

Abstracts for Conference “Contingentism, Necessitism, and Possible Worlds”

KIT FINE. Title: Mereological and Numerical Indeterminacy.

Abstract: The original Lewis/Sider argument against mereological or/and numerical indeterminacy implicitly appeals to the Barcan formula. I show how appeal to the Barcan Formula can be avoided and how the argument can thereby be made much more compelling. I also show how the difficulties that arise under the localist approach to vagueness no longer arise under the globalist approach.

JEREMY GOODMAN. Title: Qualitative generation.

Abstract: I offer a simple and tractable model of the distinction between qualitative entities, which don't essentially 'involve' any individuals, and haecceitistic ones, which do. The key idea is to separate the automorphism-based ideas from Fine (1977) and Fritz and Goodman (2016) from the use of variable domains. The basic notion in these models is that of a permutation of individuals being extendable to an automorphism of logical space. These models are then put to work. I show how they allow higher-order contingentists to avoid the expressive power challenges raised by Williamson (2013) and Fritz and Goodman (2017), and how they can also be applied to formulate attractive versions of temporal counterpart theory and intentionalism about phenomenal consciousness.

CANSU YUKSEL. Title: A Counterpart-Theoretic Account of Thorough Contingentism.

Abstract: Thorough contingentism claims that what individuals, properties and relations there are is contingent. Counterpart Theory (CT) provides a translation to convert every sentence of quantified modal logic into a sentence of a non-modal first-order language, which quantifies over worlds and objects in them (Lewis 1968, 1983). This paper has two aims. First, I argue that the framework of Lewisian CT is adequately represented as one of thorough contingentism, despite arguments by Williamson (2013) and Divers (2014) claiming otherwise. For, the thesis of thorough contingentism should be translated into the counterpart-theoretic claim 'it is not the case that every object has a counterpart at every world (Nencha 2022) and that every property/relation exists from the standpoint of every world', which holds in CT. Secondly, I suggest that this formulation of thorough contingentism is theoretically attractive. For, whilst the distinction between 'existence in a world' and 'existence from the standpoint of a world' makes the main claims of thorough contingentism clearer, the counterpart-theoretic framework allows the contingentist to make room for some highly plausible modal principles such as the being constraint.

BRUNO JACINTO. Title: Sets as properties

Abstract: According to the iterative conception of set, sets are “built in stages” in a process to be pursued “as far as possible”. It is notoriously difficult to make sense of the “building” analogy unless the mind-dependence of sets is accepted. In this talk I will sketch the sets as properties view, according to which set theory is nothing but a part of cumulative (modal) type theory, and sets are just a specific kind of properties. I will offer some reasons for thinking that the sets as properties view, broadly based on (Linnebo & Rayo 2012, Degen & Johannsen 2000) delivers a more satisfactory and realist understanding of the iterative conception than those presently available. In addition, I will address Button and Trueman's (2022) “no bootstrapping” objection to the sets as properties view. Finally, I will show how this reply paves the way to a modal and neoRussellian form of logicism which is thoroughly contingentist.

CHRISTOPHER MENZEL: TBC