Abstract:
This paper seeks to identify the possibility of Kant’s applied ethics vis-à-vis Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s (1714–62) version of it. Arguably, Kant excludes what we might now call applied ethics from his own ethics, claiming that it is merely ‘appended to the system [of ethics]’ (Metaphysics of Morals 6:469). Yet, when discussing the concept of friendship, a key concept to understanding how Kant conceives of the relationship between love and respect, Kant also articulates ‘special friendship’, where he argues that we are justified to love those who concern us more than others without contradicting the universality of the maxim of benevolence (Metaphysics of Morals 6:451). Kant scholars have discussed the topic of friendship but have largely failed to explain whether friendship directed towards a special human being – as opposed to friendship in the sense of the love for humanity – has any bearing on Kant’s critical philosophy (Baron 2002, Filippaki 2012). On the other hand, Baumgarten devotes a considerable part of his Ethica philosophica to what he calls ‘special ethics’ (Ethica philosophica §§400–500), which amounts to applied ethics in contemporary parlance. Under this category, Baumgarten discusses such topics as ‘help in passing life pleasantly’, ‘duties to nonhuman others’, and ‘duties regarding friends and those abandoned by friends’ (Ethica philosophica §§374–7, §§391–9, §§491–500), topics Kant would treat as belonging to appended ethics. Aiming to improve our understanding of Kant’s ethics by identifying what we may call Kant’s applied ethics, this paper elucidates what ‘special’ means for Kant’s ethics in light of Baumgarten’s conception of ‘special ethics’ in general and ‘special friendship’ in particular.