Non-instance based conceptions of generality

On a classical conception, a universal generalization is true because each of its instances is true. This workshop will explore alternative, non-instance-based conceptions of universal generality. Why is every object self-identical or ever whale a mammal? Each generalization can be explained, it seems, without invoking any of its instances, perhaps by citing logic or the nature of whales. Are such non-instance-based explanations possible, and if so, how? What consequences might this have for the logic of generality?

Abstracts

Program 

Thursday August 10

  • 9:15 Coffee 
  • 9:30 Gideon Rosen (Princeton), Grounding and Generality, 
  • 10:45 Break 
  • 11:00 Bob Hale (Sheffield) What makes true Universal Statements true? 
  • 12:15 Lunch 
  • 13:15 Vera Flocke (NYU) Ontological Expressivism
  • 14:30 Break 
  • 14:45 Øystein Linnebo (Oslo) Generality Explained: A Truthmaker Semantics
  • 16:00 Break 
  • 16:20 Stewart Shapiro (Ohio) Realizability as a kind of truth-making for general statements 
  • 17:35 Drinks and Dinner 

Friday August 11
  • 9:15 Coffee 
  • 9:30 Kit Fine (NYU), Generic Truthmaker Semantics, 
  • 10:45 Break 
  • 11:00 Jon Erling Litland (Texas at Austin), Does Everything Exist?
  • 12:15 Lunch 
  • 13:15 Benjamin Schnieder and Yannick Kappes (Hamburg), Generality, Grounding, and Explanation 
  • 14:30 Break 
  • 14:45 Augustin Rayo (MIT) On the Openendedness of Logical Space 
  • 16:00 End of workshop. -- 
 
 
 

 

Organizer

Øystein Linnebo and Jon Erling Litland
Published Nov. 11, 2016 9:05 AM - Last modified Aug. 3, 2017 10:39 AM