CANCELLED! Practical Philosophy Seminar: Christel Fricke

CANCELLED to prevent spread of the coronavirus (COVID-19).

"Taking Blameworthiness out of Blame"

NB! In room GM 467

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Christel Fricke. Professor Dr. phil. Professor of Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas, University of Oslo.



Recent answers to questions such as ‘What is the nature of blame?’ and ‘What are the normative constraints of blame?’ agree on the claim that blame implies a judgment of the recipient of the blame as blameworthy; it can only be justified if this judgment is true. But many further conditions have to be fulfilled for blame to be justified, including conditions that relate to the recipient of the blame and to the circumstances in which the blamer blames her or him.

Standards for openly blaming another person in a justified way are high.

We are all quick at blaming others; in the light of recent accounts of blame, most of these occurrences of blame are unjustified and should thus be withheld. 
Practices of openly blaming apparent wrongdoers play an important part in the shaping of the social and moral order of a society. Can blame continue playing this role if we openly blame an apparent wrongdoer only if we are justified to do so - and only if we have very good reasons to think that we are justified? 

I don’t think so. For this reason, I develop a revisionist account of open blame. According to this revisionist account, the main communicative function of openly blaming an apparent wrongdoer is to invite her or him to enter into a moral conversation with the blamer and other people who might have something interesting to contribute to this conversation.

Published Jan. 7, 2020 4:23 PM - Last modified Mar. 11, 2020 2:36 PM