Abstract:
Considering the way in which the international order is currently organized, i.e., as a system composed of states which are ideally organized through international law, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are a particularly vulnerable group of individuals. The particularity of the situation of IDPs is that the responsibility for their protection falls exclusively on the state in which they are displaced, leaving the international community free from any burden. Bearing in mind that this is regardless of the state’s will and/or capacity to protect these individuals, in this paper I argue that the treatment of IDPs is a clear example of the prioritization of the principles of non-intervention and self-determination over human rights supported to some extent by international law. In addition to David Owen’s (2016) and Joseph Carens’ (2013) view that the refugee protection regime operates as a legitimizing force of the international order, I argue that the protection of IDPs should also be considered necessary for legitimacy. I claim that there seems to be no morally significant reason as to why some forcefully displaced persons (refugees) are worthy of protection, while others are not (IDPs). Nevertheless, there is a major obstacle to the protection of IDPs by the international community, namely, the strict conception of sovereignty that is usually referred to as the Westphalian model of sovereignty. I suggest that the only path to successfully overcoming this challenge and ensuring the protection of IDPs is to modify the ruling conception of sovereignty and develop a model where the principles of self-determination and non-interference are conditional, depending on the protection of the basic rights of individuals. There are at least four existing proposals which go in this direction: Francis Deng’s sovereignty as responsibility (1996), Eyal Benvenisti’s view of sovereigns as trustees of humanity (2013), Carmen Pavel’s (2014) model of divided sovereignty, and Evan Fox-Decent & Evan Criddle’s (2016) fiduciary model of sovereignty. I claim that political philosophers ought to at least consider the possible consequences of assuming such proposals. The alternative, that is, to continue with the Westphalian model of sovereignty, has proven to be insufficient to protect the rights of millions of individuals, especially of those who are neglected or persecuted by their state of origin and have different impediments to escape it.
Key words: sovereignty, internally displaced persons, international community, legitimacy, self-determination, non-interference.