Practical Philosophy Seminar: Paal Kvarberg

Structural concentrations of power, ideological distortion, and institutional inertia may render ordinary deliberative channels unresponsive to grave and urgent problems, and in such cases political activism that contradicts ordinary moral, legal, and democratic norms may be permissible, and even required. This article extends the ideas underlying the classical account of civil disobedience into a general view on the requirements and limits of political action. It identifies three conditions whose degree of satisfaction determines the strength of the reasons bearing on action, to be interpreted in the light of public reason. First, the moral gravity of the problem addressed. Second, the effectiveness and necessity of the proposed course of action. And third, the cost of the action, including harms to innocent bystanders and structural undermining of legal and democratic norms and institutions. The resulting view is more permissive than liberal and communicative conceptions of the classical account, yet imposes limits on uncivil resistance that are lacking in recent permissive accounts. I illustrate the view by considering Andreas Malm’s case for strategic sabotage of fossil-fuel infrastructure to accelerate the green transition by coercive means.