There's an ethical ideal that's an important part of the justificatory foundations of modern (ie post-World War 2) free speech politics, but which philosophical theories of free speech have generally neglected. Theories of free speech have tended to focus on three core ideals – knowledge, democracy, and autonomy – as free speech's justificatory foundations. The thing that's been overlooked is the ideal of experimentality. According to this ideal, it's a good thing for people to act contrary to social norms. (Some other terms you might use to denote this ideal are “non-conformity”, “individuality”, or “eccentricity”.) The reason why experimentality has been overlooked is because the areas of free speech politics that reflect a commitment to this ideal operate at an arms-length from constitutional law, and constitutional law is the main focal point for most free speech theorising. In my forthcoming book "Experimentality: Pop Music, Free Speech, and Romantic Liberalism", I defend these claims, using popular music, and its place in the post-war liberal politics of free speech, as an extended case study. In this talk I'll present a sketch of the book's overall argument, and then delve into a critical question that this argument raises: is experimentality a good ideal? A general and indiscriminate valuation of experimentality seems harmful, or pointless, or frivolous. So why would anyone think that it's a good thing, in general, for people to act contrary to social norms?
Rob Simpson is an Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department at University College London. He writes about free speech, social epistemology, liberalism, applied ethics, and religion.
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