Keith A. Wilson

Postdoctoral Research Fellow - Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas

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Email keith.wilson@ifikk.uio.no

Phone +47 228 55 205

Room 433 GM

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Visiting address Blindernveien 31 Georg Morgenstiernes hus 0313 OSLO

Postal address PB 1020 Blindern 0315 OSLO

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Overview

I’m a Philosopher of Mind and Perception, postdoc on the Perceiving Representations project, and collaborator on the Perceiving Properties in a World of Objects project (perceivingproperties.wixsite.com).

My research interests include

the metaphysics of perception, and in particular the spatial and temporal structure of multisensory experience
perceptual appearances and representational content
the philosophy of psychology and cognitive science
the metaphysics and consciousness of time and temporal passage
the work of Thomas Reid, on whose account of visual perception I have published.

I am currently visiting the Institute of Philosophy at the University of London where I am researching the philosophy of olfaction, flavour and temporal experience.

For further details, see my personal website (keithwilson.net) or any of the networks linked opposite.

Background

Prior to becoming a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Oslo in January 2019, I was a part-time Teaching Fellow at the University of Edinburgh (2017–18) where I taught undergraduate and Masters level courses in the Philosophy of Mind and Perception.

I have previously taught philosophy at the Universities of Sussex (2013–14) and Glasgow (2014–17) where I was a Postdoctoral Researcher on the Rethinking the Senses project (gla.ac.uk), funded by the UK Arts & Humanities Research Council, and Postdoctoral Investigator on the Synchronising the Senses project (gla.ac.uk), funded by the John Templeton Foundation.

I completed my doctorate, which examined arguments for and against representational views of perceptual experience, at the University of Warwick in 2013 under the supervision of Professors Bill Brewer and Matthew Soteriou, and have also studied at the Universities of York, St Andrews, Stirling, and Columbia, New York.

Teaching

I taught part of FIL2108 Philosophy of Psychology in Autumn 2021.

View teaching (keithwilson.net)

Awards and funding

Funding for Research Stay Abroad for Postdoctoral Fellows, Research Council of Norway, University of Oslo, 2021–2022
Perceiving Properties in a World of Objects (collaborator) (perceivingproperties.wixsite.com), John Fell Fund, University of Oxford, 2019–2021
Teaching Award Nomination, Best Overall Teacher, University of Edinburgh Students’ Association, 2019
Teaching Award Nomination, Best Student Feedback, University of Edinburgh Students’ Association, 2018
John Templeton Foundation grant for Synchronising the Senses project (gla.ac.uk) via the University of Cambridge’s New Directions in the Study of the Mind initiative, 2017
Wellcome Trust ISSF Public Engagement Bursary for outreach activities at Glasgow Science Festival, 2016
Student-Led Teaching Award for Outstanding Support for the Learning Experience of Students, University of Sussex, 2014
Ede and Ravenscroft Prize for Academic Excellence and Outstanding Contribution to the Department and University Life, University of York, 2005

Outreach

I strongly believe in increasing the public awareness and understanding of philosophy, and am available to comment on a range of issues including

perception and the senses
philosophy of science and the mind (esp. psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, and the nature and experience of time), and
the relevance of philosophy and philosophical debate to wider society.

I co-designed The Illusions Index (illusionsindex.org), a searchable database of perceptual illusions with philosophical and scientific commentary, and have published several popular philosophy articles (see ‘Other’ below).

I am active on Twitter where my personal account is ranked as one of the top 100 accounts for philosophy (truesciphi.org).

View outreach (keithwilson.net)

Tags: Philosophy, Philosophy of mind, Perception, Representation, The senses, Philosophy of psychology

Wilson, Keith (2022). The Auditory Field: The Spatial Character of Auditory Experience. Ergo - An Open Access Journal of Philosophy. ISSN 2330-4014. In press. Show summary
It is generally accepted that there is a visual field, but the analogous notion of an auditory field is rejected by many philosophers on the grounds that the metaphysics or phenomenology of audition lack the necessary spatial structure. In this paper, I argue that many of the common objections to the existence of an auditory field are misguided and that, contrary to a tradition of philosophical scepticism about the spatiality of auditory experience, it is as richly spatial as visual experience — and in some ways even more so. By carefully considering the spatiality and boundedness of audition, along with how sounds or their sources are experienced as occurring within the surrounding acoustic environment, we can gain a better understanding of (i) our auditory experience of space and (ii) the conditions for the existence of spatial sensory fields in general in a way that does not privilege vision over the other senses.
Wilson, Keith A. (2021). Individuating the Senses of ‘Smell’: Orthonasal versus Retronasal Olfaction. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857. 199, p. 4217–4242. doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02976-7. Full text in Research Archive Show summary
The dual role of olfaction in both smelling and tasting, i.e. flavour perception, makes it an important test case for philosophical theories of sensory individuation. Indeed, the psychologist Paul Rozin claimed that olfaction is a “dual sense”, leading some scientists and philosophers to propose that we have not one, but two senses of smell: orthonasal and retronasal olfaction. In this paper I consider how best to understand Rozin’s claim, and upon what grounds one might judge there to be one or two distinct olfactory modalities. I conclude that while Rozin may be right that humans have dual occurrences of an olfactory ‘sense’, the concept of a sense-modality, and hence the ‘sense’ of smell, is ambiguous between two different notions: a physiological sensory channel and an experiential modality, along the lines suggested by J. J. Gibson. Furthermore, recognising that these are complementary rather than competing conceptions of a sense-modality enables the formulation of a powerful ‘dual-concept’ framework for posing and addressing questions concerning the complex architecture of human multisensory experience.
Wilson, Keith A. & Macpherson, Fiona (2018). The Senses. In Pritchard, Duncan (Eds.), Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy. Oxford Bibliographies. ISSN 9780195396577. doi: 10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0368.
Wilson, Keith A. (2018). Are the Senses Silent? Travis’s Argument from Looks. In Collins, John & Dobler, Tamara (Ed.), The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception. Oxford University Press. ISSN 9780198783916. p. 199–221. doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198783916.003.0010. Full text in Research Archive
Locatelli, Roberta & Wilson, Keith A. (2017). Perception Without Representation [Special Issue]. Topoi. ISSN 0167-7411. 36(2), p. 197–364. Show summary
https://link.springer.com/journal/11245/volumes-and-issues/36-2
Locatelli, Roberta & Wilson, Keith A. (2017). Introduction: Perception Without Representation. Topoi. ISSN 0167-7411. 36(2), p. 197–212. doi: 10.1007/s11245-017-9460-1. Full text in Research Archive
Wilson, Keith A. (2013). Reid’s Direct Realism and Visible Figure. The Philosophical Quarterly. ISSN 0031-8094. 63(253), p. 783–803. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2013.02002.x. Show summary
In his account of visual perception, Thomas Reid describes visible figure as both ‘real and external’ to the eye and as the ‘immediate object of sight’. These claims appear to conflict with Reid's direct realism, since if the ‘immediate’ object of vision is also its direct object, then sight would be perceptually indirect due to the role of visible figure as a perceptual intermediary. I argue that this apparent threat to Reid's direct realism may be resolved by understanding visible figure as the set of geometrical properties that holds between an object's visible surfaces and some particular perspective or point of view. On this relational interpretation of visible figure, and once an ambiguity over the use of the term ‘object’ is resolved, Reid's account of vision is both epistemically and perceptually direct, as well as consistent with his account of the other senses and doctrine of signs.
Wilson, Keith (2007). Does Attention Exist? British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy. ISSN 1748-9393. 2(2), p. 153–168.

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Wilson, Keith A. (2020). Multisensory Perception. Sabah Ülkesi. ISSN 2195-6456. Show summary
https://www.sabahulkesi.com/2021/01/19/cok-duyumlu-algi/ (Turkish language) https://www.academia.edu/44902484/How_Many_Senses_Multisensory_Perception_Beyond_the_Five_Senses (English)
Locatelli, Roberta & Wilson, Keith A. (2017). Erratum to Introduction: Perception Without Representation. Topoi. ISSN 0167-7411. 36(2), p. 213–213. doi: 10.1007/s11245-017-9489-1.
Wilson, Keith (2013). Perception and Reality. New Philosopher. ISSN 2201-7151. 1(2), p. 104–107. Show summary
https://www.newphilosopher.com/articles/perception-and-reality/
Wilson, Keith A. (2013). Review of Perception: Essays after Frege by Charles Travis. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. ISSN 1538-1617.

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Published Jan. 9, 2019 2:38 PM - Last modified Jan. 7, 2022 11:35 AM

Keith A. Wilson

Overview

Background

Teaching

Awards and funding

Outreach

Publications

Projects

Research groups

Keith A. Wilson

Overview

Background

Teaching

Awards and funding

Outreach

Publications

Projects

Research groups

Research events

Links