Previous seminars

2024

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Harish Pedaprolu, Perspectival Clashes are Attentional Conflicts

Talk by Harish Pedaprolu, Perspectival Clashes are Attentional Conflicts

Time and place: Nov. 22, 2024 2:15 PM – 3:30 PM, GM 467 and Zoom

Abstract

Most of us would agree that beliefs may clash if , for example, both of them can’t be true at the same time. Most of us would also agree that desires may conflict if, for example, both of them cannot be satisfied at the same time. But do perspectives clash? If they do, what does it take for them to clash?

Not many philosophers have written about this subject. Those who have written about it, disagree with each other as to whether there can be perspectival clashes and what these clashes are. Iris Marion Young suggests that while two or more perspectives may be incommensurate, it makes little sense to say that they ‘conflict’ or ‘clash’ with one another. Elizabeth Camp argues that perspectives can clash and they clash when they embody dissimilar or opposing cognitive, affective and attentional dispositions. Ege Yumusak has recently argued, against Camp, that two perspectives may clash even if they embody similar dispositions, if these dispositions are used to pursue opposing ‘agendas’ or inquiry-structuring questions. So, Yumusak argues, perspectives must be identified with inquiry-structuring questions or agendas and not dispositions.

This paper has a negative and a positive side. On the negative side, I argue that there are good reasons to reject all three of the above positions, insightful as they are. Against Young, I hold that perspectives can and do often conflict in addition to being merely incommensurate. I agree with Yumusak on her criticism of Camp’s position. However, against Yumusak, I argue that having different or ‘opposing’ inquiry-structuring questions, in itself, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for perspectives to conflict.

On the positive side, I propose four unique features of perspectival conflicts that set them apart from what are traditionally considered conflicts in belief or values: (i) Having opposing inquiry-structuring questions amounts to a clash only when one is engaged in or aims to engage in a joint inquiry with another entity (this is often another person but joint inquiries could also involve institutions, past versions of oneself, and so on as co-inquirers). (ii) The adjudication of whether two inquiry-structuring questions are ‘opposite’ or not can only be made relative to a frame of assessment or a third perspective. (iii) The site of a perspectival clash is not questions themselves but is the organization of these questions. (iv) A perspectival clash is nothing but an attentional conflict because attention is what organizes our questions.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 467 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organiser

Austin Baker, Hugo Ribeiro Mota and Harish Pedaprolu

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Camilo Ronderos, The Social Dimension of Mindreading

Talk by Camilo Ronderos, The Social Dimension of Mindreading

Time and place: Oct. 18, 2024 2:15 PM – 3:30 PM, GM 467 and Zoom

Abstract

Work in developmental pragmatics has shown that even though infants display refined

mindreading abilities, older children struggle to understand language phenomena that rely on mindreading. This apparent mismatch could be partially explained by considering children’s growing sensitivity to social categories such as their interlocutor’s age. Based on recent work in philosophy of mind, we investigated how social categorization impacts children’s developing mindreading abilities during language comprehension. We tested the hypothesis that social-category-based reasoning follows the same developmental trajectory typically described for children’s mindreading skills. In a picture-selection task, Norwegian participants (ages 3-9,

N=119) made decisions regarding a speaker’s (child or adult) preferences by choosing between images showing stereotypically child-coded and adult-coded items. Young children preferentially selected the child-coded image regardless of the speaker’s age, while older children preferred the stereotypically adult-coded image when they heard the adult speaker only. Participants’ performance in the picture-selection task was also predicted by their scores on a standard false-belief task. These results suggest that mindreading has a social dimension that develops in tandem with other mindreading abilities. We argue that future studies in developmental pragmatics should consider social-category differences between participants and speakers when drawing conclusions about children’s mindreading abilities and how these are reflected in their interpretation of verbal utterances.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 467 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organiser

Austin Baker, Hugo Ribeiro Mota and Harish Pedaprolu

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Isabella Bartoli, Social Externalism and the Implementation Challenge: Revising Socially Significant Social Kind Terms

Talk by Isabella Bartoli, Social Externalism and the Implementation Challenge: Revising Socially Significant Social Kind Terms

Time and place: Oct. 4, 2024 1:15 PM – 3:00 PM, GM 467 and Zoom

Abstract

According to social externalism, experts within a linguistic community play a crucial role in determining the semantic meaning of terms (Burge 1979). As a result, social externalism might initially seem to face fewer obstacles than other forms of semantic externalism when addressing the “implementation challenge” to conceptual engineering, and it is compatible with some proposed solutions to it (Koch 2021). However, in this paper, I argue that due to the power dynamics inherent in socially significant social kind terms, social externalism does not provide a straightforward path for implementing meaning revisions for these terms. Drawing on Ball’s (2020) distinction between two understandings of the notion of experts in the determination of meaning – “Power Metasemantics” and “Virtue Metasemantics” – I argue that both approaches pose challenges for conceptual implementation for socially significant terms. I analyse how the relevance of social facts to metasemantics makes it the case that Power Metasemantics precludes marginalized groups from bringing about meaning change – even when their engineering proposals are endorsed by trusted members of privileged social groups (due to a phenomenon I call “indirect testimonial injustice”). Moreover, I argue that Virtue Metasemantics engages in circular reasoning and does not provide an objective criterion for identifying who the experts are. I conclude that the challenge arising from Power Metasemantics significantly hinders conceptual implementation for socially significant social kind terms without making it impossible, while that arising from Virtue Metasemantics supports Cappelen’s (2018) skepticism towards implementation and the role of experts in conceptual engineering.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 467 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organiser

Austin Baker, Hugo Ribeiro Mota and Harish Pedaprolu

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Hugo Mota, The Social Epistemology of International Mediation

Talk by Hugo Mota, The Social Epistemology of International Mediation

Time and place: Sep. 20, 2024 1:15 PM – 3:00 PM, GM 467 and Zoom

Abstract

This presentation draws from a draft of a project proposal on applied epistemology centered on International Mediation. The aim of the project is to use the tools from social/political epistemology to analyze and, whenever needed, improve the field of International Mediation at three levels: Institutional level (e.g. education and training of mediators); Theoretical level (e.g. the normative foundations of mediation); Practical level (e.g. the practice of mediation). Although there are critical accounts of international mediation available, to the best of my knowledge, none use the social epistemology framework explicitly. There are some accounts from political philosophy, applied ethics, and the peace studies field itself. This project should provide a systematic understanding of the political, theoretical and practical aspects of international mediation that complements other critical accounts rather than debunk or disprove them. This understanding aims to provide improvements regarding the structure of peacemaking institutions, the guidelines instructed to mediators, and the epistemic and communicative frameworks employed by practitioners in the field. Therefore, the project has both an analytical and applied scope. Although the project has an explicit critical view of international mediation, this does not entail a rejection or dismissal of it. On the contrary, the goal is to identify and contribute to solutions to new and already established issues. An important secondary goal of the project is to incentivize more interdisciplinary collaboration from the Humanities (especially Philosophy) with Peace Studies and Peacemaking Institutions, as their mandates and tasks are extremely valuable and urgent to world-keeping in a broad sense.

This is a work-in-progress draft of a fellowship application. Every comment and suggestion is helpful. The material will be sent out next week for those in the mailing list.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 467 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organiser

Austin Baker, Hugo Ribeiro Mota and Harish Pedaprolu

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Valen Simpson, Loar Cases, Communication, and Luck

Talk by Valen Simpson, Loar Cases, Communication, and Luck

Time and place: May 30, 2024 1:15 PM – 3:00 PM, GM 467 and Zoom

Abstract

The existence of Loar cases has traditionally been taken to vindicate a broadly Fregean approach to communicative success. As subjects in the case are miscommunicating, while in fact talking about the same object, sameness of reference is shown to be insufficient as a condition for understanding. Conclusively, appeal to senses, modes of presentation, or ways of thinking is deemed necessary in order to explain the misunderstanding at the heart of the puzzle. Recently, however, the idea that Loar cases entails the triumph of Fregeanism has met resistance. As some Russellians have pointed out, they too have a stake in the discussion. More problematically for the Fregean, however, would be the possibility of Loar cases being turned against the account itself. Onofri (2019) undertakes a discussion of Loar’s puzzle, and variations thereof, to argue that the Fregean’s (matches in) ways of thinking about the referent are not necessary when accounting neither for the misunderstandings involved in Loar cases in particular, nor communicative success in general. Onofri instead provides an epistemic approach to definitively triumph over the Fregean’s in explaining the relevant desiderata surrounding Loar puzzles and communication. I aim to do two things: first, I will provide the Fregean camp with a defence against Onofri's challenge; next, I plan on presenting my own challenge to this new wave of epistemic, or knowledge-based accounts of Loar cases and communication, with their particular focus on the component of luck at the heart of it. The challenge, put succinctly, is that we have reasons to think that communication can occur with a fair share of luck and a fair lack of knowledge.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 467 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organiser

Austin Baker, Hugo Ribeiro Mota and Harish Pedaprolu

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Jonathan Lewis Knowles, Metaphysical realism and semantic externalism

Talk by Jonathan Lewis Knowles, Metaphysical realism and semantic externalism

Time and place: May 23, 2024 2:15 PM – 4:00 PM, GM 667 and Zoom

Abstract

Hilary Putnam is famous for many different philosophical ideas and arguments. Among these are his promotion of semantic externalism (SE) – the idea that meanings are dependent on aspects of speakers’ physical environments that they may be unaware of – and his rejection of metaphysical realism (MR), roughly he idea that our truth-directed thought is ultimately answerable to a world whose nature is thoroughly mind-independent and hence might in principle be quite different from what we take it to be. Though Putnam is also famous for repeatedly changing his mind about what exactly rejecting MR involves, an interesting question that has received little attention in the literature is to what extent SE can be upheld independently of accepting MR, as Putnam clearly seemed to believe was possible. In this paper I will examine this question, starting out with a discussion of a paper by Sandford Goldberg in which he argues that SE does in fact seem to depend on some form of MR. I go on to discuss a response to Goldberg due to Tim Button, as well as a more general line that can be seen as sympathetic to Putnam’s compatibilist position developed by Jussi Haukioja (in part together with Daniel Cohnitz). However, I conclude that there is reason to think Goldberg’s scepticism should be upheld. I finally show how – regardless of exactly what position Putnam exactly held about realism by the end of his life – this conclusion calls for a reinterpretation of his argument that we cannot be (eternal) brains in vats.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 667 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organiser

Austin Baker, Hugo Ribeiro Mota and Harish Pedaprolu

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Nicholas Allot, Moral ‘grammar’, the Linguistic Analogy and the competence/performance distinction

Talk by Nicholas Allot, Moral ‘grammar’, the Linguistic Analogy and the competence/performance distinction

Time and place: May 9, 2024 1:15 PM – 3:00 PM, GM 667 and Zoom

Abstract

Is moral ability similar to knowing a language? The notion of moral ‘grammar’ has a long history. (Adherents include Adam Smith and Pope Benedict XVI). With the emergence of generative linguistics a more precise comparison became possible, and the ‘Linguistic Analogy’ has received sustained attention in recent decades (from Nozick 1968; Rawls 1971; Dwyer 1999 and Mikhail 2011, inter alia). On this view, we have an innate domain-specific moral faculty, Universal Moral Grammar, which both enables and constrains the acquisition of adult moral competence, I-morality, which in its turn underpins our moral abilities including judgments of (im)permissibility. The theory has a number of attractions and, arguably, some empirical support but faces a number of serious objections (from Nagel 1971; Dupoux & Jacob 2007 and Johnson 2012, inter alia). John Mikhail has claimed that Nagel’s criticisms neglect the competence/performance distinction (Chomsky 1965), while Enoch (2013) suggests that Mikhail fails to grasp the cogency of some of the criticisms. Both are right, I argue. I show that a number of distinctions have been confused, including two possible referents of ‘moral judgment’, normative and descriptive questions, and Chomsky’s early and mature notions of competence/I-language. I do what I can to sort out the mess and evaluate where that leaves the Linguistic Analogy.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 667 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organiser

Austin Baker, Hugo Ribeiro Mota and Harish Pedaprolu

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Solveig Aasen, Shared perceptions in social dance and other bodily interactions

Talk by Solveig Aasen, Shared perceptions in social dance and other bodily interactions

Time and place: Apr. 25, 2024 1:15 PM – 2:00 PM, GM 667 and Zoom

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 667 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organiser

Drew Johnson, Hugo Ribeiro Mota and Harish Pedaprolu

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Mirela Fus-Holmedal, Language With Plausible Deniability

Talk by Mirela Fus-Holmedal, Language With Plausible Deniability

Time and place: Apr. 9, 2024 1:15 PM – 3:00 PM, GM 667 and Zoom

Abstract

Risky politically manipulative speech has unexpectedly been on the rise. This paper utilises the phenomenon of plausible deniability to provide an explanation for why linguistic devices such as dogwhistles, racial figleaves, and generic stereotypes have recently emerged as favoured tools for political manipulation. First, it hypothesises that they share the phenomenon of plausible deniability, which, by offering cover for their overtness, mitigates (some) risks of such political speech. Second, it argues that the plausible deniability of these linguistic devices makes them powerful tools for politically manipulative speech as it helps it to spread more efficiently and appear more acceptable. Finally, it elevates the ethical and political dimensions of language to a more central position within the philosophy of language by discussing two normative claims stemming from conceptual engineering: (i) we should combat such pernicious political manipulation, and (ii) we should exploit the effects of plausible deniability for beneficial purposes.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 667 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organiser

Drew Johnson, Hugo Ribeiro Mota and Harish Pedaprolu

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Harish Pedaprolu, Attention and ‘Selection-for-Inquiry'

Talk by Harish Pedaprolu, Attention and ‘Selection-for-Inquiry'

Time and place: Apr. 4, 2024 1:15 PM – 3:00 PM, GM 667 and Zoom

Abstract

Recently, philosophers (Yalcin 2016, Friedman 2019, Hoek 2022) have tried to address some long-standing problems in epistemology by looking at beliefs as question-sensitive. For instance (see Hoek 2022), how is it that I know the phone number ending in -6301 is John’s but can’t recall a phone number when asked, “What is John’s phone number?” Or (see Yalcin 2016) how is it that I know Mary lives in New York and that John lives in Boston and that New York is to the south of Boston but don’t form the logically implied belief that Mary will have to travel northward to see John in Boston? The answer lies in looking at beliefs not as belief states simpliciter, as traditional epistemology does, but look at beliefs qua answers to specific questions. In the literature, questions are often conceived as possible partitionings on the logical space. Dividing the logical space along some lines and not others, decides what beliefs are foregrounded and ‘accessible’ and which ones are rendered inaccessible due to being in the background. It is intuitive to note here that attention becomes a relevant factor. But few attempts have been made to elaborate on the connection of attention with viewing beliefs as question-sensitive.

Some authors have tried to connect attention with inquiry more broadly. For instance, Koralus (2014) makes the strong claim that attention can be defined as doing a task attentively and to do a task attentively is attending to things that might lie in the domain of answers that satisfactorily answer a question encoded by the task. Munton argues (in forthcoming work) that while attention cannot be constitutively defined in terms of performing tasks attentively, the relevance of an attentional activity to answering a question may be an important way of epistemically evaluating an attentional activity.

These views seem to look at the connection between attention and inquiry in the following way: Given a task, there is a question that we wish to answer in order to complete the task, and attention helps us narrow down on objects and beliefs that might be relevant to answering the questions or it helps us evaluate whether the task was well done, epistemically speaking.

What these views overlook is the role of attention in deciding the question that is to be addressed in the first place. This is the topic I take up in the paper.

I argue that attention often performs the function of selecting an inquiry among potential inquiries in the first place. That is, by attending to x, we prioritize inquiries or questions related to x. We could view an attentional activity as a move within a discourse where, by attending to x, I also perform an indirect, communicative act of asking a question about x. For example, when I walk into a room full of all possible things about which I can ask various questions and form various beliefs, attending to the ceiling fan ensures that I selectively focus on inquiries and beliefs concerning the ceiling fan and not other things.

The paper will also argue that attention plays a role in not just selecting what questions to ask but also the hierarchical order (of superordinate-ness and subordinate-ness) in which our questions and sub-questions divide the available logical space .

One way to summarize the paper’s position is this: attention can be seen as performing the function of ‘selection for inquiry’.

The paper tries to understand this role, situate this understanding within the foregoing philosophical literature on attention and inquiry and address the potential worry that the explanatory role proposed for attention in the paper can instead be performed by beliefs or value hierarchies. Further, the paper will consider important contributions this role of attention can make for important philosophical problems arising in connection to looking at beliefs as question-sensitive.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 667 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organiser

Drew Johnson, Hugo Ribeiro Mota and Harish Pedaprolu

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Hugo Ribeiro Mota, Political deep disagreements, structural oppression, and argumentation

Talk by Hugo Ribeiro Mota, Political deep disagreements, structural oppression, and argumentation

Time and place: Mar. 14, 2024 1:15 PM – 3:00 PM, GM 667 and Zoom

Abstract

This paper explores social deep disagreements, which are persistent, political, and collective disagreements over structural social issues. These disagreements are caused by structural oppression and harmful forms of epistemic exclusion, such as epistemic oppression. The paper examines three approaches from argumentation theory that explain the doxastic aspects of deep disagreements - Rational Dialogue, Rational Persuasion, and Social Psychology approaches - and argues that they all fail to address the challenges posed by structural oppression. To address these challenges, the paper adopts an approach that includes attention and trust as necessary conditions for argumentation within unjust settings.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 667 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organiser

Drew Johnson, Hugo Ribeiro Mota and Harish Pedaprolu

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Derek van Zoonen, Hedonic Cognitivism and Fallibilism in Plato’s Philebus

Talk by Derek van Zoonen, Hedonic Cognitivism and Fallibilism in Plato’s Philebus

Time and place: Feb. 29, 2024 1:15 PM – 3:00 PM, GM 667 and Zoom

Abstract

In the Philebus, one of Plato’s latest dialogues, Socrates and the hedonists Philebus and Protarchus discuss what eudaimonia consists in. In the course of attacking his interlocutors’ hedonism—the view that pleasure is the good and the life of pleasure the best possible life—Socrates claims, quite unexpectedly, that pleasures can be pseudês (false, unreal, deceptive). In the first half of this paper—the half you will be reading—I try shed line on this puzzling line of thought; in the second half of this paper—the half I excluded—I argue how Plato’s fallibilism, and the underlying cognitivism or representationalism, make trouble for hedonism as a theory of well-being. The Fallibilism Argument I am examining here can be broken down into roughly two pieces of argument—what I call Argument A and Argument B (for lack of better labels). Argument A suggests that pleasure is relevantly similar to a representational attitude like belief, and thus truth-evaluable (albeit in a derivative sense), whereas Argument B suggests that pleasure consists is, or is constituted by, representational attitudes (doxai and phantasmata), and thus truth-evaluable in a stronger, proper sense of the word. More specifically, I argue that any pleasure necessarily involves an informational component and an evaluative component: it suggests that some state of affairs obtains and that this state of affairs bears positively on the agent’s cares and concerns and is conducive to their flourishing.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 667 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organiser

Drew Johnson, Hugo Ribeiro Mota and Harish Pedaprolu

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Austin Baker, Outgroup Disfluency

Talk by Austin Baker, Outgroup Disfluency

Time and place: Feb. 15, 2024 1:15 PM – 3:00 PM, GM 467 and Zoom

Abstract

Members of dominant social groups report experiencing frequent discomfort and anxiety during interactions with members of minority social groups, which can motivate avoidance and distrust. This talk will give an account of this phenomenon, which I term ‘outgroup disfluency’. My account of outgroup disfluency engages with the empirical literature on cognitive load—i.e., the amount of information that an individual is actively holding and manipulating in mind, heavily constrained by processing limitations of the working memory system. I argue that social interactions with outgroup individuals can increase cognitive load, triggering peoples’ paradigmatic experiences of outgroup disfluency. In sections 1 and 2, I’ll introduce outgroup disfluency and discuss psychological features of the phenomenon. In section 3, I’ll connect outgroup disfluency to political propaganda, arguing that certain types of propaganda are successful at influencing people to discriminate against marginalized groups because the messaging subtly motivates people to experience outgroup disfluency towards members of those groups. I conclude by discussing what I see are empirically promising interventions to outgroup disfluency, emphasizing the role of ability in de-biasing social interactions. I argue that people can learn to engage in less disfluent interactions with members of social outgroups through practice (interacting more with outgroup individuals) and/or humanizing exposure (typically through media—e.g., reading books and watching television shows and movies which humanize members of the outgroup).

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 467 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organiser

Drew Johnson, Hugo Ribeiro Mota and Harish Pedaprolu

2023

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Drew Johnson, A Radical Relativist Hinge Epistemology

Talk by Drew Johnson, A Radical Relativist Hinge Epistemology

Time and place: Dec. 7, 2023 1:15 PM – 3:00 PM, GM 467 and Zoom

Abstract

Hinge epistemology, a recent branch of epistemology inspired by Wittgenstein’s comments in On Certainty (1969, henceforth OC), maintains that rational evaluation in general is possible only because of certain commitments that are legitimately held though evidentially unsupported. The goal of this paper is to develop and motivate an under-explored option for hinge epistemology. This view, which I shall label ‘Radical Relativist Hinge Epistemology’ (or RR), combines epistemic relativism (following Ashton 2019a, b) with a radically non-evidentialist account of hinges role in epistemic evaluation. Whereas others have sought to weaken or avoid the apparent non-evidentialist and relativist leanings of hinge epistemology (Piedrahita 2021; Neta 2019), this approach fully embraces them, and argues that they are not as problematic as they might appear.

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Fintan Mallory, Computation in Generative Grammar

Talk by Fintan Mallory, Computation in Generative Grammar

Time and place: Nov. 23, 2023 1:15 PM – 3:00 PM, GM 467 and Zoom

Abstract

Many branches of cognitive science attempt to characterise human capacities as functions -- mappings from inputs to outputs -- that are computed by the brain. Both the linguist Noam Chomsky and the neuroscientist David Marr have claimed that generative grammar is such a function-theoretic or computational-level theory and this idea is widely held within generative linguistics. This paper will argue that generative grammar is not a computational level theory in this sense and that this is one of the reasons it has such difficulty integrating with other branches of computational cognitive neuroscience. After discussing some of the meta theoretic problems generative grammar faces, I will present an alternative way of understanding function-theoretic characterisations in cognitive science which looks at how we can decompose functions into their constitutive parts.

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Special Seminar: Political Argumentation Theory

This is an special seminar held by OMLET with invited researchers to discuss topics on Political Argumentation Theory.

Time and place: Oct. 23, 2023 3:15 PM – 6:15 PM, GM 467 and Zoom

Description

During this OMLET Special Seminar, we'll have three presentations by invited scholars on political argumentation theory. Our focus will be on what extremism is and how it affects argumentative exchanges, in what sense the assumption of universal argumentative norms and practices is both prevalent and problematic, and how we may understand deep agreements in contrast to deep disagreements from an argumentation theory perspective.

Program

15:15-16:15 CET / 8:15-9:15 UTC-5
Daniel Mejía (University of Windsor) ― Extremism and Argumentation
 
16:15-17:15 CET / 9:15-10:15 UTC-5
Tempest Henning (Fisk University) ― Argumentative Politeness Norms
 
17:15-18:15 CET / 10:15-11:15 UTC-5
Michael Baumtrog (Toronto MU) ― Deep Agreements
 

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Harish Pedaprolu, Attentional Conflicts

Talk by Harish Pedaprolu, Attentional Conflicts

Time and place: Oct. 12, 2023 1:15 PM – 3:00 PM, GM 652 and Zoom

Abstract

We often conflict with one another in terms of our perspectives.  This paper shall discuss and critique the accounts of perspectival clashes (which are conceptually much broader than merely attentional conflicts) developed by Elizabeth Camp, Iris Young, and Ege Yumusak. Camp’s Dispositional View, as Yumusak argues, fails to account for cases where two parties might have the same dispositions and yet clash in their perspectives. But Yumusak’s Agenda Theory of Perspectives faces a similar problem: two parties may ask the same questions (and thus have the same agenda) and yet clash in their perspectives. Young’s ‘Agenda’ view is similar to Yumusak’s view but is different in that while it acknowledges that perspectives may be ‘incommensurate’, it sees no sense in speaking of perspectives as ‘clashing’. All three accounts view perspectives in terms of dispositions of some sort. This paper shall argue there cannot be a thoroughgoing definition of perspectival dispositions without a definition of a clash in attentional activity. Attentional conflicts might be related, causally or otherwise, to disagreements in belief or values or in other mental attitudes. However, for analytical purposes, there needs to be a separate account of what attentional conflicts are. This paper aims to develop such an account by drawing on the question-under-discussion (QUD) literature. It will be argued that attentional structures map hierarchies of sub-questions with respect to a super-question under discussion. Two attentional structures conflict when they map different two different hierarchies of sub-questions and it is questionable whether the sub-question at the top of each hierarchy is individually entailed by the common super-question under discussion. Hence, in attentional conflicts, the discourse goal turns from settling the original and commonly shared question-under-discussion to settling the question of what sub-questions are legitimately entailed by the super-question.

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Special Seminar: Critical Political Epistemology

This is an special seminar held by OMLET with invited researchers to discuss topics on Critical Political Epistemology.

Time and place: Sep. 19, 2023 2:30 PM – 5:30 PM, GM 467 and Zoom

Description

During this OMLET Special Seminar, we'll have three presentations by early career and established scholars on critical political epistemology. This seminar has a explicit metaphilosophical motivation, as it adopts a critical stance towards political epistemology. For this reason, we will start the discussion on the danger of epistemic idealism. Then, we will move to understanding how epistemic labor, capital and redistribution relate to its material counterpart. Finally, we will end with a presentation on the concept of global hermeneutic domination.

This seminar was directly inspired by the Critical Political Epistemology Network, and we are happy to have one of its founders, Solmu Antilla, as part of the program.

Program

14:30-15:30 CET / 8:30-9:30 EDT
Matthew Shields (Wake Forest University) ― The Perils of Epistemic Idealism
 
15:30-16:30 CET / 9:30-10:30 EDT
Solmu Antilla (VU Amsterdam) ― Material and Epistemic Labor, Capital and Redistribution
 
16:30-17:30 CET / 10:30-11:30 EDT
Breno Santos (UFMT) ― Domination and recognition in the space of reasons

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Ethan Brauer, Types of Certainty

Talk by Ethan Brauer, Types of Certainty

Time and place: Sep. 14, 2023 1:15 PM – 3:00 PM, GM 652 and Zoom

Abstract

Certainty is generally agreed to come in degrees. I argue that it also comes in different types. Just as one can be fairly certain, highly certain, or absolutely certain, so one can be practically certain, empirically certain, mathematically certain, and so on. If being certain of P is having no reasons for doubting, then being empirically certain of P is having no empirical reasons to doubt P, and similarly for other types of certainty.

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Special Seminar: Perspectives in Philosophy of Mind

This is an special seminar held by OMLET with invited researchers from the Brazilian Philosophy of Mind community.

Time and place: June 20, 2023 2:00 PM – 6:00 PM, GM 467 and Zoom

Description
At OMLET, we're eager to bring international researchers into our group discussions. That's why we're excited to announce our first-ever special meeting, where we'll be joined by a diverse group of established and early-career scholars from Brazil's Philosophy of Mind community.

During this inaugural OMLET Special Seminar, we'll have the chance to delve into a variety of topics related to contemporary philosophy of mind. Our focus will be on cognition, intentionality, representation, and perception, and we look forward to exploring these themes from a range of different perspectives.

Program

14:00-15:00 CET / 9:00-10:00 BRT
Giovanni Rolla (UFBA) ― Do babies represent? On a failed argument for representationalism
In order to meet the explanatory challenge levelled against non-representationalist views on cognition, radical enactivists claim that cognition about potentially absent targets (i.e., higher cognition) involves the socioculturally scaffolded capacity to manipulate public symbols. At a developmental scale, this suggests that higher cognition gradually emerges as humans begin to master language use, which takes place around the third year of life. If, however, it is possible to show that pre-linguistic infants represent their surroundings, then the radical enactivists’ explanation for the emergence of higher cognition is defeated. In this paper, I critically assess experiments designed to show that pre-linguistic infants inherit (or develop very early on) representational abilities.
 
15:00-16:00 CET / 10:00-11:00 BRT
Jeferson Huffermann (UFRGS) ― The action-first approach to cognition in/and development: the dynamics of gendered development as a case study
Abstract TBA.
 
16:00-17:00 CET / 11:00-12:00 BRT
Sérgio Farias (UFRPE) ― A dual proposal of minimal conditions for intentionality
Naturalist theories of representation have been attacked on the grounds of being too liberal on the minimal conditions for intentionality: they treat several states that are not representational as genuine representations. Behind this attack lies the problem of demarcation: what are the minimal conditions for intentionality that a state should satisfy to be genuinely representational? What are the limits of intentionality? This paper develops a dual proposal to solve this problem. First, I defend the explanatory role criterion in order to assess proposals of minimal conditions for intentionality. I start by proposing the success pattern condition: a state represents a given external feature provided that there is a success pattern present in the behavioural output, and the system uses this state as a proxy for the presence of this external feature. However, this condition is not sufficient for minimal intentionality—there are both intentional and non-intentional success patterns. Another minimal condition is, hence, required to draw this distinction. I propose the constancy mechanism condition: a state is representational provided that the system employs a constancy mechanism in its production. The success pattern and constancy mechanism conditions jointly constitute the dual proposal for minimal intentionality. I argue that this proposal is explanatorily justified and, so, properly demarcates the limits of intentionality.
 
17:00-18:00 CET / 12:00-13:00 BRT
Eros Carvalho (UFRGS) ― An ecological approach to disjunctivism
In this paper I claim that perceptual discriminatory skills rely on a suitable type of environment as an enabling condition for their exercise. This is because of the constitutive connection between environment and perceptual discriminatory skills, inasmuch as such connection is construed from an ecological approach. The exercise of a discriminatory skill yields knowledge of affordances of objects, properties, or events in the surrounding environment. This is practical knowledge in the first-person perspective. An organism learns to perceive an object by becoming sensitized to its affordances. I call this position ecological disjunctivism. A corollary of this position is that a case of perception and its corresponding case of hallucination—which is similar to the former only in some respects—are different in nature. I show then how the distinguishability problem is addressed by ecological disjunctivism.

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Harish Pedaprolu, On The Very Idea of Attentional Disagreement

Talk by Harish Pedaprolu, On The Very Idea of Attentional Disagreement

Time and place: June 1, 2023 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 652 and Zoom

Abstract

The philosophical literature on disagreement has largely focused on conflicts of beliefs, values, credence ascriptions, and so on. Very scant philosophical attention has been paid to conflicts in attention. And yet, it is quite intuitive that we often conflict with each other (and within our own selves) essentially in terms of what we are paying attention to and how. The purpose of this paper is to illuminate such attentional conflicts.

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Sérgio Farias, Distal Content and Counterfactual Comparison: A Teleosemantic Solution to the Distality Problem

Talk by Sérgio Farias, Distal Content and Counterfactual Comparison: A Teleosemantic Solution to the Distality Problem

Time and place: Apr. 27, 2023 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 467 and Zoom

Abstract

Naturalist theories of mental representation are often criticized on the grounds of failing to give an account of the distal content of representational states. They fail to give a principled explanation for why the representational state represents the distal feature, rather than the proximal one. Among teleological theories of representation, informational teleosemantics is specially threatened by the distalitity problem. My goal in this paper is to save informational teleosemantics by developing a counterfactual-based solution for the distality problem.

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Adriana Alcaraz-Sánchez, I woke up with a blank mind: White dreaming and associated phenomena

Talk by Adriana Alcaraz-Sánchez, I woke up with a blank mind: White dreaming and associated phenomena

Time and place: Apr. 20, 2023 1:15 PM – 3:00 PM, GM 652 and Zoom

Abstract

White dreaming is a term used in dream research to describe the feeling upon awakening that one had a dream but cannot remember its content. This feeling is said to be about a “white” dream, or a dream with content we are unable to access. The predominant view on dream research is that white dreams are forgotten dreams; one did indeed have a dream which now one cannot remember (Cohen, 1972; Lewis et al., 1966). This view finds support from experimental studies finding similar physiological markers between white dreaming and reports of contentful dreams (Siclari et al., 2013, 2017). However, alternative proposals suggest that white dream may represent sleep experiences with different types of conscious content, such as low-quality or reduced content (Fazekas et al., 2018), or very minimal content (see Windt et al., 2016). Given these different proposals, we might think that white dreaming describes a spectrum of experiences (see Windt, 2021). In this paper, I accept the view of white dreaming as a heterogeneous construct that refers to different sleep experiences. Additionally, I propose an alternative explanation to explain white dreaming. It might be that some are not about any sleep experience at all, but just memory illusions. To that aim, I compare white dreaming to other similar waking experiences including feelings of knowing, feelings of familiarity, and mind blanking. 

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Drew Johnson, Belief Beyond Reason: A Radical Relativist Hinge Epistemology

Talk by Drew Johnson, Belief Beyond Reason: A Radical Relativist Hinge Epistemology

Time and place: Mar. 30, 2023 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 652 and Zoom

Abstract

Hinge epistemology comprises an exciting non-evidentialist approach to thinking about the structure of epistemic justification. Hinge epistemology takes inspiration from Wittgenstein’s enigmatic third masterpiece On Certainty (1969) (henceforth OC), especially the metaphor that “some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like the hinges on which those turn” (§341). Hinge epistemology has primarily been developed with the aim of dissolving the problem of radical skepticism. However, recent work has extended the field to application in the epistemology of perception, logic, and testimony (Coliva 2015), the epistemology of deep disagreement (Pritchard 2021; Ranalli 2018; Johnson 2022), epistemic injustice and bias (Boncampagni 2019), feminist epistemology (Ashton 2019), political epistemology (Ranalli 2022), conspiracy theory (Smith 2022) moral epistemology (Johnson 2019), and philosophy of religion (Pritchard 2012, 2022; Boncampagni 2022; Vinten 2022; Smith 2021).
 
The goal of this paper is to propose a novel version of hinge epistemology. I begin by providing a set of taxonomical questions and use them to distinguish between some prominent versions of hinge epistemology, due to Annalisa Coliva, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Duncan Pritchard, and Crispin Wright. The taxonomical questions I set out provide logical space for an alternative to the views countenanced. The main distinguishing feature of my proposed form of hinge epistemology is how it combines relativism about hinges with a radical non-epistemic account of how hinge commitments support ordinary epistemic practices. In brief, the idea is that it is part of the ‘logic’ of certainty that for any epistemic agent, she must hold some intellectual commitment(s) to a maximal degree of subjective certainty, and that for this very reason, those commitments must be rationally unsupported for that individual. Just which commitments are held to a maximal degree of subjective certainty is a matter of the role they play in the individual’s overall belief system, rather than an intrinsic feature of certain propositions or a matter of the domain of inquiry to which they belong. I also consider some of the main objections to hinge epistemology—the demarcation problem (Ohlhorst 2022), the ‘problem’ of relativism (see Piedrahita 2021 for discussion), and the epistemic leaching problem (McGlynn 2017)—and I argue that the radical relativist view is at least as well equipped as competitors to handle these objections. Finally, I highlight some applications of the radical relativist view in the epistemology of deep disagreement and epistemic injustice.

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Nicholas Allott and Ingrid Lossius Falkum, The U-shaped curve

Talk by Nicholas Allott and Ingrid Lossius Falkum, The U-shaped curve: why do 5-year-olds have more difficulty with figurative use than younger children?

Time and place: Mar. 16, 2023 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 652 and Zoom

Abstract

A puzzling feature of pragmatic development is the mixture of ability and difficulty pre-school children have with non-literal uses of language (e.g., metaphor, metonymy, irony, implicature). While children are in many respects expert communicators from early on and spontaneously produce both metaphors and metonymies, in interpretation they often have difficulty going beyond the conventional senses of words to arrive at the speaker’s intended meaning. In this theoretical paper, we discuss some recent experimental evidence that suggests that children’s performance on some non-literal language comprehension tasks follows a U-shaped trajectory, where older children seemingly perform worse than younger ones. This finding, if robust, promises to shed light on several issues in the development of pragmatics, and suggests a number of research questions. We outline some possible explanations for U-shaped curves in general, including i) real deterioration and subsequent improvement in an ability; ii) strategy change; iii) interference between mental systems; and iv) narrowing of focus driven by experience in a domain. We then outline some possible explanations for the apparent decline in children’s performance with figurative speech, including (a) increasing sophistication in pragmatic comprehension strategies; (b) increasing metalinguistic abilities, and (c) an increase in interest and/or ability with norms. We attempt to place these within the four categories, and we discuss how they may be connected. Finally, we discuss some broader implications of this finding for pragmatics more generally, including the influential view that literal and figurative utterances are processed the same way.

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Brad Saad, Implications of Simulations for Catastrophic Risks

Talk by Brad Saad, Implications of Simulations for Catastrophic Risks

Time and place: Mar. 2, 2023 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 467 and Zoom

Abstract

The reading is actually an excerpt from a report  on simulations and catastrophic risks. The selected material provides background on the simulation argument for the hypothesis that we're living in a computer simulation and then explores a type of intervention on catastrophic risks that is suggested by the simulation argument.  While the material is philosophical, the target audience for the report is people (not primarily philosophers) in research communities working on digital minds, making the long-term future go well, and reducing catastrophic risks.

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Drew Johnson, (At)tending to your needs: The function of attention and the evolution of sophisticated cognition

Talk by Drew Johnson, (At)tending to your needs: The function of attention and the evolution of sophisticated cognition

Time and place: Feb. 2, 2023 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 652 and Zoom

Abstract

This paper proposes an account of the role of attention in the evolution of cognition. I develop a ‘Needs-Based Account’ of the proper function of attention, according to which attention functions to channel cognitive resources towards the fulfilment of the individual’s needs. This account is contrasted with other prominent approaches, including Chris Mole’s Cognitive Unison Theory (2010), Wayne Wu’s Selection-For-Action view (2014), and Sebastian Watzl’s Organizational Conception (2017). The Needs-Based Account is motivated by its explanatory potential in accounting for the origins of the possibly distinctively human capacity for ‘detached factic thought’; the ability to represent states of affairs completely isolated from the cognizer’s environment and motivations. I also consider a possible objection: that the Needs-Based Account incorrectly predicts that mind-wandering (a form of detached factic thought) is a malfunction in attention.

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Błażej Skrzypulec, Space and the Limits of Perception

Talk by Błażej Skrzypulec, Space and the Limits of Perception

Time and place: Jan. 19, 2023 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 467 and Zoom

Abstract

In considerations about the spatial structures of sensory experiences an ‘Externality Thesis’ is commonly proposed according to which awareness of sensory boundaries is also an awareness that there is a space beyond these boundaries. For instance, in the case of vision, it is proposed that awareness of boundaries of the visual field is also an awareness that visual space is a part of a larger space. Similarly, it is believed that when having bodily sensations we are not only aware that something happens within the boundaries of our body, but also that the body is an object positioned in a larger space. The paper evaluates the Externality Thesis both in the context of vision and bodily sensations. More specifically, relying on mereotopological theories, it is shown that the notion of spatial boundaries is ambiguous as it encompasses various distinct ways in which entities may be connected by a boundary. It is argued that only some of these ways are able to support the Externality Thesis. In particular, it is claimed that while bodily boundaries of which one is aware in tactile sensations are such that the awareness of them provide support for the Externality Thesis, the analogous claim is not true about boundaries of the visual field.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 467 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organizer

Fintan Declan Mallory and Hugo Ribeiro Mota

2022

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Pål Antonsen, Second-person Narration

Talk by Pål Antonsen, Second-person Narration

Time and place: Dec. 1, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 652 and Zoom

Abstract

This paper is about an underexplored mode of expression called second person narration. As a way of storytelling, the second person pronoun primarily picks out a fictional protagonist, although the speech acts themselves are de te (`to you') and directed at the audience. The paper argues that second person narration is a viewpoint ``shifty'' phenomenon, akin to free indirect discourse and protagonist projection. We start with the assumption that when authors make fictional speech acts they only pretend to perform their genuine illocutionary counterparts. As an additional speech act, however, the audience are also invited to engage in a first-personal make-belief from the protagonist's point of view. Within the confines of this make-belief, `you' successfully picks out out the central fictional character by referential transmission.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 652 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organizer

Fintan Declan Mallory and Hugo Ribeiro Mota

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Austin Baker, The Prioritization of Social Stereotypes

Talk by Austin Baker, The Prioritization of Social Stereotypes

Time and place: Nov. 10, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 467 and Zoom

Abstract

Reflecting on the pervasiveness of discrimination throughout human history, it’s clear that stereotypes have a strong hold on us. But why? In this paper I argue that stereotypes occupy a privileged position in our cognitive architecture. Unlike other types of information, stereotypes are prioritized in judgment and decision-making. I present empirical work with Jorge Morales and Chaz Firestone in which we demonstrate how prioritized stereotype information can disrupt even basic perceptual judgments about stereotype-incongruent people (Baker, Morales, & Firestone 2019). This disruption causes interactions with stereotype-incongruent people to be experienced as disfluent, subtly motivating us to discriminate against them in virtue of their incongruent social identities.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 467 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organizer

Fintan Declan Mallory and Hugo Ribeiro Mota

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Victor Lange, Decentering

Talk by Victor Lange, Decentering

Time and place: Oct. 27, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 652 and Zoom

Abstract

Clinical psychologists describe decentering as the mental operation in which a patient ‘moves out’ of immersion in a mental state. This paper argues that decentering poses serious problems for a prominent group of philosophical theories of attention. This group takes attention and attention control to be the upregulation of a phenomenon’s influence on an agent’s cognitive processing. The selection for action theory is a prominent representative of this group. The present paper argues that the theory cannot account for the dynamics of detachment involved in decentering. To accommodate the phenomenon of decentering, the selection for action must be significantly altered. The paper formulates the needed revisions the theory must make. These revisions put pressure on the idea of the ‘many-many problem’ and the definition of attention control fundamental to the theory. The paper further argues that another prominent representative of the target group of theories of attention, namely the structure theory, faces problems. Decentering shows that the theory’s foundational idea of priority structures is implausible.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 652 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organizer

Fintan Declan Mallory and Hugo Ribeiro Mota

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Hugo Mota, Towards a social epistemology of attention

Talk by Hugo Mota, Towards a social epistemology of attention

Time: Oct. 13, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM

Abstract

There is no clear consensus on how we should understand deep disagreements, much less so on how they ought to be resolved. Intending to further advance this discussion, I gather resources from the philosophy of attention, thus developing the beginnings of a social epistemology of attention. My proposal is to establish a distinction between two cognitive dimensions of deep disagreements, i.e., the argumentative and the perspectival dimensions. The first is a propositional disagreement over structural commitments, while the second is a non-propositional disagreement regarding a clash in salience perspectives (Whiteley 2022), salience structures (Munton 2021), and specific characterizations (Camp, 2019). Even though this distinction applies to all kinds of deep disagreement, my focus is only on social deep disagreements, which are genuine, persistent, and collective disagreements over structural social issues. Relevant to this kind is Yumusak’s (2022) description of perspectival clashes. Her idea is that our being perspectival generates social contestations over matters of fact, judgments of value, and especially over what’s salient to each of us. To flesh out this concept, I present a current perspectival clash set at the Brazilian social, cultural, and political context.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 652 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organizer

Fintan Declan Mallory and Hugo Ribeiro Mota

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Fintan Mallory, Erotetic Injustice

Talk by Fintan Mallory, Erotetic Injustice

Time and place: Sep. 29, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 652 and Zoom

Abstract

Discursive activity, as a social practice, is subject to the influence of social power. While previous research on this issue has focussed primarily on the ability of speakers to have their knowledge claims taken seriously by their listeners, more recent work has concentrated on discourse structure itself. This has coincided with a theoretical shift from the level of the propositional and the doxastic to the pragmatic and subdoxastic. This paper continues this trend with the introduction and analysis of the category of erotetic injustice. Whereas testimonial injustice concerns the role prejudice plays in preventing a speaker from having their assertions accepted by listeners, erotetic injustice concerns speakers’ ability to have their questions taken up and used to guide discussion. ‘Question’, in this sense, denotes a particular information structure which can be added to the common ground and which constrains the immediate goals of the discussion, determining the relevance of speakers’ contributions. Questions structure our conversations, they fix what we are talking about and what our lines of inquiry might be, and as a result, whoever controls the question-under-discussion, controls the discourse. 

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 652 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organizer

Fintan Declan Mallory and Hugo Ribeiro Mota

Oslo Mind, Language and Epistemology Network Seminar: Joey Pollock, Epistemic bubbles and contextual discordance

Talk by Joey Pollock, Epistemic bubbles and contextual discordance

Time and place: Sep. 15, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 367 and Zoom

Abstract

Recent work in social epistemology has drawn attention to various problematic social epistemic phenomena that are common within online networks. Nguyen (2020) argues that it is important to distinguish epistemic bubbles from echo chambers. An epistemic bubble is an information structure that merely lacks information or sources that would be relevant or important to the user. An echo chamber is a structure in which dissenting opinions are, not necessarily absent, but actively undermined, for example by instilling attitudes of distrust towards their adherents. Because of this, echo chambers are thought to be especially difficult to escape. In contrast, according to Nguyen, it is supposed to be relatively easy to shatter an epistemic bubble: one simply introduces the missing information. In this paper, I argue that it is more difficult to shatter an epistemic bubble than has been recognised in the literature. The reason for this is the relationship between epistemic bubbles and interpretative resources. Despite their epistemic drawbacks, it is relatively easy to gain knowledge from sources inside one’s epistemic bubble; this is because agents within a bubble typically share many contextual assumptions. In contrast, it can be very difficult to gain knowledge from sources outside of one’s bubble because interlocutors on the outside are less likely to have the shared background beliefs and interpretative dispositions needed to facilitate communicative success. I argue that strategies for escaping epistemic bubbles that do not address this semantic challenge will be ineffective, and I end with some thoughts regarding how this should inform our understanding of the phenomenon of knowledge resistance.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 367 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organizer

Fintan Declan Mallory and Hugo Ribeiro Mota

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Andrew Lee, The Structure of Iconic Representation

Talk by Andrew Lee, The Structure of Iconic Representation

Time and place: June 16, 2022 11:45 AM – 1:15 PM, GM 652 and Zoom

Abstract

This paper develops a theory of iconic representation. We begin by examining prior proposals that appeal to the parts principle, according to which iconic representations are those where parts of the vehicle represent parts of the content. Then we develop our positive theory, according to which iconic representations are “locatively structured” collections of analog representations. We also explain how our theory identifies the relationship between the iconic and the analog, precisifies the notions of a functional space and functional part, and generates an interesting taxonomy of representational systems.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have an hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 652 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organizer

Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Anna Drożdżowicz , Auditory illusions in speech sound and voice perception

Talk by Anna Drożdżowicz , Auditory illusions in speech sound and voice perception

Time and place: May 19, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 652 and Zoom

Abstract

Hearing speech in a particular voice is one of the most common auditory experiences that humans have. What can we learn about the nature of auditory experiences of listening to speech sounds in a voice from auditory illusions? The paper addresses this question by looking at four cases of such illusions: (1) the temporal induction illusion in speech, (2) the phantom words illusion, (3) the McGurk illusion, and (4) the voice-over translation experience/illusion. A unified interpretation of evidence concerning (1)-(4) will be proposed. I will also discuss selected consequences for the epistemology of spoken language understanding.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have an hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 652 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organizer

Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Fintan Mallory, Semantic competence and social justice

Talk by Fintan Mallory, Semantic competence and social justice

Time and place: Apr. 21, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 206 and Zoom

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have an hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 206 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organizer

Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Mirela Fus, Disjunctivism Approach to Objects of Engineering in Philosophy

Talk by Mirela Fus, Disjunctivism Approach to Objects of Engineering in Philosophy

Time and place: Apr. 7, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM 213 and Zoom

Abstract

Recent discussion about the subject matter of the method of engineering in philosophy, that most prominently goes by the name of Conceptual Engineering, has produced a plethora of theories about different objects that this method targets or operates on. However, within the method of engineering in philosophy, these objects are, more often than not, seen as competitors rather than co-workers. In this paper, I work towards the most plausible subject matter approach to the engineering in philosophy. I argue that we should embrace Disjunctivism Approach to objects of engineering in philosophy over its two competitors: Singularism Approach and Pluralism Approach. Disjunctivism Approach accommodates two core assumptions about the objects of engineering in philosophy: (i) they count as philosophical objects, and (ii) what counts as a philosophical object can change. Finally, I outline some benefits of Disjunctivism Approach for the method of engineering in philosophy and beyond.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have an hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 213 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organizer

Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Francesca Secco, What are we doing when we are reading words?

Talk by Francesca Secco, What are we doing when we are reading words?

Time and place: Feb. 10, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, GM652 and Zoom

Abstract

When we read a list of words, are we doing it or is it something that just happens to us? On the one hand, according to what I call intention for actions theories, reading is something we can do intentionally and, hence, can be considered an action done by an agent. That is the case, for instance, when you are reading a novel, a newspaper’s article, or studying a chapter. On the other hand, reading seems to passively happen to us. It is sufficient that a word appears in front of us to make us read it. There is, in fact, extensive scientific evidence that reading takes place no matter of the agent’s intention. For instance, numerous studies on the Stroop task are the proof that reading is unavoidable. I will capture this tension between activity and passivity in reading by presenting the reading puzzle. In this puzzle, I will consider cases of simple reading, meaning those instances of reading in which the agent is dealing with single words and she isn’t required to involve further hermeneutic efforts. The way I take to solve the reading puzzle is challenging intention for action theories.  I will argue that if intention is necessary for a process to be active, then intention for action theories fail to account for such an important human activity as reading. This outcome leaves only two options: either we need to accept that simple reading is passive, or we can take this as an invite to investigate other ways in which a process can be active independently of the agent’s intention.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have an hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 652 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organizer

Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Yvonne Huetter, Subjectivity as Tool – Philosophy’s Interest in Strong Notions of Individual Subjectivity.

Talk by Yvonne Huetter, Subjectivity as Tool – Philosophy’s Interest in Strong Notions of Individual Subjectivity.

Time and place: Jan. 13, 2022 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, Zoom

Abstract

There is a well known tension in Rorty when it comes to our linguistic agency. Famously, Rorty follows Wittgenstein, Quine, Davidson and others in that there are no private languages. However, the innovator of our language in Rorty is an individual, the “strong poet”, who Brandom calls Rorty’s “genius self”. This tension in Rorty is well described and has been problematized many times and from various angles. Against the common compulsion to mitigate Rorty’s commitment to individuality and normative detachment, this article provides a rationale for what I will call Rorty’s “vocabulary of rupture” which follows a) from fully implementing Rorty’s particular version of antirepresentationalism and b) from taking temporality into account. As for a) once we embrace that words and theories do not represent the world as it is in itself but function to serve particular aims, there are contexts in which insisting on the possibility of normative detachment becomes interesting and worth pursuing. This is the case when the aim of writing is to motivate people to get engaged in democratic practices and to embark on creative endeavors. As for b) once we bring temporality into the game, we can switch between the Davidsonian perspectives of triangulation and radical interpretation and choose freely which perspective to favor for the moment of emergence of new vocabularies – the first or the third-person account of meaning.  

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. This meeting will take place on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organizer

Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Keith Wilson, Meeting Travis’s Challenge: How We Recognize the Contents of Experience.

Talk by Keith Wilson, Meeting Travis’s Challenge: How We Recognize the Contents of Experience.

Time and place: Oct. 28, 2021 1:15 PM – 2:30 PM, Room GM 652 and Zoom

Abstract

In ‘The Silence of the Senses’, Charles Travis sets out an argument against the philosophical and scientific orthodoxy that perceptual experiences have representational content. Though widely discussed, few representationalists have directly engaged with the substance of Travis’s arguments, which concern the availability of perceptual content for first-personal thought and reasoning, rather than its individuation or structure. In this paper, I set out a novel response to Travis’s Challenge that posits the existence of recognitional capacities that are distinct from, though systematically linked to, perceptual representation and the conceptual capacities that are operative in judgement. Crucially, such capacities are themselves shaped by successive exposure to perceptual stimuli over time, which in turn explains why perception and judgement share common or systematically related contents without overly constraining the kinds of properties that can be represented in perception. This fills an important lacuna in existing representationalist accounts, offering a philosophically and empirically plausible response to Travis’s Challenge.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have an hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 652 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organizer

Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco

2021

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Sebastian Watzl, What attention is. An identifying account.

Talk by Sebastian Watzl, What attention is. An identifying account.

Time and place: Dec. 2, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Room GM 652 and Zoom

Abstract

In this paper, I will draw a distinction between explanatory accounts of attention and identifying accounts. I will then use that distinction in order to (a) diagnose a common confusion in the science and philosophy of attention, (b) criticise some extant philosophical theories of attention, and (c) propose and defend an identifying account of attention. This account is not meant to be explanatory. And I believe it is uncontroversial, and – in a sense – hopefully everyone’s account of attention. I show why it is nevertheless important to articulate this account. It carves out an important topic of research and helps to coordinate between different fields of study. It also addresses a persistent worry in the science of attention regarding whether we really know what attention is. The upshot of this paper is that we have a unifying and uncontroversial identifying account of attention. With this account in clear sight we can connect the variety of fields that study attention, and indeed we can extend them. Let’s continue trying to understand how attention works and why it matters. We know what it is.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have an hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 652 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organizer

Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Joey Pollock, Do testimonial exchanges preserve content?

Talk by Joey Pollock, Do testimonial exchanges preserve content?

Time and place: Nov. 11, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Room GM 452 and Zoom

Abstract

The dominant view of the semantic dimension of testimony maintains both that (a) successful testimonial exchanges (either always or typically) preserve content and (b) the contents so preserved are rich enough to serve as appropriate objects of testimonial knowledge. In this talk, I draw on considerations from the debate between minimalists and Relevance Theorists in philosophy of language to argue that no notion of content can play both of these roles simultaneously. Thus, we must accept that testimonial exchanges are not often content preserving: the content that the hearer recovers is not (often) the same as the content that the speaker expressed.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have an hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 452 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organizer

Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco

Talk by Andrew Y. Lee, Degrees of Consciousness
 

Time and place: Sep. 17, 2021 2:00 PM–4:00 PM, Zoom

We are pleased to announce the following talk, jointly organised by the Forum for Consciousness Studies, the CBC project, and the Oslo Mind Group (OMG). Everyone is welcome!

Presenter: Andrew Lee (postdoc, UiO, website)
Title: Degrees of Consciousness 
Time: 17. September 2021, 14:00-16:00 
(40 min talk + Q&A)
Venue:  Zoom

Presenter Bio

Andrew Lee is a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Oslo, affiliated with the ConsciousBrainConcepts project. His research is on philosophical questions about conscious experiences. He’s particularly interested in questions about (1) how conscious experiences are structured and how to formally model that structure, and (2) the ethical significance of consciousness. In addition to philosophizing about consciousness, Andrew sometimes even has some conscious experiences of his own.

Abstract

Does consciousness come in degrees? If the answer is ‘yes’, then some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. If the answer is ‘no’, then such claims are either false or incoherent. In this talk, I'll (1) argue that the most prominent philosophical objection to degrees of consciousness doesn’t work, (2) develop an analysis of what it is for consciousness to come in degrees, and (3) apply the analysis to various theories of consciousness. I’ll argue that most theories yield the result that consciousness comes in degrees, though what exactly degrees of consciousness are varies across different theories. This means that claims about degrees of consciousness should be treated as substantive hypotheses open to confirmation and falsification, rather than as obvious truths or conceptual confusions.

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Kaisa Kärki, Autonomy of Attention

We will be discussing a draft of "Autonomy of Attention" by Kaisa Kärki.

Time and place: Sep. 16, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Room GM 207 and Zoom

Abstract

What precisely does a distraction threaten? An agent who spends an inordinate amount of time attending to her smartphone even though this behavior is against her own goals – what precisely is she lacking? In this paper I develop conceptual resources to answer these questions. I suggest that whereas agency of attention is an agent’s non-automatic decision-making on what she currently pays attention to, autonomy of attention is an agent, through her second-order desires, effectively interfering with her non-automatic decision-making on what she currently pays attention to. Freedom of attention is an agent’s possibility to hold or switch her focus of attention without fixating on any specific focus against her will or without forced or manipulated distraction from chosen foci. I will further argue that autonomy of attention requires some degree of attention capital, namely the agent’s understanding of how attention works, appreciation of the value of various attention-requiring tasks, her attention skills supported by her environment and her ability and motivation to develop and regulate them. This is because especially when attention is treated as a commodity, to regulate one’s attention according to one’s own values, what is in jeopardy and commodified has to be noticed, known, and valued. The conceptual work done helps detect attention-related freedom-deficits, which in turn provide conceptual resources to track various manipulations and coercions that diminish a person’s freedom of attention. This framework is useful when developing the moral and legal attention rights of citizens to protect them from various manipulations of attention when this kind of protection is perceived to be of value.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have an hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 207 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organizer

Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Andrew Y. Lee, Degrees of Consciousness

We will be discussing a draft of ‘Degrees of Consciousness’ by Andrew Y. Lee.

Time and place: Sep. 2, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, GM 452 and Zoom

Abstract

Does consciousness come in degrees? If the answer is ‘yes’, then it makes sense to say that some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. If the answer is ‘no’, then such claims are either false or incoherent. This paper (1) argues that the principal objection to the idea of degrees of consciousness conflates questions about degrees with questions about indeterminacy, (2) examines the semantics of ‘more conscious than’ expressions, (3) develops a general analysis of what it is for a degreed property to count as degrees of consciousness, and (4) applies the analysis to various theories of consciousness. I argue that most theories entail that consciousness comes in degrees, though what exactly degrees of consciousness are varies across different theories. This means that claims about degrees of consciousness should be treated as substantive hypotheses open to confirmation and falsification, rather than as obvious truths or conceptual confusions.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar. The meetings have an hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 452 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.

Organizer

Mirela Fus and Francesca Secco

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Mirela Fus, Evolutionary Debunking of Genericity

We will be discussing a draft of ‘Evolutionary Debunking of Genericity’ by Mirela Fus.

Time and place: June 4, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Zoom

Abstract

In her paper called ‘A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value’, Sharon Street (2006) argues against realist theories of value. In this paper, I consider the prospects of applying an analogous Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of genericity by offering a debunking argument against genericity drawing on a direct analogy with Street’s (2006) paper. In particular, I focus on generic statements such as “A tiger is striped” or “Muslims are terrorists” and look at the relation between generic judgments and independent generic truths expressed by generic statements posited by the realist about genericity. This paper makes a broader methodological point about the connection between realist theories about genericity and speakers’ judgments about generic propositions, based on the assumption that generic judgments have been indirectly yet significantly influenced by evolutionary forces.

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Erlend Owesen, ‘What-It’s-Like’ Talk is Technical Talk

We will be discussing a draft of ‘What-It’s-Like Talk is Technical Talk’ by Erlend Owesen.

Time and place: May 7, 2021 12:15 PM–1:30 PM, Zoom

Abstract

It is common to define or explain ‘phenomenal consciousness’ and its cognates as what it is like to be in a mental state. But philosophers disagree whether the ‘what-it’s-like’ phrase in this context should be understood as a technical phrase, i.e. a phrase the meaning of which is peculiar to a theoretical discipline or community. This paper argues that it is a technical phrase and thus that it does not mean what is meant by the phrase in ‘ordinary’ non-philosophical contexts. This has two important consequences. The first is that theorists should stop defining or explaining phenomenal consciousness in terms of what-it’s-like-ness. The second is that theorists owe us an explanation of what they mean by ‘phenomenal consciousness’ that does not appeal to what-it’s-like-ness.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar and will take place via Zoom. All are welcome to attend (Zoom login required).

Note: This seminar will start at the earlier than usual time of 12.15.

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the Oslo Mind Group Team, which is open to all University of Oslo members, or upon request from the organizer for non-UiO users (see below).

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Max Johannes Kippersund, Experiencing Ensembles: On the Limits of Perceptual Particularity

We will be discussing a draft of ‘Experiencing Ensembles: On the Limits of Perceptual Particularity’ by Max Johannes Kippersund.

Time and place: Apr. 23, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Zoom

Abstract

One very widespread assumption about visual experience, is what I call “Particularism”. Put roughly, this is the assumption that the only properties we experience in cases of veridical perception are properties of particular things located in the perceived scene, and the only relations we experience are relations between particular things in the visual field. I​n this paper I develop a novel argument against Particularism. Building on recent empirical results from perceptual psychology, I will argue that we can experience what the average property is for groups of similar objects in a range of different feature dimensions. For instance, we can experience which orientation is the average orientation for a group of tilted lines.

Importantly, this claim is in conflict with Particularism. The reason for this is that when we experience that a group of lines has a certain average orientation, the orientation in question is not the property of any particular thing located in the visual field. This should be clear when reflecting on the fact that a certain orientation can be the average orientation for a group of lines even if no particular member of the group, or the group itself for that matter, actually instantiates that orientation. Hence, when we experience what the average property is for members in a perceived group, we are sensitive to a relation between the group members and a property which is not the property of any particular in the visual field. And this is in conflict with Particularism.

The argument presented in this paper is significant at two different levels. At a first level, it addresses an inherently interesting question in itself about whether we are sensitive to average orientation, size, emotional expression and the like in experience or only in post perceptual judgment. At a second level, the argument has major repercussions for one of the central theoretical debates in the philosophy of perception, between Naïve Realism and Representationalism. Naïve Realism, unlike Representationalism, implies Particularism. Hence, the argument presented in this paper provides a new reason to adopt Representationalism, and constitutes a direct challenge to Naïve Realism.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar and will take place via Zoom. All are welcome to attend (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the Oslo Mind Group Team, which is open to all University of Oslo members, or upon request from the organizer for non-UiO users (see below).

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Andrew Lee, Knowing What It’s Like

We will be discussing a draft of ‘Knowing What It’s Like’ by Andrew Lee.

Time and place: Apr. 9, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Zoom

Abstract

This paper develops a degree-theoretic account of knowledge of what it’s like to have an experience. I argue that knowledge of phenomenal character varies along a spectrum from the more exact to the more approximate, and
that phenomenal concepts vary along a spectrum in how precisely they characterize what it’s like to undergo their target experiences. I motivate this degreed picture by appeal to limits in epistemic abilities such as recognition, imagination, and inference.
I argue that approximate knowledge of phenomenal character cannot be explained merely by appeal to determinable or vague phenomenal concepts. I discuss how phenomenal concepts that yield more exact knowledge of what it’s like to undergo their target experience are those that eliminate more “phenomenal possibilities”. And I explain how the resulting view challenges some common assumptions about the acquisition conditions, requirements for mastery, and referential mechanisms of phenomenal concepts.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar and will take place via Zoom. All are welcome to attend (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the Oslo Mind Group Team, which is open to all University of Oslo members, or upon request from the organizer for non-UiO users (see below).

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Erlend Owesen, Does the Brain Think?

We will be discussing a draft of ‘Does the Brain Think?’ by Erlend Owesen.

Time and place: Mar. 26, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Zoom

Abstract

It is commonplace in cognitive science to ascribe psychological predicates to the brain, i.e. to assert that the brain sees, feels, thinks, etc. This has prompted philosophical debate. On one view, the relevant locutions of cognitive scientists are nonsensical (Bennett and Hacker 2003, 2007). On a different view, they make perfect sense and report empirical truths about brains (Dennett 2007; Crane 2015; Figdor 2017, 2018). In this paper, I propose a novel view on which cognitive scientists’ locutions are figurative, with ‘brain’ referring to the human being. I compare it to other views and argue that it is a plausible alternative.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar and will take place via Zoom. All are welcome to attend (Zoom login required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the Oslo Mind Group Team, which is open to all University of Oslo members, or upon request from the organizer for non-UiO users (see below).

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Francesca Secco, Why is Creative Thinking Praiseworthy?

We will be discussing a draft of ‘Why is Creative Thinking Praiseworthy?’ by Francesca Secco.

Time and place: Mar. 5, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Zoom

Abstract

Creative thinking and its outcomes are widely appreciated in our society. Not only do we value novel ideas and intuitions, but we also praise the agents for their creative thinking. This practice is in tension with other traits of this activity. Creative thinking is open-ended and highly spontaneous. Indeed, many instances of creative thinking seems just to happen to the agent. If having new ideas is just a lucky circumstance, why should we praise the agent for having them?

I draw a parallel with moral theories to discuss what we need to justify the attribution of praise to an agent for her creative thinking. I consider the approach presented in deep self theories, and I suggest that agents can be held responsible for creative thinking in virtue of its connection with what they care about. With this idea in mind, I state the commitment principle. According to it, an agent should be held responsible for her creative thinking and praised for it, because she has the commitment necessary to gain the knowledge and the experiences needed to obtain that novel insight.

The commitment principle has the merit of accounting for the whole spectrum of creative thinking, independently of how much the agent is intentionally doing something, or how much she can control it. Accepting this principle means to acknowledge that there are spontaneous instances of creative thinking that depend on the agent’s character, interests, and past experiences, which set the conditions for them to happen in certain ways.

How to attend

This is a read-ahead seminar and will take place via Zoom. All are welcome to attend (Zoom account required).

The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the Oslo Mind Group Team, which is open to all University of Oslo members, or upon request from the organizer for non-UiO users (see below).

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Filippos Stamatiou, The Worry about Mental Luck

We will be discussing a draft of ‘The Worry about Mental Luck’ by Filippos Stamatiou of the University of Copenhagen.

Time and place: Feb. 12, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Zoom

Abstract

I argue for an epistemic, metaphysically independent, and generalisable version of Alfred Mele’s “worry about present luck”. Mele introduces present luck as a challenge for libertarian theories of free will. Present luck suggests that it is possible for an indeterministically free decision to be a matter of luck. Several philosophers have attempted to provide replies to the challenge posed by present luck, or to generalise the worry beyond libertarianism and into compatibilism.

Here, I take a different route. I present a version of the worry about present luck that focuses on the perspective of the agent. In this version, the physical world may differ, but the epistemic perspective of the agent remains unaffected. I call this the worry about mental luck. I argue that in cases of mental luck, agents are susceptible to a degree of epistemic luck about their own mental states, such that decisions are the outcome of a lottery from their perspective. Mental states that lay outside the perspective of consciousness, such as implicit biases, may be responsible for cases of mental luck. Importantly, the worry about mental luck does not depend on the metaphysical structure of the world, but rather, on the epistemic constraints of human psychology.

I finish the paper with a discussion about the importance of the worry about mental luck. The probability that any decision is subject to mental luck is low. However, its existence has alarming implications that undermine prominent theories of free will and moral responsibility.

How to attend

This ‘read-ahead’ seminar will take place via Zoom. All are welcome to attend.

A copy of the paper for discussion will be made available in advance via the Oslo Mind Group Team, which is open to all University of Oslo members, or upon request from the organizer for non-UiO users (see below).

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Keith Wilson, Perspectival Realism

We will be discussing a draft of ‘Perspectival Realism: The Perspectival Character of Perceptual Experience’ by Keith Wilson.

Time and place: Jan. 15, 2021 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Zoom

Abstract

Perception is characteristically an experience of how the world is here and now, from our particular embodied perspective. Consequently, when our perspective upon the world varies, it affects the qualitative or phenomenal character of experience. How are we to explain such variations? In this paper I examine how two leading views of the metaphysics of experience—intentionalism and Naïve Realism—account for the perception of perspectival features, such as relative spatial location, perspectival shape, lighting and other environmental conditions. In both cases, I argue, the resulting explanation fails to capture the distinctive contribution of perspectival features to the phenomenal character of experience. I then sketch an alternative view—perspectival realism, or perspectivalism for short—that develops some of Naïve Realism’s key insights to provide an intuitive and explanatorily adequate account of perceptual perspective and variation.

How to attend

This ‘read-ahead’ seminar will take place via Zoom. All are welcome to attend.

A copy of the paper for discussion will be made available in advance via the Oslo Mind Group Team, which is open to all University of Oslo members, or upon request from the organizer for non-UiO users (see below).

Organizer

Keith Wilson

2020

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Davide Zappulli, A Meta-Metasemantic Defence of the Kripke–Putnam Theory of Natural Kind Terms

We will be discussing a draft of ‘A Meta-Metasemantic Defence of the Kripke–Putnam Theory of Natural Kind Terms’ by Davide Zappulli.

Time and place: Dec. 11, 2020 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Oslo Mind Group Team

Abstract

I identify two central claims in the theory of natural kind terms proposed by Kripke and Putnam. The first is what I call ‘metasemantic externalism’, the idea that the meaning of natural kind terms is largely determined by mind-external and mind-independent factors. The second is the claim that the world is full of objective essences, which successful introductions of natural kind terms pick out and constitute sufficient and necessary conditions for kind-membership.

While the theory of Kripke and Putnam is a very popular one, it has been subjected to strong criticisms, especially coming from the philosophy of biology and chemistry in recent years. One central criticism of its opponents is that the theory is incompatible with how natural kind terms are treated in science. In this paper, focusing on biology, I argue that Kripke and Putnam’s theory can successfully respond to this objection.

My defense is based on a distinction between three distinct levels: the semantic level, the metasemantic level, and the meta-metasemantic one. I will start by defining these notions. Then, I will present the theory of Kripke and Putnam and the arguments moved against it. Having put all the pieces on the table, I will argue that the theory of Kripke and Putnam can respond to those objections. Finally, I will consider some objections to the proposed solution.

Note

This is a ‘read-ahead’ seminar and will take place via Microsoft Teams.

A copy of the paper for discussion will be made available in advance via the ‘Seminar’ channel of the Oslo Mind Group team, which is open to all University of Oslo members, or is available upon request from the organizer for non-UiO users (see below). All are welcome to attend.

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Anna Drożdżowicz, What About Reading?

We will be discussing a draft of ‘What About Reading?’ by Anna Drożdżowicz.

Time and place: Dec. 4, 2020 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Oslo Mind Group Team

Abstract

It has been argued that competent language users can have experiences of understanding linguistic utterances (e.g. Hunter 1998; Fricker 2003; Brogaard 2018; Longworth 2018). In recent years, the nature of such experiences has been the subject of heated discussions. Many of these philosophical debates have proceeded largely in abstraction from issues of the specific sensory modality (auditory or visual) to which linguistic utterances are presented, with some notable exceptions where the focus has been on experiences of understanding in spoken linguistic comprehension (e.g. O’Callaghan 2011).

Reading, despite being a pervasive and important form of linguistic comprehension, has not been systematically considered in this debate. Do sensory modalities involved in linguistic comprehension lead to experiences of understanding of a different or a similar kind? Is abstracting away from the import of sensory modalities a methodologically sound approach? The goal of this paper is to make progress on these questions by investigating differences and similarities between the cases of comprehending spoken and written linguistic utterances, with a special focus on reading. The results will be somewhat surprising.

After discussing some systematic differences between the two cases, I will present some evidence which could suggest that linguistic comprehension in both cases might result in experiences of understanding of (roughly) the same kind. I will explain what consequences these observations might have for the existing views in the debate about states of understanding.

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Sebastian Watzl, The Ethics of Attention

We will be discussing a draft of ‘The Ethics of Attention?’ by Sebastian Watzl.

Time and place: Nov. 6, 2020 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Oslo Mind Group Team

Abstract

Discussions regarding which norms, if any, govern our practices of forming, maintaining and relinquishing beliefs have come to be collected under the label “The ethics of belief”. Included in the ethics of belief are debates about how those normative issues relate to the nature of belief, whether belief formation is, for example, ever voluntary. The present talk concerns an analogous set of questions regarding our practices of attention. “The ethics of attention” thus concerns the discussion of which norms, if any, govern our practices of attention: what norms govern what we should attend to, how we should engage our capacity for attention, when we should begin and when we should stop to pay attention to something? Like the ethics of belief, the ethics of attention will connect those normative questions to issues regarding the nature of attention, what may or may not be subject to such normative pressures. Compared with rich, complex, and systematic investigation of the ethics of belief, the study of the ethics of attention is more or less undeveloped. This paper aims to begin to change that. Specifically, it shows that attention is an appropriate target for serious normative investigation and then classifies potential norms of attention along three dimensions: whether they are manner or object based, instrumental or non-instrumental, and whether its source is moral, prudential or epistemic.

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Andrew Lee, Is Consciousness Continuous?

We will be discussing a draft of ‘Is Consciousness Continuous?’ by Andrew Yuan Lee.

Time and place: Oct. 23, 2020 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Oslo Mind Group Team

Abstract

Consider your visual experience of a blue sky, your auditory experience of a rising pitch, or your temporal experience of an interval of time. A number of philosophers have contended that these kinds of conscious experiences have continuous (rather than discrete) structures. This paper first explains what it means to say that conscious experiences have continuous (versus discrete) structures. Then I argue that a better diagnosis of the aforementioned kinds of experiences is that they are contiguous, where this means roughly that adjacent values from one experiential domain map to adjacent values in another experiential domain. I explain why every experience that is contiguous must be discrete, and I argue that our introspective evidence favors the discrete theory rather than the continuous theory. Along the way, I use formal tools to precisify the notions of continuity, discreteness, and other relevant structural properties.

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Erlend Owesen, Eliminativism About Phenomenal Consciousness

We will be discussing a draft paper by Erlend Owesen on eliminativism about phenomenal consciousness.

Time and place: Oct. 9, 2020 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Oslo Mind Group Team

Abstract

This paper explores and defends eliminativism about phenomenal consciousness. First, I discuss what definition of consciousness both non-reductive and reductive realists can agree about in order to avoid verbal dispute, which identifies the target for eliminativism. Then I clarify the eliminativist position by addressing potential objections.

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Yvonne Hütter-Almerigi, The Moral Philosophy of Philosophy

Yvonne Hütter-Almerigi will be giving a talk on ‘Do You Value Topic-Continuity? The Moral Philosophy of Philosophy’.

Time and place: Sep. 25, 2020 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Oslo Mind Group Team

Abstract

The main argument of the paper is that Cappelen’s insistence on the category of “topics” and, more importantly, the insistence on topic-continuity, is motivated morally and strategically not semantically or theoretically more in general. When investigating what accounts for samesaying, topics, just as meaning, are not defined by content (Cappelen 141). Further, topics are metaphysically lightweight (Cappelen 138). topics (and topics), are defined pragmatically and as we go: Speakers talk about the same topic when we (and they) attribute they do. But why should we do that? Why should we aim for continuity and why should we think it is possible in general?

On a political and societal level, the answer Sally Haslanger gives, is that by insisting on continuity of concepts like marriage inferential uptake is smoothened and, therewith, we guarantee (political) power to our word. On the other hand, Rachel Sterken has argued that rupture and friction can have just as fruitful effects. Cappelen’s argument operates on a higher level of abstraction, yet, I think, the same strategic choice between continuity and rupture applies at the theoretic level. This is especially the case, if one assumes, as Cappelen does, that there is no limit to (his version) of conceptual engineering (Cappelen 194), and that, following Williamson, linguistic practices can hold together even in absence of a common creed that all participants endorse (Cappelen 63, 142). Why, then, invent the category “topics” which’s only job-description is to account for continuity in revision, if, on a theoretical level, we could perfectly do without it?

My answer is that topics serve the same pragmatic role at the theoretical level that they serve at the practical/political/societal level: Cappelen’s engineering of “conceptual engineering” aims for uptake and Cappelen chooses the road  of continuity which I will try to contrast with rupture. Strategically, I will argue, Cappelen exploits the lexical effects of “continuity”, “unity of inquiry”, and “exchange of ideas” in order to click with the group of people in the theoretical departments that he wants to be and remain friends with. Morally, when taking Cappelen’s commitment to continuity at face-value, I will argue, that it all hinges on what you think communication is, how you constrain “ideas”, and how high you value novelty. Sometimes rupture might (morally) be the better choice, also at the level of abstraction Cappelen is working on.

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar: Jonathan Knowles, Relationalism, Berkeley’s Puzzle, and Phenomenological Externalism

We will be discussing Jonathan Knowles’ paper on ‘Relationalism, Berkeley’s Puzzle, and Phenomenological Externalism’ (OUP, 2019).

Time and place: Sep. 11, 2020 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, Oslo Mind Group Team

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar (Online)

We will be discussing a draft of ‘Engineering Generic Judgements’ by Mirela Fus.

Time and place: July 10, 2020 2:00 PM–3:30 PM, Zoom

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar (Online)

We will be discussing a draft of ‘The Perception/Cognition Distinction’ by Anders Nes, Sebastian Watzl, and Kristoffer Sundberg.

Time and place: June 19, 2020 2:00 PM–3:30 PM, Zoom

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar (Online)

We will be discussing a draft of ‘The Bodily Theory of Pain’, by Erlend Owesen of the University of Cambridge.

Time and place: June 5, 2020 2:00 PM–3:30 PM, Zoom

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar (Online)

We will be discussing a draft of Max Kippersund’s paper on ‘Illusory Conjunctions, a New Puzzle for Naïve Realism’.

Time and place: May 22, 2020 2:00 PM–3:30 PM, Zoom

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar (Online)

We will be discussing a draft of Joey Pollock’s paper ‘Content Internalism and Conceptual Engineering’.

Time and place: May 8, 2020 2:00 PM–3:30 PM, Zoom

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar (Online)

We will be discussing a draft of Keith Wilson’s paper ‘Individuating the Sense(s) of Smell: Orthonasal and Retronasal Olfaction’.

Time and place: Apr. 24, 2020 2:00 PM–3:30 PM, Zoom

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar (Online)

We will be discussing a draft of Simon Høffding, Carlos Vara Sanchez and Tone Roald’s paper ‘Dufrenne and Dewey on Being Moved’.

Time and place: Apr. 3, 2020 2:00 PM–3:15 PM, Zoom

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar

We will be discussing a draft of Solveig Aasen’s paper on ‘Pictorial Content Structure in Drawings Coming to Life’.

Time and place: Mar. 6, 2020 1:00 PM–2:15 PM, GM 652

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar

We will be discussing the paper ‘How to Think About the Representational Content of Visual Experience’ by Michael Tye (2019).

Time and place: Feb. 28, 2020 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, GM 652

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar

We will be discussing the paper ‘The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling’ by Uriah Kriegel.

Time and place: Feb. 14, 2020 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, GM 452

Organizer

Keith Wilson

Oslo Mind Group Seminar

We will be discussing the paper ‘Debate on Unconscious Perception’ by Ian Phillips and Ned Block.

Time and place: Jan. 31, 2020 1:15 PM–2:30 PM, GM 652

Organizer

Oslo Mind Group

2019

Oslo Mind Group Seminar

Simon Høffding is presenting his paper ‘Not Being There: An Analysis of Expertise-Induced Amnesia’.

Time and place: Dec. 13, 2019 12:15 PM–2:00 PM, GM 652

Organizer

Oslo Mind Group

Oslo Mind Group Seminar

Max Kippersund is presenting his paper ‘On Seeing States of Affairs, and Why it is Explanatorily Prior to Seeing Objects’.

Time and place: Nov. 15, 2019 2:15 PM–4:00 PM, GM 652

Organizer

Oslo Mind Group