Abstract
An influential argument due to Jane Friedman posits that traditional epistemic norms conflict with highly plausible norms of inquiry, or “zetetic” norms. Friedman suggests that this conflict is best resolved by bringing epistemic normativity under the purview of zetetic normativity. This move would entail a radical revision of the domain of the epistemic. In this paper, I argue that the conflict Friedman proposes can be dissolved only by distinguishing the act of forming a belief from the patterns of attention and reasoning that lead to belief formation. But once we make this distinction clear, something surprising happens: the epistemic norms on belief formation disappear. Thus, epistemologists are left with a choice. Either follow Friedman or deny that there are epistemic norms on belief formation. The latter option is the better one.
How to attend
This is a read-ahead and/or presentation seminar. The meetings have a hybrid format. We meet in person in GM 467 and digitally on Zoom (Zoom login required).
The meeting link, along with a copy of the paper to be discussed, will be made available in advance via the mailing list.