Hugo Ribeiro Mota

Image of Hugo Ribeiro Mota
Norwegian version of this page
Room 340
Username
Visiting address Blindernveien 31 Georg Morgenstiernes hus 0313 Oslo
Postal address Postboks 1020 Blindern 0315 Oslo
Other affiliations Faculty of Humanities (Student)

I am a PhD candidate in Philosophy at the University of Oslo under the supervision of Joey Pollock and co-supervision of Catarina Dutilh-Novaes.

My research project, Structural oppression and deep disagreement: communication beyond argumentation, is part of the New Models of Knowledge Communication project, funded by the Research Council of Norway.

My CV is available here.

Research summary

Structural oppression is a widespread and complex phenomenon. I take social epistemology as a starting point to identify its roots in social deep disagreements, which are caused by global hermeneutic domination and structural epistemic injustice. Then, for a broader understanding, I turn to the philosophy of attention to talk about these disagreements in terms of perspectival clashes and discuss how structural oppression is related to salience biases. Final steps involve investigating issues in communication from the argumentation theory point of view, analyzing cases of structural racism in the Americas and Europe drawn from social anthropology and political history, and considering non-argumentative ways to change inherently harmful perspectives in light of recognition theory, standpoint theory and social movement theory.

Areas of research

Areas of Specialization:

Social & Political Epistemology • Philosophy of Language • Philosophy of Mind

Areas of Competence:

Social & Political Philosophy • Argumentation Theory • Philosophy of Education

Academic background

I have a BA and MA in Philosophy from the Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE, Brazil). My master's thesis investigated to what extent there was a defense of a type of foundationalism Wittgenstein's On Certainty. I argued for an anti-foundationalist reading through an analysis of the twelve key metaphors from the book.

Tags: Philosophy, Epistemology, Philosophy of language, Disagreement, Wittgenstein

Selected publications

Mejía, D.; Mota, H. R.; Baumtrog, M. D. (2022). Connecting the Americas Through Argumentation. Argumentation & Advocacy, 58 (3-4), 193-213. https://doi.org/10.1080/10511431.2022.2138182

Mota, H. R. (2021). Em que medida Wittgenstein seria fundacionista? [To what extent is Wittgenstein a foundationalist?]. Voluntas, 12 (2), e02. https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378666403

Mota, H. R. (2021). Paradoxo do Desacordo Profundo: uma abordagem relativista epistêmica [Deep Disagreement Paradox: an epistemic relativist approach]. Revista do Seminário dos Alunos do PPGLM/UFRJ; 11(1):11–28.

Silva, M.; Cavalcanti, I.; Mota, H. (2020). Linguagem e Enativismo: uma resposta normativa para a objeção de escopo e o problema difícil do conteúdo [Language and Enactivism: a normative answer to the scope objection and the hard problem of content]. Prometeus; 33:129–160. https://doi.org/10.52052/issn.2176-5960.pro.v12i33.13811

Cavalcanti, I.; Mota, H. (2019). Cognição e linguagem: seria a linguagem um desafio para abordagens enativistas? [Cognition and language: is language a challenge for enactivist approaches?]. In: A Mente Humana para Além do Cérebro - Perspectivas a partir dos 4Es da Cognição. Coimbra: Coimbra University Press. p. 139–156.

Published Sep. 20, 2021 1:50 PM - Last modified Dec. 7, 2023 5:16 PM