In The Moral Problem Michael Smith defended only a weak moral rationalism: the view that moral requirements entail pro tanto reasons. But in recent work he has moved to a stronger form of rationalism, according to which moral requirements are also rational requirements. It is the point of the present paper to try to understand what motivated his change in view, and to assess whether those motivations were good ones. I will argue that the motivation depended on particular views of (i) what reasons are, (ii) how they can be classified as moral or not, and (iii) how they combine to yield moral requirements. And I will suggest that Smith’s move to strong moral rationalism was largely the result of problematic answers to all three of these questions.
Joshua Gert is distinguished professor at the College of William & Mary (USA). He has published extensively on topics including: practical rationality, metaethics, philosophy of colour, and neopragmatism. Gert's books include Primitive Colors: A Case Study in Neo-Pragmatist Metaphysics and Philosophy of Perception (2017), Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality and Reasons (2012), and Brute Rationality: Normativity and Human Action (2004).
All welcome! Following the seminar, we will have a reception with light food served in the 4th floor kitchen.