James Jerome John Cameron

• Cameron, James Jerome John (2025). Undermining the Balance: MIRV Exclusion, SALT I, and Strategic Instability. I Herzog, Stephen; Arceneaux, Giles David & Petrovics, Ariel F. W. (Red.), Atomic Backfires: When Nuclear Policies Fail. MIT Press. ISSN 9780262051866. s. 225–256. doi: 10.7551/mitpress/16163.003.0017. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  A sobering edited volume on how efforts to reduce nuclear weapons dangers may sometimes wind up exacerbating them. The existential risks posed to the world by nuclear weapons are growing. Efforts to halt nuclear proliferation, manage crises, promote arms control, and build alliances are all considered fundamental to reducing the likelihood of nuclear catastrophe. Yet, no tool is guaranteed to succeed and some may even have unanticipated, counterproductive consequences for international security. In a field fixated on finding solutions, Atomic Backfires, edited by Stephen Herzog, Giles David Arceneaux, and Ariel F. W. Petrovics, provocatively takes the opposite tack. An impressive group of contributors calls for close scrutiny of “standard operating procedures” in nuclear politics. They warn decision makers, scholars, and students not to lose sight of the drivers and often calamitous effects of failed nuclear policies. The volume’s authors aim to provide insights for navigating the difficult nuclear choices pursued in Washington, D.C., and other capitals around the globe. Contributors David M. Allison, Giles David Arceneaux, Sarah Bidgood, Tyler Bowen, James Cameron, Hyun-Binn Cho, Eliza Gheorghe, Rebecca Davis Gibbons, Stephen Herzog, Ulrich Kühn, Ariel F. W. Petrovics, Daniel Salisbury, Lauren Sukin, Kristin Ven Bruusgaard.

• Cameron, James Jerome John (2025). Negotiating Primacy: Strategic Stability, Superpower Arms Control, and the End of the Cold War. Texas National Security Review (TNSR). ISSN 2576-1021. 8(2), s. 47–74. doi: 10.26153/TSW/59559. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The United States successfully used the concept of strategic stability to tip the nuclear balance against the Soviet Union during the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) of the 1980s and early 1990s. Both superpowers sought to employ strategic stability to legitimate their objectives for START, but differed significantly over how it should be operationalized in an arms control agreement. Despite appearances, the 1991 START I treaty did not reflect the reconciliation of these two divergent views of strategic stability, but rather the triumph of Washington’s conception over Moscow’s, thereby laying the groundwork for arms control in an era of US military primacy.

• Cameron, James Jerome John & Bruusgaard, Kristin Ven (2024). Norway, deterrence, reassurance and strategic stability in Europe. Journal of Strategic Studies. ISSN 0140-2390. doi: 10.1080/01402390.2024.2321138. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The Russian invasion of Ukraine has placed stability in Europe under severe strain. This special issue explores Norway’s policy of balancing deterrence and reassurance of Moscow and the deterrent interaction between NATO and Russia to produce insights into how NATO states can craft a more stable Europe. It emphasizes how new technologies and capabilities reshape the landscape of strategic stability. Although the prospects for a more stable European continent seem dim with Moscow as an unwilling partner, calibrating deterrence and reassurance has proven adaptable and will likely remain important in Norway’s and potentially NATO’s future efforts to mitigate the security dilemma.

• Cameron, James Jerome John (2024). Deterrence, reassurance and strategic stability: The enduring relevance of Johan Jørgen Holst. Journal of Strategic Studies. ISSN 0140-2390. doi: 10.1080/01402390.2024.2321135. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Focusing on the academic and policy career of Norwegian scholar-statesman Johan Jørgen Holst, this article explores the history of Norway’s attempt to ensure its security through a balance between deterrence and reassurance of the Soviet Union. It argues that Holst’s concept of balancing deterrence and reassurance provided an intellectually coherent rationale for Norwegian policy, tailored to its specific needs. However, Holst encountered increasing difficulties in implementing his concept during his time in government in the 1970s and 1980s. Holst’s government experience underlines the importance of combining any future reassurance measures with a coherent deterrence package, in consultation with NATO allies.

• Cameron, James Jerome John (2021). Anticommunism, Trade, and Debt: The Reagan Administration and Brazil, 1981-1989. I Hunt, Jonathan R. & Miles, Simon (Red.), The Reagan Moment: America and the World in the 1980s. Cornell University Press (CUP). ISSN 9781501760716. s. 281–299. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Cameron, James Jerome John (2020). What History Can Teach. Daedalus. ISSN 0011-5266. 149(2), s. 116–132. doi: 10.1162/daed_a_01793. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Most analyses of arms control during the Cold War focus on its role in maintaining strategic stability between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, history shows that the superpowers' search for strategic stability is insufficient to explain the roots and course of negotiations. This essay argues that arms control was used as one tool in a broader strategy of war prevention, designed to contain a series of challenges to U.S. and Soviet dominance of the international system that both sides worried could upset bipolarity and increase the chances of conflict between them. At the same time, U.S. policy-makers balanced this joint superpower interest with Washington's extended deterrent commitment to its allies, which ultimately upheld the integrity of the system as a whole. The essay concludes that today's leaders should integrate arms control into a more comprehensive strategy of political accommodation fit for twenty-first-century conditions.

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• Cameron, James Jerome John (2018). The Double Game: The Demise of America's First Missile Defense System and the Rise of Strategic Arms Limitation. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780190459925. 248 s. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

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• Cameron, James Jerome John (2021). China’s Silos: New Intelligence, Old Problems. War on the Rocks. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Cameron, James Jerome John (2021). Russia proved it can shoot down a satellite. Does this make space less secure? The Washington Post. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Cameron, James Jerome John (2021). The U.S. and Russia kept a bilateral nuclear weapons deal alive. The harder part comes next. The Washington Post. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Cameron, James Jerome John (2021). What did China test in space, exactly, and why? The Washington Post. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Cameron, James Jerome John (2020). The U.S. plans to withdraw from the Open Skies treaty. That’s a miscalculation. The Washington Post. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Cameron, James Jerome John & Rabinowitz, Or (2020). Trump officials have talked about resuming nuclear testing. Here’s why that would hurt the U.S. The Washington Post. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Cameron, James Jerome John; Pifer, Steven & Andrey, Baklitskiy (2021). Deep Cuts Working Paper #14: Missile Defense and the Offense Defense Relationship. Deep Cuts Commission. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

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