had migrated. In December 1911, he attended meetings of the regional associations of concert-hall proprietors and advertised AKM repertoire to them, promising cheaper rates than Afma. This promotion met with a consensus among music users that popular concert and dance venues could not do without the Austrian repertoire. AKM issued updated brochures with the latest titles from its members. These were reprinted in Saalbesitzer-Zeitung, the journal of the concert-hall proprietors’ association. The list from December 1912 included waltzes, marches, Viennese songs, a few couplets and operettas from the catalogues of Austrian publishers Doblinger, Robitschek, Bard & Bruder and Karczag, international houses like Anton Benjamin and Bosworth & Co., but also of the German firms Drei Masken and Harmonie-Verlag. Bryk’s promotional efforts, the endorsement of the association of venue proprietors and not least its highly attractive repertoire allowed AKM to make inroads into the German market. During the first two years of independent operations, the society signed 2500 contracts worth 300,000 Austrian crowns.

The proliferation of AKM repertoire also benefited from the huge presence of Austrian musicians in Germany. These had come to Germany with the expansion of concert cafés in the early twentieth century and were very active in the formation of professional associations, which represented bandleaders’ interests in general and served as a placement service in particular. Bandleaders were important gatekeepers in all sorts of venues, from variety theatres to dance halls and concert cafés. As they worked as subcontractors for proprietors, they selected the repertoire and hired the musicians, thereby shaping the sound as well.

Parallel to the dispute between AKM and Afma over the exploitation of ‘small rights’, the question of ‘mechanical rights’ was brought to the agenda. In 1909, copyright laws were extended to interdict unauthorised use of music for mechanical reproduction on records, piano rolls or for music boxes and obliged manufacturers to pay a compulsory fee to rights holders. Publishers and composers both claimed to be entitled, but this time, publishers went ahead and formed the Anstalt für musikalisch-mechanische Rechte (AMMRE, Institution for Musical-Mechanical Rights) in late 1909. This new organisation was founded in co-operation with the French Société Générale Internationale de l’Édition Phonographique et Cinématographique. It was partly financed with French money and managed by a Frenchman, which illustrates the strong French influence in these matters. In
1910 the organisation distributed 71,169 Marks, the following year 173,498, of which three quarters were derived from the licensing of phonograph records. The proceeds, which seemed to have positively surprised AMMRE’s publisher members, were distributed among 221 authors, both from Germany and Austria, and 302 publishers. The conflict among GDT composers and publishers over mechanical rights escalated when a group of 42 publishers and 10 composers walked out on Afma. A court case ensued, and the Supreme Court decided that all contracts between Afma and its members were invalid, as these agreements did not allow lapsed members to regain their exclusive rights from Afma. This decision allowed publishers to break away from Afma and form the Genossenschaft zur Verwertung musikalischer Aufführungsrechte (Gema, Society for the Exploitation of Musical Performance Rights) in December 1915. AKM supported this new body with which it set up a joint Verband zum Schutze musikalischer Aufführungsrechte für Deutschland (abbreviated as Musikschutzverband, Association for the Protection of Musical Performance Rights for Germany) three months later. This association was managed by Bryk, who had in the meantime established himself as an operetta impresario in Berlin. The agreement between AKM and Gema meant that the Austrian association left the collection of performance fees to its German sister organisation. However, the two organisations were unequal partners, as AKM received a larger share of the royalties collected from German music users than Gema itself. Apparently, the representation of Austrian music seemed so profitable to Gema members that they renewed the agreement in 1926.

While AKM rose to become a major force in the German popular-music business, the resistance of venue proprietors against the ‘tax on music’ waned. In this situation, a number of publishers invented a new business model to generate revenue from the cabaret and beer hall ‘Schlager’ which had been promoted by publicans as a means to undermine the principle of performance fees. In the 1920s, these publishers started to give away free copies to bandleaders – not so much with the intent of stimulating sheet-music sales, as had been done in the US, but primarily to encourage performances which in turn generated royalties. Among the most prolific publishers in this regard were Austrians like Otto Hein and Karl Brüll (proprietors of Wiener Bohême Verlag, Edition Karl Brüll, Berliner Bohême), Victor Alberti and Armin L. Robinson (Alberti, Alrobi) and Ernst Wengraf (repertoire manager of Drei Masken and owner of Monopol-Lieder-Verlag). Tight personal networks with bandleaders and the musical stage as well as their membership in AKM enabled them to place their catalogues in leading metropolitan concert venues and, later on, in radio. Numerous bandleaders and eminent theatre impresarios had come from Austria and Hungary to Berlin prior to the war and were now ready to collaborate with their Austrian compatriots.

The convoluted story of the beginnings of the exploitation of ‘small rights’ in Germany puts the Americanisation thesis in perspective. The first point to be highlighted is the overwhelming presence of both Austrian protagonists and Austrian repertoire in the first third of the twentieth century. This presence suggests that popular music in Germany at the time was not so much Americanised as ‘Austrianised’, at least in a business sense. The second point is that these developments appear to be European rather than American. Decisive impulses for the formation of collecting societies came from France and Austria, two countries where organisations for the exploitation of musical performance rights were set up before 1900. Consequently, we may speak of a European trajectory in the modernisation of the popular-music business. Again, the US case shows differences, with the chain of events being reversed. Whereas in France, Italy, Austria and Germany the discussion about performance fees preceded the one about mechanical reproductions and
spurred on the foundation of collecting societies in the nineteenth century, the American debate was mainly centred around the question of mechanical rights and led to the formation of an authors’ society considerably later. The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) was founded only in 1914, at a time when this type of organisation had already become a major feature of the music business in Continental Europe. Tellingly, it did not demand fees from vaudeville, the largest user of popular music in the early twentieth century, and remained weak during the first years of its existence, as publishers tended to drop out of the united front and relapsed to the old habit of paying performers for ‘plugs’.

The differing importance of mechanical reproductions and public performances as two ways to generate revenue from music proved to be long lasting. Figures from the late 1950s show that in the US receipts from ‘small rights’ of about $30 million were dwarfed by the income from record sales and jukebox takings at ca. $900 million, whereas in West Germany royalties from broadcasts and live performances made up more than half of all fees (including mechanicals) of 75 million DM, with record sales at a relatively modest 129 million DM. While German music providers generated a large share of their income by selling licences to music users, American producers made most of their profits by selling recorded music to consumers. It is intriguing to speculate that this difference in the political economy of the music business accounts for the greater dynamism of the music trade in the US, where producers targeted the great number of individual listeners, while their European colleagues were more concerned with relatively few organised music users.

‘Americanisation’ without an American model: Jazz in Germany, 1919–30

While music publishing developed along different paths in the US and Continental Europe, leading to the proliferation of different dominant genres in the two regions, the connections between American vaudeville and its European counterpart brought stage performers across the Atlantic, among them musical acts and dancers. This transatlantic exchange had become very lively by the early twentieth century. H.B. Marinelli’s World’s Agency, which had offices in New York, London, Paris and Berlin and placed artists around the world, claimed to have brokered contracts for 730 attractions between October 1903 and September 1904. The American trade journal Variety reported in August 1906 that 150 acts would appear on European stages during the following variety season. Theatre directors and agents travelled across the Atlantic to book attractive performers, and those entrepreneurs who did not have the means to do so were able to read about foreign programmes and international trends in the trade press. The German Artist frequently published news from the American and European variety stages as well as repertoires of the foremost theatres in cities from New York, London and Paris to Budapest, Amsterdam and Kraków.

US vaudeville acquired a leading position in this global entertainment industry. As the above-mentioned syndicates, which had a near monopoly on the booking of performers, exerted strict quality control by sending on tour only those acts which had been rehearsed and developed to perfection, impresarios in countries like Germany were able to hire tried and tested talent simply by taking over acts from the American circuit. For German directors, it was more difficult to spot domestic performers of similar pedigree on the home market, because all kinds of acts offered their services with equally grandiose self-acclaim in the trade press, and every director had to separate the wheat from the chaff himself. Frequent complaints about the poor artistic standards of German variety in comparison
with American vaudeville theatres and the fact that many German entertainers used Anglo-American pseudonyms indicate that US vaudeville stood for superior quality in that theatrical field. \textsuperscript{73} American theatre entrepreneurs were equally interested in sending acts abroad. That way, successful acts could be exploited after they had toured the American circuit. Artists typically travelled through several European countries and performed for two weeks at each theatre. Among them were musical acts and dancers who introduced European audiences to show dances like the cakewalk. \textsuperscript{74} Against a backdrop of programmes that might have featured an Italian band, a Hungarian ensemble, a Polish-Ruthenian orchestra and an Original Munich Schrammel quintet on the same bill, a ‘Negro’ duet demonstrating an ‘excentric’ dance added another exotic flavour to a form of entertainment that seemed to have been modelled on the idea of a world exhibition. It should be stressed that authenticity was not an issue. Instead, versatility was the primary virtue for performers. A Dutch-Indian string orchestra for instance, consisting of 10 to 14 uniformed musicians, advertised itself as a double bill, stating that it would return after the interval in a second set of costumes as German sea cadets from Kiel. \textsuperscript{75}

The international transfer of variety artists to Germany was interrupted by the war in 1914 and revived only when the economic situation improved. As not many American performers were present, ‘Jazz’ arrived in the summer of 1919 as little more than a word for what was regarded a new and outrageous dance from America. Sheet music of ‘Jazz’ tunes by US songwriters was imported by German publishers right after the war, but this did not compensate for the absence of live performances where audiences and musicians could have experienced what ‘Jazz’ was supposed to sound and look like. Ignorance about the new phenomenon was, however, not confined to Germany, a country that was cut off from the international entertainment circuit, but also prevalent in Britain and France, where the first American bands performed ‘Jazz’ at about the same time as the public began to use the term. In Britain, the Original Dixieland Jazz Band introduced ‘Jazz’ first to the audience of the London Hippodrome, accompanied by a male dancer and a woman who danced and sang, before the ensemble was employed as a dance band and cut records. While criteria to evaluate the musical component were missing, the reception focused on the visual aspects of the band’s performance. Consequently, early ‘Jazz’ music was often vaguely described as a mixture of noise, humour and excitement. \textsuperscript{76} The same holds true for France, where early ‘Jazz’, with its visual tricks and show dancing, adapted best to established forms of music-hall entertainment, while contemporaries struggled to make sense of its sound and its musical material. \textsuperscript{77} The European confusion in regards to ‘Jazz’ as a musical form is hardly surprising, given that even in the US musicians and critics pondered the question of what exactly a ‘Jazz’ band was supposed to be. As in Europe: ‘The short answer was, damn near any group that could play fast and frantically.’ \textsuperscript{78} All kinds of ensembles from Tango orchestras to Ragtime groups changed their names and became ‘Jazz bands’ to profit from the latest craze.

In Germany, the label ‘Jazz’ was unashamedly employed as a marketing gag. It promised something new and exciting, while at the same time the ignorance about the ‘true’ musical features of the new style provided cover for a lack of formal musical training. In this way, ‘Jazz’ opened up opportunities for many semi-professional musicians who sought engagement in cabarets, bars and similar venues. After the war, at least in Berlin, the number of concert venues grew, and with it the demand for musicians. But many of these bars, whose proprietors changed on a regular basis, rested on shaky financial foundations. \textsuperscript{79} Consequently, publicans were not prepared to pay much for music, and so semi-professionals as well as foreign musicians, primarily from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, stepped forward and offered their services.
The German musicians’ unions blamed foreigners and ‘con artists’ for falling fees and unemployment and urged the authorities to exclude this cheap competition from the labour market. The Deutscher Musikerverband, speaking for about 50,000 members, adopted at its conference in 1919 a resolution which stated that Germany suffered from a ‘deluge’ of foreign musicians, ‘often disreputable persons from other professions who band together in Germany to form so-called Hungarian, Jazz or balalaika ensembles and undercut domestic musicians’. The association urged the authorities ‘to protect domestic musicians with all the force of the law against this foreign competition and its excesses’. In a brochure titled Die Ausländerkonkurrenz (The Foreign Competition), the union in 1926 estimated that 25% to 30% of musicians employed in Germany were foreigners.

Initially, the Zentralverband der Zivilmusiker Deutschlands, one of the unions that merged to form the Musikerverband, had identified the Association of Bandleaders in Germany (Kapellmeister-Großverband Deutschlands) – to which a large number of Austrian and Hungarian ‘Kapellmeister’ were affiliated – as one of the culprits and accused it of placing foreign musicians. The association reacted to this by taking a clear stance against ‘foreigners’ as well (Austrians of course not included) and directing the police to venues where foreign musicians were hired so that their work permits would be checked.

Ultimately, these campaigns found little support with the authorities, who were concerned about the response a harsh treatment of foreign musicians could cause abroad. The authorities arrived at this position after they had sent inspectors to look into the matter. Their reports concluded that foreign bands were indeed more popular with German audiences. The inspectors stated that while these musicians may not always be brilliant instrumentalists, they more than compensated for their lack of instrumental skills with showmanship and a willingness to give the people what they wanted. In contrast to German musicians, foreigners were ready to depart from their playlists and pepper their sets with special performances, as a police report registered. They were, according to another report to the Minister of Trade, ‘often very quick to engage with audiences and meet their taste and wishes with encores, while German musicians were stolid and could not be moved to change or extend their fixed programmes’.

Domestic professionals were faced with the challenge of ‘Jazz’, which first and foremost stood for a more interactive relationship with audiences rather than a particular musical style. As elsewhere, early ‘Jazz’ required showmanship, an ability which was beyond the skills of most German musicians who had been trained and saw themselves as craftsmen.

While German professionals fought against ‘dilettantes’, Jazz became institutionalised as a musical genre in the US by musicians and critics who positioned themselves against the musical ruckus of the novelty phase and applied their professional skills and artistic categories to define a style. This way, they essentially reinvented ‘Jazz’ as ‘symphonic syncopation’. Bandleader Paul Whiteman, who was the pivotal figure in the domestication of Jazz, went on European tours in 1923 and 1926, the second of which brought him to Germany. The appearance of Whiteman’s orchestra seemed like a godsend to the German musical establishment. The new take on Jazz converged with what German musicians perceived as ‘good’ music and was understood as a clear statement against mere showmanship and musical gimmickry. Symphonic Jazz was challenging for instrumentalists and arranged to detail; it therefore required the professional skills and the virtuosity which German musicians had seen devalued by the racket that had been – as it turned out wrongly – labelled Jazz. German ensembles, but also composers, took up the refined Jazz of Whiteman, Sam Wooding and Jack Hylton and employed it to clean up domestic dance and entertainment music from ‘dilettantism’ to which they had had no answer in the years after the war.
With the arrival of American (and then also British) bands, Jazz was defined as a distinct musical genre and became part of the domain of the trained professionals. This process of institutionalisation was supported by new organisations and media. A Jazzband-Musiker-Union (Jazz Musicians’ Union) was formed in Berlin in 1925, which promised to offer protection against foreign competitors and made membership dependent on a successful audition in front of a commission. Moreover, a Jazz class – the first of its kind in Europe – was set up in 1928 at the Frankfurt Conservatory, which made Jazz part of the musical canon. The project to define and refine Jazz was further aided by the dissemination of this new sound via radio, gramophone records and – a few years later – sound film. As these media relied on highly skilled professionals who were able to record in one session and did not falter during broadcast, ‘refined’ Jazz reached many more listeners than live concerts by bands who were now exposed as ‘fakes’.

To be sure, the attempts of domestic musicians to transform Jazz into ‘good’ music still conflicted with the cultural conservatism of those who continued to denounce it as ‘negro music’. This is the ‘progressive’ side of the appropriation of Jazz which the Americanisation thesis focuses on. However, there is also a conservative aspect to this development, as refined Jazz served many of its promoters to return to a situation where musical craftsmanship reigned and ‘dilettantes’ were excluded. In any case, it is important not to project subsequent definitions of Jazz on the historical phenomenon, which was initially little more than the latest manifestation of a longer continuity of exotic and fashionable sounds and dances. Many of these had been developed first in American vaudeville, which had acquired a leading position in the global variety business, and so the ‘American’ trait of early ‘Jazz’ was its association with a superior brand of showmanship. Particular meanings, ethnic roots and ‘authenticity’ were added later on, in Germany in the second half of the 1920s, when ‘Jazz’ became a musical genre. This institutionalisation, which happened in other countries as well, owed its dynamics to a considerable extent from conflicts within the music trade, where professional musicians struggled to retain their position and radio and records became new important outlets for popular music.

**Conclusion**

This article has discussed the thesis that popular music in Germany in the early twentieth century was Americanised. Focusing on the supply side of music, it has tried to qualify this thesis in several respects. To begin with economic aspects, the comparison between Germany and the US has revealed different paths of modernisation of the music business. In both countries, the industry departed from an older ‘book-trade’ model around 1900, albeit in different directions. Whereas in the US music publishers established a system of mass production and sales of printed music, German popular publishers discovered the exploitation of the performance right as a source of revenue and transformed the music business into a rights industry. Initially, only the performance rights of musical dramas were exploited, but with the start of the twentieth century, fees were also collected for public performances in venues like concert cafés, cabarets and beer halls. This development formed part of a larger trajectory of the music trade in Continental Europe, where France had taken an early lead in 1850 with the formation of the world’s first collecting society. SACEM and the Austrian AKM played a pivotal role in setting up a system to generate revenue from ‘small rights’ in Germany.

Structural differences between the music industry in Germany and the US had repercussions on the popular repertoire in the two countries. While in America popular
music of the 1890s and 1900s consisted mainly of sentimental ballads, which were targeted at females who were supposed to play them at home on their pianos, in Germany operettas set popular trends and catered to an audience of men and women interested in the social events that were sparked by this type of music. In the 1910s, the conflict between GDT and AKM concerning the exploitation of ‘small rights’ stimulated the proliferation of humorous couplets, a genre which became a viable business proposition after the formation of Gema and Musikschatzverband and remained important in the 1920s. In 1910s America, the popular repertoire was dominated by dance music.

After the First World War, popular music in Europe and America seemed to converge, with ‘Jazz’ becoming popular on both sides of the Atlantic. However, a closer look reveals that the history of early ‘Jazz’ in Germany can hardly be interpreted as a straightforward Americanisation. Apart from the import of sheet music, ‘Jazz’ was first played and promoted in Germany without any connections to American developments. Its only link to ‘America’ was its claim to excitement and showmanship, which by that time had become a trademark of vaudeville performers from the US circuits. This in turn means that early ‘Jazz’ in Germany should be interpreted in the longer history of early twentieth-century variety rather than as a sudden response to new ‘needs’ of audiences after the war. A direct American influence on Jazz in Germany can be discerned with the arrival of US bands in the mid-1920s. This influence was mediated by the domestic musical establishment that appropriated ‘original’ American Jazz to mark and exclude semi-professional showmen as ‘fakes’. The referral to the American model implied a reform of older repertoires and performance styles. At the same time, however, it served to domesticate popular music and bring Jazz into the professional domain. For audiences, it meant that Jazz lost a lot of its unexpectedness as it was transformed from musical showmanship into well-rehearsed dance music.

A primary aim of this article was to unveil the inherent dynamics of music production, which flowed from the actions of professional music producers who worked under particular structural constraints. This brought turning points and aspects of cultural change into view, which are largely overlooked in studies that interpret popular music as a reflection of collective values, norms and beliefs. Copyright disputes and technological change, economic incentives, producers’ networks and professional socialisation have featured prominently in this account, which has argued that popular music should be studied as a factor for, not just a reflection of, cultural change.

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Notes
1. Sewell, “Concept(s) of Culture.”
5. Peterson and Anand, “Production of Culture Perspective;” Nathaus and Childress, “Production of Culture Perspective;” See also the introductory essay to this special issue of the European Review of History.
7. Köster, Deutscher Musikalienhandel, 9; Ballstaedt and Widmaier, Salonmusik, 98.
8. Promotional activities are described in detail in Marks, They All Sang, 3–21, and Suisman, Selling Sounds, ch. 5.
9. Sanjek, Print to Plastic, 10.
10. Ibid., 12.
11. In Britain, where piano ownership was not unusual among working-class people, “popular” hits at the turn of the century frequently achieved sales of 200,000 copies. See Ehrlich, Music Profession, 103. In Germany, the sale of 120,000 copies for a popular title were highlighted as a “special success.” See Max Reichardt, “Neues vom Musikalienmarkt,” Der Artist, 30 June 1907.
13. Ibid., 25.
16. Marks, They All Sang, 59–64.
17. For details on the circuits see Wertheim, Vaudeville Wars.
18. For the Witmarks see Witmark and Goldberg, House of Witmark. Von Tilzer has written an unpublished autobiography (Mister Tin Pan Alley, Himself) in the late 1920s, Library of Congress, Music Division, General Collections, Von Tilzer / Gumm collection, box 1, folder 14.
27. Watzka, Verborgene Vermittler, 97.
29. Epstein, Theater als Geschäft, 90.
30. Proclamation relating to German–US copyright relations, 15 April 1892, US: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Office of the Legal Adviser, box 1, folder “Germany – Law Proclamations.”
31. See the correspondence between Gustav Amberg and the Shubert theatre company in late 1907 and early 1908. Shubert Archive, Gustav Amberg Correspondence, box 1, folders 1 and 2.
32. McNamara, Shuberts of Broadway.
33. Thorvald Solberg to William Klein, 7 Oct. 1908, Shubert Archive, Gustav Amberg Correspondence, box 1, folder 5.
34. Rothfuss, “Gustav Amberg.”
35. Amberg to Shubert, 16 Aug. 1908, Shubert Archive, Gustav Amberg Correspondence, box 1, folder 4.
36. See the lists of plays handled from 1911 to 1914 in Shubert Archive, Contracts Series II, folder 471.
37. Stubblebine, Early Broadway Sheet Music, is an encyclopaedia that provides details on the adaptations of European operettas in the US.
38. Linhardt, Stimmen zur Unterhaltung, 20.
40. Marks, They All Sang, 3.
41. Frey, “Was sagt ihr zu diesem Erfolg”; Idem, Leo Fall; Schneidereit, Paul Lincke; Dümling, Verweigerte Heimat.

42. Jablonski, Irving Berlin.

43. Suisman, Selling Sounds, 42f.

44. Hofmeister, Verzeichnis.

45. Lotz, German Ragtime.

46. D’Albert, Musikverlag, 10.

47. For the following see Dümling, Musik hat ihren Wert; Schmitt, Anfänge der Tantiemenbewegung; D’Albert, Verwertung des musikalischen Aufführungsrechts.


52. Notice, ibid., 17 Sep. 1907.


55. Quoted in a petition of the Federation of German Publicans’ Associations (Vereinigung deutscher Gastwirts-Vereine) concerning copyright laws from 1914, Bundesarchiv Berlin, R 3001/6360, fol. 37.

56. Bryk provided a brief biographical statement in an application for a theatrical licence in Berlin in 1912. See Landesarchiv Berlin, A Pr. Br. Rep. 30–5, no. 1913, fol. 12. In the early 1900s, he had worked as a conductor and accompanist in the US (“The Irving Place Theatre Opens,” New York Dramatic Mirror, 7 Oct. 1905, 16; Mr Caruso and Mme Rappold heard by brilliant society gathering, New York Herald, 19 Jan. 1906, 10). Engagements at New York’s Irving Place Theatre and the Metropolitan Opera meant that he was in close contact with Heinrich Conried, director of the Met from 1903, and Gustav Amberg, two leading importers of musical plays from Austria and Germany since the 1880s. For Conried’s play-brokering activities see Moses, Heinrich Conried, 36–45.


64. Dümling, Musik hat ihren Wert, 148–9.


68. Ryan, Production of Culture Perspective, 21, 27.

69. Nathaus, Turning Values into Revenue, 143.

70. For this argument see ibid.

71. Wertheim and Bair, Papers of Will Rogers, 388.

72. See “Notes from America,” Der Artist, 19 Aug. 1906.


74. Lotz, Black People.

75. See the advertisement in Artist, 7 Jan. 1906.

76. Parsonage, Evolution of Jazz, 132.

77. Jackson, Making Jazz French, 36.

78. Wald, How the Beatles, 58.

87. This “labour market” argument is developed in Schröder, Tanz- und Unterhaltungsmusik, 300. For similar developments among dance bands and dance teachers in Britain see Nott, “Contesting.”
88. Schröder, Tanz- und Unterhaltungsmusik. 300–11.
89. Ibid., 378–9.

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