Caj Strandberg

I joined IFIKK/CSMN in July 2014 as Associate Professor in Practical Philosophy.

The main part of my research is focused on different themes in metaethics, but I have also authored papers in aesthetics, experimental philosophy, and normative ethics.

In my dissertation, Moral Reality. A Defence of Moral Realism (2004), I defend a naturalist, non-reductionist, version of moral realism.

In recent years, I have become particularly interested in the connection between moral language and attitudes, and the connection between normative reasons for action and rationality. I have taught most areas of practical philosophy, including metaethics, normative ethics, aesthetics, and philosophy of religion.

Earlier I have been affiliated to Lund University and University of Gothenburg (Sweden).

Publications

• • ‘Dispositional Moral Properties and Moral Motivation’, Theoria, Vol. LXV, 1999, pp. 171–192.
• • ‘Aristotle’s Internalism in the Nicomachean Ethics’, The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 34, 2000, pp. 71–87.
• • ‘Two Conceptions of Inequality’, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 30, 2001, pp. 169–199.
• • ‘In Defence of the Open Question Argument’, The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 8, 2004, pp. 179–196.
• • Moral Reality. A Defence of Moral Realism (Lund University). Dissertation
• • ‘Externalism and the Content of Moral Motivation’, Philosophia, Vol. 35, 2007, pp. 249–260, 2007.
• • ‘Particularism and Supervenience’, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed. by Russ Shafer-Landau, Vol. 3, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 129–158.
• • ‘A Structural Disanalogy between Aesthetic and Ethical Value Judgments’, The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 51, 2011, pp. 51–67.
• • ‘The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation’, The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 15, 2011, pp. 341–369.
• • ‘A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXXIV, 2012, pp. 87–122.
• • ‘Expressivism and Dispositional Desires’, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 49, 2012, pp. 81–91.
• • ‘Recent Work on Motivational Internalism’, Analysis, Vol. 72, 2012, pp. 123–137. Together with F. Björklund, G. Björnsson, J. Eriksson, and Ragnar Francén Olinder.
• • ‘An Internalist Dilemma­—and an Externalist Solution’, The Journal of Moral Philosophy, Vol. 10, 2013, pp. 25–51.
• • ‘Cognitivism’, International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. by Hugh LaFollette, Oxford: Blackwell, 2013, pp. 850–859.
• • ‘Properties, Moral’, International Encycolopedia of Ethics, ed. by Hugh LaFollette, Oxford: Blackwell, 2013, pp. 4159–4168.
• • ‘Is Moral Internalism Supported by Folk Intuitions?’, Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 26, 2013, pp. 319–335. Together with F. Björklund.
• • ‘Options for Hybrid Expressivism’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. Vol. 1, 2015, pp. 91-111.
• • ‘Can the Embedding Problem be Generalized?’, Acta Analytica, Vol. 30, 2015, pp. 1–15.
• • Motivational Internalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Edited together with G. Björnsson, R. Francén Olinder, J. Eriksson, and F. Björklund.
• • ‘Motivational Internalism: Contemporary Debates’, in Motivational Internalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Together with G. Björnsson, R. Francén Olinder, J. Eriksson, and F. Björklund.
• • Review of Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge (eds.), Having it Both Ways, Ethics, Vol. 126, 2016, pp. 500–505.
• • ‘A Puzzle about Reasons and Rationality’, The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 21, 2017, pp. 63–88. 
• • ‘Aesthetic Internalism and Two Normative Puzzles’, Studi di Estetica, No. 6, 6, 2016, pp. 23–70.
• 'Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons', Dialectica, Vol. 72, 2018, pp. 69-100.
• 'An Ecumenical Account of Categorical Moral Reasons', Journal of Moral Philosophy, Vol. 16, 2019, pp. 160-188.
• 'Internalism and the Frege-Geach Problem', Belgrade Philosophical Annual, Issue 32, pp. 76-91.
• 'Moral Blame and Rational Criticism', European Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.