Georg Morgenstiernes hus (map)
Metacognition, roughly the ability to monitor and control one’s cognitive processes, has been studied in psychology for several decades. Recent studies suggest that some non-human primates also have this ability, and document in increasing detail its pattern of development over the human lifespan.
In her recent book Joëlle Proust argues that metacognitive abilities are distinct from and do not rely on metarepresentational abilities, and examines the consequences of this view for several key questions about the mind, including for mental agency and our sense of self. She explores the role of metacognition in these areas with reference to non-human primates, normally developing humans at various stages of development, and disturbances in such psychopathologies as schizophrenia.
This workshop will address metacognition and its relationship to closely related notions such as mentalization, mental action, introspection, and reasoning.
The workshop will take place on two days: Monday April 28 has an emphasis on philosophical questions, while Tuesday April 29 brings together perspectives from philosophy and clinical psychology/psychiatry.
The workshop is free, and open to anyone interested.
The Reflective Mind project at CSMN, in cooperation with the Aims and Norms project at the University of Southampton, UK, is very pleased to announce the following event.
Judgment is subject to norms. Judgments can be correct or incorrect, right or wrong, justified or unjustified. In turn, judgment issues in belief, which is itself subject to norms. Does judgment have an aim, which might explain the norms governing it? Might those norms be akin to rules the following of which leads to the satisfaction of that aim? What is the relevant aim? And how do the aims and norms of judgment relate to the aims and norms of belief?
The focus of this course will be the view that communication involves inference to the best explanation of an utterance, where in normal cases the best explanation is that the speaker intended to inform the hearer of an intention to inform the hearer of something. This view derives from Grice's work on speaker meaning (1957) and on conversational maxims and implicatures (1975).
We will look at criticisms of this view which aim to show that (all or some) communication is not inferential, or does not involve the recovery of speaker intentions. We will also look at what this view of communication assumes about inference and about metarepresentation, and more broadly, at the explanatory role in cognitive science of talk about inferences over representations.
Both theoretical and practical reasoning appear to be subject to norms. One can reason correctly or incorrectly, rightly or wrongly, well or poorly. In turn, reasoning concludes in beliefs, actions, desires, intentions and the like, things which are themselves subject to norms. Does reasoning have an aim, which might explain the norms governing it? Might those norms be akin to rules the following which leads to the satisfaction of that aim? What is the relevant aim? And how, if at all, is it related to the aims and norms of the acts and attitudes which the reasoning results in?