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Davide Sutto

Student - Faculty of Humanities

Email davide.sutto@ifikk.uio.no

Room 636

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Visiting address Niels Henrik Abels vei 36 P. A. Munchs hus 0313 Oslo

Postal address Postboks 1079 Blindern 0316 Oslo

Other affiliations Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas

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Academic interests

My research interests are in Philosophy of Mathematics, with a special focus on the Philosophy of Set Theory. I am also interested in areas such as Logic and Philosophy of Logic, Formal Ontology and Philosophy of Science.

Current Project

I am a PhD within the project C:FORS: Construction in the Formal Sciences, where I am working on the work package involving constructional approaches to the foundations of mathematics. More precisely, I am currently working on the formal and philosophical developments of potentialis set theory.

Background

I received a BA in Philosophy from the University of Turin in 2019 with a thesis on Charles Parsons' mathematical structuralism (Supervisors: Michele Lubrano & Vincenzo Crupi). In 2022 I received a MA in Philosophy from the University of Turin (Philosophy International Curriculum) with a thesis on Potentialist Set Theory (Supervisors: Matteo Plebani & Lorenzo Rossi).

Tags: Philosophy, Philosophy of Mathematics

Sutto, D. 2026. "A Taxonomy for Set-Theoretic Potentialism". Philosophia Mathematica. 34(1). pp. 7-34. https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkae016

Sutto, D. 2025. "The Plural Iterative Conception of Set". Journal for the Philosophy of Mathematics. 2. pp. 161-193. https://doi.org/10.36253/jpm-3549

Sutto, Davide (2025). The Plural Iterative Conception of Set. Journal for the Philosophy of Mathematics (JPM). 2, p. 161–193. doi: 10.36253/jpm-3549. Full text in Research Archive Show summary
Georg Cantor informally distinguished between “consistent” and “inconsistent” multiplicities as those many things that, respectively, can and cannot be thought of as one, i.e., as a set. To clarify this distinction, the recent debate filtered the logic of plurals through two main approaches to the process of set-formation: limitation of size (Burgess) or set-theoretic potentialism (Linnebo). In this paper I propose a third route through the development of a plural iterative conception of set. Inspired by Tim Button’s Level Theory, I define and axiomatize the notion of a plural level, which explains Cantor’s multiplicities either as level-bound (consistent) or level unbound (inconsistent) pluralities. While this framework is clearly in contrast with the limitation of size view, it also revives a plausible actualist framework prematurely dismissed by the advocates of potentialism.
Sutto, Davide (2024). A Taxonomy for Set-Theoretic Potentialism. Philosophia Mathematica. ISSN 0031-8019. doi: 10.1093/philmat/nkae016. Full text in Research Archive Show summary
Set-theoretic potentialism is one of the most lively trends in the philosophy of mathematics. Modal accounts of sets have been developed in two different ways. The first, initiated by Charles Parsons, focuses on sets as objects. The second, dating back to Hilary Putnam and Geoffrey Hellman, investigates set-theoretic structures. The paper identifies two strands of open issues, technical and conceptual, to clarify these two different, yet often conflated, views and categorize the potentialist approaches that have emerged in the contemporary debate. The final outcome is a taxonomy that should help researchers navigate the rich landscape of modal set theories.

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Sutto, Davide (2024). Potentialist set theory: New paths and open questions. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. ISSN 1079-8986. 30(1), p. 133–133. doi: 10.1017/bsl.2024.15. Full text in Research Archive

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Published July 5, 2026 12:53 PM - Last modified July 5, 2026 1:10 PM

Research groups

Logic at the University of Oslo