Previous Practical Philosophy Working Group

2024

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Allan Sæther Thommessen

"Expanding sexiness"

Time and place: Nov. 14, 2024 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

There are plenty of sexual actions that we consider unethical. However, when it comes to sexual attractions, opinions vary. We agree that for instance pedophilia or racial sexual preferences are ‘bad’ in some way, but it’s possible to oppose them being labelled ‘unethical’. One argument for such a position is that no choices are involved in the formation of sexual attractions. If this is true, philosophy would have a very limited ability to effect change in these areas. The issue becomes even more pressing when we consider widespread, secondary problems influenced by certain sexual attractions. Some people receive too much sexual attention, while others feel sexually invisible. In this presentation, which is a snapshot of the first chapter of my master’s thesis, I build the case that ethics does apply to sexual attraction. This is done by raising epistemological issues of categorization and feminist objections to naturalist claims. The further chapters will present some historical issues with normative arguments in sexual attraction, and point out that they share an emphasis on restriction. At the end I will sketch one possible alternative approach, centered on expansion.

Allan Sæther Thommessen is an MA student at IFIKK.

Organiser

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Hugo Ribeiro Mota (UiO)

"The Social Epistemology of International Mediation"

Time and place: Nov. 7, 2024 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

This presentation draws from a draft of a project proposal on applied epistemology centered on International Mediation. The aim of the project is to use the tools from social/political epistemology to analyze and, whenever needed, improve the field of International Mediation at three levels: Institutional level (e.g. education and training of mediators); Theoretical level (e.g. the normative foundations of mediation); Practical level (e.g. the practice of mediation). Although there are critical accounts of international mediation available, to the best of my knowledge, none use the social epistemology framework explicitly. There are some accounts from political philosophy, applied ethics, and the peace studies field itself. This project should provide a systematic understanding of the political, theoretical and practical aspects of international mediation that complements other critical accounts rather than debunk or disprove them. This understanding aims to provide improvements regarding the structure of peacemaking institutions, the guidelines instructed to mediators, and the epistemic and communicative frameworks employed by practitioners in the field. Therefore, the project has both an analytical and applied scope. Although the project has an explicit critical view of international mediation, this does not entail a rejection or dismissal of it. On the contrary, the goal is to identify and contribute to solutions to new and already established issues. An important secondary goal of the project is to incentivize more interdisciplinary collaboration from the Humanities (especially Philosophy) with Peace Studies and Peacemaking Institutions, as their mandates and tasks are extremely valuable and urgent to world-keeping in a broad sense.

Hugo Ribeiro Mota is a PhD candidate at IFIKK.

Organiser

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Alejandra Mancilla and Vincent Seffinga (UiO)

From global leftovers to "planetary commons"?

Time and place: Oct. 24, 2024 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Theories about the importance of the global commons and the need to protect them have become ubiquitous in different academic disciplines. In practice, however, the delimitation of the global commons leaves much to be desired. Inexistent as a legal concept, the global commons are whatever is left beyond states’ national jurisdictions and have been subject to continuous shrinking as technology improves and demand for resources increases. At the same time, earth systems sciences and climate sciences have been showing us the importance that certain parts of the planet that cut across national jurisdictions play in keeping the earth relatively stable for human habitation—what Johan Rockström et al. have called the “the planetary commons”.

In this article, we start by giving an overview of how the concept of the global commons generally gets defined in international law and political theory, mixing empirical and normative considerations. We then identify three entrenched biases that frame these definitions: methodological nationalism, methodological anthropocentrism, and methodological extractivism. As long as these continue to underpin the frameworks meant to define and govern the commons, the issues of inadequate environmental protection and preservation and of socio-economic inequality will remain. Ultimately, what seems necessary is to move beyond these biases towards a more functional understanding of territorial jurisdiction that does justice to places of planetary importance.

Alejandra Mancilla is professor of philosophy at IFIKK and PI of the project “Dynamic Territory”.

Vincent Seffinga is a research fellow at IFIKK, working in the project “Dynamic Territory”.

Organiser

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Anna Smajdor (UiO)

"Ethics and synthetic DNA"

Time and place: Oct. 17, 2024 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

DNA has occupied a special place in the popular imagination as ‘the building block of life’ since it was first discovered [1]. As well as being what makes us human, it is widely assumed that DNA also makes us the unique individuals that we are [2]. When we reproduce, it is DNA that makes us the parents of our offspring [3]. Moreover, DNA is revealing. It tells us things about each other [4]. It enables us to identify who has been at a particular place [5], who is related to whom [6], what diseases an individual may be predisposed to [7], what sex they are, and their ethnicity [8]. Ordinarily we expect this information to be safely locked up in our cells. But scientists are now able to generate chains of DNA through the systematic joining together (concatenation) of single nucleotides (A, T, G, C). To date, only genomes from bacteria and small eukaryotic organisms have been constructed from synthetic DNA (hereafter “synDNA”). However, it is feasible that scientists will have the ability to concatenate full mammalian chromosomes and even genomes. In this paper, I examine the implications of DNA synthesis and its potential to disrupt common understandings of identity, health, reproduction, and privacy that are still prevalent in the public domain and in some areas of policy making. redundant. As it turns out, there are commitments in Leibniz’s metaphysics that diminish the role not only of hope, but even of heaven and beatitude. Although this tendency sets Leibniz apart from the Augustinian-Lutheran strain of Christianity, it reflects a tension that is inherent in Christianity itself, namely one between hope and faith.

Anna Smajdor is professor of philosophy at IFIKK.

Organiser

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Zsolt Kapelner (IFIKK, UiO)

The ethics of agenda setting

Time and place: Sep. 26, 2024 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Agenda setting occurs when in a context of decision-making some agents influence what items other agents consider and in what order, i.e., their agenda. Agenda setting is a widespread phenomenon. The agenda setting effect of media on public discourse has long been established by social scientists. Experts, interest groups, and civil society actors can influence the agenda of policymakers and legislators. But agenda setting is even more ubiquitous; doctors set their patients agenda about their healthcare, teachers set students’ agenda about their studies, managers can set their team-members agenda for work, and so on. Agenda setting matters greatly. By keeping items on or off, high or low on, our agenda, agenda setters can facilitate or even force some decisions over others without directly interfering with our choices. Given the immense power of agenda setters, agenda setting is often seen with suspicion, as a potential source of domination. However, agenda setting is an indispensable element of our social epistemic life. It is often both unfeasible and undesirable to eliminate agenda setting effects. For whatever its risk, appropriate agenda setting confers immense benefits compared with being left to one’s epistemic devices. But this raises the question of what it means for an agenda to be set appropriately. That is, if one is justifiably in an agenda setting position, how should one use one’s agenda setting power? What are the ethical goals and constraints that should govern the activity of agenda setting? In this paper I outline a theory of the ethics of agenda setting. I argue that agenda setters ought to promote choice that is both beneficial – to the chooser and to others – and autonomous; however, autonomy does not demand that agenda setters show complete deference to choosers’ judgements, i.e., set their agenda in a way they would have set it for themselves. Legitimate agenda setters can’t force choosers to make the choices they ought to make, but they have limited discretion to ensure that they face the choices they ought to face.

Zsolt Kapelner is a postdoctoral research fellow at IFIKK.

Organiser

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Fredrik Dybfest Hjorthen (ARENA, UiO)

"Due process and discrimination. A normative analysis of (un)principled justification in NAV"

Time and place: May 23, 2024 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: In recent years, the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV) has been at the center of scandal and controversy. One reason for this is the well-documented failure to provide sufficient justification for decisions. Assuming that there is a right to justification, this is problematic in and of itself. But it is also true that people are differentially affected by this problem. Arguably, poor justifications disproportionately affect people who lack the administrative, legal, technical, and medical nous required to understand decisions and to formulate appeals without the requisite guidance from a properly formulated justification. In this paper, I investigate whether NAV’s practice of providing clients with inadequate justifications amounts to wrongful discrimination. I argue that NAV’s practice can constitute both direct and indirect discrimination, but that this turns on answering key questions about group membership.

Fredrik is a researcher in the project Rule of Law in NAV: Principled Justification (RETTS) at ARENA Centre for European Studies (UiO).

Organiser

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Patrick J. Winther-Larsen (University of St. Andrews)

“Untimely Blame: Vulnerability and Other Contextual Features”

Time and place: May 2, 2024 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: For this work-in-progress talk, I’ll explore whether certain contextual features can undermine the propriety of otherwise fitting instances of blame. In essence, I’ll argue that blame can be expressed at the ‘wrong’ time, which I call ‘untimely blame’. I’ll focus on two types of cases: the first involves the blamer failing to consider the vulnerability of the wrongdoer (i.e., the target of blame). Less abstractly, consider cases where an agent has committed a wrongdoing, and is thus blameworthy, but they receive bad medical news or suffer a bereavement sometime following the relevant wrongdoing. In light of their vulnerability, it seems it is sometimes inappropriate to blame them while they are in this state, which may in some cases be permanent. Subsequently, I’ll consider cases where the circumstances under which blame is issued are more ‘pressing’ than the relevant wrongdoing. In contrast to cases of vulnerability, blaming someone at a wedding (or some other positive event) seems inappropriate because it would spoil the target’s good mood. With respect to vulnerability, I’ll address two objections: the first has it that this type of untimely blame is reducible to disproportional blame, while the second has it that this constraint is too epistemically demanding.

Patrick J. Winther-Larsen is a PhD student in philosophy at the University of St Andrews. His area of specialization is moral responsibility and the main topic of his dissertation is the ethics of third-party blame. Other research interests of his include the ethics of forgiveness, praise, protest, grandstanding, and related phenomena.

Organiser

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Anna Smajdor (UiO)

"In-vitro fertilisation (IVF) as a person-generating intervention:

is it ethically permissible?"

Time and place: Apr. 18, 2024 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: Since the publication of the Warnock Report 40 years ago, philosophers have deliberated extensively about the moral status of the embryo, the nature and scope of reproductive rights, the non-identity problem in relation to fertility tratments, and the degree to which access to IVF should be state-funded. Yet the status of IVF as a treatment for infertility has not itself been fully problematised. The fact that reproductive technology can fulfil the wishes of people other than infertile heterosexual couples, has become increasingly clear. The interests that motivate these requests go beyond what we would normally expect from the paradigmatic ‘infertile couple’ that the Warnock committee envisaged, and beyond even the ‘marginal’ cases such as single women and same sex couples, that were regarded at the time as being potentially problematic. In this paper I ask what IVF is, what kind of needs or interests it satisfies, and to what extent these needs or interests are the proper domain of medicine per se. I argue that IVF is best understood as a ‘person-generating’ intervention, undertaken in order to fulfil specific relationship aspirations held by those who seek treatment. I suggest that person-generation is inherently morally problematic, regardless of the relationship need it aims to fulfil. I show this, by demonstrating that the same arguments and criteria that are drafted in to uphold the notion that IVF is acceptable in the case of involuntary childlessness, can be used to support the case for person-generation for the fulfilment of other relationship aspirations. Such aspirations might include: friendship; sexual partnership; family relationships other than that of parent-child

Anna Smajdor is professor of philosophy at IFIKK.

Organiser

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Franco Trivigno (IFIKK, UiO)

"Friendship and well-being"

Time and place: Apr. 4, 2024 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: Friendship plays an interesting role in debates in value theory. There is a shared consensus in the psychological and philosophical literature that friendship contributes substantially to well-being, but much disagreement about how exactly it contributes. In moral philosophy, theories that do not recognize the value of friendship or the legitimacy of the obligations that friendship entails are often thought to be thereby deficient. Eudaimonism seems well-placed to be able to explain both the prudential value of friendship and to accommodate its norms into a conception of the ethically good life. But how exactly does friendship contribute to well-being on eudaimonist theories? Is its value ultimately derivative, dependent on the value of virtue? In this paper, I propose to sketch three distinct ways in which friendship contributes to well-being: indirectly, as the beneficiary of our friend’s virtuous actions; directly, as agent of benefit for our friends; and substantively, as mutually reinforcing values and the joint subjects of well-being.

Franco Trivigno is professor of philosophy at IFIKK.

Organiser

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Torbjörn Tännsjö (University of Stockholm)

"From Despotism to Democracy:

How a World Government Can Save Humanity"

Time and place: Mar. 18, 2024 12:15 PM – 2:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: Global existential problems are facing humanity. The only way to solve them is to rely on global legislation. I have earlier argued, in my book Global Democracy, that it must take the form of a global democracy. This is still desirable and a reasonable goal in the long run. However, time is short. Action is needed immediately. The reason that it must take the form of global legislation has to do with the tragedy of the commons. Sovereign nation states, each one driven by egoistic motives, are incapable of finding a joint solution. A typical problem is global heating. Global heating just like the prospects of an all-out nuclear war, or terrorists spreading deadly and highly contagious viruses, poses an existential threat to humanity. However, global heating is special in that it comes with a timeline. This means that it renders political action at some (last) point possible. There is no guarantee that necessary action will be forthcoming, and we should also consider the possibility that we fail. However, a global despotic government may save us. The establishment of such a government need not threaten existing national democracies (nor existing national despotisms) but it will deprive them of their sovereignty. Global democracy as a long-time goal will remain.

Torbjörn Tännsjö is professor at the University of Stockholm.

Organiser

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Bryan W. Van Norden (Vassar College)

“‘Like Loving a Lovely Sight’: Weakness of Will in Confucian Philosophy”

Time and place: Mar. 14, 2024 12:15 PM – 2:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: The Confucian classic the Great Learning states that one must hate evil “like hating a hateful odor” and love the good “like loving a lovely sight.” These metaphors played a central role in Chinese debates over the possibility of “weakness of will”: doing what you know is wrong. In this talk, I explain how the great Confucians Zhu Xi (12th century CE) and Wang Yangming (16th century CE) appealed to these same metaphors to defend contradictory conclusions in their argument over the relationship between moral knowledge and action.

Bryan W. Van Norden is James Monroe Taylor Chair in Philosophy at Vassar College (USA), and Chair Professor in the School of Philosophy at Wuhan University (China). A recipient of Fulbright, National Endowment for the Humanities, and Mellon fellowships, Van Norden has been honored as one of The Best 300 Professors in the US by The Princeton Review. Van Norden is author, editor, or translator of ten books on Chinese and comparative philosophy, including Taking Back Philosophy: A Multicultural Manifesto (2017), and Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy (2011). He has also published several featured op-eds in the New York Times, and written a Ted-Ed video on Confucius that has been viewed over a million times. Books and articles by or about him have been translated into Arabic, Chinese, Danish, Farsi, German, Korean, Portuguese, Spanish, and Turkish. Van Norden’s hobbies are poker (he has played in the World Series of Poker in Las Vegas) and video games.

Organiser

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Paal Fredrik Skjørten Kvarberg (UiO)

"Naturalistic Eudaimonism: Scientific Reconstruction of the Aristotelian Conception of Well-being"

Time and place: Mar. 7, 2024 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract:

In this paper, I develop and defend a naturalistic theory of well-being along the lines suggested by Aristotle. According to this idea, the conceptual structure of well-being track patterns of natural normativity that permeate the domain of life along the functional joints of nature. In one interpretation of the idea, it is intrinsically good for living beings to flourish in the sense of fulfilling and integrating their nature throughout life. Due to a number of concerns, contemporary proponents of the idea reject naturalistic interpretations of it. The chief concern is that a theory of well-being grounded in natural kind properties postulated by empirical sciences is likely to contradict our considered convictions regarding the meaning of well-being. In this article, I consider three influential forms of argument based on that concern. Through engagement with these arguments, I develop a scientific sort of Aristotelian naturalism that is compatible with a modern scientific worldview, and consistent with the premises to the most important objections to it. My conclusion is that the Aristotelian approach to ground well-being in nature has a lot of unexplored potential, and is a live alternative to subjective explanatory theories of well-being.

Organiser

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Marcus Holst-Pedersen (IFIKK, UiO)

"What should workplace democracy be?"

Time and place: Feb. 29, 2024 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: The concept “workplace democracy” points to a democratic organisation of the workplace, but how should we practically organise it? Questions like: who should be the “demos” (people), what should be decided upon, and how comprehensive should participation be, are all important in forming a workplace democracy that contributes to a better society. I will argue that we ought to include all stakeholders (not shareholders) into the democratic processes, to counteract dominance of those depending on the workplace. Further, I will argue that all decisions should in some way be democratically anchored, even the broader aims of the workplace. Finally, I will argue that a high level of participation is preferable, both because I see participation and self-governance as goods in a community (normative argument), and because it fosters participation in broader society (descriptive argument).

Organiser

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Åsne D. Grøgaard (IFIKK, UiO)

“The Unimportance of Hope in Leibniz’s Philosophy”

Time and place: Feb. 1, 2024 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: Is there need—or even room—for hope in the best of all possible worlds? This paper makes a case against the importance of hope in Leibniz’s philosophy. Contrary to what has been claimed by recent commentators, Leibniz should not be counted among the philosophical proponents of hope. I argue, firstly, that there are insufficient textual grounds for making ‘hope’ a central concept in Leibniz’s philosophical apparatus. Secondly, and more importantly, I argue that Leibniz’s brand of optimism makes hope theologically redundant. As it turns out, there are commitments in Leibniz’s metaphysics that diminish the role not only of hope, but even of heaven and beatitude. Although this tendency sets Leibniz apart from the Augustinian-Lutheran strain of Christianity, it reflects a tension that is inherent in Christianity itself, namely one between hope and faith.

Åsne D. Grøgaard holds a DPhil in Philosophy from the University of Oxford (2024). Her research focuses on G.W. Leibniz’s philosophy of religion.

Organiser

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Ludvig Beckman (Stockholm University)

"The boundaries of democracy"

Time and place: Jan. 18, 2024 12:15 PM – 2:00 PM, GMH 652

Abstract:

This book provides a general theory of democratic inclusion for the present world. It presents an original contribution to our understanding of the democratic ideal by explaining how democratic inclusion can apply to individuals in a variety of contexts: the workplace, social clubs, religious institutions, the family, and, of course, the state. The book explores the problem of democratic inclusion, what it means to be subject to de facto authority, how this conception translates into legal systems, and the relationship between territorial claims by the state, and law’s claim to legitimate authority.

Ludvig Beckman is professor in the Department of Political Science at Stockholm University.

Organiser

Practical Philosophy Group

2023

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Anna Wienhues

"Sustainability and Habitat Rights"

Time and place: Nov. 30, 2023 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: 

In this presentation, I compare how theorising from sustainability and integrating sustainability ex-post in non-anthropocentric theories of just conservation differ from each other. I thereby argue for the former approach by engaging the example of habitat rights as a recent area of philosophical debate which can be understood as contributing to non-anthropocentric accounts of just conservation. In this context, not all non-anthropocentric accounts of justice are as good as others with respect to their theoretical potential to integrate and take seriously the dynamic nature of sustainability. Ultimately this implies that I argue from within a non-anthropocentric perspective against the current dominant animal rights approach in political thought in favour of starting from sustainability.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Toshiro Osawa (UiO)

"Kant, Baumgarten, and Applied Ethics"

Time and place: Nov. 23, 2023 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: 

This paper seeks to identify the possibility of Kant’s applied ethics vis-à-vis Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s (1714–62) version of it. Arguably, Kant excludes what we might now call applied ethics from his own ethics, claiming that it is merely ‘appended to the system [of ethics]’ (Metaphysics of Morals 6:469). Yet, when discussing the concept of friendship, a key concept to understanding how Kant conceives of the relationship between love and respect, Kant also articulates ‘special friendship’, where he argues that we are justified to love those who concern us more than others without contradicting the universality of the maxim of benevolence (Metaphysics of Morals 6:451). Kant scholars have discussed the topic of friendship but have largely failed to explain whether friendship directed towards a special human being – as opposed to friendship in the sense of the love for humanity – has any bearing on Kant’s critical philosophy (Baron 2002, Filippaki 2012). On the other hand, Baumgarten devotes a considerable part of his Ethica philosophica to what he calls ‘special ethics’ (Ethica philosophica §§400–500), which amounts to applied ethics in contemporary parlance. Under this category, Baumgarten discusses such topics as ‘help in passing life pleasantly’, ‘duties to nonhuman others’, and ‘duties regarding friends and those abandoned by friends’ (Ethica philosophica §§374–7, §§391–9, §§491–500), topics Kant would treat as belonging to appended ethics. Aiming to improve our understanding of Kant’s ethics by identifying what we may call Kant’s applied ethics, this paper elucidates what ‘special’ means for Kant’s ethics in light of Baumgarten’s conception of ‘special ethics’ in general and ‘special friendship’ in particular.

Practical Philosophy Seminar:

"The refugee protection regime and the legitimacy of the international system"

Time and place: Nov. 16, 2023 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: 

Considering the way in which the international order is currently organized, i.e., as a system composed of states which are ideally organized through international law, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are a particularly vulnerable group of individuals. The particularity of the situation of IDPs is that the responsibility for their protection falls exclusively on the state in which they are displaced, leaving the international community free from any burden. Bearing in mind that this is regardless of the state’s will and/or capacity to protect these individuals, in this paper I argue that the treatment of IDPs is a clear example of the prioritization of the principles of non-intervention and self-determination over human rights supported to some extent by international law. In addition to David Owen’s (2016) and Joseph Carens’ (2013) view that the refugee protection regime operates as a legitimizing force of the international order, I argue that the protection of IDPs should also be considered necessary for legitimacy. I claim that there seems to be no morally significant reason as to why some forcefully displaced persons (refugees) are worthy of protection, while others are not (IDPs). Nevertheless, there is a major obstacle to the protection of IDPs by the international community, namely, the strict conception of sovereignty that is usually referred to as the Westphalian model of sovereignty. I suggest that the only path to successfully overcoming this challenge and ensuring the protection of IDPs is to modify the ruling conception of sovereignty and develop a model where the principles of self-determination and non-interference are conditional, depending on the protection of the basic rights of individuals. There are at least four existing proposals which go in this direction: Francis Deng’s sovereignty as responsibility (1996), Eyal Benvenisti’s view of sovereigns as trustees of humanity (2013), Carmen Pavel’s (2014) model of divided sovereignty, and Evan Fox-Decent & Evan Criddle’s (2016) fiduciary model of sovereignty. I claim that political philosophers ought to at least consider the possible consequences of assuming such proposals. The alternative, that is, to continue with the Westphalian model of sovereignty, has proven to be insufficient to protect the rights of millions of individuals, especially of those who are neglected or persecuted by their state of origin and have different impediments to escape it. 

 Key words: sovereignty, internally displaced persons, international community, legitimacy, self-determination, non-interference.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Elisabeth Theresia Widmer (UiO)

"Political Representation. A Kantian Argument Against Economic Elites"

Time and place: Nov. 9, 2023 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: 

Is the Kantian state dominated by an economically privileged elite? While Kant’s discussion of passive citizens might suggest such an arrangement, this paper argues that Kant’s conceptualization of citizenship fundamentally aims to mitigate the risk of laws being manipulated in favor of the economically privileged. Kant asserts that the legislative branch of a republican state should be built upon the united will, which is the fundamental principle that all individuals should be treated as if they actively and rationally consented to legislation. The actualization of this principle necessitates distinguishing between active and passive citizens. Only those capable of formulating laws in line with the general will, rather than catering to the interests of specific factions, are eligible for legislating. While interpretations aiming to refute economic dependence by showing that Kant’s examples do not hinge on economic considerations have followed a similar path, this paper demonstrates that these views are not without challenges. These challenges can be effectively addressed by the proposed ‘general will actualization’ account.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Joona Räsänen, University of Turku

"The Grim View of Online Dating - Rethinking Tinder"

(This seminar was cancelled on the grounds of ill health)

Time and place: Nov. 2, 2023 12:15 PM – 2:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: 

In the past, opportunities for meeting sexual or marital partners were limited. However, with the advent of online dating, people have an almost endless number of partners to choose from, people can reject potential partners in a split second without getting to know them, and people make the first cut - or not - based on physical attractiveness. Online dating has a very skewed sex-ratio also where men outnumber women. Because of these features in modern dating, there is a challenge to justice, or so I claim. I paint a devastating picture, the Grim View of Online Dating, and argue that online dating apps, such as Tinder, are a problem for justice. They are problem for justice since from the perspective of men a few individuals get all the opportunities, while the majority get none. The inequality in sex is already striking: the distribution of sex partners among people is more unjust than the distribution of wealth among the most unequal countries. Tinder does not make this better, if anything it makes it worse. While online dating is bad for most men, things are not much better for women either. Women struggle to find long-term relationship prospects online, since men who are successful on Tinder are constantly presented with attractive potential sexual partners. Since having sexual and romantic relationships is considered to be an important part of human life, well-being and flourishing, online dating is a serious challenge to justice. Therefore, we should take measures to correct the inequalities in online dating.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Niels de Haan (University of Vienna)

"The Non-Compliance Dilemma for Team Reasoning Views of Collective Moral Duties"

Time and place: Oct. 26, 2023 12:15 PM – 2:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: 

Collective moral problems concern cases where some collective outcome must be generated or prevented, but no (individual or collective) agent has direct control over the outcome in the form of actions that are sufficient to prevent or generate that outcome. For example, refraining from buying factory-farmed chickens, not (over)using polluting modes of transport, moving to renewable energy among corporations, nuclear disarmament among states, reducing GHG emissions, or refraining from large-scale natural resource depletion. In such cases, we have good reason to think the group somehow morally ought to refrain from collective harm or to secure the collective benefit. The difficulty is that no agent individually can make a morally relevant difference, yet unorganized groups do not qualify as moral agents, and therefore the group itself cannot bear moral duties. Recently, Collins (2019), Schwenkenbecher (2021), and Blomberg and Petersson (2023) have developed accounts of collective moral duties based on variants of team reasoning to explain why (members of) non-agential groups have relevant duties in such cases. Team reasoning is a kind of reasoning that invokes the perspective of the group as the starting point for reasoning about what to do when faced with a collective action problem.

In this paper, I raise the non-compliance dilemma for such views. The collective duty is either conditional or unconditional on the willingness of members. If the collective duty is conditional on the willingness of members (Collins 2019; Schwenkenbecher 2021), then team reasoning views generate wrong first-order moral judgments in cases of known non-compliance. If the collective duty is unconditional on the willingness of members (Blomberg and Petersson 2023), then the ability to successfully team reason is masked in cases of known non-compliance, which shows that team reasoning is not the relevant kind of moral reasoning for collective moral problems. Finally, I argue that to account for our considered moral judgments in all collective moral problems, we must invoke a kind of moral reasoning based on a principle that has universality embedded within itself (e.g., Kant’s Formula of Universal Law). But this requires a solution to the problem of relevant descriptions. I conclude by tentatively suggesting such a solution.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Espen Dyrnes Stabell (NTNU)

"Must I mean what I say? On the ethics of doing ethics "

Time and place: Oct. 19, 2023 12:15 PM – 2:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: 

As academic philosophers working in ethics, we might wonder whether it is important that the views we defend publicly (for example, in publications) are ones that we personally endorse or believe to be true. This paper discusses two main positions on the issue. Both agree that the views we defend should be based on good reasons. However, what I call the Integrity View suggests that the views I defend publicly should also be ones I personally endorse or hold to be true. The Service View (SV), on the other hand, suggests that this is of no (or at least secondary) importance. What is important according to SV, is that the views I defend meet a demand or need for reasons-based views and arguments in the public sphere. I argue that academic philosophers should accept SV as the basis for their ethic of doing ethics. 

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Christel Fricke

"Moral Vulnerability"

Time and place: Oct. 5, 2023 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM 452

Moral vulnerability is a specific kind of vulnerability. Not every living being is morally vulnerable. I inquire into the following questions: who is morally vulnerable, what are the sources of moral wounds, and in virtue of what is someone morally vulnerable.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Aksel Braanen Sterri

"AI and the Transition Problem"

Time and place: Sep. 7, 2023 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: 

Suppose that successively more powerful AIs are created, and they eventually perform most tasks cheaper and better than humans. This is likely to generate enormous wealth that can be used to fill human needs at one obvious cost: mass unemployment. In this paper, I will examine one possible response to this possibility, championed by theorists and practitioners alike. That is, to adapt our institutions to give people income and meaning in a world without work. I argue that given a plausible theory of political change I call realism, adaptation is a self-defeating strategy. According to realism, transformative change comes about if and only if the beneficiaries have the power to demand it. Replacing people with AI weakens their bargaining power and without power political elites will not adapt our institutions to give people income and meaning without work. The adaptationist project therefore fails, and we need to look to two other possible solutions, blocking and steering the development of AI.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Wang Pei and Daniel A. Bell (University of Hong Kong)
"In Defense of Hierarchy"

Time and place: June 8, 2023 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: 

Social hierarchies are ubiquitous in the modern world. We reject unjust hierarchies such as racism and sexism. But fighting against all forms of social hierarchy is neither feasible nor desirable. So we need to distinguish between unjust hierarchies and forms of hierarchies that may be morally justified so that we can promote the latter and stamp out the former in pursuit of a more just world. But which social hierarchies are morally justified? Drawing on their book Just Hierarchy: Why Social Hierarchies Matter in China and the Rest of the World (Princeton University Press, 2022, paperback ed.), Wang Pei and Daniel A. Bell will try to answer this question.

Bios: 

WANG Pei is Assistant professor at The School of Chinese at the University of Hong Kong. She completed her PhD thesis on phenomenology at the department of philosophy of Tsinghua University. She was a post-doc fellow at the Tsinghua Institute of Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences. She has authored academic articles in English, Chinese, and French, mainly on phenomenology, ethics, and comparative philosophy. Her book (co-authored with Daniel A. Bell) Just Hierarchy: Why Social Hierarchies Matter in China and the Rest of the World was published by Princeton University Press in 2020.

Daniel A. Bell  (貝淡寧) is Professor, Chair of Political Theory with the Faculty of Law at the University of Hong Kong. He served as Dean of the School of Political Science and Public Administration at Shandong University (Qingdao) from 2017 to 2022. His books include The Dean of Shandong (2023), Just Hierarchy (co-authored with Wang Pei, 2020), The China Model (2015), The Spirit of Cities (co-authored with Avner de-Shalit, 2012), China’s New Confucianism (2008), Beyond Liberal Democracy (2007), and East Meets West (2000), all published by Princeton University Press. He is also the author of Communitarianism and Its Critics (Oxford University Press, 1993). He is founding editor of the Princeton-China series (Princeton University Press) which translates and publishes original and influential academic works from China. His works have been translated in 23 languages. He has been interviewed in English, Chinese, and French. In 2018, he was awarded the Huilin Prize and was honored as a “Cultural Leader” by the World Economic Forum.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: James Furner

"A critique of Kant’s ethics"

Time and place: May 25, 2023 12:15 PM – 2:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: 

I will present the critique of Kant’s ethics outlined in Part II of Rescuing Autonomy from Kant (Brill, 2023). There I argue that an agent who adopts any of Kant’s formulas of the categorical imperative is committed to a belief in the existence of God (that is, a perfect moral creator), but that Kant offers us no good argument to believe that God exists, and so Kant provides us with no good reason to adopt the categorical imperative. In this talk, I focus on the Formula of the Law of Nature (FLN), the Formula of the End in Itself (FEI), and Kant’s argument from the highest good.

The use of FLN presupposes a belief in the existence of God, because its use rests on a regulative principle of natural teleology known as the principle of suitability (the principle that nothing about an organized being could be bettered in respect of its fitness for purpose). Only a belief in the existence of a perfect moral creator could encourage us to adopt this regulative principle. The derivation of FEI presupposes a belief in the existence of God, because it relies on a regressive argument. The most that a regressive argument from rational nature can show is that a rational agent must regard the end-setting capacity of every rational agent as an end in itself. It cannot show that a rational agent must regard humanity in a person as an end in itself. To complete the derivation of FEI, we must additionally suppose that humanity and personality are coextensive, but the only way that Kant allows us to do so relies on the principle of suitability.

All this would not constitute a fatal problem, if Kant could successfully argue that we have an a priori reason to believe that God exists. But Kant’s argument from the highest good - that we must postulate the existence of God in order to think of the concept of the highest good as possible - is flawed. It is subject to an objection from moral happiness, which says that it is self-contradictory to postulate the existence of God to think of the concept of the highest good as possible, because postulating the existence of God deprives us of moral happiness, which is part of happiness, and thus belongs to Kant’s concept of the highest good.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Fredrik Hjorthen

"Democracy and Liability to Intervention"

Time and place: May 11, 2023 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: 

This article focuses on the question of whether a state being democratic makes it more or less difficult to justify intervention against it, other things being equal. A key feature of democracies is the fact that policies, in general, tend to have some kind of demonstrable popular support. According to standard objections against external intervention – i.e., the practice where one or more states substitute their will for that of another state to halt or prevent human rights violations – such popular support for policies tells against the permissibility of intervention. Specifically, this is the message of the objection from legitimacy, the objection from tolerance, and the objection from self-determination. In response to these objections, this article develops an argument from liability that shows that it can in fact be easier to justify intervention when rights violating policies enjoy popular support, and that this has implications for the permissibility of intervention against democracies.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Suki Finn

"On the Reality of Gender"

Time and place: May 4, 2023 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract:

In this talk I will describe and defend a metaphysically realist position of gender that takes gender to be real. I will argue for this as a result of applying a (W.V.O.) Quinean indispensability argument as such: for as long as there is gender-based oppression such as misogyny or transphobia then we have an indispensable need for gender-based concepts such as woman and man in order to understand and eliminate such oppression, and therefore if gender is indispensable, albeit contingently, then we should take gender to be real. I argue that debates about what gender is are partially about what the world is like, given that reality includes social reality, where gendered experiences are an irreducible aspect of that social reality. In the spirit of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's strategic essentialism applied at the meta-level, gender is essential for strategic political purposes, even if genders are not essentially defined. I call this position (2nd order) gender essentialism without (1st order) gender essencealism.    

Bio:

Dr Suki Finn is a Lecturer in Philosophy at Royal Holloway University of London and a visiting fellow with the CPS at the University of Oslo. Previously, she was a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Southampton and has held other visiting fellowships at the University of Vienna (2023), Australian National University (2019), New York University (2018), and City University of New York Graduate Center (2014). Her areas of research span the philosophy of logic, metaphysics, philosophy of science, feminism, and epistemology. She has published a number of articles on these topics in Synthese, Bioethics, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, European Journal of the Philosophy of Science, Australasian Journal of Logic, Philosophia, and more. She is the author of What’s in a Doughnut Hole? And other philosophical food for thought (Icon, 2024) and editor of Women of Ideas (Oxford University Press, 2021). Dr Finn. is a University and College Union representative, and is on the Executive Committee for the Society for Women in Philosophy UK and the Council for the Royal Institute of Philosophy. For more information on her research, see her website here.  

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Anna Wienhues

"The ‘Global duties – Local burdens’ Problem in Just Biodiversity Conservation"

Time and place: Apr. 27, 2023 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: 

The subject matter of just biodiversity conservation has been receiving increased attention in interdisciplinary environmental debates, including political philosophy. In this context, different concerns of environmental (intra-human) and interspecies justice have been examined, which includes accounts of just burden-sharing concerning the costs of conservation. Yet, within this context one issue of philosophical interest has been largely overlooked which concerns the case of discrepancy between global justice theorising and local conditions; the ‘global duties – local burdens problem’. Against the background that biodiversity conservation always has implications for land-use (land as place and habitat), the necessity to consider this case arises due to the circumstance that in practice biodiversity protection can (and often has) put more burdens on individuals, communities or states that share the collective duty to lessen the degradation of biodiversity to a lesser degree, because areas of interest for habitat protection are not geographically evenly distributed and do not necessarily match up with a community’s environmental impact. Taking a common approach to environmental and interspecies distributive justice that relies on the distribution of ecological space as an example, this paper explains why his problem arises from the incongruity between the currency of justice (ecological space) in the global-abstract and the local-particular (the conceptual problem). It this then argued that cultural costs, in turn, are essential to understanding the central moral concern at stake.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Elisabeth Widmer

"Johann Benjamin Erhard's Duty to Revolution"

Time and place: Apr. 20, 2023 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: 

In On the People’s Right to Revolution (1795), Johann B. Erhard draws on the categorical imperative to argue for a moral duty to revolution. However, we also find an increased focus on consequences, calling into question the deontological framework of his justification of revolution. I argue that Erhard’s consideration of foreseeable consequences should be positioned at the level of act descriptions. I show that Erhard makes use of ‘unspecific’ and ‘specific’ act descriptions. Unspecific act descriptions refer to a definitional core descriptor that is tested against the categorical imperative. Specific act descriptions include social facts and intended consequences when tested against the moral law. While Erhard uses unspecific act descriptions in his justification of human rights, we find him using specific maxim descriptions in his moral justification of revolutionary action. My interpretation allows for a more coherent and textually supported interpretation of Erhard’s theory of revolution than earlier interpretations.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Michael Craig Victor Kryluk

"‘What is, is Good’: Reason Contra Skepticism and the Intellectual Horizon of Kant’s Philosophy of History"

Time and place: Apr. 13, 2023 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: 

Although Kant’s philosophy of history remains an object of enduring interest to political theorists and scholars of the Enlightenment, its roots in his pre-critical thought and its core influences remain largely unexplored. In this paper, I propose to excavate the philosophical background to Kant’s conceptions of history and historical progress that emerges in two phases over the period 1755 to 1765/6. The unifying theme of this era is Kant’s quest to formulate a rational purpose or end of human nature able to overcome objections to the providence of creation raised by the problem of evil.

In the first phase, which runs from 1755 to 1759, Kant is a conventional proponent of Enlightenment optimism in the mold of Leibniz’s Theodicy and Pope’s Essay on Man. Like Leibniz and Pope, Kant seeks to justify reason’s ability to assign a providential aim to human existence in response to skeptical doubts generated by the problem of evil. This skeptical tendency is exemplified above all by Bayle, but it finds later echoes in Voltaire, Hume, Hamann, and Abbt. At this stage, Kant’s defense of the underlying goodness and rationality of the universe and the distinctive position of humanity within it is chiefly theoretical and dogmatic. Accordingly, he would later express embarrassment about his work on this topic from the 1750s.

In the second phase, which occurs in the mid-1760s, Kant re-orients his vindication of providential reason around a Rousseauian philosophical anthropology that emphasizes the unique capacity of moral freedom to provide the human being with an entirely self-given final end. Despite the artificial evils unleashed by human freedom in the advance of the species from nature to civilization, Kant holds that civil society makes possible a course of political, educational, and religious progress that will ultimately lead to the attainment of the moral vocation or destiny (Bestimmung) of humanity. As a result, Kant shifts the terrain of the Enlightenment response to the challenge of skepticism on the question of the final end of the human being from theoretical to practical reason.

While Kant’s understanding of history and historical progress continues to evolve after 1765/6, I conclude by showing that his mature philosophy of history retains the basic interpretation of Rousseau and the purposiveness of practical reason adopted in the mid-1760s. If so, contemporary evaluations of Kant’s theory of history (and its successors) must account for the specific intellectual context that informs and determines his view.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Tor Otterholt

"The Small N-Approach - Bridging the Gap Between Experimental and Traditional Philosophy"

Time and place: Mar. 23, 2023 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: 

Over the last decades, philosophers’ practice of addressing normative questions by employing moral intuitions has been challenged. A new set of methods, here termed the “The Big-N Approach” based on experiments on - and statistical analyses of - people’s intuitions have been developed and applied, partly as a criticism of and partly as a supplement to conventional approaches (here called Traditional Philosophy). The purpose of this paper is primarily to explore the room that lies between these two approaches and sketch the framework of and discuss the prospects of a third way, termed “The Small N Approach” to normative questions.

“The Small N Approach” shares traits with both The Big N Approach and Traditional Philosophy. Like the former, “The Small N Approach” embraces the use of social science methods in order to reach normative insights. Like the latter, The Small N Approach proposes methods that the student of normative questions can use themselves, if not in their armchair, then at least in their office, in order to distinguish between reliable and unreliable intuitions.

Furthermore, The Small N Approach is based on the principles of Reflective Equilibrium, as has dominated conventional approaches for half a century. It is argued that the “Small N Approach” follows the guidelines of Reflective Equilibrium to an even larger extent than conventional approaches do. However, the Small N Approach is not merely a combination of older approaches. By employing qualitative research methods from the social sciences, it also has its unique features, that can enhance transparency of future studies of normative questions.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Vittorio Bufacchi (University College Cork)

"Liberalism and Structural Injustice: When the Solution Becomes the Problem"

Time and place: Mar. 16, 2023 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: 

If structural injustice is the problem, is liberalism the solution? This paper argues that over the last few centuries liberalism tackled three manifestations of historical injustice (slavery; natural hierarchies; colonialism) by promoting the mantra of individual rights, but the unintended consequence of this philosophy was to engender and legitimize even more enduring forms of structural injustice (exploitation; inequality; domination). Historical injustice has not gone away, it has simply learned to accommodate liberal orthodoxy. To tackle structural injustice, it may be necessary to look beyond liberalism.

About: 

Dr. Vittorio Bufacchi is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at University College Cork, Ireland. He is the author of 'Violence and Social Justice' (Palgrave); 'Social Injustice' (Palgrave); and 'Everything Must Change: Philosophical Lessons from Lockdown' (Manchester). His next book, 'Why Cicero Matters' (Bloomsbury) will be published in October 2023. He is the editor of the book series 'Palgrave Philosophy Today'. www.vittoriobufacchi.com

Climate Justice and Territory: An Overview

Practical Philosophy Seminar with Patrik Baard and Alejandra Mancilla. 

Time and place: Mar. 9, 2023 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

About the seminar

In the near future, climate change will affect the territories of millions. The territorial impacts of climate change will range from states losing their entire land to sub-state collectives being displaced or forced to change the ways in which they use their lands.

This will happen both as a direct consequence of climate change (through extreme weather events and shifting long-term climate patterns), and as a result of policies for mitigating climate change (like afforestation, the use of carbon capture and storage technologies, and the transformation of agricultural land into crop plantations for biofuel).

In this seminar, we offer an overview of how philosophers have discussed these and other justice-related issues to climate change and territory, and we gesture at some topics that remain under-researched from a philosophical perspective.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Hallvard Hodne Sandven

"On the functional role of feasibility discourse"

Time and place: Mar. 2, 2023 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: 

The structure and content of feasibility constraints are often considered crucial for assessing normative proposals for institutional innovation and for stringent requirements of distributive justice. This article critically examines a recent development in the philosophical analysis of feasibility: functionalism. Defended most elaborately by Nicholas Southwood, functionalism holds that feasibility should be defined by reference to its functional role in our practices of practical deployment. Taking up this suggestion, I offer a functional analysis of feasibility that departs from functionalists’ general optimism about feasibility’s usefulness for normative theorising. To this end, I highlight two pernicious functions of feasibility discourse. First, I argue that feasibility performs a distortive function by obscuring important features of moral obligations. Second, I argue that feasibility performs a dismissive function by misrepresenting substantive normative issues as technical in nature. Finally, I argue that the concept of feasibility’s most important role in normative theory – to adjudicate between candidates for moral obligation – can be performed by other concepts, especially the concept of social power. My somewhat provocative suggestion will thus be that a functionalist analysis of feasibility discourse provides grounds for endorsing an eliminativist view of feasibility.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Aksel Sterri

"Valuing Animals" 

Time and place: Feb. 9, 2023 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM room 452

Abstract: 

How should we value animals? Many philosophers treat moral and economic value as incompatible ways of valuing: As Kant put it, some things have prices, and others have ‘inner value’ and are ‘beyond price.’ Since most contemporary philosophers believe animals have intrinsic value, many believe we ought to de-commodify animals. They defend veganism and animal liberation. In this talk, I examine and reject this dichotomy. We must value animals in both moral and economic terms. In a market society, where everything has a monetary value, including human lives, priceless often means worthless, not dignified. However, an animal’s economic value should not be dictated by consumers but the moral worth of an animal’s life in monetary terms. I examine the merits of recent advances in economics and policy analysis that have been or can be used to capture animal value, including a novel proposal I call “Tax on animal suffering.” 

2022

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Drew Douglas Johnson

“Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and the Function of Moral Belief”

Time and place: Nov. 24, 2022 12:15 PM – 2:00 PM, GM Room 452

Abstract: 

Evolutionary debunking arguments aim to provide evidence against non-skeptical moral realism. The evolutionary debunker argues that evolutionary forces have significantly influenced moral belief in ways conducive to reproductive success rather than to discovering moral truths, and that this fact undercuts warrant for moral belief, leading to a skeptical result (given realist assumptions). Responses typically proceed not by challenging the debunker’s evolutionary hypothesis, but rather its purported skeptical implications given moral realism.

The goal of this paper is to articulate a naturalistic approach to thinking about moral belief in terms of proper function, from which the debunker’s evolutionary hypothesis appears misguided. I also consider and respond to an important variant of the debunking argument framed in terms of cultural selection. I conclude with a proposal that moral belief may indeed have the proper function of tracking moral truth, even if this function did not directly contribute to human reproductive fitness.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Patrik Baard

"Sovereignty of Place: Are Non-Anthropocentric Territorial Rights Unreasonable?"

Time and place: Nov. 10, 2022 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM Room 452

Abstract: 

The following is an attempt to consider issues such as: can convincing normative arguments be given where sovereignty encompasses natural sites on their own grounds? Is a ‘sovereignty without people’ reasonable, where the protection of a natural site is not derivative on its use for conventional moral subjects? Given the historical contingency of nation states, different normative conceptions of land (including indigenous), and the different rules of recognition, are rules of ascribing sovereignty flexible enough to encompass natural sites? That is, to make their borders politically relevant and environmental protection imperative.

Many natural sites have characteristics that evoke intuitions that a wrong or injustice is committed if that site is damaged. Sovereignty can possibly express that normative significance. This article explores the possibility of ascribing sovereignty directly to natural sites, making the wrong or injustice to the natural site itself, through characteristics such as ecosystem integrity, and by drawing parallels to how natural sites are recognized as World Heritage by UNESCO. If sovereignty can encompass natural sites, such sites per se have standing, in contrast to being regarded as resource or property. It will be suggested that while sovereignty could possibly be ascribed to some natural sites based on their characteristics, such sites are few. However, the findings contribute to environmental law, and explicate limits to the concept of sovereignty.

Organizer

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Toshiro Osawa

“Internal Duties of Right”

Time and place: Oct. 27, 2022 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM Room 452

Abstract:

Standard accounts of Kant’s moral and political philosophy distinguish between duties of right and duties of virtue according to whether these duties are either external or internal, respectively. In this paper, I challenge the assumption behind these accounts, namely the assumption that right has to do with the possibility of coercing others but not oneself. I argue that we can identify internal duties of right, where one coerces oneself regardless of the possibility of being coerced by others, in Kant’s doctrine of right. In an elusive and yet important way, right (Recht) and ethics (Ethik) operate as the highest division regulating the lower divisions of the doctrine of right and the doctrine of virtue. In developing my argument, I also shed light on the problematic nature of our perceptions about whether something is internal or external.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Prof. Jamie Kelly (Vassar College)
"Marx, Robots, and Social Reproduction"

Time and place: Oct. 20, 2022 2:15 PM – 4:00 PM, GM Room 452

Abstract: 

In this paper I develop a roughly Marxist account of artificial labour. That is, I modify Karl Marx’s account of labour from Capital, Volume One, in order to show how an Artificial Intelligence could become a bona fide labourer (rather than a mere machine that serves to increase the productivity of human labour). I then go on to examine the potential consequences of artificial labour for Marx’s account of economic production. I conclude that in order for artificial labour to function in a way that is analogous to human labour, robots would need to engage in social reproduction: they would need to use some of their labour to maintain or reproduce themselves into the future.

Organizer

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Christel Fricke

"Racism and the limits of an ethics of conviction (Gesinnungsethik)"

Time and place: Oct. 13, 2022 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM Room 452

Abstract: 

I shall take my starting point from Kant’s Categorical Imperative and its Natural Law version in particular. First, I shall reconstruct his account of practical reasoning. Then, I shall inquire into the question whether this account excludes all kinds of racism. I shall argue that it does not.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Fredrik Dybfest Hjorthen

"Proportionate intervention and self-determination"

Time and place: Sep. 22, 2022 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM Room 452

Abstract: 

Most political philosophers hold that external intervention into the internal affairs of another state is permissible in extreme cases. In cases where rights violations are less severe and fewer in number things are less clear. This article investigates how the importance of human rights can be reconciled with the right to self-determination in the context of external intervention. I will argue that the right to self-determination should be understood in a different way than usual, and that, thus understood, it becomes apparent that it should be factored in as part of the proportionality assessment rather than be understood as an external constraint.

As I will show, this has (at least) two implications: first, that there is additional reason to favour a continuum view on intervention over threshold views, and second, that it might be more difficult to justify intervention than we might think at first, because intervention will more often be disproportionate.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Tyson Ashley Retz

"Progress and the Scale of History"

Time and place: May 19, 2022 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM Room 452 and Zoom

Abstract: 

Belief in progress long went out of fashion. Optimists may continue to prosper in certain circles, but pessimism is in vogue, crisis talk more pervasive than progress talk. And yet the idea of progress remains very much with us in our political imaginations and in the ways we link past, present and future. In this presentation, I offer five categories for thinking about progress that each rely on a different conception of history. The scale on which we conceive history, I argue, plays a determining role in how we think about progress.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Patrik Baard

"Reasons, relations and places: are environmental relational values necessary and sufficient for ethics and management?"

Time and place: May 12, 2022 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM Room 452 and Zoom

Abstract: 

In recent years, environmental ethics and policy have seen a steadily increasing interest in relational values. Relational values have come to influence both scholarly discussions, as well as frameworks for The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES). Conventionally, though not undisputedly, environmental ethics has emphasized intrinsic and extrinsic, or final and instrumental, values, sought to identify the conditions for such values, and assessing to which entities they can be ascribed. Proponents of relational values lament that this emphasis has resulted in limited relevance for environmental management and policies. Furthermore, some argue that the distinction does not accurately reflect the value the environment has for people, and risk excluding long-held relations of communities to the environment. Relational values avoid these shortcomings, opting instead for a promising axiological category that is better equipped to reflect people’s different relations to nature in a policy-relevant manner. While being intuitively reasonable, I will argue that relational values applied to territory evoke several challenges.

Based on current conceptualizations of relational values I will stipulate two relational principles. Based on four challenges, I will argue that the principles require re-introducing conventional axiological categories to avoid counter-intuitive prescriptive conclusions and foundational weaknesses. The four challenges are contingency, inconsistencies and conflicts, ‘destructive’ relations, and dynamics of changing territories. The result is a ‘mixed relational principle’. While this does not refute the category of relational values, it shows that the concept needs to be unpacked and its content scrutinized to provide for ethically justified environmental policy.

Organizer

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Michelle Bastian

"Muddling towards a field philosophy of phenology"

Time and place: Apr. 28, 2022 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM Room 452 and Zoom

Abstract: 

This talk will reflect on my current interdisciplinary project, which asks what would a philosophy of time look like if it were to arise from dialogues with ecologists, rather than physicists or psychologists. In particular I’m interested in discussing issues of method from the perspective of a philosopher engaged in ‘field research’. How might we approach interviews, field notes, focus groups in ways which draw on philosophical approaches and yet don’t ignore the many lessons and warnings from social scientists? 

Organizer

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Ingvild Torsen

"Angela Davis and Friedrich Schiller on Violence and Tragedy"

Time and place: Apr. 7, 2022 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM Room 452 and Zoom

Abstract: 

In the mid-sixties, before returning to the US and becoming the nation's most well-known communist, feminist activist, Angela Davis studied with Adorno and Marcuse in Frankfurt and planned to write a dissertation on freedom in the aesthetic theories of Kant and Schiller. Schiller’s early romantic view of the importance of aesthetics for both autonomy and Buildung might seem miles away from the militant Black activism of Southern California two hundred years later, but here I want to show how Schiller’s theory can illuminate Davis’ reading of Fredrick Douglass Narrative of his life in slavery. This leads to a rejuvenation of the philosophical problem of tragedy: how can the aesthetic experience of violence and suffering be valuable? 

Organizer

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Alejandra Mancilla

"Migration and Poverty: Philosophical Perspectives"

Time and place: Mar. 17, 2022 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, Zoom

Abstract: 

In 1540, following the trend from other European cities, Madrid established its Poor Laws. These laws subjected poor people to a moral test to check whether they were deserving or not, forced them to confess and communicate to get aid from the municipal authorities, and confined them to stay within the limits of the city. Foreign beggars were denied entry altogether. Domingo de Soto, eminent Dominican theologian and philosopher in Salamanca at the time, was asked to give his opinion on the matter. In his Deliberation on the Cause of the Poor, De Soto offers an argument against the Poor Laws and for open borders, based on the rights of everyone (including the poor) to move freely, regardless of whether they were “natural” or not. Individuals ought not to be bound to their cities, especially if they were not guaranteed enough for a decent life - which was more than a life right on the edge of subsistence. Instead, they should be left free to make their living elsewhere, by begging or otherwise. Moreover, Christians had a duty to help others in need and to be charitable, no matter where the recipients came from. De Soto further questioned the requirement to pass a moral test to get help. Ultimately, he thought, what these laws revealed was hatred and weariness towards the poor, and the injustice of denying them rights that the rest enjoyed (De Soto 2003).
 
Almost five hundred years later, De Soto’s defense of the right of poor people to move freely across borders resonates in the current philosophical debate on migration. The political unit is no longer the city, but the nation-state, but the question whether they have a right to exclude and on what grounds is still at the center of the discussion. What nation-states owe morally to needy “non-naturals” also remains relevant, although the issue is framed in terms of universal human rights rather than Christian duties. Moreover, whether migration or migration restrictions should be actively used as a tool for the eradication of poverty is passionately debated, with answers ranging from those who see free movement as the best recipe, to those who see it as entrenching and deepening the plight of the worst off.
 
In this essay, I offer an overview of the main answers that contemporary political theorists have given to the following questions:
1. Do states have a right to exclude poor foreigners, and what are the limitations of this right?
2. May migration and/or migration restrictions be actively used as a tool for the eradication of global poverty?
3. Have political theorists framed the discussions under 1 and 2 above correctly, or is their method flawed?
 
The text is intended as an entry on a book on “Philosophical perspectives on poverty” and it is in that context that it ought to be read

Organizer

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Katharine Browne & Sebastian Watzl
"Attention as a Commodity: An analysis and ethical assessment"

Time and place: Feb. 17, 2022 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM Room 652 and Zoom

Abstract: 

Many people seem worried about the so-called “Attention Economy.” One worry concerns how our attention is bought and sold by tech companies like Google and Meta. In the philosophical literature, some have argued that the attention economy is a noxious market. But can this economy be understood as a “market” for attention? Our aim is to improve the conceptual understanding of the attention economy with an eye to providing a more rigorous ethical assessment of it.

We ask: to what extent can attention be understood as a commodity and can we apply the literature on the ethics of contested commodities (e.g., organs and reproductive labour) to this case? We distinguish what we call “front end” and “back end” transactions that are involved in the trade of our attention, and argue that neither qualifies as treating attention as a commodity per se. Nevertheless, we argue that some of the insights from the literature on the ethics of commodification are applicable.

Organizer

Practical Philosophy Group

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Franco Trivigno

"Modelling Human Happiness" (ModHap)

Time and place: Feb. 10, 2022 12:15 PM – 1:00 PM, GM Room 452 and Zoom

Abstract: 

ModHap is an interdisciplinary project that integrates insights from ancient philosophy, philosophy of science and psychology in order to develop new empirically testable notions of happiness. Our main objective is to develop new scientific models of happiness, which will provide vital knowledge about the sources of happiness, generate novel metrics for empirically measuring happiness, and lay the groundwork for innovative interventions aimed at improving and sustaining happiness. Our core hypothesis is that an integration of ancient conceptions and contemporary scientific investigations will generate novel models and understandings of human happiness.

An overly individualistic and subjectivist modern perspective limits contemporary happiness research, and groundbreaking conceptual and methodological changes in the science of happiness will be made possible by exploring four ancient theses about the nature of happiness: that it is best understood (i) as fundamentally interpersonal or social, (ii) as inherently value-laden, (iii) as grounded in human nature and (iv) as a temporally extended dynamic activity. 

Organizer

Practical Philosophy Group

2021

Practical Philosophy - Annual Workshop

Time and place: Nov. 26, 2021 10:00 AM–3:00 PM, Georg Morgenstiernes hus, room 452

Venue: Georg Morgenstiernes Hus, room 452, Blindern, University of Oslo

Friday November 26, 2021

• 10:00-10:15 Coffee and Welcome
• 10:15-11:00 Bjorn Sether Wastvedt (University of Arizona/ UiO)  "Care ethics as humanized virtue theory"
• 11:00-11:15 Break
• 11:15-12:00 Anne-Sofie Greisen Højlund (Aarhus University) “The Wrongs and Remedies of Political Inequality”
• 12:00-13:00 Lunch
• 13:00-13:45 Joona Räsänen (UiO)  “What is personality discrimination and is it morally wrong?”
• 13:45-14:00 Break
• 14:00-14:45 Jens Jørund Tyssedal (Aarhus University)  “Overcoming the problem of work: Why liberal-egalitarianism is not enough”

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Toshiro Osawa

"Kant on Justice in Ethics"

Time and place: Nov. 9, 2021 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, GM 452 and zoom

Abstract: 

Kant’s concept of justice has been widely discussed within the domain of political philosophy. Yet, little attention has been paid to what bearing this concept has on Kant’s ethics. Or at best, previous scholarship has considered justice ambiguously in the mixture of political and ethical terms (O’Neill 2004; Vogt 2008). Part of this ambiguity is owed to Kant himself: Kant discusses justice mostly in his political writings or in relation to political themes; Kant also sharply separates justice from virtue that Kant deals with within the domain of ethics. I argue that justice, which Kant conceives of in the traditional sense he received from his predecessors, namely the principle of not taking what is mine or yours, operates implicitly yet sturdily in Kant’s ethics, since he received the notion of “what is his ethically” (suum ethicum) from Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten and transposed it into his ethics, particularly when Kant discusses envy, ingratitude, and malice. (Baumgarten also calls suum ethicum internal justice (iustitia interna).) After defending my argument, this paper concludes by evaluating the implications of my argument for the long-standing debate over whether right has priority over virtue or vice versa for Kant (Willaschek 1997; Guyer 2002; Willaschek 2002; Willaschek 2009; Willaschek 2012; Baiasu 2016; Guyer 2016; Wood 2018).

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Maria Seim

"Collective responsibility and culpable ignorance"

Time and place: Nov. 2, 2021 12:15 PM–Apr. 20, 2021 1:00 PM, GM 452

Abstract: 

When exploring the possibility of holding collective agents morally responsible it is common to focus mainly on what is know as the control condition on moral responsibility. Thus attempting to answer the question “Does collective agents have the control, or freedom, necessary for moral responsibility?” In this project I propose we explore another condition on moral responsibility, known as the epistemic condition. I attempt to answer the question “Does a collective agent have the cognitive and epistemic states necessary for moral responsibility?”. I explore, in particular, the possibility of collective agents such as organizations having the cognitive and epistemic states necessary to be held liable for culpable ignorance. Culpable ignorance is of special importance when exploring moral responsibility for organization because of the way information is shared, or not shared, between individuals within the organization. I suggest that a collective agent does not need awareness to be held responsible for culpable ignorance, and that we instead should focus on identifying epistemic vices when determining the moral responsibility of organizations.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Aksel Sterri

"Is it wrong to offer risky vaccines? Assessing the Nordic policy of excluding AstraZeneca and Janssen"

Time and place: Oct. 12, 2021 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

Abstract:

In the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Norway excluded AstraZeneca- and Janssen-vaccines from the vaccination program. In this paper, I examine the core normative justification behind this decision. I argue the decision is grounded in a principle of Do no harm, which states that the health authorities should not offer healthcare that is individually harmful. I suggest two plausible ways to ground the principle, in a general obligation to prevent self-harm and a fiduciary duty between health authorities and people receiving care. Although both groundings are plausible candidates, they fail to justify exclusion over giving people freedom to choose between risky and safe vaccines. In the last part of the paper, I show that the principle is self-defeating and leads to counter-intuitive conclusions.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Colin Rowe

"A comprehensive theory of competency placement"

Time and place: Sep. 21, 2021 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Zoom

Abstract

For as long as there has been political philosophy, it has examined the question of, ‘who should be in charge?’ For the last few hundred years, this has centred on what legitimizes a state. While this is a complicated and difficult question, there is a consensus that in one way or another, it is ‘the people’ of the state that generate state legitimacy and therefore, through the state, should ultimately be in charge.

However, the state is not the only locus of government, there are towns, cities, regions, transnational governments and every variation in between. Each has its own areas of jurisdiction: a town may be in charge of waste disposal and local policing, while a region may be in charge of healthcare and education, the state might have jurisdiction over defence and immigration, and a transnational entity such as the EU may be in charge of the monetary currency and food standards. These distributions are often the result of historical chance. However, with the rise of entities like the EU as well as urgency of global issues such as climate change, the question of how these competencies should be distributed has become more heated (though the normative justifications underlying competency placement remain unclear). The classic answer of ‘the people’ should be in charge provides little assistance, at each level of government a ‘people’ exist.

In order to answer these questions it is not enough to rely on political horse trading or appeals to practical considerations such as efficiency or effectiveness unless we are willing to accept that any government may take control of a competency simply because it does a better job. We must, therefore, investigate whether there are normative reasons that justify particular competency placements. I argue that there are. In this seminar I will focus of a chapter of my doctoral thesis where I present two sets of criteria which show when a government may (is allowed to) have a competency and, secondly, justifications for when a government should have jurisdiction over a particular competency.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Joona Räsänen

"Should vegans have children? Examining the links between animal ethics and antinatalism"

Time and place: June 1, 2021 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Zoom

Abstract

Vegans and vegetarians believe it is seriously immoral to bring animals into existence who live miserable lives. In this paper, I will discuss whether such a belief also leads to the conclusion that it is seriously immoral to bring human beings into existence. I will argue that vegans should abstain from having children since they believe unnecessary suffering should be avoided. After all, humans will suffer in life and having children is not necessary for a good life. So vegans, and probably vegetarians as well, should not have children. I will consider several objections against this controversial claim and show why the objections are not entirely convincing.

Practical Philosophy Seminar - Oda Storbråten Davanger

"A New Reading of the Rights Paradox for Identities of Difference in Democracy"

Time and place: May 11, 2021 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Zoom

Abstract:

A phenomenological approach to understanding identities of difference such as gender or race has emerged as a third option to the two dominant modes of understanding the political “self”. These two are universal humanism emphasizing sameness for all human beings in the liberal tradition on the one hand, and the communitarian tradition emphasizing plurality and differences on the other hand. These two traditions lead to different solutions for democratic equality: The former ascribes to formal equality under the law in neutral terms, whereas the latter favors affirmative action and quotas that takes advantage of differenced identities to overcome structures of domination.

I defend political philosopher Wendy Brown’s Rights Paradox against criticism in order to demonstrate why a phenomenological approach is useful for understanding the kinds of democratic issues at play in movements such as #MeToo and Black Lives Matter. According to Brown, neutral rights fail to rectify injustice by presuming apriori equality whereas identity-specific rights rely on identities as being othered and subordinated. The claimant is then forced to publicly subsume a subordinated, othered identity in order to call upon the law to address an injustice, which evokes ressentiment or a ‘wounded attachment’ to one’s identity of difference. I propose a reading of the paradox that relies on phenomenological notions of the symbolic, and articulates a problem for identity-based emancipation movements in democracy; engaging the very premises of a logic it aims to disavow.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Alejandra Mancilla, "Effective disoccupation"

Time and place: May 4, 2021 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Zoom

Alejandra Mancilla, Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas, University of Oslo.

In international law, the doctrine of effective occupation was developed by imperial and colonial powers to justify their sovereignty over newly annexed territories, and was measured by two criteria: animus occupandi, that is, the right will or intention to be sovereign over the territory; and corpus occupandi, that is, the actual exercise of sovereignty to mark presence in the territory. What counted as “actual”, however, was narrowly understood as having a legal and institutional system similar enough to the European, thus allowing for the dispossession and loss of control of the native inhabitants over the lands that the European colonized.

The morally outrageous implications of this narrow concept of sovereignty for the subjected peoples were denounced with increasing force especially since the second half of the twentieth century, giving way to a process of global decolonization that raised the number of states from around 90 in the 1950s to 195 today, and counting. However, the morally outrageous implications of this narrow concept of sovereignty for the nonhuman, natural world remain intact. Today, both the ex-colonial powers and the newly independent states enjoy Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, which has allowed not only the use, but the overuse and abuse of the nonhuman, natural world. The consequences are staring us in our face, the most obvious being climate change and the biodiversity crisis.

In this article, I propose a transition from effective occupation to effective disoccupation when it comes to the nonhuman, natural world—not only on the grounds that we must, but also on the grounds that we should. To enact effective disoccupation, states must show animus disoccupandi, that is, the right will or intention to give up Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and to replace it with Permanent Trusteeship. To this must be added the corpus disoccupandi, to wit, the concrete, actual exercise of trusteeship over the territory.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Espen Dyrnes Stabell

"Moral Uncertainty and Moral Theory: A Tension"

Time and place: Apr. 27, 2021 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Zoom

Abstract

In recent years, a substantial literature has emerged on decision making under moral uncertainty – that is, decision making when agents are uncertain about which moral view/theory is correct or should guide their decisions/actions in particular situations. In this talk, I consider what I will refer to as the decision theoretic approach to moral uncertainty, notably as developed by MacAskill, Bykvist and Ord in the recent book Moral Uncertainty (Oxford UP, 2020). More specifically, I discuss a tension between the decision theoretic approach and what I take to be a plausible view of the nature of (at least some central) moral theories. The dilemma is the following: In order for moral decision making to be rational, it seems that it should take moral uncertainty into account in something like the way suggested by the authors of Moral Uncertainty. However, taking moral theory seriously might mean that taking credences and preferences over moral theories into account as suggested by the decision theoretic approach can be morally problematic. In the talk, I will explain the dilemma further and discuss how practical philosophers might respond to it

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Maria Seim

"No unified account of 'standing'"

Time and place: Apr. 20, 2021 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Online

Abstract: 

It has recently become fashionable to use the term ‘standing’ when determining who can and should respond to moral wrongdoing. What is wrong with hypocritical blame, meddlesome blame and third-party forgiveness, the standard view has it, is that the blamer, or forgiver, lacks standing to respond to the wrong in question. In this paper I address some important challenges to the current use of this term. Macalester Bell (2013) and Matt King (2019) have suggested that what makes these moral responses wrong is not that the responder lacks standing, but that the responses are wrong in virtue of some independent moral fault. Just like we can be petty, stingy, or arrogant when responding to moral wrongdoing, we can be hypocritical or meddlesome – and these faults have nothing to do with the standing of the responder (Bell 2013:275). There are two ways of interpreting this challenge. It can either mean that whether or not you have standing does not influence the propriety of blame. Or, it can be interpreted as challenging whether there is such a thing as ‘standing’ in the first place; and thus that ‘standing’ is simply a term used to avoid explaining what is wrong with hypocrisy and meddling. I argue that only the latter of these interpretations poses a real challenge to our use of the term. To address the real challenge, I explore whether we have a general understanding of ‘standing’ that applies to all the cases where it is used. I conclude that we do not, and that there are different conceptions of standing at play in the literature. None of the extant conceptions of standing can be extended to all the suggested standing conditions.

Practical Philosophy Webinar: Johan Vorland Wibye

Title: "The Liberty to Attempt Referral as Right to Conscientious Objection"

Time and place: Mar. 23, 2021 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Online: Zoom

Johan is a postdoctoral fellow at PluriCourts, working on applied rights theory as a means of clarifying and evaluating claims about graded legitimacy standards for international courts. He also has research interests in legal theory, practical ethics, administrative law, legal methods, and constitutional law.

Abstract:

Currently, scholarship about the permissibility of conscientious objection (CO) in health care does not systematically account for the standing of liberties to attempt referral of patients which lack a companion claim that the request be accommodated. Failure to recognise the inherent significance of such liberties, masks normatively significant distinctions between policy options. For the right-holder, the liberty’s value lies in the ability to attempt referral without violating a duty, even when the referral may be accommodated for reasons not ostensibly related to conscience, and even when the outcome of the attempt is uncertain. For those who are accommodated, the liberty translates into the tangible benefit of not having to act against one’s conscience. Furthermore, granting mere liberties to healthcare workers produces functionally similar results as versions of a right to CO that are conditional on the individual motivations of healthcare workers, such as genuineness or reasonableness standards. In order to adequately specify the content of the rights they are advocating or opposing, participants in the moral debate on CO should thus clarify their stance on liberties to attempt referral. If liberties to attempt referral are not rights to CO, then any jurisdiction requiring individual assessment of objectors risks being classified as not granting such a right. Conversely, if liberties to attempt referral are rights to CO, some jurisdictions not formally considered to recognise conscience-based refusals, such as Norway and Sweden, should be considered as granting such a right, albeit in a severely limited form.

Practical Philosophy Webinar: Anne-Sofie Greisen Højlund

Anne Sofie Greisen Højlund, Aarhus University. Title: "Towards Testimonial Justice: The Case of Sexual Misconduct Accusations"

Time and place: Mar. 16, 2021 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Online: Zoom

Abstract:

How should testimonial injustice be understood and what can be done politically to counteract it in the context of sexual misconduct accusations? A common response to sexual misconduct accusations is to cast doubt on the credibility of the speaker—even in the absence of good reason. Building on central elements of relational egalitarianism, this paper scrutinizes such undue credibility assessment as a case of failure to relate to others as epistemic equals. It argues that this is objectionable in and of itself and because it typically leaves people worse off in terms of protecting their rights and interests. Distinguishing between policies targeting the individual and institutional level, the paper suggests promoting epistemic recognition respect through civic education programs; reforming the standards for what counts as evidence for or against the credibility of a testifier to sexual misconduct; and implementing a system of external controls and sanctions to check the practice of dealing with accusations of sexual misconduct in the criminal justice system.

Building a more comprehensive, normative theory of competency placement

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Colin Rowe (KU Leuven, Belgium). "Building a more comprehensive, normative theory of competency placement".

Time and place: Mar. 9, 2021 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Zoom

Abstract:

Should the EU be in charge of COVID-19 vaccine procurement? Should we have global entities that ensure human rights? Should environmental protection be administered by local governments, or by states, or globally?

These are questions of competency placement or questions of ‘what level of government should be in charge of which things.’ They ask ‘who should be in charge of what?’ which, surprisingly, has been understudied in political theory. There are many theories of distributive justice which help us understand how best to distribute benefits and burdens in a society (see: Rawls, Dworkin, Cairns…) and even more theories of sovereignty that argue why ultimate authority should be placed at a particular level of government (see, for instance, Miller or Tamir argue for the nation-state and almost every other major philosopher throughout history). None of this speaks directly to how different levels of government, normatively, should be organized. The theories that do speak to this, such as all-affectedness or subsidiarity are not only conceptually and normatively vague, but also incomplete (should the administration of human rights, or a military really be closest to the individual as possible as subsidiarity says?). I argue that there is value (practical and normative), in producing a more comprehensive theory of competency placement. In this presentation I will briefly summarize what we are missing and present a working outline such a theory.

Bio:

Colin Rowe, KU Leuven
Doctoral Candidate
https://hiw.kuleuven.be/ripple/people/00119700

Colin is a doctoral candidate at RIPPLE (KU Leuven, Belgium). He is from Victoria, BC, Canada and worked in Yukon (northern Canada) in Indigenous relations before starting his degree. He works on normative political theory with forthcoming papers on federalism in Ethiopia and the requirement to assistance immigrants with language acquisition. While his doctoral thesis is on competency placement and he is working on papers on simplicity and voting, and individual responsibility for state actions, he is also interested in the normative considerations of space exploration, population ethics, the interplay between cultural norms and immigration, incorporating meaningfulness into peoples lives and environmental ethics.

2020

Practical Philosophy Group – Annual Workshop 2020

Due to coronavirus restrictions, this event will be held online.

Time and place: Nov. 19, 2020 10:45 AM–4:00 PM, Online

The workshop is open to all. If you are interested in attending on Zoom, please send an e-mail to okdavang@uio.no before Friday November 12th.

Program

• 09.30-10.00 Coffee and welcome
• 10.00-10.45 Feroz M. Shah "Is there s Kantian duty to promote public schools?"
• 11.00-11.45 Antoinette Scherz "How Much Justice Does Legitimacy Require? Evaluating the CJEU's Service in Normative Terms"
• 11.45-12.15 Coffee break
• 12.15-13.00 Colin Rowe "Keeping it simple: the importance og avoiding voting system complexity"
• 13.00-14.00 Lunch
• 14.00-14.45 Johan A. Trovik "A right to break the law? On the political function and moral grounds of civil disobedience"
• 15.00-15.45 Aksel Sterri "Should we save life years or lives? The relevance og hope"
• 18.00 Dinner

Presenters

• Colin Rowe, Ph.D. Candidate (Philosophy, KU Leuven)
• Antoinette Scherz, Postdoctoral Fellow (PluriCourts, UiO)
• Aksel B. Sterri, Doctoral Research Fellow (Philosophy, UiO)
• Johan Andreas Trovik, Ph.D. Candidate (Department of Politics, Princeton University)

Practical Philosophy Webinar: Lars Christie

Lars Christie (Innland Norway University of Applied Sciences)

"In defense of mistaken killers"

Time and place: Nov. 10, 2020 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Online: Zoom

Sometimes people kill others through innocent mistakes. Consider a person who unknowingly catches a deadly virus and passes it to another, causing the death of that person. Or a competent fire truck driver who veers off the road due to an oil spill, killing a pedestrian. Consider finally a police officer or a soldier who kills an apparent attacker they are justified in believing are about to kill an innocent person.

Is there a moral difference between innocent killers like these? Several authors have attempted to draw a distinction between the unknowingly infectious person and the fire driver on the one hand, and the police and soldier who engage in mistaken other-defense on the other. According to this view, there is a moral symmetry between innocent killers of the first sort and their victims, while a moral asymmetry (to the victim’s advantage) holds between those who kill others in mistaken other-defence and their victims

In my paper, I dispute this distinction. I argue that both types of innocent killings belong to a category of Unavoidable Mistakes. I compare the harm inflicted through Unavoidable Mistakes with collateral harm. It is widely considered that foreseeably harming innocents as part of a military attack is permissible, if it is necessary and proportionate to the moral value of the military attack.  I argue that we ought to think about Unavoidable Mistakes in the same manner. Insofar as such mistakes form an unavoidable part of a type of action that is overall morally justified (driving of fire-trucks, engaging in self-defence), we ought to evaluate such mistakes the same way as we evaluate collateral harm.  

If my view is right, there is a moral symmetry between just soldiers and those unjust soldiers who are innocent in believing that they are fighting for a just cause. The upshot of this is that wars are harder to justify than what international law and the majority of current just war theorists would have us believe.

Zoom: The links to the zoom meetings will be sent to all those in the mailing list. If you wish to get the information weekly, please send an email to Oda Davanger (okdavang@uio.no).

Practical Philosophy Webinar: Espen Dyrnes Stabell

"Conceptual Engineering and Applied Ethics"

Time and place: Nov. 3, 2020 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Online: Zoom

Abstract

Conceptual engineering involves improving concepts for social or epistemic purposes. Should applied ethicists engage in conceptual engineering? Three possibilities are explored: that applied ethics (AE) should never involve conceptual engineering (CE); that AE should always involve CE; and that AE should sometimes, or under certain circumstances, involve CE. It is argued that there is reason for AE to engage in CE when concepts are ‘defective’ in the sense of being counterproductive with regard to social aims – such as welfare promotion and social justice – or ethically relevant epistemic aims, such as achieving a better understanding of a socially or morally relevant phenomenon. However, even if concepts can be defective in this way, it might be very difficult to identify and ameliorate defective concepts in the context of applied ethics. I suggest a strategy that can be employed in at least some core cases of applied ethics.

Zoom: The links to the zoom meetings will be sent to all those in the mailing list. If you wish to get the information weekly, please send an email to Oda Davanger (okdavang@uio.no).

Espen Dyrnes Stabell , NTNU.

Practical Philosophy Webinar: Johan Olsthoorn

Johan Olsthoorn, KU Leuven.

"Rights, Standing, and Liability in the Ethics of War"

Time and place: Oct. 27, 2020 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Online: Zoom

Abstract: Waging a war of national self-defence against unjust foreign aggression, some revisionist just war theorists have argued, can be morally impermissible. Proportionality requirements and duties of care owed to nationals can render it morally mandatory for political communities to surrender national territory to unjust aggressors. This paper assumes the soundness of this contested view in order to spell out the normative conditions of victims and attackers should the former nonetheless, and wrongly, resort to defensive war. (As was the case, perhaps, in the 1939 Finnish-Soviet war.) I canvass their respective normative conditions using the distinction between directed and nondirected liberty-rights (Sreenivasan 2010). Directed liberty-rights express the absence upon the right-holder of directed duties as against some other party. Deontological liberty-rights, by contrast, are non-directed all-things-considered moral permissions. When faced with conditional political aggression, I suggest, political communities may be morally obliged to abstain from exercising their directed liberty-right to wage defensive war against unjust aggressors. Yet if they contravene this requirement, and impermissibly inflict (narrowly proportionate) defensive harm upon unjust enemy combatants, then the latter are neither wronged by this, nor have standing to complain. The proposed analysis has some theoretical significance: it suggests that rival conceptions of moral liability are suited for different purposes. On internalist and comparativist conceptions, liability informs statements of what agents can justifiably do (to others). On externalist and non-comparativist conceptions, by contrast, liability can capture the distinctive standing wrongdoers occupy vis-à-vis their victims. The two functions may come apart. The language of directed and nondirected liberty-rights, I suggest in conclusion, helps integrate a second-personal dimension into the ethics of war.

Zoom: The links to the zoom meetings will be sent to all those in the mailing list. If you wish to get the information weekly, please send an email to Oda Davanger (okdavang@uio.no).

Johan Olsthoorn, Assistant professor in political theory, University of Amsterdam; Senior postdoctoral research fellow at KU Leuven, Institute of Philosophy.

Practical Philosophy Webinar: Hallvard Sandven

Title: ‘Domination and border control: a restatement’

Time and place: Oct. 13, 2020 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Online: Zoom

Abstract

Despite the surge of interest in republicanism and its associated theory of freedom as non-domination, on the one hand, and in migration and border control, on the other, there have been relatively few attempts to combine the two in contemporary political theory. One explanation for this lack of engagement is that the ideal of non-domination can seem indeterminate when applied to the institution of border control and, by extension, that republican political theory can seem ill-equipped to theorise the regulation of international movement. This paper will explain the source of this problem of indeterminacy and argue that it arises on a particular conception of how border controls function. It will then show that, once we appreciate how many states currently seek to regulate migration, non-domination can ground a normative framework for migration with significant explanatory power and critical capacity.

Zoom: The links to the zoom meetings will be sent to all those in the mailing list. If you wish to get the information weekly, please send an email to Oda Davanger (okdavang@uio.no).

Hallvard Sandven, Ph.D. Candidate, Oxford University.

Practical Philosophy Webinar: Alejandra Mancilla

Title: "From sovereignty to trusteeship: Antarctica’s model for global natural resource governance"

Time and place: Sep. 22, 2020 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Online: Zoom

Abstract

Recent scientific studies suggest that the destabilization of the earth’s climate and biodiversity loss are not separate, but interdependent phenomena. In this context, some have proposed the creation of a “global safety net” of spaces that should be preserved to reverse biodiversity loss, prevent more CO2 emissions from land conversion, and allow natural carbon removal. In this article, I claim that one way to achieve this is to freeze state sovereignty over land and natural resources in these areas and replace it with state trusteeship. I propose to follow a model that has already been implemented over a whole continent with a fair degree of success: in 1959, the Antarctic Treaty froze the sovereign claims of seven countries over Antarctica, but these countries (plus 48 others today) have been remarkably successful in preserving the continent for peace, science and the protection of the environment. After addressing a series of objections, I present what a Global Environmental Protocol could look like.

Zoom: The links to the zoom meetings will be sent to all those in the mailing list. If you wish to get the information weekly, please send an email to Oda Davanger (okdavang@uio.no).

Practical Philosophy Webinar: Espen Dyrnes Stabell

"Why environmental philosophers should be ‘buck-passers’ about value"

Time and place: May 12, 2020 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Online

Value theory is central to environmental ethics, which studies the value and moral status of the environment and its non-human contents. A variety of values have been proposed and discussed in environmental ethics, and there has been extensive debate over the value of different parts of nature. However, there has been less discussion about how to understand the concept of value and its relation to reasons and normativity.

This paper defends a buck-passing account of value, which holds that for an entity or state of affairs in nature to be intrinsically (non-instrumentally) valuable is for it to have properties (other than that of being valuable) that provide reasons to promote or have a pro-attitude towards it. It is argued that in spite of some difficulties with the account, environmental philosophers should prefer it to ‘common-sense’ views treating values themselves as reason-providing properties of (things or states of affairs in) nature. The paper concludes by discussing some implications the buck-passing account may have for research in environmental ethics.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Kerstin Reibold

Kerstin Reibold (Arctic University of Norway), "Climate Change and Indigenous Rights"

Time and place: Apr. 28, 2020 1:15 PM–2:00 PM, Online

Abstract

Indigenous peoples are one of the most vulnerable groups worldwide. Climate change threatens to impose even greater harm on them in the future. Many indigenous lands will become unusable and the ecological systems that they have relied on will shift or be destroyed. In other cases, indigenous land will become even more valuable because of its carbon sequestration capacity, its biodiversity, and its other natural resources. This increase in value will heighten the pressure on indigenous land and resource rights. In my talk, I will think about these challenges within two frameworks: global welfare egalitarianism and indigenous treaty ecologies. I will ask whether these two approaches to land and resource rights are compatible, where there are frictions, and which solutions they can offer for the question of indigenous rights under conditions of climate change.

Webinar: Practical Philosophy Seminar: Maria Seim

"The standing to forgive and conditional forgiveness"

Time and place: Apr. 21, 2020 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Webinar in Zoom

Abstract

The philosophical literature on the standing to forgive is divided. Some argue that only victims have the standing to forgive (Murphy and Hampton 1988, Walker 2013), while others argue that third parties also have the standing to forgive (Pettigrove 2009, MacLachlan 2008, Chaplin 2019). This paper argues for the victim’s unique standing to forgive by way of a specific account of the nature of forgiveness. When accounting for forgiveness we are met with the ‘paradox of forgiveness’. In solving the paradox, we end up with an account of forgiveness that denies the possibility of third party forgiveness.

Maria Seim, Doctoral Research Fellow in Practical Philosophy, University of Oslo.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Joona Räsänen

"Should acknowledgements in published work include gratitude for reviewers who reviewed for journals that rejected the work?"

Time and place: Mar. 10, 2020 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Georg Morgenstiernes hus, room 452

Abstract

It is a common practice for authors of scientific work to thank anonymous reviewers of a journal that publish their work. Allegedly, scholars thank the reviewers because their comments improved the quality of the paper and thanking them is a proper way to show gratitude to them. Yet, often a paper is rejected from multiple journals before finding a journal that accepts it. However, authors do not thank reviewers of journals that end up rejecting their work even though comments from those reviewers often improve the quality of the work. We contacted prominent scholars in bioethics and philosophy of medicine and asked whether thanking journal reviewers of journals that rejected the work would be a welcome trend. Receiving responds from 107 scholars, we discuss the suggested proposal in light of both philosophical argument and the results of this questionnaire study. We argue that when an author’s work is published, the author should thank the reviewers whose comments improved the quality of the paper regardless whether the comments came from reviewers who reviewed for journals that rejected or accepted the work. That is because scholars should show gratitude to those who deserve it and those whose comments improved the quality of the paper deserves gratitude. We also consider objections against this practice raised by scholars in the questionnaire and show why we think they are not entirely persuasive.

Joona Räsänen is PhD Research Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Oslo.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Kim Angell

Kim Angell, "Freedom and Democratic Inclusion: Two Versions of the All-Subjected to Coercion Principle"

Time and place: Mar. 3, 2020 12:15 PM–2:00 PM, Georg Morgenstiernes hus, room 452

Abstract

This paper analyses a prominent principle in the debate on democratic inclusion, the all-subjected to coercion principle (ASC). According to ASC, a person has a right to inclusion in a polity’s decisions if and only if those decisions (will) coerce her.

My paper has two aims. First, based upon the well-known distinction between liberal and republican freedom, I identify two different versions of ASC, and map the degree of commitment to those versions in the current debate. Second, I argue that proponents of ASC have good reason to favor its liberal version. Doing so will enable them generally to withhold the franchise from people whom they typically (but not invariably) aim to exclude: those permanently located outside the polity’s territory and those who are transient visitors in it.

Kim Angell, Centre for Philosophy and Public Policy, Department of Culture and Learning, Aalborg University.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Sebastian Watzl

"Meditation and the Ethics of Distraction"

Time and place: Feb. 11, 2020 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Georg Morgenstiernes hus, room 452

Abstract

Meditation and Mindfulness practices are advertised and implemented on a large scale (estimated to be worth more than 1 Billion USD in the US alone). Those practices are promoted as tool to help us cope with practical problems that are the result of our age of distraction: from reducing stress, and anxiety, to increasing compassion, and dealing substance abuse or weight gain. I argue that this focus on how to change us (and our children) is misguided. Rather, we should focus on changing them: being distracted is not in itself bad. What is morally problematic is that someone else is distracting us from what is in fact important for us and gains de facto control over our mind. Our age of distraction is an age of distractors: powerful individuals and companies that engage in mental manipulation and threaten our autonomy. The massive commodification of attention is morally problematic, and our moral focus should be on how to change and regulate the attention market.

Sebastian Watzl is Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Oslo.

Workshop: "Land rights in a changing climate"

Time and place: Jan. 30, 2020 9:00 AM–Jan. 31, 2020 4:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

Thursday

• 09.00-09.30 Coffee and welcome
• 09.30-11.00 Clare Heyward /UiT) and Dominic Lenzi (Mercator Research Institute on Global Commond and Climate Change), "Global sinks and local carbon rights: Improveing arguments for special claims"
• 11.00-11.15 Coffee break
• 11.15-12.45 Alejandra Mancilla (UiO), "Occupancy Rights: Dunamic As Well As Located"
• 12.45-13.45 Lunch
• 13.45-16.00 Writing session
• 18.00 Dinner

Friday

• 09.00-09.30 Coffee and welcome
• 09.30-10.30 Megan Blomfiels (University og Sheffield), "Land as a global commins?"
• 10.30-10.45 Coffee break
• 10.45-11.45 Kerstin Reibold (UiT), "Indigenous land rights under climate change"
• 11.45-12.00 Break
• 12.00-13.00 Matthew Coffay (UiB), "Sustainability in Norwegian agriculture: The normative model og sustainable development and sustainability transition studies"
• 13.00-14.00 Lunch
• 14.00-16.00 Writing session

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Christopher Bertram

"Restricted mobility and climate emergency"

Time and place: Jan. 21, 2020 12:15 PM–2:00 PM, Georg Morgenstiernes hus, room 452

Abstract

Some climate activists and political philosophers have suggested that migration to wealthy countries may need to be restricted in order to reduce carbon emissions. Such arguments are the flip side of some pro-migration arguments from economists. Starting from a methodological framework that rules governing human mobility have to be justifiable to everyone, I argues that restrictions that push the costs of climate mitigation of those who are already sufferering from its consequences are unjustified, but that intensifies the obligation of the already-wealthy to pursue rapid decarbonization.

Christopher Bertram is Professor of Social and Political Philosophy at the University of Bristol.

Program

• 12.15-14 Seminar on "Restricted mobility and climate emergency"
• 14-15 Lunch
• 15-17 Meeting with students

2019

Practical Philosophy Group - Annual Workshop

Time and place: Nov. 21, 2019 9:00 AM–Nov. 22, 2019 4:00 PM, Georg Morgenstiernes hus, room 452

Practical Philosophy Seminar. Anna Smajdor: "Drag and blackface: equally objectionable?"

Time and place: Nov. 12, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

The BBC recently reported on Justin Trudeau’s apology for having used ‘blackface’[1] at an Arabian nights themed party in 2001.[2] Also covered on that day on BBC News, was an article celebrating the artist RuPaul’s drag act.[3] This is not the first time a public figure has expressed contrition about ‘blacking up’. Some years ago the British comedian and actor Lenny Henry wrote about his shame and regret for having participated in a ‘black and white minstrels’ show.[4] Henry himself has also appeared in drag[5] but has never to my knowledge expressed any kind of sorrow or regret over this. Yet at a superficial glance, drag and blackface share some similarities. In both, the characteristics of a specific biologically-defined group are mimicked for the purposes of entertainment. So why is it that the two phenomena are treated so differently?

Rebecca Tuvel’s widely publicised paper ‘In defense of transracialism’, argues that 'considerations that support transgenderism seem to apply equally to transracialism'.[6] If this is the case it might seem to strengthen the idea that drag is at least potentially as objectionable as blackface. Tuvel discusses the idea that it is offensive to 'don' black identity, suggesting that it could be viewed as 'insulting or otherwise harmful' to do so. She mentions the 'horrid history of white people pretending to be black.' According to Tuvel ‘There are myriad insulting and harmful ways one could assume a black identity’. It seems that one could make many of the same points about the ‘donning’ of female identity in drag performances.

But Tuvel’s paper, of course, sparked a wave of outrage and controversy. Transgenderism is far more widely accepted as a ‘real’ phenomenon than ‘transracialism’.[7] What is true of gender is not necessarily true of race, and vice versa. Could this distinction contribute to, or justify, the different ways in which we respond to drag and blackface? In my analysis, I will consider whether the gulf between the social acceptability of drag and blackface respectively, could be reasonably ascribed to a simple failure of blackface to correlate with a ‘real’ phenomenon of transracialism in the way that drag could be correlated with transgenderism.

I will suggest that though superficially plausible, this explanation does not ultimately convince. Therefore, we should be prepared to regard drag acts as being similar enough to blackface acts to warrant similar responses, whether these responses are outrage and offense, or amusement and hilarity.

Footnontes

[1] I take ‘blackface’ to be the use of makeup to darken one’s features, possibly in conjunction with other measures to mimic ‘black’ characteristics.

[2] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49749851

[3] https://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-49737795/rupaul-s-drag-race-uk-hits-the-pink-carpet

[4] https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/lenny-henry-on-racism-and-regret-673j707tckk

[5] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wTrnLJfoTQE

[6] Tuvel R. In defense of transracialism. Hypatia. 2017 May;32(2):263-78.

[7] Botts TF. In Black and White: A Hermeneutic Argument against. Res Philosophica. 2018 Apr 3;95(2):303-29.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Joona Räsänen

"Epigenetic harm"

Time and place: Oct. 29, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

Developments in the emerging field of epigenetics have shown that lifestyle habits such as eating unhealthy food can have an impact on future generations’ health. In this paper, I focus on the ethics of intergenerational aspects of epigenetics and argue that parents impose harm upon their future children by consuming unhealthy food and therefore they wrong their future children.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Christel Fricke

Time and place: Oct. 22, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Attila Tanyi (Arctic University of Norway)

Time and place: Oct. 15, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 467, Georg Morgenstiernes Hus

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Yelena Yermakova, TBA

Time and place: Oct. 8, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, Georg Morgenstiernes Hus

Workshop "On interspecies relations: Moral Status, Rights and Conflicts"

Time and place: Sep. 26, 2019 9:30 AM–10:30 AM, Room 652, GM Hus

Program

• Ursula Müster (University of Oslo): "Animatin the Forest in a South Indian naturalcultural conflict zone"
• Anna Wienhues (University of Zurich): "Political Non-ranking Biocentrism: Grounding a Framework of Ecological Justice"
• Juan Pablo Manalich (Universidad de Chile): "Animalhood, Subjectivity, and Rights"
• Alejandra Mancilla (University of Oslo): "Fluid Territory: A Preliminary Exploration"

Organizers

Organized by Alfonso Donoso (Universidad Católica de Chile) and Alejandra Mancilla (UiO).

Sponsored by Conicyt and Practical Philosophy Group.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Alejandra Mancilla, "Fluid territory: A preliminary exploration"

Time and place: Sep. 24, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Chris Armstrong (University of Southampton)

"Dealing with dictators"

Time and place: Sep. 17, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

Abstract

"Dictatorship is a moral outrage. How should outsiders - including those committed to liberal democratic principles - respond to it? A number of philosophers have argued that we have a duty to cease trading with dictatorships. I will distinguish instrumental and non-instrumental arguments for breaking off trade with dictatorships. But in each case I will show that the case for breaking off trade is harder to make than we might suppose. In fact, I will suggest, our best moral response to the horror of dictatorship might turn out to be to trade more, rather than less, with countries blighted by it."

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Alice Pinheiro-Walla (University of Bayreuth)

Kant and the Climate Crisis: A Territorial Rights Approach

Time and place: May 28, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

Kant’s ethical theory is attractive for justifying duties to curb the effects of climate change. The very idea of a categorical imperative test evokes the idea of sustainable maxims of action. However, I argue that applying Kant’s ethical theory to climate change has limitations, since it cannot adequately account for the external enforcement required by climate change policies. In contrast, Kant’s legal philosophy can account for global collective and enforceable duties to mitigate and address the effects of climate change.

I argue that that the territorial rights of states give rise to specific duties of right towards those affected by climate change globally. Because they preclude the global mobility required for climate change adaptation, the global community of states has a duty to provide a satisfactory alternative arrangement. This would involve not only a duty to mitigate climate change, but also a duty to provide assistance to those affected by climate change to adapt to the new global conditions.

I conclude with the suggestion that securing the territorial rights of indigenous peoples and local groups who interact with their land with deep environmental knowledge, genuine emotional attachment and in a sustainable way would be a possible way to do something significant towards environmental preservation in face of international political inaction and provide a model for long term change in the way we understand and interact with land.

Practical Philosophy Seminar - Antoinette Scherz: Reasons to Comply for States: How Can International Institutions Bind States?

Time and place: May 21, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

The tension between the authority of states and the authority of international institutions is a persistent feature of international relations, which legitimacy assessments of international institutions must address. Such exclusionary content-independent reasons for states to comply and not to interfere. Yet what are such reasons for states? What kind of reasons can ground authority? And are the reasons that apply do states different from those for individuals?

The paper addresses these questions by proposing an autonomy-based conception of legitimacy. It argues that self-regarding reasons cannot ground political authority with the respective demand for compliance, because the protection of autonomy needs to be valued higher. Therefore, only other-regarding reasons can ground authority. The paper argues further that reasons for states are based on reasons that apply to individuals. This highly restricts the domain of self-regarding reasons, which cannot be subject to the authority of international institutions. Finally, it discusses whether there is a difference in reasons for democratic and non-democratic states.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Einar Duenger Bøhn, "The Moral Turing Test"

Time and place: May 14, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Clare Heyward, "Intent, Nature and the Moral Significance of Climate Change Geoengineering"

Time and place: May 7, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

Without certain technological innovations, including some technologies frequently regarded as examples of “geoengineering” remaining under the 2°C threshold of “dangerous climate change” is all but impossible. As such, there is increasing interest in the development of certain geoengineering technologies, but also awareness that the development of such technologies is a source of potential moral concern.   One such concern is whether a geoengineering technology is a step too far in “interfering in nature”.  Indeed, some early definitions of “geoengineering” included the idea that a geoengineering intervention was by definition “unnatural” (Schelling 1996).  By contrast, the first piece on the ethics of geoengineering technologies argued that such technologies were permissible insofar as they are exercised in ways that do not transgress the idea of “learning to live with nature” (Jamieson 1996).  A preference for technologies perceived as being more “natural” than others has been expressed in focus group research (NERC 2010), which is arguably an example of the perennial appeal of “the natural” as a rhetorical resource (Rayner and Heyward 2013).

These moral concerns are usually expressed in terms of moral permissibility: that intentional large-scale interventions in natural systems is generally impermissible and that any given geoengineering technology is an example of such an intervention.  However, proponents of such views are sometimes charged with maintaining an implausible divide between humankind and nature, or face a counterargument that due to current circumstances, such interventions are permissible, regardless of whether they are examples of living in accordance with nature (e.g. Preston 2015).              

However, following Thomas Scanlon (2008), questions of permissibility do not exhaust the category of moral questions.  There are also questions of significance, which concern relationships.  Questions of permissibility may interact with questions of significance. In this paper, I use Scanlon’s distinction to explain why many scientists who research into certain geoengineering technologies profess a certain “reluctance” or “ambivalence” about doing so.  More generally, these attitudes are behind concerns about the oncoming of the “Anthropocene”.   

Clare Heyward is professor of philosophy at the University of Tromsø, and has published extensively on the ethics of climate change and climate justice. She is the co-editor of Climate Justice in a Non-ideal World (OUP 2016).

Practical Philosophy Seminar- Maria Seim: "Angry blame and moral protest"

Time and place: Apr. 23, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

Abstract

Blame is the social practice through which we hold each other morally responsible. When we blame we attribute responsibility for a morally bad action or attitude to a moral agent. This paper identifies blame with the moral emotion anger in an attempt to explain what blame most fundamentally is. Anger is, however, a somewhat controversial emotion. Anger has been portrayed as unpredictable and unreliable, and it has been argued that anger does not listen to reason; it ruins relationships and damages its host as well as its target. In short, we would be better of if we could rid ourselves of angry emotions altogether. This paper defends anger against its critics. By presenting and defending a paradigm based explanation of blame as angry moral protest, and identifying the goal of angry moral protest as acknowledgment and re-establishment of moral status for the victim, the importance of anger in our moral lives is revealed.    

Contemporary attempts at defining blame usually take one of three methodological approaches: concept analysis, functional theory, or a paradigm based explanation. In this paper I argue that there is no reason to differentiate between paradigm based explanations and functional theories of blame. In merging the two approaches we can argue that anger is the paradigmatic emotional response associated with blame, and that the function of angry blame is moral protest.

I identify three typical objections to this account of blame. The first is a methodological worry. The reason to chose a functional account over concept analysis is that all accounts based on concept analysis have proven vulnerable to counter examples that show how the criteria for the account can come apart from the criteria for what we commonly think of as blame. Whatever necessary condition one puts forward for blame, there seems to be a counter example of blame that does not meet this condition. If the functional account is a better method, it must be proven to be more resilient towards such counter examples.

Second, it is hard to see how there is room for private blame in an account that identifies protest as the paradigm example. Protest seems necessarily to be communicated, so how do we account for private blame on this account?

The third challenge is to show why protest is the function of blame. In psychology anger has been associated with the action tendency of wanting to take revenge or inflict pain on the wrongdoer. If blame is so closely connected to anger, it could thus be argued that a more likely function of blame is revenge.

In addition, we have the overarching question of how to vindicate a practice that has anger at its core. As mentioned, anger is morally problematic emotion, and if blame is fundamentally connected to anger, this might be a reason to stop blaming altogether, or at least to set the standards which need to be met in order for blame to be appropriate and fitting very high.

In answering to the first and second challenge, I argue that the combination of a functional account and a paradigm based account can accommodate a wider variety of attitudes and behaviors than an account that posit necessary and sufficient condition. As long as the attitude or behavior has a residue of the function the paradigm example of angry communicated blame, it can be counted as part of our blaming practice.

In answering to the second challenge I argue similarly that protest can be private, but that the paradigm example of blame is communicated, angry protest.

In answering to the third and fourth challenge I argue that wanting acknowledgment of the wrongdoing and re-establishment of moral worth is a more likely action tendency for anger, and use this analysis to counter the most common skeptical arguments against anger.

Seeing the function of blame as protest means that when we blame we protest against the wrong done towards us. When performing a morally wrong action the wrongdoer is expressing their disregard, and implicitly claiming that the victim can be treated this way, and does not deserve being treated better. Blame is the protest of this claim. When we blame we are in effect saying that what the morally wrong action is communicating is not true: We cannot be treated this way, and we deserve to be treated better. What the protest is aiming for is for the wrongdoer to acknowledge the nature of the wrong done; recant the meaning of the wrong, and thereby re-establish the moral worth of the victim.

Feminist philosophy has a long history of praising anger as a moral emotion necessary in the protest against marginalization. In the last part of the paper I draw on this philosophy to strengthen the view that blame, understood as angry protest, is an important practice that deserves vindication.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Aksel Sterri, "Reward kidney donors"

Time and place: Apr. 9, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

The current system for procuring kidneys from living donors is badly flawed. The problem is that we to a large degree treat living kidney donations as a dyadic relationship between the donor and the recipient. Besides failing to provide kidneys to those who need it, we fail to live up to widely shared ideals of fairness and equality.

In this paper, I will argue that kidney transplants are better understood as a triadic relationship, where the state plays a crucial mediating role between donors and recipients. In fact, it is the collective, not the individual, that are responsible for providing a new kidney to those that need it. If we adopt this view, we can move beyond the market-gift-dichotomy that often permeates the debate over organ transplants.

I will argue that we should generously reward people that volunteer to donate kidneys as this is a fairer way of distributing the burdens involved in providing people in need with a kidney and will express the collective’s gratitude to the donor. A sufficiently generous reward framed in a moral language of duties and rights, will also be more likely to meet the demand for kidneys. It will thus enable the collective to fulfill its responsibilities, while protecting the status of both donors and recipients.

Drawing on recent work in economics and sociology, I will argue that rather than crowding out altruistically motivated donors, it could crowd in altruistically motivated kidney vendors and have positive expressivist effects. The reward model can also deal with claims that paying people to give up kidneys wrongly commodifies kidneys and that it comes with a disadvantage to the poor.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Lars Christie, "The role of comparative and non-comparative justice in defensive harming"

Time and place: Apr. 2, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

he role of comparative and non-comparative justice in defensive harming

Abstract

Most people agree that there is a proportionality constraint on the amount of defensive harm one may impose to avert a threat of unjust harm. But how is the proportionality constraint justified?

Consider the following cases:

Negligent driver:

A driver who texts while driving is about to veer off the road threatening to paralyze a pedestrian. The pedestrian has a grenade and her only defensive option is to blow up the car, killing the negligent driver.

Negligent bicyclist:

A bicyclist who is listening to music is about to negligently hit a pedestrian, threatening to break pedestrian’s leg. The pedestrian has a grenade and her only defensive option is to throw it, killing up the bicyclist.

Does the pedestrian violate the proportionality constraint if she throws the grenade to avert the threat? Many believe that the answer is no in the first case and yes in the second. Yet providing a unified theoretical justification for these views is tricky.

If defensive harming is justified on grounds of non-comparative retributive justice, then we can justify the positive verdict in the second case by pointing out that lethal harm is disproportionate to the culpability of the negligent bicyclist. However, the retributivist approach is not able to justify the negative verdict in the first case. After all, even hard-hearted retributivist would not go as far as claiming that the culpability of the negligent driver is sufficient to make him deserve to be killed.

The opposing view that defensive harming is justified by principles of comparative distributive justice is often cashed out in roughly luck egalitarian terms. According to this view, a person who voluntarily imposes a foreseeable risk of unjust harm, may permissibly be made to carry the entire cost of averting this risk if it eventuates.  This approach is able to provide conclusion that the pedestrian may throw the grenade in the first case, but cannot explain why she cannot do so in the second.

In sum, the non-comparative approach indicate proportionality constraint that is too stringent, whereas the comparative approach seems to lack a proportionality constraint altogether.

In my talk I suggest a hybrid justification of defensive harming which invokes both comparative and non-comparative justifications. I explore the implications of this view for proportionality and necessity constraints on defensive harming.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Jahel Queralt Lange, "The Ballot and the Wallet: Self-Respect and the Fair Value of Political Liberties"

Time and place: Mar. 26, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

(co-authored with Iñigo Gonzalez Ricoy)

Economic inequalities often translate into disparities in political influence, rendering political liberties less valuable to nonaffluent citizens than to wealthier ones. Concerned with this, Rawls advocated that a guarantee of the fair value of political liberties be included in the first principle of justice as fairness, with significant regulatory and distributive implications. He nonetheless supplied little examination of the content and grounding of this guarantee, which we here offer. After examining three uncompelling arguments in its favor, we complete a more promising yet less explored argument, which builds on the value of self-respect. We first inspect the specific duties that securing self-respect commands. We then look into how the allocation of political liberties and their value bears, expressively and due to the power imbalances it entails, on how citizens perceive each other and on the reciprocal discharging of these duties.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Jesse Tomalty (University of Bergen)

The Scope Problem for Human Rights

Time and place: Mar. 19, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

The idea of universal human rights faces a problem of scope. This becomes apparent in trying to answer the seemingly simple question of who bears these rights. The seemingly obvious answer is: all and only humans. This answer implies that all and only humans share certain rights-grounding features. The trouble is that there aren’t any such features. Any rights-grounding features possessed only by humans are not shared by all humans; and any rights-grounding features shared by all humans are also possessed by members of other species. The lack of rights-grounding features shared by all and only humans entails a lack of justification for extending human rights to all humans while at once limiting their scope to only humans.

There are two ways in which the scope problem might be solved. The first is to give up on the universality of human rights, and accept that they are only held by a subset of the species. I call this the restricted scope solution. The second is to extend the scope of human rights beyond our species. I call this the expanded scope solution. Both of these solutions encounter further problems, but I argue that the expanded scope solution is preferable. I conclude with some reflections on what this solution implies for current human rights discourse and practice.

About Jesse Tomalty

Jesse Tomalty is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Bergen. Her PhD is from the University of St Andrews, and she has held positions at the University of Frankfurt, the University of Oxford, and the University of Stirling. Her main research interests are in contemporary ethics and political philosophy. Jesse has published papers on a variety of interrelated topics including the human right to subsistence, the nature of duties of assistance towards the global poor, and the relationship between moral and legal human rights. She is currently working on papers on social rights, the right to work, and the scope of human rights.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Yelena Yermakova

Time and place: Mar. 12, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

Title: "Mineral Regime in Antarctica: Territorial Status Revisited"

If you would like to read the paper in advance, please contact grethe.netland@ifikk.uio.no

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Anna Smajdor

Time and place: Mar. 5, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Alejandra Mancilla, "Superseding white colonialism"

Time and place: Feb. 26, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

Abstract: Between 1908 and 1940 a handful of colonial and wishing-to-be colonial powers claimed whole wedges of the Antarctic continent (or reserved their right to make a claim). These nine countries continued to exercise their influence over Antarctic matters after the Antarctic Treaty was signed, in 1959, and they still do so today, joined by some latecomers. In this article, I call “white colonialism” the practice of taking over vast expanses of uninhabited, “white” space, and examine three levels at which it is morally wrong in the specific case of Antarctica. I then offer some reasons why it should be superseded, address some objections, and point to some implications of the view.

If you would like to read the paper in advance, please contact our administrator, Grethe Netland.

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Mathias Slåttholm Sagdahl, "Melancholy as Responding to Reasons"

Time and place: Feb. 5, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

If you would like to read the paper in advance, please contact Grethe Netland

Practical Philosophy Seminar: Jakob Elster, "Autonomy in political philosophy"

Time and place: Feb. 12, 2019 12:15 PM–1:00 PM, Room 452, GM Hus

Abstract: The concept of autonomy is arguably one of the key concepts of political philosophy. This paper seeks to provide an overview of the different roles autonomy plays within political philosophy and of possible conflicts and tensions between these roles. I will first try to describe the concept of autonomy, as this is often understood in both moral and political philosophy. I argue that autonomy has two main aspects: first autonomy involves developing one’s own understanding of what kind of life one wants to live and what one wants to do and acting, at least with some success, based on that understanding. Next, autonomy involves having a set of normative powers, including both the power to impose laws upon oneself and immunities from others. Building in this understanding of the twin aspects of autonomy, I describe and discuss different functions the concept of autonomy has in political philosophy, notably: i) autonomy as a goal; ii) autonomy as a constraint; and iii) autonomy as a foundation.

2018

Practical Philosophy group  Annual Workshop 2018

Time and place: Oct. 11, 2018 8:45 AM–Oct. 12, 2018 3:45 PM, GM 652 University of Oslo

Thursday, October 11

• 0845 – 0900    Coffee and Welcome
• 0900 – 0945    Martin Vestergren: “Why instrumentalizing dependency is wrongful domination".
• 0945 – 1030     Hallvard Sandven: “Subjection, domination, and legitimacy in border regimes”
• 1030 – 1045    Break
• 1045 – 1130    Alejandra Mancilla: “A Normative Framework for Territorial Claims in Antarctica”
• 1130 – 1215    Yelena Yermakova: “Mineral Regime in Antarctica: Disaggregating Sovereignty”
• 1215 – 1300     Lunch
• 1300 – 1345     Johan Wibye: “One path to fulfilment or many - A sorting mechanism for positive and negative rights”
• 1345 – 1430    Carlos Joly: “Are money matters moral matters? A moral take on US and EC fiduciary duty regulation”
• 1430 – 1445     Break
• 1445 – 1530     Søren Wenstøp: “The moral psychology of corruption in orgnaizations”
• 1530 – 1615     Aksel Sterri: “The Ethics of Emergencies”

Friday, October 12

• 0945 – 1000    Coffee
• 1000 – 1045    Espen Dyrnes Stabell: “Hard Environmental Choices: Comparability, Justification, and the Argument from Moral Identity”.
• 1045 – 1130    Maria Seim: “Standing to blame and meddling”
• 1130 – 1215    Lunch
• 1215 – 1400    Key Note:Peter Railton: TBA
• 1400 – 1415    Break
• 1415 – 1500    Einar Duenger Bøhn: “AlphaMoral”
• 1500 – 1545    Jeroen Rijnders: “"Moral Agency, Automaticity, and Character: A Tripartite Model"