Wetlesen, Jon
(2010).
Searching for the Self in Buddhist Traditions.
In Fløistad, Guttorm (Eds.),
Contemporary Philosophy, Volume 10: Philosophy of Religion.
Springer Science+Business Media B.V..
ISSN 9789048135264.p. 215–260.Full text in Research Archive
Wetlesen, Jon
(2003).
Spinozas vei til indre frihet - gradvis eller plutselig?
Agora Journal for metafysisk spekulasjon.
ISSN 0800-7136.p. 208–240.Full text in Research Archive
The question in the title has recently been answered in the affirmative by Paul Williams in his book on Altruism and Reality: Studies in the Philosophy of the Bodhicaryavatara. Williams assumes that Shantideva attempted to justify the bodhisattva's universal altruism on the basis of a reductive conception of a person, and that this entails a number of absurd consequences that are destructive of the bodhisattva path. Williams concedes that Shantideva might have avoided these consequences if he had adopted a non-reductive conception of the person as a conventional truth, but Williams seems to assume that this would have to be an individualistic conception, and in that case it would have prevented Shantideva from reaching his desired conclusion.
I argue that there may be a way out of this dilemma if we interpret Shantideva's conception of the person in the direction of an interpersonal holism. In this view, others are perceived not only as more or less similar to oneself, but as parts of oneself. The bodhisattva path is understood as a transformation from the small to the big self within the framework of conventional truth, and eventually to non-self within the highest truth. I believe that this approach takes better care of those few verses in chapter eight of Shantideva's book, on which Williams has based his interpretation, and that it is supported by a number of other verses in this context, to which Williams has not paid much attention.
Wetlesen, Jon
(1999).
The Moral Status of Beings who are not Persons: A Casuistic Argument.
Environmental Values.
ISSN 0963-2719.
8,
p. 287–323.Full text in Research Archive
Thommessen, Bjørn & Wetlesen, Jon
(1998).
Hva er etisk tenkning? Noen refleksjoner og et svar på Knut Ruyters kritikk.
Norsk Teologisk Tidsskrift.
ISSN 0029-2176.p. 116–120.Full text in Research Archive
Wetlesen, Jon
(1998).
Kasuistikkens død og oppstandelse,
Hva er kasuistikk? Om moralsk læring og refleksjon i tilknytning til forbilder og eksempler.
Universitetet i Oslo.
p. 7–29.Full text in Research Archive
Wetlesen, Jon
(1998).
Value in nature: intrinsic or inherent?
In Witoszek, Nina & Brennan, Andrew (Ed.),
Philosophical Dialogues: Arne Naess and the Progress of Ecophilosophy.
Rowman & Littlefield, New York.
Full text in Research Archive
Thommessen, Bente & Wetlesen, Jon
(1998).
Hva er etisk tenkning? Noen refleksjoner og et svar på Knut Ruyters kritikk.
Norsk Teologisk Tidsskrift.
ISSN 0029-2176.p. 116–120.Full text in Research Archive
Wetlesen, Jon
(1982).
Naess on the development of a Pyrrhonian sceptic; some comments in the light of Indian scepticism.
In Wetlesen, Jon & Gullvåg, Ingemund (Ed.),
In Sceptical Wonder; Inquiries into the Philosophy of Arne Naess on the Occasion of his 70th Birthday.
Universitetsforlaget.
ISSN 9788200058670.p. 185–199.Full text in Research Archive
Wetlesen, Jon
(1978).
Selverkjennelse og frihet fra en ikke-egologisk synsvinkel.
Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift.
ISSN 0029-1943.p. 1–22.Full text in Research Archive
Wetlesen, Jon
(1975).
Menneskerettigheter og økologi som premisser for praktiske standpunkt.
In Vinje, Arne & Hofseth, Paul (Ed.),
Økologi, økofilosofi.
Gyldendal Norsk Forlag A/S.
ISSN 9788205078116.p. 189–227.Full text in Research Archive
Wetlesen, Jon & Gullvåg, Ingemund
(1982).
In Sceptical Wonder; Inquiries into the Philosophy of Arne Naess on the Occasion of his 70th Birthday.
Universitetsforlaget.
ISBN 9788200058670.328 p.Full text in Research Archive
Wetlesen, Jon
(2003).
På hvilken måte begrunnes retten til tros- og livsytringsfrihet i buddismen?
Mennesker og Rettigheter.
ISSN 0800-0735.p. 165–178.Full text in Research Archive
Wetlesen, Jon
(2000).
Contemplation in a world of action. A neglected dimension - and a challenge to ethics in the new millenium.
Full text in Research Archive
Wetlesen, Jon
(2000).
Om en positiv og en negativ måte å forstå "tomhet", bl. a. hos Shenxiu og Huaihai på den ene side, og Huineng på den annen.
Full text in Research Archive