Øystein Linnebo

Professor - Filosofi

English version of this page

E-post oystein.linnebo@ifikk.uio.no

Telefon +47 22856961

Mobiltelefon +47 46660036

Rom 644

Brukernavn

Besøksadresse Georg Morgenstiernes Hus

Postadresse Postboks 1020 Blindern 0315 Oslo

Last ned visittkort

Faglige interesser

Mine forskningsinteresser ligger innen filosofisk logikk, matematikkens filosofi, Frege, metafysikk og språkfilosofi. Ellers er mine filosofiske interesser ganske brede.

Her er en svært kort presentasjon av min nyere forskning inspirert av Aristoteles' begrep om potensiell uendelighet (2023).
Her er en kort populærvitenskapelig artikkel om samme tema (2013).
Jeg har også bidratt til en podcast om universets begynnelse (2021).

Utdannelse og stillinger

Før jeg kom til IFIKK i 2012 var jeg Professor of Philosophy ved Birkbeck, University of London. Jeg har også hatt stillinger ved University of Bristol og Merton College, Oxford. Jeg fikk min PhD i filosofi fra Harvard University i 2002, og har hovedfag i matematikk fra UiO i 1995.

Verv

Forskningsleder, IFIKK (januar 2021- desember 2022)
Programrådsmedlem, Honours-programmet
Medlem av Instituttstyret, IFIKK (2013-2020)

For annen informasjon, vennligst se min engelske nettside.

Emneord: Filosofi, Logikk, Metafysikk, Språkfilosofi, Frege

"Generality Explained", Journal of Philosophy (2022)
The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study of Plural Logic (with Salvatore Florio), Oxford University Press (2021)
Thin Objects: An Abstractionist Account, Oxford University Press (2018)
"Actual and Potential Infinity" (with Stewart Shapiro), Noûs (2019); kåret av Philosophers' Annual til en av de ti beste filosofiske artiklene i 2019.
Philosophy of Mathematics, Princeton University Press (2017)
“What is the Infinite?” The Philosophers' Magazine 2nd quarter (2013), 42-47
“The Potential Hierarchy of Sets”, Review of Symbolic Logic 6:2 (2013), 205-28
“Pluralities and Sets,” Journal of Philosophy 107:3 (2010), 144-164
“Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics,” in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2009)
“Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence,” Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008), 59-79
“Plural Quantification,” in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2004)

Linnebo, Øystein & Roberts, Sam Royston (2024). No Easy Road to Impredicative Definabilism. Philosophia Mathematica. ISSN 0031-8019. 32(1), s. 21–33. doi: 10.1093/philmat/nkad013. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Linnebo, Øystein & Shapiro, Stewart (2023). Predicativism as a form of potentialism. The Review of Symbolic Logic. ISSN 1755-0203. 16(1), s. 1–32. doi: 10.1017/S1755020321000423. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Linnebo, Øystein (2023). Replies. Theoria. ISSN 0040-5825. 89, s. 393–406. doi: 10.1111/theo.12465. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
deRosset, Louis & Linnebo, Øystein (2023). Abstraction and grounding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. ISSN 0031-8205. doi: 10.1111/phpr.13036. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Linnebo, Øystein (2023). Précis. Theoria. ISSN 0040-5825. 89(3), s. 247–255. doi: 10.1111/theo.12464. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Crosilla, Laura & Linnebo, Øystein (2023). Weyl and Two Kinds of Potential Domains. Noûs. ISSN 0029-4624. doi: 10.1111/nous.12457. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Linnebo, Øystein (2022). Generality Explained. Journal of Philosophy. ISSN 0022-362X. 119(7), s. 349–379. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Brauer, Ethan; Linnebo, Øystein & Shapiro, Stewart (2022). Divergent Potentialism: A Modal Analysis with an Application to Choice Sequences. Philosophia Mathematica. ISSN 0031-8019. 30(2), s. 143–172. doi: 10.1093/philmat/nkab031. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Linnebo, Øystein (2022). Aristotelian Aspirations, Fregean Fears: Hossack on Numbers as Magnitudes. I Kürbis, Nils; Assadian, Bahram & Nassim, Jonathan (Red.), Knowledge, Number and Reality: Encounters with the Work of Keith Hossack. Bloomsbury Academic. ISSN 9781350186439. s. 189–201. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Hartimo, Mirja; Kjosavik, Frode & Linnebo, Øystein (2022). Introduction to special issue on ‘critical views of logic’. Inquiry (Oslo). ISSN 0020-174X. 65(6), s. 631–637. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2019.1651077. Vis sammendrag
Critical views of logic are presented. These are views that are critical of logic in a sense akin to the way in which Kant is critical rather than dogmatic about traditional metaphysics. Such approaches differ from the Fregean ‘logic-first’ view. In accordance with the latter, logic is often regarded as epistemologically and methodologically fundamental. Hence, all disciplines – including mathematics – are considered as answerable to logic, rather than vice versa. In critical views of logic, by contrast, the logical principles that govern some subject matter may depend on the metaphysics of this subject matter or on the semantics of our discourse about it. Space is thereby carved out between a Fregean position on the one hand and thoroughgoing holism à la Quine on the other.
Linnebo, Øystein & Shapiro, Stewart (2021). Modality in Mathematics. I Bueno, Otávio & Shalkowski, Scott A. (Red.), The Routledge Handbook of Modality. Routledge. ISSN 9781138823310. s. 281–291. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Linnebo, Øystein & Shapiro, Stewart (2020). Potentiality and indeterminacy in mathematics. Journal of Applied Logics (JAL-FLAP). ISSN 2631-9810. 7(6), s. 1201–1221.
Linnebo, Øystein (2020). Riemann’s Scale: A Puzzle About Infinity. Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy. ISSN 0165-0106. doi: 10.1007/s10670-020-00345-x. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Linnebo, Øystein & Shapiro, Stewart (2020). Potentiality and Indeterminacy in Mathematics. Journal of Applied Logics: The IfCoLog Journal of Logics and their Applications. ISSN 2055-3706. 7(7), s. 1201–1221. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Linnebo, Øystein & Hale, Bob (2020). Ontological Categories and the Problem of Expressibility. I Hale, Bob (Red.), Essence and existence: Selected Essays. Oxford University Press. ISSN 9780198712084. s. 73–103. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Linnebo, Øystein (2020). Peacocke on numbers and magnitudes. Philosophical Studies. ISSN 0031-8116. 178, s. 2717–2729. doi: 10.1007/s11098-020-01542-8. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Linnebo, Øystein & Florio, Salvatore (2020). Critical Plural Logic. Philosophia Mathematica. ISSN 0031-8019. 28(2), s. 172–203. doi: 10.1093/philmat/nkaa020. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Hamkins, Joel David & Linnebo, Øystein (2019). THE MODAL LOGIC of SET-THEORETIC POTENTIALISM and the POTENTIALIST MAXIMALITY PRINCIPLES. The Review of Symbolic Logic. ISSN 1755-0203. 15(1), s. 1–35. doi: 10.1017/S1755020318000242. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Linnebo, Øystein & Shapiro, Stewart (2019). Realizability as a Kind of Truthmaking. I Szatkowski, Miroslaw (Red.), Quo Vadis, Metaphysics . Walter de Gruyter (De Gruyter). ISSN 3110662493. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Linnebo, Øystein (2019). The Context Principle in Frege’s Grundgesetze. I Ebert, Philip & Rossberg, Marcus (Red.), Essays on Frege's Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Oxford University Press. ISSN 9780198712084. doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198712084.003.0004. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Linnebo, Øystein & Shapiro, Stewart (2019). Actual and potential infinity. Noûs. ISSN 0029-4624. 53(1), s. 160–191. doi: 10.1111/nous.12208. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Linnebo, Øystein (2018). Putnam on Mathematics as Modal Logic. I Cook, Roy & Hellman, Geoffrey (Red.), Hilary Putnam on Logic and Mathematics. Springer. ISSN 978-3-319-96274-0. s. 249–267. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-96274-0_14.
Linnebo, Øystein (2018). Rumfitt on the logic of set theory. Inquiry (Oslo). ISSN 0020-174X. 62(7), s. 826–841. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2018.1530832. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Linnebo, Øystein (2018). On the Permissibility of Impredicative Comprehension. I Leech, Jessica (Red.), Being Necessary Themes of Ontology and Modality from the Work of Bob Hale. Oxford University Press. ISSN 9780198792161. s. 170–189. doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198792161.003.0009. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Linnebo, Øystein (2018). Truth in Mathematics. I Glanzberg, Michael (Red.), Oxford Companion to Truth. Oxford University Press. ISSN 9780199557929. s. 648–665. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199557929.013.24. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Linnebo, Øystein (2018). DUMMETT ON INDEFINITE EXTENSIBILITY. Philosophical Issues. ISSN 1533-6077. 28(1), s. 196–220. doi: 10.1111/phis.12122. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Cook, Roy & Linnebo, Øystein (2018). Cardinality and Acceptable Abstraction. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. ISSN 0029-4527. 59(1), s. 61–74. doi: 10.1215/00294527-2017-0012. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Linnebo, Øystein & Florio, Salvatore (2017). Logic and Plurals. I Ludwig, Kirk (Red.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. Routledge. ISSN 9781138783638. s. 451–463. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Linnebo, Øystein (2016). Impredicativity in the Neo-Fregean Program. I Philip, Ebert & Rossberg, Marcus (Red.), Abstractionism: Essays in the Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford University Press. ISSN 9780199645268. s. 247–268. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645268.003.0012.
Linnebo, Øystein (2016). How to Harness Basic Law V. I Carrara, Massimiliano; Arapinis, Alexandra & Moltmann, Friederike (Red.), Unity and Plurality: Logic, Philosophy, and Linguistics. Oxford University Press. ISSN 9780198716327. s. 19–32. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716327.003.0002.
Linnebo, Øystein & Florio, Salvatore (2016). On the Innocence and Determinacy of Plural Quantification. Noûs. ISSN 0029-4624. 50(3), s. 565–583. doi: 10.1111/nous.12091.
Linnebo, Øystein (2016). Plurals and Modals. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. ISSN 0045-5091. 46(4-5), s. 654–676. doi: 10.1080/00455091.2015.1132975.
Linnebo, Øystein; Shapiro, Stewart & Hellman, Geoffrey (2016). Aristotelian Continua. Philosophia Mathematica. ISSN 0031-8019. 24(2), s. 214–246. doi: 10.1093/philmat/nkv024.
Horsten, Leon & Linnebo, Øystein (2015). Term Models for Abstraction Principles. Journal of Philosophical Logic. ISSN 0022-3611. s. 1–23. doi: 10.1007/s10992-015-9344-z.
Linnebo, Øystein; Florio, Salvatore; Welch, Philip & Walsh, Sean (2015). Set Theory and Higher-Order Logic: Foundational Issues and Philosophical Developments. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. ISSN 0029-4527. 56, s. 1–2.
Linnebo, Øystein & Shapiro, Stewart (2015). Frege Meets Brouwer (or Heyting, or Dummett). The Review of Symbolic Logic. ISSN 1755-0203. 8(3), s. 540–552. doi: 10.1017/s1755020315000039.
Shapiro, Stewart & Linnebo, Øystein (2014). Frege Meets Brouwer (or Heyting or Dummett). The Review of Symbolic Logic. ISSN 1755-0203. 8(3), s. 540–552. doi: 10.1017/S1755020315000039.
Linnebo, Øystein & Rayo, Agustin (2014). Response to Florio and Shapiro. Mind. ISSN 0026-4423. 123, s. 175–181.
Linnebo, Øystein & Pettigrew, Richard (2014). Two Types of Abstraction for Structuralism. The Philosophical Quarterly. ISSN 0031-8094. 64, s. 267–283. doi: 10.1093/pq/pqt044.
Linnebo, Øystein (2014). 'Just is'-Statements as Generalized Identities. Inquiry (Oslo). ISSN 0020-174X. 57(4), s. 466–482. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2014.905037.
Linnebo, Øystein (2013). What is the infinite? . Philosophers' magazine. ISSN 1354-814X. s. 42–47.
Linnebo, Øystein (2013). Freges oppfatning av logikk: Fra Kant til Grundgesetze. Norsk Filosofisk tidsskrift. ISSN 0029-1943. 48(3-4), s. 219–229.
Muller, F.A. & Linnebo, Øystein (2013). On Witness-Discernibility of Elementary Particles. Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy. ISSN 0165-0106. 78, s. 1133–1142. doi: 10.1007/s10670-012-9385-4.
Linnebo, Øystein (2013). Føllesdal and Frege on Reference. I Frauchiger, Michael (Red.), Reference, Rationality, and Phenomenology. Themes from Føllesdal. Ontos Verlag. ISSN 978-3-86838-182-5. s. 259–279. doi: 10.1515/9783110323542.259.
Ladyman, James; Linnebo, Øystein & Bigaj, Tomasz (2013). Entanglement and non-factorizability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics. ISSN 1355-2198. 44(3), s. 215–221. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsb.2013.02.004.
Linnebo, Øystein (2013). THE POTENTIAL HIERARCHY OF SETS. The Review of Symbolic Logic. ISSN 1755-0203. 6(2), s. 205–228. doi: 10.1017/S1755020313000014.
Linnebo, Øystein (2012). Hierarchies Ontological and Ideological. Mind. ISSN 0026-4423. 121, s. 269–308. doi: 10.1093/mind/fzs050.
Linnebo, Øystein (2005). To Be Is to Be an F. Dialectica. ISSN 0012-2017. 59.
Linnebo, Øystein (2005). Epistemological challenges to mathematical platonism. Philosophical Studies. ISSN 0031-8116.
Linnebo, Øystein (2004). Frege's Proof of Referentiality. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. ISSN 0029-4527. 45(2), s. 73–98. Vis sammendrag
I present a novel interpretation of Frege's famous attempt at Grundgesetze I §§29-31 to prove that every expression of his language has a unique reference. I argue that Frege's proof is based on a contextual account of reference, similar to but more sophisticated than that enshrined in his famous Context Principle. Although Frege's proof is incorrect, I argue that the account of reference on which it is based is of potential philosophical value, and I analyze the class of cases to which it may successfully be applied.
Linnebo, Øystein (2004). Predicative fragments of Frege Arithmetic. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. ISSN 1079-8986. 10, s. 153–174. Vis sammendrag
Frege Arithmetic (FA) is the second-order theory whose sole non-logical axiom is Hume's Principle. According to Frege's Theorem, FA and some natural definitions imply all of second-order Peano Arithmetic. This paper distinguishes two dimensions of impredicativity involved in FA--one having to do with Hume's Principle, the other, with the underlying second-order logic--and investigates how much of Frege's Theorem goes through in various partially predicative fragments of FA. Theorem 1 shows that almost everything goes through, the most important exception being the axiom that every natural number has a successor. Theorem 2 shows that this axiom cannot be proved in the theories that are predicative in either dimension.
Linnebo, Øystein (2003). Plural Quantification Exposed. Noûs. ISSN 0029-4624. 37(1), s. 71–92. Vis sammendrag
Jeg gir en fremstilling av George Boolos sin teori om plural-kvantifikasjon og kritiserer påstanden hans om at denne teorien er en rent logisk teori sterk nok til å tolke full annen-ordens logikk.
Linnebo, Øystein (2003). Critical Study of Stewart Shapiro, Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology. Philosophia Mathematica. ISSN 0031-8019. 11(1), s. 92–104. Vis sammendrag
Jeg gjør en kritisk analyse av Stewart Shapiros nye bok i matematikkens filosofi og kommer med et positivt forlag om hvordan matematisk strukturalisme bør forstås.
Linnebo, Øystein (2003). Frege's Conception of Logic: From Kant to Grundgesetze. Manuscrito - Revista Internacional de Filosofia. ISSN 0100-6045. 26(2), s. 235–252. Vis sammendrag
I first argue that Frege started out with a conception of logic closer to Kant's than is generally recognized. Then I analyze Frege's reasons for gradually rejecting this view. Although I concede that the demands imposed by Frege's logicism played some role, I argue that his increasingly vehement anti-psychologism provides a deeper and more interesting reason for rejecting his earlier view.

Se alle arbeider i Cristin

Hartimo, Mirja; Kjosavik, Frode & Linnebo, Øystein (2023). Critical Views of Logic. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-032-57351-9. 219 s.
Linnebo, Øystein & Florio, Salvatore (2021). The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study . Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198791522. 336 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Linnebo, Øystein (2018). Thin Objects: An Abstractionist Account. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199641314. 256 s.
Linnebo, Øystein (2017). Philosophy of Mathematics. Princeton University Press. ISBN 9780691161402. 216 s.

Se alle arbeider i Cristin

Hartimo, Mirja; Kjosavik, Frode & Linnebo, Øystein (2023). Introduction to "Critical views of logic". I Hartimo, Mirja; Kjosavik, Frode & Linnebo, Øystein (Red.), Critical Views of Logic. Routledge. ISSN 978-1-032-57351-9. s. 1–8.
Linnebo, Øystein (2021). Har bevisstheten en plass i en fysisk verden?
Linnebo, Øystein & Torgersen, Eivind (2021). Hvilken nytte kan historikere, filosofer og språkforskere ha av algoritmer?
Linnebo, Øystein (2021). Critical Study of Bob Hale, Essence and Existence: Selected Essays. Philosophia Mathematica. ISSN 0031-8019. 29(3), s. 420–427.
Linnebo, Øystein (2021). Finnes universets begynnelse? [Internett]. https://www.uio.no/om/aktuelt/universitetsplassen/nyheter/20.
Linnebo, Øystein (2021). Tiden som filosofisk problem.
Linnebo, Øystein (2020). Review of John Bell, The Continuous, the Discrete. American Mathematical Society Mathematical Reviews. ISSN 2167-5163.
Linnebo, Øystein & Bøhn, Einar Duenger (2020). Interview with Dagfinn Føllesdal. Norsk Filosofisk tidsskrift. ISSN 0029-1943. 55(1), s. 46–79.
Linnebo, Øystein (2020). The Paradox of the Largest Number: From Aristotle to Cantor. I Kjosavik, Frode & Serck-Hanssen, Camilla (Red.), Metametaphysics and the Sciences. Historical and Philosophical Perspectives. Routledge. ISSN 978-0-367-26369-0.
Linnebo, Øystein (2019). DORA-erklæringen og vår vurdering av forskningskvalitet. Khrono.no. ISSN 1894-8995.
Maliks, Reidar; Linnebo, Øystein & Strand, Arne (2017). Den viktige uenigheten. Klassekampen. ISSN 0805-3839.
Linnebo, Øystein (2017). Bokmelding: Frege – Utvalgte Tekster. Norsk Filosofisk tidsskrift. ISSN 0029-1943. 52(4), s. 187–192.
Linnebo, Øystein (2016). Identity and two conceptions of ontology. Filosofisk supplement. ISSN 0809-8220. s. 44–47.
Linnebo, Øystein (2013). “What is the Infinite and Is It Real?”. Philosophers' magazine. ISSN 1354-814X. s. 42–47.
Linnebo, Øystein (2013). Review of Patricia Blanchette, Frege’s Conception of Logic. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. ISSN 1538-1617.
Linnebo, Øystein (2004). Plural Quantification. I Zalta, Ed (Red.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vis sammendrag
Ordinary English contains two sorts of object quantifiers. In addition to the usual singular quantifiers, as in 'There is an apple on the table', there are plural quantifiers, as in 'There are some apples on the table'. This article provides a survey of recent discussions of the logic, semantics, and metaphysics of plural quantification, as well as of its various philosophical applications.
Linnebo, Øystein (2004). Review of Kit Fine, The Limits of Abstraction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. ISSN 0004-8402. 82(4), s. 653–656.
Linnebo, Øystein (2004). Reference and Frege's Context Principle.
Linnebo, Øystein (2004). Kant and Frege on Formal Logic.
Linnebo, Øystein (2004). Reference and Frege's Context Principle.
Linnebo, Øystein & Parsons, Charles (2003). Introductory Note to Correspondence with Walter Pitts. I Feferman, Solomon (Red.), Kurt Gödel: Collected Works, Vol. V. Clarendon. ISSN 0198500750. s. 157–159.
Linnebo, Øystein (2003). Neo-Logicism and Impredicativity.
Linnebo, Øystein (2003). Predicative Fragments of Frege Arithmetic.
Linnebo, Øystein (2003). Mathematical Structuralism.
Linnebo, Øystein (2002). Naturalistic Challenges: On the Possibility of Non-Scientific Knowledge. Vis sammendrag
Jeg diskuterer filosofisk naturalisme og noen av de utfordringer denne posisjonen gir opphav til, spesielt angående matematikk og etikk. Etter å ha avvist de tradisjonelle utfordringene av denne typen ved å skille mellom minimal- og scientistisk naturalisme, argumenterer jeg for at naturalisme likevel gir opphav til visse utfordringer.