Arranged by ConceptLab, New Frontiers of Speech and AI&Humanities-Lab@HKU
A workshop dedicated to Hermann Weyl's Philosophy of Mathematics
Many philosophers conceive of properties in higher-order terms, in part because untyped conceptions are threatened by a version of Russell's paradox. Nonetheless, untyped conceptions of properties remain attractive, not least because of their greater expressive power.
This event has been cancelled to prevent spread of the coronavirus (COVID-19).
The Super Linguistics research group & Concept Lab joint colloquium series are happy to announce our first talk of the semester (details below).
As always, all are very welcome!
More info will come soon.
Since Kripke, philosophers have distinguished a priori true statements from necessarily true ones. A statement is a priori true if its truth can be established before experience, and necessarily true if it could not have been false according to logical or metaphysical laws. This distinction can be captured formally using two-dimensional semantics.
There is a natural way to extend the notions of apriority and necessity so they can also apply to questions. Questions either can or cannot be resolved before experience, and either are or are not about necessary facts. Intuitively, the question ‘am I here now?’ is a priori and contingent, while the question ‘who am I?’ is a posteriori and necessary. Classical two-dimensionalism has no account of question meanings, so it has to be combined with a framework for question semantics in order to capture these observations.
In this talk I will discuss several options, and work out a two-dimensional variant of inquisitive semantics in detail. In this framework, definitions of apriority and necessity can be formulated in terms of information. These definitions apply to questions and statements uniformly.