About the project

The Kantian Foundations of Democracy

KanDem is the first large scale study of the democratic theory of Kant and his followers in the 1790s. Kant’s political philosophy has in recent years been subject to an unprecedented scholarly interest (Ripstein 2009, Byrd and Hruschka, 2010, Horn 2014, Varden 2020). Yet, scholars have ignored that he was the center of a large and productive research group known at the time as ‘the Kantian School’ in political philosophy. These philosophers included Heydenreich (1794), Bergk (1796), Reinhold (2005), Tieftrunk (1798), Feuerbach (1798), Erhard (1970), Maimon (1795), Forster (1965), Jakob (1794), Reimarus (1791), Schlegel (1996), and the early Fichte (1973). The Kantians were remarkable in one particular aspect: they sought to develop a philosophical justification for popular sovereignty, both in terms of the political rights of citizens, and in terms institutions, such as voting, plebiscites and representative government. Remarkably, by the standards of the Eighteenth century, many of the Kantians defended the extension of the franchise to workers and women. They were not just ahead of their time, but produced philosophical theories that remain of high interest, in particular in their views of how freedom can be reconciled with government in democratic self-legislation, on how democracy relies on a free public sphere and popular enlightenment, and in their definition of the nation. They developed sophisticated theories of collective action that sought to show how a people has a right to change its constitution, either through reform or revolution.

Influential during the French revolution, the Kantians were quickly forgotten as their radical ideals of democracy did not fit the era of restauration after the revolution (Klippel, 1976). Other directions, such as post-Kantian German idealism, historicism, and romanticism took over and have remained in the scholarly spotlight. Although the history of democratic theory has recently attracted significant new interest (Meckstroth 2015, Tuck 2016, Urbinati 2006), the Kantian contributions have been neglected. Kantian Foundations of Democracy argues that the resulting knowledge gap is a problem because it leaves us in the dark about a highly interesting group of thinkers who developed Kant’s principles of equality and autonomy in ways that illuminate how Kantian thought can be the foundation of democracy. Although differing in many respects, Kant and his followers were united in seeing political autonomy as not just a matter of participating occasionally in elections, but in continuously participating politically. This is an ideal of democracy that this project will seek to analyze. KanDem aims to lead and consolidate the new research agenda into this neglected history of philosophy, which aims to have an impact both on Kant-studies and studies of the history of democratic theory.

State of the art

Kant’s theory of democracy has not been the focus of much research. His term for what today we call democracy was republicanism, and to him it signified elected government and separation of powers. As some scholars have pointed out, there are both elements of direct and representative aspects of his view of democracy (Maus 1992), and his theory includes a much discussed attempt to connect democratic procedures to international peace (Doyle 1983). Yet, much about the theory remains controversial. Scholars have often thought that he was committed to the doctrine of popular sovereignty as an idea but in reality quite content with autocracy (Pettit 2014, Tuck 1999, Stedman Jones 1994, Mandt 1976). His rejection of a right of revolution is often taken as evidence of this. More recently, however, scholars have pointed out that Kant was heavily influenced by the Rousseauean idea of political autonomy as self-legislation, and that this presupposes not just a free public sphere, but a wide franchise (Ripstein 2009, Maliks 2009, Byrd and Hruschka 2010). The dominant view today is that while he rejected a legal right of revolution, he defended a moral right of revolt against “barbaric” regimes (Ripstein 2009). Some have claimed that Kant’s principles favor a form of deliberative democracy (Habermas 1992), and others have argued that Kant was committed to the idea of representative democracy for its contribution to political autonomy (Maliks 2009, Rostbøll 2016). Yet, it is quite clear that Kant never developed his theory of democracy in any great detail, and it is also clear that he was not fully committed to the principle of equality, as he excluded both women and workers from the franchise (Maliks 2014). In this, he was criticized by his followers. Instead of excluding those who are financially dependent, the Kantians argued that they must be given full political rights, while at the same time society must pay for education and enlightenment through a free public sphere (see the essays reprinted in Schmidt 1996). That, in turn, would make it possible for the people to act collectively in political decision making.

Important at the time, the Kantians have since been largely forgotten by scholarship. There are a few exceptions: Marxist scholars have sought to write the history of radical and revolutionary agitation in Germany (Batscha 1981, and Schlumbohm 1975, Blühdorn 1974, Garber 1980), and some legal historians have found an interest in them for their early contributions to constitutionalism (Stolleis 1972, Klippel 1999, 1976, Walker 2002, Martinson 1990). These scholars, however, have tended to explore the Kantians not so much in their own right, and for their philosophical interest, but as examples of historical tendencies that would later come to fruition. Recently, however, philosophers have taken an interest in them (Maliks 2012, 2014, Curtis- Wendlandt 2012, Kleingeld 2012, Clarke 2018, Dahlstrom 2018, Josifović and Noller 2019, Quinn 2019, Clarke and Gottlieb, 2021). The UK Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) recently sponsored a research network on ‘Reason, Right, and Revolution: Practical Philosophy between Kant and Hegel’, Clarke and Gottlieb, 2017). Yet, this research is in its infancy and has not focused on the Kantian contributions to democratic theory. This project argues that their chief contribution was to develop the Kantian concept of equality as well as the Kantian idea of political autonomy. The upshot of these twin principles was that individuals can only be free in so far as they have a right to contribute to the horizontal and vertical deliberations in a political community, and as long as they can have an equal right to participate directly or indirectly in decision-making. Analyzing these theories can help us bring out the full potential of the Kantian philosophy.

KanDem's objectives and ends are set by these two knowledge needs and has the ambition to consolidate an emerging research program in the history of philosophy in two ways:

1. To generate ground breaking knowledge about a forgotten group of democratic theorists

2. To improve our understanding Kant’s theory of popular sovereignty

Considering the lack of knowledge of the Kantians are plenty of “low hanging fruits” in the sense of simply bringing to light forgotten philosophers. Yet, the project has greater ambitions. The two objectives together make up a new research agenda that aims to change the way we think about Kantian philosophy and democratic theory. This has the potential to generate serious theoretical developments also in contemporary efforts to apply Kantian philosophy to democratic theory. Kant’s philosophy has had a significant influence on the development of deliberative democracy (Maus 1992, Habermas 1992). This project will utilize the theory of democracy of Kant’s followers for invigorating contemporary democracy in similar ways, focusing in particularly on the connection of autonomy to democracy.

Research questions and hypotheses, theoretical approach and methodology

The research will proceed through four cross-cutting questions, which have been chosen because they allow a comprehensive survey from basic foundations (questions 1 and 2) to more applied topics (questions 3 and 4).

(1) How did the Kantian philosophers justify the principle of equal rights? Following Kant, they started from the premise that principles of right for a polity must secure freedom understood as independence, the status of not being subject to arbitrary rule or the arbitrary choices of fellow citizens. They were committed defenders of equal rights based on an a priori foundation. As Erhard wrote, there is an innate and inalienable “right to acquire legal rights” (“das Recht, sich Rechte zu erwerben” (1970:17). It follows from the innate right that no one can have a right unilaterally to decide over what belongs to others, including their body and property. Freedom, therefore, must be equal. They frequently adopted Kant’s relational approach to right, according to which principles of justice are exclusively concerned with regulating interaction among persons who unavoidably affect each other. Yet, they also differed from Kant. To Erhard and the early Fichte, for example, personal and political autonomy was an intrinsic aspect of democratic government. Individual autonomy, on that view, was not just to live in a condition were rights are protected, but to be self-legislating through public institutions. Public autonomy, was when an entire polity governed itself according to a rational view of right and wrong. They thought of legislation not merely as providing the condition for freedom, but as expressing their freedom (for that distinction, see Neuhouser 1993). For that reason, their view of rights differed from Kant’s. For them, teleological notions of the human end of developing moral capabilities was intrinsically a goal of a democratic society. They were led to interpret the concept of freedom as independence differently, not just as independence from interpersonal domination, but also as independence from myopia and ignorance. Their foundation raises numerous questions. How could such views be compatible with a Kantian relational foundation? How does their view of citizens as rational agents justify political equality and inclusion? If freedom requires participation in public deliberation and decision-making, does that mean that unpolitical and private persons are not free?

(2) How did the Kantians define equal political rights? Kant’s way of reconciling liberty and political authority was through a notion of the social contract as an ideal standard of justice, and by providing political freedom in the form of the right to vote. Yet, Kant considered that all could have civil freedom, even if they lacked political freedom, and therefore argued that workers and women were free, even when subject to authority that they did not participate in electing. In this regard the Kantians split from Kant, because they saw law not merely as a condition, but as expressing freedom. To them, freedom required the right to participation. Elise Reimarus, the only woman among the Kantians, voiced the critique: ”Don’t women together with men make up all of humanity, have the same abilities as the latter, and therefore have the same right to all affairs and activities which [the men] claim for themselves alone?” (Spalding, 2005:130). Likewise, Bergk (1797:187) expressed a shared view when he wrote, “Men and women are equally free and independent moral beings, both sexes hold the state in common, hence one half cannot exclude the other from political rights.” Tieftrunk (1798:246) concluded: “mere sexual difference is no reason to deny them the exercise of this right [to vote]”. Likewise, many of the Kantians also rejected Kant’s exclusion of workers from the franchise. Heydenreich (1794:117) defended a desert-based justification for the franchise, and wrote “Should a strong, powerful person [then] not have at least as much worth to the state as a cripple with property?” Property owning does not “make the voter more honest, the legislator more perceptive, and the judge more impartial”, Bergk wrote (1797:53). The Kantians were united in seeing freedom as a matter of participating actively in government. How did they reconcile that with Kant’s view of freedom as being subject only to the rule of law? They differed from Kant in considering that participating politically was a condition of freedom. Why did Kant not take that step? Did the Kantians rely on that principle alone, or did they combine it with an argument about distribution of power through the franchise? Why were they more attentive to the inclusion of women than Kant? How did they think in terms of the protection of the economic status of marginal groups in society? If freedom is an innate right, and it inherently requires political rights, does that mean that resident aliens must be granted full political rights?

(3) How did the Kantians define popular sovereignty and its institutions? Kant had argued that freedom is compatible with authority only if government is aligned with an ideal general will. The Kantians, by contrast, argued that freedom, rightly understood, requires actual participation. They differed, however, in how they saw individual participation and in their views on how a nation can act collectively. Part of the purpose of popular sovereignty was to avoid domination by a master, in line with the neo-republican program. Yet, exactly what was it about popular sovereignty that prevented domination? The Kantians were forced to explore the prospect of arbitrary majorities, and many of them went far in a populist direction, making justice the outcome of an expressed popular will. Thus, Bergk (1796:125) concluded that: “the majority view confirms justice in a state”. This seems to have been based on the classical notion of volenti non fit injuria (no harm is done to the one who consents). How did they develop this problematic ideal and how did they avoid falling into relativism? They also tended to follow Kant in rejecting mixed government and defend a unitary state, where power is hierarchical, in such a way that the legislature was sovereign. When rejecting checks and balances, how did they conceive of limits to the arbitrary exercise of authority? Many of them sought to find ways in which to establish popular sovereignty in the form of constitution making assemblies, aimed at consensus. How did they conceive of the social and cultural unity, which they admitted this sort of collective action required? The Kantians differed in how they conceived of the unity of the nation and its foundation for popular sovereignty. Some, such as Erhard, were more inclined to a cultural definition, while others like the early Fichte saw the nation in more legal terms.

The question of the nation was brought up not the least by European colonialism. As has been shown in recent years Kant held racist views (Kleingeld 2012), yet he was at the same time highly critical of European colonialism and tended to treat colonized people (including Amerindians) as sovereign nations even though they did not have the features of the state that he proposed and that was prevalent in Europe (Flikschuh and Ypi 2014). Some Kantians, like Forster, seem to have followed Kant in this endeavour, yet at the same time being highly critical of his view of race. This raises questions of how the Kantians considered non-European cultures, and what that may tell us about their views of the nation and its right of self-determination.

(4) How did the Kantians conceive of revolution and reform? Like Kant, his followers considered universal republicanism to be the goal of politics. Yet, while Kant rejected revolution as a means to that end, all the Kantians defended it in various ways. In doing so they crafted nuanced theories that drew fine distinctions between actions like rebellion and sedition, which were illegitimate, and conscientious objection and revolution, which under some conditions could be justified. Yet, these theories raise conundrums. How could they defend a people’s right of revolution and yet remain faithful to their Kantian premises? Kant had maintained that individual never may use moral arguments for challenging legal authority. He had also argued that it is perfectly possible to be free, even when subject to tyrannical and despotic government, because an unaccountable ruler may govern in a virtually democratic way. To this, the Kantians objected, because they considered participating in self-legislation an intrinsic aspect of freedom. Since they were nonetheless committed to Kant’s view that all moral principles only can be valid through public law, they could not admit a moral right of resisting positive law. Their solution to this conundrum was in arguing that only properly democratic republics may count as true states, whereas despotic government really is just a state of nature with a serious power imbalance. Despotic rulers dissolve their authority. Erhard, for example, wrote that “What contradicts reason can be no law for humans, it is the speech of a fool or the threat of a robber” (1970:16). Likewise Heydenreich: “As soon as the ruler [Oberherr] or the subjects no longer hold the basic laws of society to be holy one cannot say that there still truly is a state. The ruler, then, releases the ties of society through each intrusion [Eingriff] in the basic laws” (1794:154). As a result, the united people is justified in acting collectively in re-claiming its right to construct a constitution. Although this might look like a revolution, it is in fact just seeking to transcend a state of nature.

In defining the legitimate state in a way that required democratic participation, the young Kantians set their view of freedom as a condition of the state. For them, revolution is about creating the republic as the ‘foundation of freedom’, to use a terminology Hannah Arendt (1963:33) introduced. They were still faced with the practical question of how a people could act together outside of institutions to create a new constitution, and they argued that this could only take place when the population had arrived at a shared insight into justice. To explain how that could happen, they utilized Kant’s ideas of public enlightenment as a path to shared opinion- and will formation. The Kantian thinking on revolution raises many questions about the legitimacy of non-institutional collective action against governments. By what authority can revolutionaries claim to represent the people? How could one possibly speak of a mobilized people, when ordinary procedures for identifying a popular will (such as voting) do not exist? How did they distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate attempts at a revolution? By what practical methods can a people come to a united conscience about the injustice of a regime?

When answering these four cross cutting questions, we will not just be able to discuss original democratic approaches to Kant’s philosophy, we will also be able to throw light on other currently controversial topics in Kant-studies, such as the connection or lack of it between the principles of morality and the principles of politics (Guyer 2000, Willaschek 2009), and the question of a right of resistance and revolution (Korsgaard 1997, Maliks 2022).

In order to reach sound conclusions to the four cross-cutting questions, KanDem will combine contextual and analytical methods. The Kantians are overlooked today because of an (often unstated) commitment among scholars to analyze canonized thinkers outside of their context. This commitment has often lead to the exclusion of voices, including those of women (Gjesdal, forthcoming). A particularly valuable contextual method for this project is Dieter Henrich’s “constellation research”, which seeks to understand philosophical ideas and individual philosophers in light of the mutual interaction of persons and theories in particular milieus and networks (Mulsow and Stamm 2005). This is a useful approach when several philosophers share premises and aims, but differ in the conclusions they draw. This contextual approach should not, however, be seen as contrary to the analytical method, which consists of detailed study of the concepts and larger theoretical commitments of the philosophies, often in the form of rational reconstructions (Rorty 1984). The analytical method will be highly relevant in exploring philosophical concepts like right, equality, popular sovereignty, and revolution, elucidating the deeper logic of the Kantian writings and bringing them to bear on Kant scholarship and the history of democratic theory. Contextualism and conceptual analysis share the purpose of better understanding, evaluating, and applying philosophical claims, and they will be pursued simultaneously.

KanDem will consist of four work packages with associated tasks. Each work package will analyze Kant and the Kantians along the four cross-cutting questions detailed above: WP1: The principle of equal rights, WP2: equal political rights, WP3: Popular sovereignty, and WP4: revolution and reform. The sequence of the work packages is structured so as to deal with the most foundational subjects to begin with and subsequently engage with more applied topics. Each work package will be the subject of attention for an academic year, to build up the team’s knowledge successively. The work packages will form the basis for the collective endeavors, including the reading group, construction of shared bibliographies, and they will form the topic of the annual workshops. Each scholar will take on a specific research task, which may span several work packages.

Measures for communication and exploitation

The target audiences for KanDem are scholars in the history of political thought. An interdisciplinary area, this includes scholars in Philosophy, History of ideas, and Political science. As described above, there is currently a growing interest in Kantian philosophy, with a growing specialized audience for this work. There are, furthermore, large research communities devoted to Kant’s legal and political philosophy, and to the history of democratic political thought. The project aims for dissemination in top ranking journals such as History of Political Thought and Journal of the History of Philosophy and by top university presses. The Postdoctoral fellows will be expected to produce a monograph on the topic of the work package, or the equivalent in articles, and the Ph.D. student will produce a dissertation as well as at least one published article. The project will also produce at least one special issue of a journal with a selection of contributions from the annual workshops. The British Journal for the History of Philosophy would be a suitable home for the special issue, and they have demonstrated their interest by publishing a series of articles on the Kantians and translations of their writings.

Reidar Maliks will write a monograph with the title The Kantian Origins of Democracy, which will be the first monograph analyzing the philosophical outlook. This will likely generate significant interest, since it concerns a Kantian theory of democracy from an unusual angle. Furthermore, there is a plan to edit a volume of translated writings by Kantians, to be submitted to the Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. In particular the writings of Johan Benjamin Erhard and the early Fichte on a popular right of revolution, which have been translated into many European languages, ought to be presented in an English edition, due to their considerable philosophical and political interest.

The project will communicate with a wider public in multiple ways. The team will run a project website where each participant will be expected to publish short blog posts to present (and market) major research outputs and review works Kantian democratic thought. The blogs will also be broadcast on social media, including Facebook and Twitter. The project will publish podcasts of keynotes and other lectures from conferences and workshops. The project will also use traditional print media, targeting Norwegian cultural journals like Morgenbladet and Samtiden as well as international media like the Die Zeit, LA Review of Books, and Aeon. Finally, there will be public presentations of research findings at venues such as the Oslo Literature House, the Fritt ord foundation, and the Goethe-Institut.

Project organisation and management

The four scholars (including the PI) employed by the project will each be assigned a task, in order to complete the four work-packages.

Task 1: A study of the Kantian principle of equal rights and its connection to equal political rights of participation. It will engage chiefly with WP1 and WP 2 but will connect to all the cross-cutting questions.

Task 2: A study of Kant’s theory of popular sovereignty in light of the Kantians. The task may engage with all work packages.

Task 3: A study of Kantian views of reform and popular revolution. The task may engage with all work packages.

Task 4: A comprehensive analysis of the democratic theory of the Kantians. This will be the first systematic study of the entire group, and it will draw upon all the work packages. It will require extensive background knowledge and philosophical training and it will therefore be the task of the Principal Investigator.

The work plan organizes the work packages in a logical succession. WP1– WP4 allow for sustained attention to each set of questions, yet the project will allow flexibility in order to meet the needs of each team member. The tasks are organized so as to maximize the effort from the start. Task 1-3 may be taken on by either Post-doctoral researchers or the doctoral research fellow. There will be room for scholars to freely pursue their own ideas along the lines of the project goals.

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