2017: The Thought and Sense Conference
This conference is dedicated to exploring the nature of the contrast, or contrasts, between perception and cognition. It brings together the main issues of the Thought and Sense Project.
Time and place: Nov. 2, 2017 10:00 AM–Nov. 4, 2017 6:00 PM, University of Oslo. Blindern Campus
- Tim Bayne (Monash),
- Jacob Beck (York University)
- Ned Block (NYU)
- Brit Brogaard (Miami)
- Mette Hansen (University of Bergen)
- Grace Helton (Princeton)
- Michael G.F. Martin (UCL, UC Berkeley)
- Michelle Montague (University of Texas)
- Jessica Pepp (Uppsala University)
- Maja Spener (Birmingham)
- Fiona Macpherson (Glasgow University)
- Pär Sundström (Umeå University)
- Sam Clarke (Oxford University)
- Anna Drozdzowicz (University of Århus)
- Ben Henke (Washington University in St. Louis)
- Jake Quilty-Dunn (Oxford University)
- Gerardo Viera (University of Antwerp)
The distinction between sense perception and cognition is central to our conception of the mind, and crucial to several debates in philosophy, in epistemology, philosophy of science, theories of concepts and mental content, and beyond. Yet there has been comparatively little systematic and focused discussion on what, more exactly, the difference between perception and cognition comes to.
Recent developments call for a fresh and focused discussion of this question. Some of the traditional marks of the perceptual – e.g. distinctive immediacy, vivacity, or forcefulness; qualitative character or phenomenality; nonconceptuality; and cognitive impenetrability – have encountered serious challenges. Work in cognitive science, e.g. on predictive processing, has emphasized the importance of top-down processing, and such influentially posited capacities as ‘System 1’ or ‘core cognition’ seem to be neither clearly perceptual nor clearly cognitive.
So, is there one contrast between perception and cognition or many? Is there continuity or discontinuity? If there is an important distinction, how is it to be characterized? While there is a growing body of literature on the cognitive penetrability of perception, the focus of this conference, while related, is importantly different: it concerns not so much how often a certain boundary is crossed and what counts as crossing, but whether there is a boundary, whether there is one boundary or many (possibly cross-cutting), and whether the existence of a boundary, if there is one, has any of the interesting consequences in epistemology or other areas that it has often been thought to have. Thus, this conference will address the character and the consequences of the perception-cognition distinction.
Thursday, 2. November 2017
Sebastian Watzl (University of Oslo) “Introduction: The perception/cognition distinction”
Ned Block (NYU) “A joint in nature between perception and cognition without modularity of mind”
Grace Helton (Princeton University) “Unrevisability and the boundary between perception and cognition”
Tim Bayne (Monash University) “Border disputes”
Jacob Beck (York University) “Stimulus-Dependence and the Perception–Cognition Boundary”
Friday, 3. November 2017
Michelle Montague (University of Texas) “The sense/cognition distinction”
Berit Brogaard (University of Miami) “Phenomenal dogmatism: the problems of veridical illusion and high-level properties
Commentator: Pär Sundström (Umeå University)
Poster session: Sam Clarke (Oxford University, Princeton University), Anna Drozdzowicz (University of Aarhus), Ben Henke (Washington University St. Louis), Jake Quilty-Dunn (Oxford University), Gerardo Viera (University of Antwerp)
Maja Spener (University of Birmingham) “Subjective methods, response bias and introspection”
Mette Hansen (University of Bergen) “The principle of acquaintance and the argument from conceptual art”
Saturday, 4. November 2017
Michael G. F. Martin (University College London, UC Berkeley) “Experience needed”
Kristoffer Sundberg (University of Oslo) “Perceiving properties”
Commentator: Fiona Macpherson (Glasgow University)
Anders Nes (University of Oslo) “If perceptions are inferred and cognitive penetrated, then why aren’t they based on reasons?”
Jessica Pepp (Uppsala University)
“Is it perception? From sensory substitution to photographic transparency”
Sam Clarke (Oxford University): "The (Un)limits of Iconicity"
Anna Drozdzowicz (University of Århus) "Do we hear meanings? – experiences of language understanding and the perception/cognition divide"
Ben Henke (Washington University in St. Louis): "Perceptual Learning, Cognitive Penetration, and The Continuum Hypothesis"
Jake Quilty-Dunn (Oxford University): "Perceptual Pluralism"
Gerardo Viera (University of Antwerp): "Sensory Individuation and The Sensory / Non-Sensory Divide"
Anders Nes, Kristoffer Sundberg and Sebastian Watzl
2016: Conference on Depiction and Perception
The conference aims to shed light on the interactions between theories of depiction and the philosophy of perception. Some core issues concern the capacities used for picture perception, imagination, aesthetic response, veridicality, and the difference between 'seeing-in' and 'face to face' perception.
Time and place: Oct. 12, 2016–Oct. 13, 2016, Room 652, Georg Morgenstierne's House
- Perception, Interpretation and Images as Design Objects – Lambert Wiesing (Jena)
- Depiction, Systems of Representation and Resemblance – Catharine Abell (Manchester)
- Modernism and Pictorial Organization – Bence Nanay (Cambridge/Antwerp)
- Prospects for a Sensory Profile Account of Pictorial Presence –
- Robert Hopkins (NYU)
- Picturing Possibilities – Dominic Gregory (Sheffield)
- Perceptual Mediation and the Problem of Non-Existence – Maarten Steenhagen (Antwerp)
- Moving Pictures – Solveig Aasen (Oslo)
List of participants
- Catharine Abell (Manchester)
- Dominic Gregory (Sheffield)
- Robert Hopkins (NYU)
- Bence Nanay (Cambridge/Antwerp)
- Maarten Steenhagen (Antwerp)
- Lambert Wiesing (Jena)
- Solveig Aasen (Oslo)
2015: Responding to Global Poverty
-- On what the affluent ought to do and what the poor are permitted to do
Time and place: May 28, 2015 9:00 AM–May 29, 2015 5:30 PM, Room 652 Georg Morgenstiernes hus
- Helen Frowe (Stockholm University, Sweden)
- Holly Lawford-Smith (Sheffield, UK)
- Patrick Tomlin (University of Reading, UK)
- Alejandra Mancilla (CSMN, UiO)
- Kasper Lippert–Rasmussen (University of Aarhus, Denmark)
- Garrett Cullity (University of Adelaide, Autstralia)
- Thom Brooks (Durham University, UK)
- Alec Walen (Rutgers University, USA)
- Bashshar Haydar (American University, Beirut)
- Matthew Lindauer (Yale, USA)
- Ole Koksvik (University of Bergen, Norway)
- Christopher Heath Wellman (Washington University, St. Louis, USA)
- RJ Leland (Australian National University)
- Jeff McMahan (Oxford, UK)
- Leif Wenar (Kings College London, UK)
- Christian Barry (Australian National University)
Thursday, 28 May
- “Assisting the Poor and Two Types of Emergency” Bashshar Haydar (co-authored with Gerhard Øverland)
- “On Satisfying Duties to Assist” Holly Lawford-Smith (co-authored with Christian Barry)
- “Rectification and Assistance” Garrett Cullity
- “Is Severe Poverty a Just Cause? Øverland on Extraordinary Humanitarian Intervention” Thom Brooks
- “Profiting from Poverty” Ole Koksvik (co-authored with Gerhard Øverland)
Friday 29 May
- “What the Old Right of Necessity can do for the Contemporary Global Poor” Alejandra Mancilla
- “Pogge, Poverty and War” Kasper Lippert–Rasmussen
- “Moral Judgment and the Duties of Innocent Beneficiaries” Matthew Lindauer (co-authored with Christian Barry)
- “On the fundamental connection between property and deontology” Alec Walen
- “Giving Rise to Cost and the Doing, Allowing, Enabling Distinction” Christian Barry (co-authored with Gerhard Øverland)
2015: PragMaPS. Pragmatism at the Intersection of Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science
Time and place: June 4, 2015 9:00 AM–June 5, 2015 5:00 PM, University of Oslo, Georg Morgenstiernes hus, floor 6, room 652
Thursday June 4
- Jim Woodward (University of Pittsburgh, HPS), with ½ hour Q&A "Sketch of some themes for a pragmatic philosophy of science"
- John Dupre (University of Exeter), with ½ hour Q&A: "Structure and Function: A Pragmatic, Process-Centred View"
- Edward Hall (Harvard), with ½ hour Q&A: "On some connections between explanation and metaphysics"
- Holly Andersen (Simon Fraser University), with ½ hour Q&A: "What happens when we keep the door open on the Metaphysics Room? A pragmatic philosophy of science take on Sider's Writing the Book of the World"
Friday, June 5
- Huw Price (Cambridge) with ½ hour Q&A: 'Here' is the tip of the iceberg: Pragmatism about indexicals and causality.
- Chris Hitchcock (CalTech), with ½ hour Q&A: "Pragmatic metaphysics between reduction and analysis"
- Sandra Mitchell (University of Pittsburgh), with ½ hour Q&A
- Open discussion section with speakers and audience: Moderated by Megan Delehanty, University of Calgary
Some topics, such as causation or laws of nature, are central to both metaphysics and philosophy of science. The approaches used for these shared topics in these different fields can vary, sometimes widely, which has often enough prevented fruitful discussions or interactions between those two fields. There is a long history in philosophy of science, dating at least to logical empiricism, of dismissing metaphysics as useless and emphasizing science as a superior method for understanding the nature of the world. Recently, though, philosophers of science have come to a clearer understanding of the metaphysical commitments involved in many of their own views, and metaphysicians have drawn in much more depth on empirical work in the sciences. Pragmatism is an intriguing thread through the last century of philosophy that can serve as an alternative to logical empiricism in situating philosophy of science versus metaphysical approaches to common topics of interest. It also highlights potentially problematic assumptions, such as that physics should be the go-to science for metaphysics rather than, for instance, biology.
This conference aims to provide a forum in which to discuss pragmatic approaches to metaphysics from the perspective(s) of philosophy of science. The invited speakers share an interest in pragmatism, either in general or as a way to approach particular issues in their own field. The goal is start from a broadly pragmatic perspective to examine particular issues at the intersection of metaphysics and philosophy of science, as well as considering more general issues about how pragmatism can mediate interaction between parallel discussions in the two fields.
Please see the PragMaps web page for more information, including abstracts and prereadings.
Olav Gjelsvik and Bjørn Ramberg
2015: Conscience and Moral Self-Knowledge in Kant and German Idealism
Time and place: Aug. 20, 2015–Aug. 22, 2015, Room 652, Georg Morgenstiernes hus
According to Kant, your first duty to yourself and the “beginning of all human wisdom” is to know yourself (MM, 6:441). But what kind of knowledge is this, how can we attain it, and how is it relevant to our moral agency? Kant’s conception of the self and the subjective conditions for moral actions were challenged by subsequent thinkers like Fries, Fichte, and Hegel who identified alleged tensions in Kant’s account and proposed innovative solutions. The question about the relation between self-knowledge and morality is still subject to debate among scholars of Kant and German Idealism.
Thursday (August 20th):
Keynote Lecture: Jeanine Grenberg: Self-Deception and Self-Knowledge: A Kantian Account of Becoming a Moral Person
Martin Sticker: Ain’t no Party like a Third Party
Carsten Fogh Nielsen: On the very idea of a Kantian moral phenomenology
Laura Papish: Self-Deception, Evil, and Lack of Virtue
Markus Kohl: Radical Evil as a Regulative Idea
Friday (August 21st):
Jens Timmermann: Kant’s Theory of Conscience – Open Questions
Carla Bagnoli: Kant on self-knowledge as practical knowledge
David Zapero: Kant on moral self-opacity
Dean Moyar: Self-Certainty and Self-Blindness in Moral Judgment: Hegel’s Immanent Critique of Fichtean Conscience
Irina Schumski: Can We Know What to Do without Knowing What We Are Doing? Unpacking Kant’s Opacity Thesis
Feroz Mehmood Shah: Kantian Conscience and the Threat of an Ethics of Conviction
Saturday (August 22nd):
Marijana Vujosevic: Kant on Moral Self-Control and Conscience
Jonas Jervell Indregard: A Self-Knowledge (Morally) Worth Having
Ryan Wines: Respect for Law and Kant’s Causal Account of Moral Self-Consciousness
Owen Ware: Fichte on Conscience
2015: Inference and Consciousness
Time and place: July 2, 2015 10:00 AM–July 4, 2015 2:00 PM, Room 652, Georg Morgenstiernes hus
Keywords: Inference, Consciousness, Reasoning, Reflection, Cognitive
Phenomenology, Dual-Process Theory, Inferential Justification.
Thursday July 2:
Brit Brogaard (Miami) - "Gut Feelings, Unconscious Inference and Immediate Justification"
Nico Orlandi (UC Santa Cruz) - “Unconscious Inference: the case of Vision”
Anders Nes (CSMN) – “Fore- and Background in the Phenomenology of Inference”
Friday July 3:
Christopher Peacocke (Columbia) - "Inference, Rationality, and Consciousness"
Anna-Sara Malmgren (Stanford) - "Goodness, Availability, and Argument Structure"
Elijah Chudnoff (Miami) - “Experience and Epistemic Structure”
Declan Smithies (Ohio State) - "Moore's Paradox, Self-Knowledge, and the Nature of Belief"
Saturday July 4:
Timothy Chan (CSMN) – "Acting for a Reason and Assenting to a Reasoning."
Fabian Dorsch (Fribourg) - "The Phenomenal Presence of Reasons"
The idea that inference can be unconscious was once a bold innovation,enabling the hypothesis that inference is involved even in mental processes, e.g. in perception, that seem immediate and where are typically unaware of making any inferences. These days, unconscious inference is so widely taken for granted that the question arises whether consciousness is of any special importance to inference at all. The conference proposes to address this basic question of how, if at all, consciousness matters to inference. Under this broad heading, a number of issues arise. In this conference, the ambition is to illuminate a subset of the following issues, or related questions also bearing on the theme of the import of consciousness for inference.
- What notion, or notions, of consciousness, e.g. access consciousness, self-consciousness, or phenomenal consciousness, if any, are of importance to the philosophical understanding of inference? Conversely, are any of these notions of consciousness susceptible of illumination through their connection with inference?
- Does consciousness have any place in philosophical account of what inference is? Does conscious inference have any constitutive or explanatory priority, or autonomy, with respect to unconscious inference, or is conscious inference to be understood as inference of a generic sort that happens also to have a feature of consciousness
- Does the conscious character of an inference, or its lack thereof, have any epistemological or normative implications, e.g. for the capacity of the inference to transmit justification, for its reliability, for its power to provide inferential justification meeting epistemicallly internalist requirements, or for the thinker’s responsibility for what she infers?
- What significance does the distinction(s) between conscious and unconscious inference have in such domains as linguistic understanding and perceptual judgement? For example, does such a distinction correlate with relevantly different notions of meaning or content, such as, for example, the distinction between what is said vs. what is implied (in the linguitic case, cf. Recanati's 'availability criterion'), or that between nonconceptual and conceptual content (in the perceptual case). If so, what is the significance of such a correlation?
2013: Measuring Poverty and Gender Disparity
Time and place: June 6, 2013 8:00 AM–5:00 PM, Aud. 3, Helga Engs house, Universitetet i Oslo
Measuring Poverty and Gender Disparity: A Joint Approach to a New Measure of Deprivation
Recent years have seen flourishing academic and public debates regarding how social and economic progress should be measured. In most cases, poor men and women have been excluded from these discussions. Over the past 3 years, in 18 sites across six countries in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, researchers have worked with men and women living in poverty to help construct a new measure of deprivation that is capable of revealing gender disparities. This one day public event will explore the existing debates surrounding the measurement of social progress, report on a new approach to measuring poverty and gender disparity, and provide critical commentary and suggestions for future research.
Thomas Pogge (Yale University), Sharon Bessell (Australian National University), Fatima Castillo (University of the Philippines), Alison Jaggar (University of Colorado), Scott Wisor (Australian National University), Janet Hunt (Australian National University), Jo Crawford (International Women’s Development Agency), Caster Palaganas (University of the Philippines), Stephan Klasen (University of Goettingen), Sylvia Chant (London School of Economics),
Measuring Progress: Old Measures, New Measures
Critiques of GDP and monetary poverty lines as measures of progress are now well known amongst academics and development practitioners. In response to this criticism, there has been a proliferation of recent initiatives to develop new ways to measure poverty, gender disparity, and social progress. This panel considers the strengths and weaknesses of both long-standing measures, such as the World Bank’s International Poverty Line, and recently debuted measures, such as the OECD’s Social Institutions Gender Index.
Panelists: Stephan Klasen, Thomas Pogge, Jo Crawford, TBD
A Joint Approach Approach: Feminist Methodology, Participatory Research
This research project explicitly adopted a feminist approach to our central research question of how poverty and gender disparity should be measured. Among other features, this included a commitment to privilege the views and perspectives of men and women living in poverty. This panel explores the importance of feminism to the research project, the role that participation had in developing a new measure of deprivation, and the challenges of
Panelists: Alison Jaggar, Fatima Castillo, Erlinda Palaganas, Janet Hunt, Sylvia Chant
Key Findings and Proposed Measure
We report on a new measure of poverty that is multidimensional, capable of revealing gender disparities, and easy to use for governments and non-governmental organizations. The Core Deprivation Measure (CDM) tracks deprivation in 15 areas of life, allows for scalar assessments within each dimension, and is weighted to reflect the greater importance of worse deprivations in important dimensions. We contrast the CDM with monetary poverty lines, the Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index, and other composite indices of human development and gender equity.
Panelists: Thomas Pogge, Scott Wisor
Responses from Experts
Following the presentation of the measure, we allow experts to provide critical commentary on our research project and the CDM. This critical commentary is followed by brief responses from project team members.
Panelists: Stephan Klasen, Sylvia Chant, Thomas Pogge, Scott Wisor
The Future of Measurement
We conclude by indicating directions for future research, the potential of continued improvements in the measurement of poverty and gender disparity, and the possibility of integrating this research into global benchmarks for development progress
Panelists: Jo Crawford, Thomas Pogge
2012: The CSMN/Arché Graduate Conference
CSMN, Centre for the study of Mind in Nature, and Arché, the Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology (University of St Andrews), are pleased to announce the sixth in a series of annual graduate conferences aimed at showcasing international graduate work in contemporary analytic philosophy.
Time and place: Nov. 17, 2012–Nov. 18, 2012, University of Oslo, Georg Morgenstiernes hus, Arne Næss Auditorium
Saturday 17th November
- Keynote talk: John Hawthorne (Oxford) + Q&A
- Wesley Buckwalter (CUNY): “Factive verbs and protagonist projection" + Response from Torfinn Huvenes + Q&A
- Lea-Cecile Salje (UCL): “Thought insertion and immunity to error through misidentification: a compatibilist resolution” + Response from Herman Cappelen + Q&A
- Justin Dallman (USC): “A normatively adequate credal reductivism” + Response from John Hawthorne + Q&A
Sunday 18th November
- Anthony Shiver (U Georgia): “Mereological bundle theory and the identity of indiscernibles” + Response from Einar Duenger Bøhn + Q&A
- Diana Mazzarella (UCL): “Where accessibility-based approaches to pragmatics fall short” + Response from Francois Recanati + Q&A
- Bernhard Salow (MIT): “Kripke’s dogmatism paradox” + Response from Stewart Cohen + Q&A
- eynote talk: Delia Graff Fara (Princeton): "Circularity Is No Problem for Predicativism" + Q&A
Nick Hughes, Josh Thorpe, Monica Roland
Time and place: May 23, 2012 10:00 AM–May 25, 2012 5:30 PM, <br/> Svinøya Rorbuer, Svolvær in Lofoten
Lara Buchak (Berkeley) "Belief and Credence: Irreducible and Ineliminable"
Juan Comesana (Arizona) "Neo-Rationalism and the doxastic problem of easy knowledge."
Branden Fitelson (Rutgers) "Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence"
Mark Kaplan (Indiana) "Jeffrey's Challenge"
Alan Hajek (Australian National University) "Staying Regular?"
Thomas Kelly (Princeton) "Believers as Thermometers"
Sarah Moss (Michigan University) "Epistemology Formalized"
Jim Pryor (New York University) "Problems for Credulism"
Timothy Williamson (Oxford) "Models of Improbable Knowing"
- Jessica Brown
- Mark Budolfson
- Herman Cappelen
- Steward Cohen
- David Christensen
- Josh Dever
- Olav Gjeslvik
- Ishani Maitra
- Jessica Pepp
- Andrew Reisner
- Nicholas Silins
- Levi Spectre
- Rachel Sterken
- Andreas Stokke
- Scott Sturgeon
- Jonathan Vogel
- Brian Weatherson
- Roger White
- Maria Lasonen Aarnio
Herman Cappelen and Steward Cohen
2012: Philosophy without intuitions
Time and place: Dec. 15, 2012, Senate House, WC1, University of London
The Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature and the Institute of Philosophy will be hosting a one-day conference on themes from Herman Cappelen’s lastest book, Philosophy Without Intuitions, Oxford University Press, 2012.
- John Bengson (Wisconsin-Madison)
- Paul Boghossian (NYU)
- Berit Brogard (Missouri-St Louis)
- Herman Cappelen (CSMN and Arché)
- David Chalmers (NYU and ANU)
- Mark Richard (Harvard)
Olav Gjelsvik, CSMN and the Institute of Philosophy, University of London
Exploring Evaluative and Normative Constraints of Human Agency in a Historical and Ethnographical perspective
Conference co-hosted and co-funded by CSMN/Oslo and SCAS/Uppsala
Time and place: June 11, 2012–June 13, 2012, Uppsala
Human agency is always situated within a complex framework constituted by, among other things, evaluative and normative constraints that not only limit, but also enable, human agency. Understanding these constraints of human agency should be on the agenda of philosophical research. These constraints are embedded in a social context and they are subject to historical change and cultural variation. Any attempt at treating ethical and moral phenomena as “natural” should be aware of this variation and of this historical contingency of moral judgment and moral behavior.
Our plan is to bring together philosophically and historically minded non-philosophers specializing in different cultures, epochs and languages and philosophers specializing in the evaluative and normative constraints of human agency in general as well as in ethical thought and its history in particular. The purpose is to explore the richness of phenomena in the realm of feelings of obligations. Concepts, distinctions, conceptual repertoires and their semantic fields will be a basic focus of attention. The etymology and history of use of these conceptual tools as provided by different languages will be discussed in a philosophical analytic spirit.
Our aim is to provide a comparative basis for a careful philosophical analysis of the evaluative and normative constraints of human agency in its varying social and historical contexts.
One obvious question to ask is to what extent certain strictly comparable ethical and moral conceptualizations are to be found in all the cultures under discussion. A second question will be to what extent such shared conceptual features are common to other cultures not yet closely investigated. A third question concerns the circumstances and ways in which evaluative and normative constraints of human agency come to be conceptualized and re-conceptualized in the cultures under discussion.
We plan to publish a volume with contributions from the scholars involved in this project.
Monday, June 11
Session I Chair: Øyvind Rabbås
Peter Railton (Michigan/ CSMN)Title: What is Distinctive About Normative Guidance? – Philosophical, Psychological, and Social Dimensions
Session II Chair: Øyvind Rabbås
Wlodek Rabinowicz (SCAS/ Lund)Title: Value Incommensurabilities from the Perspective of Fitting-Attitudes Analysis
Christel Fricke (CSMN) Title: The Importance of Being Normal
Christoph Harbsmeier (CSMN/SCAS) Title: The Philosophical Ethnography of Normativity: How to Feel Obliged
Tuesday, June 12
Session III Chair: Christoph Harbsmeier
Michael Puett (SCAS/Harvard) Title: Dispositions, Rituals, and Norms: Perspectives from Classical China
Emilie Aussant (Paris) Title: Vyâkaranic texts and Shastric discourse
Session IV Chair: Christoph Harbsmeier
Hugo David (Paris) Title: Human Action as Seen in Early Medieval Indian Philosophical Schools (600-1000 AD)
Douglas Cairns (Edinburgh) Title: Revenge, Punishment, and Justice in Athenian Homicide Law
Wednesday, June 13
Session V Chair: Christel Fricke
Julia Annas (Arizona) Title: Being Good and Doing the Right Thing: Modern Problems with Ancient Greek Ethics
Maria Alejandra Carrasco (Santiago de Chile/CSMN) Title: Virtues and Universal Principles – On Adam Smith’s Moral Theory
Session VI Chair: Christel Fricke
Øyvind Rabbås (CSMN) Title: Eudaimonist Virtue, Community, and the Ethics of Honour