Keith A. Wilson

• Wilson, Keith (2022). The Auditory Field: The Spatial Character of Auditory Experience. Ergo - An Open Access Journal of Philosophy. ISSN 2330-4014. In press. Vis sammendrag

  It is generally accepted that there is a visual field, but the analogous notion of an auditory field is rejected by many philosophers on the grounds that the metaphysics or phenomenology of audition lack the necessary spatial structure. In this paper, I argue that many of the common objections to the existence of an auditory field are misguided and that, contrary to a tradition of philosophical scepticism about the spatiality of auditory experience, it is as richly spatial as visual experience — and in some ways even more so. By carefully considering the spatiality and boundedness of audition, along with how sounds or their sources are experienced as occurring within the surrounding acoustic environment, we can gain a better understanding of (i) our auditory experience of space and (ii) the conditions for the existence of spatial sensory fields in general in a way that does not privilege vision over the other senses.

• Wilson, Keith A. (2021). Individuating the Senses of ‘Smell’: Orthonasal versus Retronasal Olfaction. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857. 199, s. 4217–4242. doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02976-7. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The dual role of olfaction in both smelling and tasting, i.e. flavour perception, makes it an important test case for philosophical theories of sensory individuation. Indeed, the psychologist Paul Rozin claimed that olfaction is a “dual sense”, leading some scientists and philosophers to propose that we have not one, but two senses of smell: orthonasal and retronasal olfaction. In this paper I consider how best to understand Rozin’s claim, and upon what grounds one might judge there to be one or two distinct olfactory modalities. I conclude that while Rozin may be right that humans have dual occurrences of an olfactory ‘sense’, the concept of a sense-modality, and hence the ‘sense’ of smell, is ambiguous between two different notions: a physiological sensory channel and an experiential modality, along the lines suggested by J. J. Gibson. Furthermore, recognising that these are complementary rather than competing conceptions of a sense-modality enables the formulation of a powerful ‘dual-concept’ framework for posing and addressing questions concerning the complex architecture of human multisensory experience.

• Wilson, Keith A. & Macpherson, Fiona (2018). The Senses. I Pritchard, Duncan (Red.), Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy. Oxford Bibliographies. ISSN 9780195396577. doi: 10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0368.
• Wilson, Keith A. (2018). Are the Senses Silent? Travis’s Argument from Looks. I Collins, John & Dobler, Tamara (Red.), The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception. Oxford University Press. ISSN 9780198783916. s. 199–221. doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198783916.003.0010. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Locatelli, Roberta & Wilson, Keith A. (2017). Perception Without Representation [Special Issue]. Topoi. ISSN 0167-7411. 36(2), s. 197–364. Vis sammendrag

  https://link.springer.com/journal/11245/volumes-and-issues/36-2

• Locatelli, Roberta & Wilson, Keith A. (2017). Introduction: Perception Without Representation. Topoi. ISSN 0167-7411. 36(2), s. 197–212. doi: 10.1007/s11245-017-9460-1. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Wilson, Keith A. (2013). Reid’s Direct Realism and Visible Figure. The Philosophical Quarterly. ISSN 0031-8094. 63(253), s. 783–803. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2013.02002.x. Vis sammendrag

  In his account of visual perception, Thomas Reid describes visible figure as both ‘real and external’ to the eye and as the ‘immediate object of sight’. These claims appear to conflict with Reid's direct realism, since if the ‘immediate’ object of vision is also its direct object, then sight would be perceptually indirect due to the role of visible figure as a perceptual intermediary. I argue that this apparent threat to Reid's direct realism may be resolved by understanding visible figure as the set of geometrical properties that holds between an object's visible surfaces and some particular perspective or point of view. On this relational interpretation of visible figure, and once an ambiguity over the use of the term ‘object’ is resolved, Reid's account of vision is both epistemically and perceptually direct, as well as consistent with his account of the other senses and doctrine of signs.

• Wilson, Keith (2007). Does Attention Exist? British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy. ISSN 1748-9393. 2(2), s. 153–168.

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• Wilson, Keith A. (2020). Multisensory Perception. Sabah Ülkesi. ISSN 2195-6456. Vis sammendrag

  https://www.sabahulkesi.com/2021/01/19/cok-duyumlu-algi/ (Turkish language) https://www.academia.edu/44902484/How_Many_Senses_Multisensory_Perception_Beyond_the_Five_Senses (English)

• Locatelli, Roberta & Wilson, Keith A. (2017). Erratum to Introduction: Perception Without Representation. Topoi. ISSN 0167-7411. 36(2), s. 213–213. doi: 10.1007/s11245-017-9489-1.
• Wilson, Keith (2013). Perception and Reality. New Philosopher. ISSN 2201-7151. 1(2), s. 104–107. Vis sammendrag

  https://www.newphilosopher.com/articles/perception-and-reality/

• Wilson, Keith A. (2013). Review of Perception: Essays after Frege by Charles Travis. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. ISSN 1538-1617.

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