Abstract: Generally, unity is the phenomenon of many as one. There are many different kinds of unity, e.g., those related to composition, predication, explanation, properties, propositions, facts, and so on. A number of standard metaphysical views are locally disunified in the sense that they reject one or more kinds of unity. But this raises a natural question: how disunified can a metaphysics be? That is, how many kinds of unity can we feasibly do without? In this paper, we explore this question in detail by exploring the feasibility of what we call metaphysical minimalism---the view that there are unstructured atomic propositions and that is all there is. (The view is closely related to Turner's (2016) factalism.) In particular, we try to see whether a radically disunified metaphysics such as minimalism can nonetheless recover the basic entailment patterns between propositions captured in propositional logic. We prove that it can, introducing a minimalist-friendly sequent calculus that has the expressive power of classical propositional logic (thereby filling in a lacuna in Turner’s book). But in doing so we show that adherents must accept some basic unities involved in plural logic.