Our external actions, that is, how we use our words and bodies, exist for us, but when we act, those very actions exist for others too. In my thesis, I argue that Immanuel Kant’s theory of justice captures this aspect of what it means to act externally among others. Human beings must live honourably, not hurt anyone and, when disputes arise, submit to a public authority: these are the boundaries of public justice. Every action of ours can be understood in terms of what we owe to each other, but also – and this is my focus – in terms of what we owe to ourselves.
Kant writes that everybody has a right (which he calls innate) to use themselves in a way that honours their humanity. This part of Kantian justice protects our own actions as we ourselves understand them, and marks out who belongs to the community of justice, meaning human beings who act in space and time, making use of their capacities. While doing so, human beings are accountable not only towards each other, but towards themselves as well: they stand in a relationship with themselves that is irreplaceable and makes sense internally, from within the standpoint they occupy when they act.
Why should we care? Kant’s theory establishes the importance of the relationship people have with themselves while acting among others. This aspect of our coexistence cannot be replaced by other layers of justice – how we act with others in private transactions or as members of the public – and deserves recognition in our institutions.
Trial lecture
Designated topic: To be announced.
Time and place: Friday 30 October 2026, 10:15 AM, Sophus Bugges hus, aud. 2
Evaluation committee
- Professor Katrin Flikschuh, The London School of Economics and Political Science
- Professor Sorin Baiasu, University of Liverpool
- Senior Lecturer Feroz Mehmood Shah, University of Oslo (committee administrator)
Chair of the defence
Supervisors
- Professor Reidar Maliks, University of Oslo
- Professor Jens Timmermann, University of St Andrews