Generative approaches to ontology have recently received much attention. The most widely known example is the iterative conception of sets, according to which sets are successively formed, or generated, from previously available objects. But the approach is far more general. One may, for instance, understand abstraction generatively, holding that the values of abstraction operations are generated from the inputs. Different abstraction principles characterize different abstraction operations - Hume’s Principle characterizes the cardinal abstraction operation, other abstraction principles characterize structural abstraction. One may also understand mereology generatively, holding that wholes are successively generated from their previously available parts. Such a generative approach to mereology is attractive since it might provide a solution to the problem of how to combine mereology with set theory.
The generative approaches raise a fundamental philosophical question: What is the relevant notion of generation? There are several attempted answers. Constructivists hold that generation should be understood in terms of the possibility of certain (mental) actions. Minimalists (Incurvati) treat the talk of generation as metaphorical, as just a fanciful way of saying that the relevant objects can be organized in a particular way. More metaphysically heavyweight approaches have invoked a distinctive mathematical modality (Parsons), a notion of dependence (Linnebo), the notion of grounding (Rosen & Schwartzkopff), or the notion of essence and/or real definition (Litland).
The workshop will bring together philosophers who approach these issues from different perspectives.
Everyone is welcome to attend, but to do so, please register by contacting jon DOT litland At utexas DOT edu
Further information on online participation and schedule will come.