Teaching
Russian studies, Russian history of ideas, , nationalism and ethnic conflict
Academic Interests
Russia, ethnic conflicts,de facto states, nationalism / nation building, religion / church history, history of ideas
Research projects
Tags:
Russia,
post-Soviet states,
de facto states,
Russian history,
Identity politics,
Nationalism,
Church History
Publications
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Blakkisrud, Helge & Kolstø, Pål
(2025).
Introduction: Values-based Legitimation in Putin’s Russia.
In Blakkisrud, Helge & Kolstø, Pål (Ed.),
Political Legitimacy and Traditional Values in Putin's Russia.
Edinburgh University Press.
ISSN 9781399539005.
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Tyldum, Guri & Kolstø, Pål
(2025).
1 Russian Popular Values under President Putin: A ‘Conservative Turn’ – or Anomie?
In Blakkisrud, Helge & Kolstø, Pål (Ed.),
Political Legitimacy and Traditional Values in Putin's Russia.
Edinburgh University Press.
ISSN 9781399539005.
p. 25–49.
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1 Russian Popular Values under President Putin: A ‘Conservative Turn’ – or Anomie? was published in Political Legitimacy and Traditional Values in Putin's Russia on page 25.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2025).
“Thou shalt not kill”: Opposition to the war in Ukraine among Russian Orthodox believers.
In Rimestad, Sebastian & Saggau, Emil Hilton (Ed.),
Fault Lines in the Orthodox World
Geopolitics, Theology, and Diplomacy in Light of the War in Ukraine.
Palgrave Macmillan.
ISSN 9783031815041.
p. 203–234.
doi:
10.1007/978-3-031-81505-8_8.
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Kolstø, Pål & Kolov, Bojidar Angelov
(2024).
The Religious Component in Contemporary Russian Imperialism.
Religions.
15(9).
doi:
10.3390/rel15091138.
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Ever since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, various voices in the Russian public sphere have been trying to make sense of Russia’s new place in the world, its geopolitical horizons, and the identity of its people. One of the dominant trends that have emerged is Orthodox imperialism, which combines religious symbols and narratives with a geopolitical vision of Russian expansion and “reunification”. This article provides an overview of the Russian Orthodox imperialist voices, analysing the political norms and identities they have enabled. Our investigation shows that by advancing a programme that combines geopolitical restoration and eschatological religious mis-sion, Orthodox imperialism offers an ideological solution to the problem of Russia’s lost great-power status. This solution, however, does not envisage a bright future for Russia or the world. On the contrary, it remains firmly fixated on the past, foretelling of an apocalyptic disaster if Moscow does not regain its former imperial glory and exercise its divine role as a “restrainer” to any global domination.
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Blakkisrud, Helge; Gelashvili, Tamta; Kemoklidze, Nino & Kolstø, Pål
(2024).
Does recognition matter? Exploring patron penetration of de-facto state structures.
Territory, Politics, Governance.
ISSN 2162-2671.
doi:
10.1080/21622671.2024.2323104.
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De facto states seek international recognition. But do patron states that extend such recognition to their de-facto state clients treat them differently than they would have done otherwise? Will patrons, having extended official recognition, be more inclined to treat their clients as ‘regular’ states? Or does recognition only make the client more beholden to the patron? To investigate this, we explore whether granting recognition affects the degree of patron-state penetration of two sectors critical to the de facto state for retaining (internal) sovereignty and agency: the executive branch, and the military.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2024).
Eurasia’s de Facto States after Russia’s Attack on Ukraine: Client Reactions to Patron Decline.
Problems of Post-Communism.
ISSN 1075-8216.
72(4),
p. 285–296.
doi:
10.1080/10758216.2024.2427604.
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Patron–client relationship depends on the evolving international situation. Russia’s war in Ukraine has weakened Russia’s ability to support client economically, in addition, Russia’s reputation as has patron suffered. In this situation, the Eurasian de facto states that have Russia as their patron, have reacted differently: Abkhazia and South Ossetia have made moves to huddle more closely together with their patron. Transnistria has signaled willingness to distance themselves from Russia, by allowing grain to be exported from Ukraine over their territory to Romania. The article examines the causes behind the changed vectors of de facto state orientation vis-à-vis the patron.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2023).
Ukrainians and Russians as ‘One People’: An Ideologeme and its Genesis.
Ethnopolitics.
ISSN 1744-9057.
doi:
10.1080/17449057.2023.2247664.
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Vladimir Putin has numerous times claimed that ‘Ukrainians and Russians are one people’; this was part of the legitimation for the attack on Ukraine in February 2022. This article examines the prehistory of this claim in Russian nationalist thinking both in recent times and in the tsarist era. It is argued that the claim differs from and is more sinister than the pre-revolutionary idea of a ‘triune Russian nation’ consisting of Great Russians, Little Russians ( = Ukrainians) and Belarussians, for the simple reason that the term ‘Russians’ (russkie) does not refer to the same group of people in the two contexts.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2023).
The Russian Orthodox Church and its fight against abortion: taking on the state and losing.
Religion, State and Society.
ISSN 0963-7494.
51(2),
p. 153–173.
doi:
10.1080/09637494.2023.2190290.
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During Vladimir Putin’s presidency, and in particular since the enthronement of Patriarch Kirill (2009), the Russian Orthodox Church has invested considerable energy and prestige in its fight against abortion. Nevertheless, the strategy adopted by the ROC seems ill-conceived and in many ways has proved counterproductive in terms of the goals which the ROC has set itself. While certain restrictions on the right to abortion have been introduced under Putin, this has been a far cry from the complete abortion ban advocated by the ecclesiastical leadership under Patriarch Kirill
and supported by virtually all Orthodox believers who have
expressed themselves publicly. At the same time, survey results as well as circumstantial evidence suggest that most Russians, including many who declare themselves to be Orthodox, have been reluctant to support a campaign for a ban on abortion. When the church leaders have failed to impress the public or the politicians,they have not readjusted their message towards more accommodating positions. The top hierarchs have been deeply involved in the anti-abortion drive and there are few signs of disagreements within the ROC leadership on this issue. However, the abortion issue threatens to sour relations between the ROC and the Putin regime
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Kolstø, Pål
(2022).
What’s in a name? “De facto states”, terminological choices and normative consequences.
Пути к миру и безопасности.
ISSN 2307-1494.
62(1),
p. 30–46.
doi:
10.20542/2307-1494-2022-1-30-46.
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There are a handful of territories around the globe that have state-like qualities
such as governments, police, and tax collection, but are not recognized as states
by other states, or are, perhaps, recognized by only one or several states. The
study of these entities has been characterized by “terminological anarchy”, with
each author developing his or her own designations, sometimes covering exactly
the same ground, or seeking to introduce definitions to expand or delimit the
number of cases. While these “name games” are partly driven by the ambitions of
academics who want to present their research as being original and innovative,
they also reveal underlying attitudes towards the phenomenon of de facto
statehood. In the article, the range of appellations used in describing these
political entities at the margins of international society is analyzed, to see what the
choices of names can tell us about underlying attitudes. It is argued that current
terminological pluralism is unhelpful and should be eliminated, in order to ensure
that we are referring to the same entities in discussing what these entities “are”,
what moves them and how they interact with other entities.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2022).
Orthodoxy Inside-Out: How Certain Orthodox Ideas Are Reflected in Lev Tolstoi’s Religious Thinking.
Филологический класс.
ISSN 2071-2405.
27(1),
p. 8–21.
doi:
10.51762/1FK-2022-27-01-01.
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Lev TolstoI developed his religious ideas in conscious opposition to the Orthodox faith in which he was raised. He was deeply imbued with Orthodox thinking and incorporated important elements of Orthodox spirituality into his religious system. However, in its basic structure, his teaching differed significantly from the Orthodox worldview. The elements he took from Orthodox spirituality underwent a radical change of meaning when it was applied to his teaching. Thus, in defining Tolstoi’s relationship to the Orthodox Church, we must simultaneously emphasize both continuity and rupture. To say that Tolstoy was influenced by Orthodox spirituality is not to say that he was an Orthodox believer in any way – obviously he was not. Rather, we must acknowledge that in 19th-century Russia, the worldview of the Orthodox Church rubbed off on even some of its most vehement detractors. In A Confession, his first religious text after his spiritual crisis in the late 1870s, Tolstoi argued that in Orthodoxy there is “both truth and falsehood”. This view can be found even in his most viciously anti-Orthodox work, An examination of Dogmatic Theology, an almost forgotten book which is important for our understanding Tolstoi’s attitude towards Orthodoxy. In this article, I focus on two points: his anthropology and his view on how we can understand God. I combine textual and contextual analysis, that is, a careful reading of this book with a reading of the theological treatises on which he based his criticism.
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Kolstø, Pål & Blakkisrud, Helge
(2022).
Engaging Without Recognizing? Western Approaches to the Eurasian De Facto States.
Mezjdunarodnaja analitika.
ISSN 2587-8476.
13(4),
p. 58–75.
doi:
10.46272/2587-8476-2022-13-4-58-75.
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From being a relatively neglected field, the study of de facto states has developed rapidly in recent years. As the break-up of the Soviet Union produced seven de facto states – four that still exist to this day (Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Transnistria) and three that are now defunct (Chechnya, the Done – scholars from this region have contributed greatly to the development of this field. Russian scholars have been particularly active, with Russia serving as the patron state of three of the extant entities (having reintegrated/absorbed the three defunct ones), as well as of the patron of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia. But Western scholars have also made a sizeable contribution, although often working in relative isolation from “local” research. Whereas local researchers excel in in-depth knowledge of the history and culture of the region, their Western colleagues add to the comparative and theoretical approaches. And just as Russian researchers naturally focus on the relations of the Eurasian de facto states with their Russian patron, their Western counterparts often analyse the
policies of their own countries towards these entities. Thus, we argue, two separate “ecosystems” of research into Eurasian de facto states have gradually developed: a “local” one and a “Western” one, each with its own peculiarities. In this article, we survey the “Western” literature on de facto states, noting the various assessments of the possibilities for US and EU engagement with the Eurasian de facto states. The scholarly literature discussing Western engagement emerges as partly analytical, explaining what Western states are doing and not doing and why, and partly normative, offering policy recommendations on how best to engage. Implicit in the concept of “engagement,” however, is the understanding that engagement is preferable to “ignoring” or “sanctioning.” According to this view, Western cooperation with de facto state authorities is inevitable.
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Kolstø, Pål & Blakkisrud, Helge
(2021).
Russian Neighborhood Policy and Its Eurasian Client States: No Autocracy Export.
Russia in Global Affairs.
ISSN 1810-6374.
19(2),
p. 38–62.
doi:
10.31278/1810-6374-2021-19-2-38-62.
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Do authoritarian regimes engage in active export of their political systems? Or are they primarily concerned about their geopolitical interests? This article explores these questions by examining Russia's policy towards Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. In all three de facto states, Moscow is fully able to dictate election outcomes should it desire to, but, we argue, has increasingly refrained from doing so. These client states are unlikely to attempt to escape from Russia's tutelage; and with its geopolitical interests fully ensured, Russia appears willing to grant them latitude. We then ask whether these findings can be extrapolated to serve as a template for understanding Russia’s policy towards its client states more generally, discussing Moscow’s reactions to attempted regime change in Armenia and Belarus.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2020).
‘Authoritarian Diffusion, or the Geopolitics of Self-Interest? Evidence from Russia’s Patron–Client Relations with Eurasia’s De Facto States’.
Europe-Asia Studies.
ISSN 0966-8136.
doi:
10.1080/09668136.2020.1806209.
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It is claimed that authoritarian regimes actively export their political systems. An alternative explanation maintains that authoritarian states are primarily concerned with geopolitical interests. Both explanations can produce coherent narratives. This article adjudicates among them by looking at Russia’s relations with Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In all three unrecognised states Moscow could dictate the outcome of elections but has, increasingly, abstained from interference. These client states are utterly dependent on Russia’s patronage and with its geopolitical interests ensured, Russia appears willing to grant them wide latitude.
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Blakkisrud, Helge; Gelashvili, Tamta; Kemoklidze, Nino & Kolstø, Pål
(2020).
Navigating de facto statehood: trade, trust, and agency in Abkhazia’s external economic relations.
Eurasian geography and economics.
ISSN 1538-7216.
doi:
10.1080/15387216.2020.1861957.
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What opportunities and trade-offs do de facto states encounter in developing economic ties with the outside world? This article explores the complex relationship between trade and trust in the context of contested statehood. Most de facto states are heavily dependent on an external patron for economic aid and investment. However, we challenge the widespread assumption that de facto states are merely hapless pawns in the power-play of their patrons. Such an approach fails to capture the conflict dynamics involved. Drawing on a case study of Abkhazia, we explore how this de facto state navigates between its "patron" Russia, its "parent state" Georgia, and the EU. The conflict transformation literature has highlighted the interrelationship between trust and trade – but how does this unfold in the context of continued nonrecognition and contested statehood? Does trade serve to facilitate trust and hence prospects for conflict transformation? With Abkhazia, we find scant correlation between trust and trade: in the absence of formal recognition, trade does not necessarily facilitate trust. However, the interrelationship between trade, trust, and recognition proves more complex than expected: we find less trust in the patron and more trade with the parent than might have been anticipated.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2020).
Biting the hand that feeds them? Abkhazia–Russia client–patron relations.
Post-Soviet Affairs.
ISSN 1060-586X.
36(2),
p. 140–158.
doi:
10.1080/1060586X.2020.1712987.
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The article discusses the post-Soviet de facto state of Abkhazia, and its relationship to its main patron, Russia. All patron–client nexuses are marked by a high degree of asymmetrical power – especially with de facto states, which depend upon the patron for their very survival. Thus, it is surprising to see how de facto client states repeatedly show that they are both willing and able to defy the wishes of their patrons and pursue their own agendas instead. Moreover, the patron may be willing to tolerate such rebelliousness. What can explain such “disobedient” behavior? I examine three contentious aspects of Russian–Abkhazian relations: the process leading up to the signing of an extended bilateral agreement in 2014; the tussles over how to fight crime in Abkhazia; and acrimony over Abkhazia’s reluctance to allow Russians to buy property in their country, despite massive pressure from Russian authorities.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2019).
An inconvenient anniversary: how Russia did (not) celebrate the centenary of the Russian Revolution.
In Myklebost, Kari Aga & Bones, Stian (Ed.),
In the North, the East and West Meet: Festschrift for Jens Petter Nielsen.
Orkana Forlag.
ISSN 9788281043442.
p. 61–78.
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The Centenary of the October Revolution in November 2017 seems to have been rather inconvenient for the Kremlin. Should 1917 be celebrated as a bright dawn after a long night of reactionary tsarist authoritarianism – or as marking the descent into a nightmare of oppression and suffering? Surveys show that opinions on this matter were sharply divided in Russian society. Both czarists and liberals denounced the communist period as an unmitigated disaster, while members of the Communist Party and other Soviet nostalgics continued to hail Lenin and Stalin as great leaders, and celebrated the revolutionary anniversary every year. In the end, no Kremlin leader participated in any celebrations of the October Revolution, while the Conservative Minister of culture, Vladimir Medinskii, tried to frame the Centenary as an occasion for “reconciliation and national unity,” something which the communists rejected as an affront.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2019).
Antemurale thinking as historical myth and ethnic boundary mechanism.
In Berezhnaya, Liliya & Hein-Kircher, Heidi (Ed.),
Rampart Nations: Bulwark myths of East European Multiconfessional Societies in the Age of Nationalism.
Berghahn Books.
ISSN 9781789201475.
p. 347–373.
doi:
10.2307/j.ctv12pns5t.19.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2019).
The concept of 'rootedness' in the struggle for political power in the Former Soviet Union in the 1990s.
In Côté, Isabelle M.; Mitchell, Matthew I. & Toft, Monica Duffy (Ed.),
People changing places: new perspectives on demography, migration, conflict, and the state.
Routledge.
ISSN 9780815360766.
p. 107–127.
doi:
10.4324/9781351117623-6.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2019).
Dmitrii Medvedev's Commission Against the Falsification of History: Why Was It Created and What Did It Achieve? A Reassessment.
Slavonic and East European Review.
ISSN 0037-6795.
97(4),
p. 738–760.
doi:
10.5699/slaveasteurorev2.97.4.0738.
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In spring 2009, three initiatives were taken in Moscow to control public presentation of Russian history: two bills were prepared for the Duma that would criminalize ‘the rehabilitation of Nazism’ and shortly afterwards President Dmitrii Medvedev established a commission, mandated to ‘counteract attempts to falsify history to the detriment of the interests of Russia.’
The article examines why President Medvedev felt it necessary to establish such a commission, how the commission was composed and worked, and what it achieved. While the Duma bills and the commission have usually been treated as initiatives that pulled in the same direction, I argue that they were fundamentally at odds with each other. In my interpretation, the commission was intended not to promote but to obstruct the passing of the new laws.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2019).
Iver Neumann og utenriksdebatten i Norge.
Internasjonal Politikk.
ISSN 0020-577X.
77(2),
p. 140–147.
doi:
10.23865/intpol.v77.1589.
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Iver Neumann begynte sin akademiske karriere som Russland-forsker, og selv om han senere har utvidet sitt repertoar av studieområder kraftig har han hele tiden beholdt også en interesse for Russland, både landets historie og dets aktuelle politikk. Han tok med seg sin brede teoretiske skolering inn i russlandstudiet, og tilførte dermed norsk russlandforskning viktige nye perspektiver. Særlig verdifulle er hans identitetsstudier, basert på blant annet Fredrik Barths nyansatser i antropologien.
Samtidig som Neumann er en svært meritert og sitert forsker har han aldri nøyd seg med å bidra til den rene vitenskapen, han har også kastet seg ut i samfunnsdebatten generelt og utenriksdebatten spesielt. Her har han ofte viklet seg inn i mange ikke alltid like fruktbare polemikker der han har forfektet postmodernistiske posisjoner. I hans kommentarer til dagsaktuell politikk i både Russland og Norge adskiller analysen seg likevel ofte ikke i særlig grad fra gjengse «realistiske» perspektiver.
Både som forsker og mediekommentator utmerker Neumann seg med et meget bevisst forhold til språket. Han spiller på hele registeret av stilistiske nyanser, både på norsk og engelsk, noe som gjør hans tekster til en fryd å lese. Hans vilje og evne til å spissformulere seg i intervjuer og korte avisartikler kan imidlertid til tider gjøre hans uttalelser i overkant bombastiske.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2019).
Is imperialist nationalism an oxymoron?
Nations and Nationalism.
ISSN 1354-5078.
25(1),
p. 18–44.
doi:
10.1111/nana.12449.
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According to Ernest Gellner’s celebrated definition, nationalism is a political principle that holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent. Based on this definition, Alexander Motyl has declared that “nationalism and imperialism are polar types”. Even so, dozens of books and articles have used the concept of “imperialist nationalism” without any qualms. Is this just a matter of terminological confusion, or does it reflect a deeper disagreement on what the phenomenon of nationalism actually is?
In the lecture I discuss the concept of “imperialist nationalism” as used in the standard literature and find that numerous historical actors take pride in being both nationalists and imperialists. I distinguish between overseas colonial empires and contiguous land-based empires, and demonstrate that in both cases “imperialist nationalism” can be found. In the latter case, nationalism can take the shape of either “nation-building imperialism”, in which nationalists strives for cultural homogenization throughout the state, or “ethnocratic imperialism”, in which the distinction between “the imperial nation” and other national groups are retained. In colonial empires I find only ethnocratic imperialism.
As a case study, I analyze how Russian nationalists have related to the fact that Russia has historically been an Empire.
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Kolstø, Pål & Blakkisrud, Helge
(2018).
Introduction: Exploring Russian nationalisms.
In Kolstø, Pål & Blakkisrud, Helge (Ed.),
Russia before and after Crimea: Nationalism and Identity, 2010-17.
Edinburgh University Press.
ISSN 9781474433853.
p. 1–20.
doi:
10.3366/edinburgh/9781474433853.003.0001.
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In the introductory chapter, the two editors, Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, argue that in Putin's third period as president, nationalism has become even more important for understanding Russian politics and society than before. Prior to the annexation of Crimea, the influx of low-skilled labour from Central Asia and the Caucasus had been creating strong migrantophobic sentiments in sectors of the Russian population, boosting support for ethno-nationalism. The dramatic events in Ukraine in 2014 onwards, however, radically changed the political scene in Russia. Nationalist movements in opposition to the Kremlin went into steep decline, while the nation rallied around its leader, President Putin, who for the first time explicitly used nationalist themes in his propaganda. At first glance, this development may appear radically new. However, our introductory chapter, drawing on insights from several of the chapters in the volume, shows how this pattern has precedents in Russian history: Russian state authorities have generally tended to use other methods of legitimation than nationalism, leaving the nationalist field to various societal forces. However, in times of crisis – as during the Great Patriotic War– a state-focused, imperialistic nationalism is fully exploited as a mobilising device, and any autonomous, popular expressions of nationalism are suppressed. Seemingly an oxymoron, 'imperialist nationalism' has in fact been a strong current throughout Russian history, competing with cultural and ethnic nationalism.
Further, this introductory chapter presents an outline of other chapters, pointing out how the themes discussed – the Kremlin's post-2012 quest for legitimacy, migrantophobia, the rise and fall of right-wing ethno-nationalism, and Russian reactions to the Crimean annexation – all emerge as interrelated when interpreted in this framework.
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Blakkisrud, Helge & Kolstø, Pål
(2018).
'Restore Moscow to the Muscovites': Othering 'the migrants' in the 2013 Moscow mayoral elections.
In Kolstø, Pål & Blakkisrud, Helge (Ed.),
Russia before and after Crimea: Nationalism and Identity, 2010-17.
Edinburgh University Press.
ISSN 9781474433853.
p. 236–257.
doi:
10.3366/edinburgh/9781474433853.003.0010.
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Today, the Russian Federation has the second largest migrant population in the world in absolute numbers. The chapter looks at what role these migrants – and migrantophobia – play in Russian contemporary identity discourse through the lens of the 2013 Moscow mayoral elections.
On the eve of these elections, Muscovites identified the large numbers of labour migrants in the capital as the most important campaign issue. This chapter explores how 'the migrant issue' was addressed at the candidate level as well as how it was perceived by ordinary Muscovites. First, it traces what images of 'the migrant' the candidates presented; how they assessed the potential for integration into Russian society; and what measures they proposed for regulating the flow of new migrants. Next, drawing on survey data, the chapter discusses to what extent campaign promises reflected the positions of the electorate on the same issues.
It concludes that the Moscow electoral experiment of allowing semi-competitive elections contributed to pushing the borders of what mainstream politicians in Russia perceived as acceptable positions on migrants and migration policy, for at least two reasons: Firstly, incumbent mayor Sobianin faced stiff competition from the rising star of the non-systemic opposition, liberal-nationalist Aleksei Navalnyi, and had to find a way of outbidding him on the migrant issue. Second, in this more competitive environment, Sobianin could not rely on administrative resources alone, but had to respond to popular demands, to ensure an acceptable win: therefore, he had to appear as 'tough' on migrants. The experiment with semi-competitive elections in Moscow in 2013 thus demonstrated the limits of the Kremlin’s ability to fully control Russian nationalist discourse and also contributed to reinforcing the idea of 'the migrant' as the new 'Other' in Russian identity discourse.
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Blakkisrud, Helge & Kolstø, Pål
(2017).
Regime Development and Patron–Client Relations: The 2016
Transnistrian Presidential Elections and the "Russia
Factor".
The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization.
ISSN 1074-6846.
25(4),
p. 503–528.
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In December 2016, Transnistria held presidential elections in which, after an exceptionally loud and dirty campaign, the incumbent yielded power to his main opponent. This article explores regime evolution in the breakaway republic through the prism of these elections. First, drawing on the literature on hybrid regimes, we ask what the recent campaign can tell us about regime evolution in Transnistria. Second,
arguing that, in the case of Eurasian de facto states, this
literature must be complemented by a discussion of the
role of the patron state, we then turn to the importance
of the "Russia factor." We conclude by arguing that, due
to Transnistria's dependency on its Moscow patron, this factor always looms large – but not necessarily in the ways that might be expected.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2017).
St. Georgsløyfen i russisk nasjonsbygging.
Arr - Idéhistorisk tidsskrift.
ISSN 0802-7005.
29(3/4),
p. 113–123.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2022).
Strategic Uses of Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict:
Interest and Identity in Russia and the Post-Soviet Space.
Edinburgh University Press.
ISBN 9781474495004.
294 p.
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Argues that nationalism and ethnic conflict can be used as strategies to achieve power and influence
Collects 8 thoroughly revised articles and book chapters, together with a new introductory theoretical chapter, based on Pål Kolstø's 30 years of study of nationalism and ethnic conflict in post-Soviet states
Uses inter-related case studies in Russia and the former Soviet Union
Theoretically informed, with both an overarching theoretical framework and chapter-specific theoretical discussions
Shows how the resurgence of ethnonationalism in the post-Soviet world compells us to re-examine the dynamics of ethnic conflict
Based on specific empirical cases, drawing on a wealth of primary sources
With a new introductory theoretical chapter, the book collects eight thoroughly revised articles and book chapters on nationalism and ethnic conflict in post Soviet states. Kolstø examines how the drivers behind ethnic conflicts in the non-Russian republics were not only the struggles for collective identities but also more mundane interests, such as competition for jobs and positions. He also analyses the transformations of Russian nationalism, both among the ruling elite and in the opposition, with a particular focus on the use of symbolism.
Exploring nationalism as a pervasive feature of politics in the modern world, Kolstø argues that both state leaders and 'ethnic entrepreneurs' employ nationalist rhetoric and stratagems to further their political agendas and achieve particular goals. He examines some of the ways this is used as a political strategy and focuses on nationalism at the societal level and as a state strategy.
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Blakkisrud, Helge & Kolstø, Pål
(2025).
Abkhazia’s 2025 Presidential Elections: De Facto State Patron–Client Relations and Russian Interference.
p. 12–16.
doi:
10.3929/ethz-b-000741462.
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On 15 February 2025, the Abkhazians went to the polls to elect a new president to succeed Aslan Bzhania, who had been forced to resign following a wave of popular protests. This election was particularly notable due to unprecedented interference by Abkhazia’s patron, the Russian Federation. The relationship between Abkhazia and Russia has evolved over the years. While Abkhazia relies heavily on Russian backing for security and infrastructure, most Abkhazians oppose full integration with Russia. In particular, the question of whether Russian citizens should be allowed access to the Abkhazian real estate market has become a contentious issue that has sparked resistance. When Bzhania attempted to accommodate Russian interests in the real estate market in 2024, he faced a backlash and was ultimately forced to resign. The 2025 election featured two main candidates: Badra Gunba, who was backed by Moscow, and opposition leader Adgur Ardzinba. Gunba’s victory raises several questions about Abkhazian sovereignty and the future of the country’s political landscape. Gunba must balance the expectations of his patron against the concerns of a populace that has grown wary of losing its autonomy amid Russia’s increasing integration efforts. Hence, the dynamics of this election exemplify the complexity of de facto state patron–client relationships.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2025).
The 2025 presidential elections in Abkhazia: a turning point in Abkhazian-Russian relations? (blogpost).
De facto states research unit.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2024).
De Facto States and Land-for-Peace Agreements: Territory and Recognition at Odds? by Eiki Berg and Shpend Kursani, Routledge, 2022, 194 pp., $153 (hardcover), ISBN 9780367485139, $47.65 (ebook), ISBN 9781003041436.
Nationalities Papers.
ISSN 0090-5992.
52(2),
p. 1456–1457.
doi:
10.1017/nps.2023.88.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2024).
Tarnished Heroes. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in the Memory Politics of Post-Soviet Ukraine, anmeldelse.
Nordisk Østforum.
ISSN 0801-7220.
38,
p. 148–151.
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Kemoklidze, Nino; Blakkisrud, Helge; Kolstø, Pål & Gelashvili, Tamta
(2024).
Gain recognition, lose independence? How Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia cemented Kremlin control.
LSE blog.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2023).
John Færseth, Spesialoperasjon: Ukraina og Russland 2004–2023.
Humanist forlag.
Nordisk Østforum.
ISSN 0801-7220.
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Kolstø, Pål & Blakkisrud, Helge
(2023).
Spillet om Nagorno-Karabakh er i ferd med å avsluttes. En av taperne er Russland.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2023).
Ukrainians and Russians Are Not One People—But
Perhaps Not for the Reasons You Think.
PONARS Eurasia: Policy Memo.
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Haga, Lars Peder & Kolstø, Pål
(2022).
Professor mener Putins prosjekt har skåret seg fullstendig. Er han i ferd med å miste grepet?
[Journal].
Bergens Tidende.
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Mjør, Kåre Johan; Myhre, Marthe Handå; Kolstø, Pål & Kulås, Guri
(2022).
Berga brør eller forviste fiendar?
[Journal].
Klassekampen.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2021).
'The Western Balkans’ as the New Balkans: Regional Names as Tools for Stigmatisation and Exclusion.
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The word ‘Balkans’ often functions as a stigma. Several authors have discussed the bloodbath during the wars in the former Yugoslavia with references to an alleged Balkan culture.
Towards the end of the 1990s the term ‘Balkans’ entered the vocabulary of the European Union, now with the prefix ‘Western’. ‘The Western Balkans’ became a common denominator for non-member states in South Eastern Europe.
A survey in 2011 in the ‘Western Balkans’ shows that those who live there, to a large extent share this view: membership in Western organizations like the EU determine whether a country is ‘European’ or ‘Balkan’.
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Blakkisrud, Helge; Kemoklidze, Nino; Kolstø, Pål & Gelashvili, Tamta
(2021).
Trade, Trust, and De Facto State Conflicts: Abkhazia’s International Economic Engagement.
All the Russias: NYU Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2021).
Hoch, Tomáš, & Kopeček, Vincenc (eds). De facto states in Eurasia. London: Routledge, 2019, anmeldelse.
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute.
ISSN 1359-0987.
27(4),
p. 1003–1004.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2021).
Weiss-Wendt, Anton. Putin‘s Russia and the falsification of history: reasserting control over the past. Bloomsbury Academic 2021. Anmeldelse.
Slavonic and East European Review.
ISSN 0037-6795.
99(2),
p. 378–380.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2021).
Creating a Yawning Gap between Neighbours: Civilization Rhetoric among Ukrainians and Belarusians vis-à-vis Russia.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2019).
Chernobyl - hva skjedde egentlig?
Et seminar om tv-serien Chernobyl.
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Oslo Peace Days har samlet tre eksperter for å prate om Sovjetunionen, autoritære regimer og Chernobyl-serien. Hva skjedde egentlig? Kunne noe liknende ha skjedd i dag?
Marianne Dahl, PRIO
Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, PRIO
Pål Kolstø, Professor Russland, Sentral-Europa og Balkan, ILOS, Universitetet i Oslo
Denne samtalen ledes av journalisten Asbjørn Slettemark, som til daglig er serieanmelder i Aftenposten
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Kolstø, Pål
(2018).
Dramatisk splitting. intervju om bruddet mellom Den russisk-ortodokse kirke og patriarken i Konstantinopel.
[Journal].
Dag og Tid.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2018).
Revolution and War in Contemporary Ukraine: The Challenge of Change. Ed. Olga Bertelsen. Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Societies, no. 161. Ibidem: Stuttgart, 2017. 430 pp. $50.00, paper.
Slavic Review: Interdisciplinary Quarterly of Russian, Eurasian, and East European Studies.
ISSN 0037-6779.
77(1).
doi:
10.1017/slr.2018.41.
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Kolstø, Pål
(2017).
Mischa Gabowitsch, Protest in Putin’s Russia, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017. (anmeldelse).
Slavonic and East European Review.
ISSN 0037-6795.
95(3),
p. 591–594.
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Kolstø, Pål & Blakkisrud, Helge
(2017).
Book symposium.
The new Russian nationalism: imperialism, ethnicity and authoritarianism 2000–2015.
Nationalities Papers.
ISSN 0090-5992.
45(4),
p. 716–719.
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Kolstø, Pål & Blakkisrud, Helge
(2021).
Not So Traditional After All? The Russian Orthodox Church's Failure as a "Moral Norm Entrepreneur".
PONARS Eurasia.
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Published
Sep. 23, 2010 12:00 PM
- Last modified
July 30, 2025 10:06 AM
