According to three considered judgments about well-being, a person’s welfare depends on (i) the valence of her experience, (ii) the degree to which her life resonates with her, and (iii) the extent to which she fulfills her potential. Theories of well-being have struggled to provide rigorous explanations that accommodate all three. Most either reject one of these judgments or introduce qualifying conditions that render their accounts indeterminate and resistant to practical application. The problem can be framed as a dilemma: theories of well-being must choose between sacrificing our considered judgments or the clarity required for practical guidance. The aim of this article is to show that standard versions of the three most influential theories are impaled by one of the horns of this dilemma, and to diagnose the source of the problem. In doing so, I draw attention to an undertheorised form of explanation that integrates phenomenological, conative and teleological elements in a unified account which has the potential to overcome the dilemma.
Paal Fredrik S. Kvarberg is a PhD candidate in philosophy at IFIKK.