Knowledge is Indefeasible, and We Have Lots of It

Abstract: This paper argues for the thesis stated in its title. I begin by examining Kripke’s “dogmatism paradox,” according to which knowledge licenses rational dogmatism: if one knows that p, then one knows that evidence against p is misleading and is therefore not rationally required to modify one’s opinion in light of such evidence. I argue that neither Harman’s influential response nor Rachel Fraser’s recent “Volitionist” response provides an adequate solution to the paradox. Fraser's criticism of Harman's response is that it cannot solve a series of revenge puzzles, but I argue that Fraser's own response cannot solve those revenge puzzles either. I then show that accepting the conclusion of Kripke’s argument has no skeptical consequences. The widespread assumption that it does have skeptical consequences depends on a confusion concerning the material conditional.

Ram Neta is Professor of Philosophy at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He specializes in epistemology and is currently at work on a book on the nature of knowledge. In particular, he is trying to understand what knowledge is by examining the various ways in which knowing some things depends upon knowing other things.