Kant, Fichte, de Staël

A KanDem "hub"

Bildet kan inneholde: oransje.

Hilma af Klint, Childhood, The Ten Largest, No. 2, Group IV, 1907, tempera on paper, mounted on canvas, 10.25 × 7.75 feet. Images © The Hilma af Klint Foundation. Courtesy of Moderna Museet, Stockholm. 240cm, egg tempura on architect’s paper, 1907.

January 13 Georg Morgenstiernes hus room 652

10:00-11:30 Sjur Sandvik Strøm, (University of Oslo) From Radical-Democrats to Sleeping Sovereigns? Fichte on Political Representation and Democratic Influence (1792-98)

Fichte’s early writings on philosophy of right have long been read as offering a sustained defence of democratic influence and control over government (Buhr 1991; Fetscher 1986). More recently, a number of scholars have challenged this interpretation, arguing that Fichte’s theory of legislation, his insistence that legislative and judicial power should belong to a strong executive, and his conception of constitutional guardians (the ephorate), leave virtually no room for direct or even indirect democratic influence (La Vopa 2001; Maus 2001; Thiele 2002; Weber 2005).

The aim of my paper is to argue that Fichte’s favourable account of a «rightfully constituted democracy» was tailored to facilitate indirect political participation from citizens. Evidence for this claim can be found in Fichte’s discussion of the right to vote for representatives in the executive branch and the ephorate, as well as his defence of a right to revolution, popular sovereignty, and his theory of lawmaking. In fact, when it comes to the question of the preconditions for political participation of citizens, there is a greater degree of continuity between the early 1792/93-essays and the Foundations, than scholars have tended to acknowledge (cf. Schottky 1962). On this basis, I will reject the non-representative (La Vopa 2001) and non-democratic (Maus 2001; Thiele 2002; Weber 2005) readings of Fichte. At the same time, I take issue with the Foundations’ dualist division of power between the executive and the ephorate, and make the case that a more Kantian arrangement is not a priori impossible for him to entertain.

11:30-13:00 David James, (University of Warwick) Kant and Democracy: Some Difficulties 

Kant makes claims that indicate some kind of commitment, however weak, to democracy. For example, although he limits the franchise, his concept of active citizenship involves the right to vote. What, then, do citizens vote on and for? The lack of detail concerning such matters means that one must pursue the implications of other claims when deciding whether, and to what extent, Kant truly favours democracy. I intend to focus on the difficulties presented by one example of where it looks like a strong claim in favour of democracy can be attributed to Kant. This claim may be thought to follow from Kant’s claim that since the increasing financial costs of waging war and preparing for it must be borne by the people rather than by the head of state, the people will eventually refuse to fund unnecessary wars and thus the military arrangements demanded by them (AA 8: 311, AA 8: 351). This implies that people have a democratic right to refuse to pay taxes to fund wars decided upon by the executive, despite how this decision does not concern the making of law and cannot, therefore, be easily accommodated within Kant’s model of the powers of the state in a way that makes it a matter for ‘the united will of the people’. This move, however, is problematic for two reasons. First, it threatens to contradict Kant’s definition of a head of state as ‘he who possesses the supreme administration of public right’ (AA 8: 299–300). Second, and more relevant to the issue of democracy, such a move threatens to introduce a direct form of democracy contrary to Kant’s characterization of it as ‘despotism’ (AA 8: 352). Thus Kant can hardly be thought to grant such a right to the demos even when the latter is identified with the active citizens of which he speaks.

13:00-13:30 Lunch GM652

13:30-15:00 Michael Nance (University of Maryland, Baltimore County), Fichte, Patriarchy, and Voluntary Servitude”

This talk will explore Fichte’s theory of the gendered division of labor and his theory of marriage from a broadly Marxian perspective. After a brief discussion of exploitation within the family, I will argue that within Fichte’s theory of right, women (including married women) in fact have substantive rights to political and economic independence. To maintain the system of (supposedly) natural patriarchy he endorses, Fichte therefore must rely heavily on the individual, social, and religious enforcement of moral ideologies about gender relations that collectively make it unthinkable for married women to wish to exercise their rights. Womens’ subordination within marriage is, by Fichte’s own lights, voluntary, and therefore requires some form of ideological consciousness for its perpetuation.

15:00-16:30 Kristin Gjesdal (Temple University) Undermining the Political Sphere: Germaine de Staël on Passions, Politics, and Fanaticism

Over a period of more than two decades, Germaine de Staël – a self-professed Kantian – discusses the philosophical dimensions of political fanaticism. Fanaticism, on her view, undermines politics and democratic decision-making. Yet, discussions of enlightenment approaches to fanaticism typically ignore her contribution. Similarly has Staël’s discussion of fanaticism been overlooked within scholarship on her work. This presentation seeks to highlight Staël’s contribution to the philosophical discussion of fanaticism. While accepting the basic enlightenment phenomenology of fanaticism (its dangers and its challenges), Staël launches her analysis of fanaticism from within her larger moral psychology. She situates fanaticism as part of a web of passions with which we are all familiar and suggests, from within this framework, a set of productive responses. In this way, she challenges Voltaire’s identification of fanaticism and religion and his notion of the fanatic as being beyond both reason and the worthiness of tolerance. Staël’s model is philosophically robust, politically relevant, and indeed worthy of our attention when we seek to map the phenomenon of fanaticism and the historical roots of our responses to it.

 

January 14 Georg Morgenstiernes hus room 452

10:00-11:30 Sofie Møller (University of Cologne) Kant on Progress 

Since the Enlightenment we have been obsessed with progress. Kant believed that epistemic, scientific, political and even moral progress were a necessary presupposition for practical agency. For Kant, we must allow the belief that progress is at least possible to strive towards realizing our ideals. The notion of progress runs as a guiding thread across Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophy: Any theoretical inquiry is aimed at progress in our understanding of the world and ourselves; any practical endeavor strives to bring us closer to realizing our practical ideals in the world.

11:30-12:15 Lunch

12:15-14:00 Michael Kryluk, (Université de Fribourg) Kant's Perfect Republic and the (Non-) Instrumentality of Democracy

The aim of this talk is to highlight Kant’s two primary formulations of the ideal republic and their relationship to the contemporary debate about the value of democracy. Although the theme of the perfect republic is a constant presence in Kant’s thought, the topic has received far less attention than other forms of ideal moral and political association in his work—e.g. the kingdom of ends, the ethical commonwealth. To remedy this neglect, this paper compares the distinctive roles of Kant’s model polity in his philosophy of history and political philosophy.

Published Dec. 1, 2025 10:38 AM - Last modified Jan. 13, 2026 7:36 AM