Finnur Dellsén

• Dellsén, Finnur & Norton, James (2026). THE EPISTEMIC MISMATCH PROBLEM: SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND KNOWLEDGE OF APPROXIMATE TRUTHS. Ergo - An Open Access Journal of Philosophy. 13, s. 1653–1675. doi: 10.3998/ergo.11018.
• Dellsén, Finnur (2026). Collectivizing Public Scientific Testimony. Episteme: A journal of individual and social epistemology. ISSN 1742-3600. doi: 10.1017/epi.2026.10124. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  On many topics of commoninterest, there are multiple scientific experts who are more-orless equally reliable as far as most laypeople can tell. In such situations, it would generally be a bad idea for those laypeople to form or update their opinions by deferring to the opinions of individual experts; rather, when possible, they should consider the more general distribution of opinions among all the experts. Building on this thought, this paper argues that scientific experts themselves should ideally not simply report their own opinions on topics within their expertise; rather, if possible, they should provide information about expert opinion distributions more generally, for example, by communicating that a majority of their fellow experts take such-and-such position on a topic while the minority has a contrary view– even when they are themselves in the minority. I go on to trace some important implications of this argument, for example, that scientific communities have an epistemic obligation to periodically gather data on expert opinion distributions regarding topics that are of interest to the general public.

• Beebe, James R.; Dellsén, Finnur & Khalifa, Kareem (2026). Deeper explorations of scientific realism in the wild. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857. 207(2). doi: 10.1007/s11229-025-05412-w. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur (2025). Inferring to the Best Explanation from Uncertain Evidence. Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0031-8248. doi: 10.1017/psa.2025.10151. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur (2025). Disagreement and Consensus in Science. I Maria, Baghramian,; Adam, Carter, J. & Rach, Cosker-Rowland, (Red.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement. Routledge. ISSN 9780367723484. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Disagreement is one of the deepest and most pervasive topics in philosophy; arguably its very bedrock, and is an ever-increasing feature of politics, ethics, public policy, science and many other areas. Despite the omnipresence of disagreement, the topic itself has received relatively little sustained examination. This outstanding handbook examines the philosophy of disagreement and how it extends to debates in public policy and science. Comprising 41 chapters by an international team of highly distinguished contributors, the Handbook is divided into six clear parts: Philosophy of Disagreement Epistemology of Disagreement Disagreement in Science Moral Disagreement Political Disagreement Disagreement and Public Policy Within these sections key topics are examined, including skepticism, truth, pluralism, feminist philosophy, philosophy of religion, epistemology of peer disagreement, ethics, metaethics, political philosophy, rationality, intellectual virtues, relativism, realism, instrumentalism, and scientific method.

• Baron, Sam; Dellsén, Finnur; Firing, Tina & Norton, James (2025). Philosophical methodology: a plea for tolerance. Analysis. ISSN 0003-2638. 85(3), s. 575–586. doi: 10.1093/analys/anae053. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Many prominent critiques of philosophical methods proceed by suggesting that some method is unreliable, especially in comparison to some alternative method. If one agrees with these critiques, it may seem natural to conclude that these (comparatively) unreliable methods should be abandoned. Drawing upon work on the division of cognitive labour in science, we argue that things are not so straightforward. Rather, whether an unreliable method should be abandoned depends heavily on the crucial question of how we should divide philosophers’ time and effort between different methods in order to maximize our prospects of achieving epistemic success. We show that, in a range of cases, even a (comparatively) unreliable method may deserve to be allocated some of these resources.

• Dellsén, Finnur & Linnebo, Øystein (2025). What to Do When Experts Disagree. I Peter, Brössel,; Asunta, Eder, Anna-Maria & Thomas, Grundmann, (Red.), The Epistemology of Experts: New Essays. Routledge. ISSN 9781003431459. s. 223–244. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Presents new research on the epistemology of experts. It features original essays from leading epistemologists on this timely topic. Modern societies benefit significantly from a certain kind of epistemic division of labor: they outsource much of their epistemic work to well-trained cognitive experts. However, due to their degree of specialization, cognitive sophistication, and highly privileged status, cognitive experts tend to become alienated from laypeople. This leads to what one may call the paradox of experts: as experts become more competent, specialized, and sophisticated, the harder it will be for laypeople to identify and trust experts. The chapters in this volume explore the epistemology of expert judgment across several core themes and crucial questions: Analysis of Experts: What does it take to be a cognitive expert? Epistemic Authority: How much should we concede experts over laypeople? The Social Roles of Experts: What role do experts play in society, and what role should they play? Challenges: What problems arise from experts’ epistemic authority and societal role?

• Beddor, Bob & Dellsén, Finnur (2025). Inclusive Inquiry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. ISSN 0031-8205. 111(3), s. 796–821. doi: https:/onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.70032. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  What is the point of inquiry? Some say that the aim of inquiring into some question is to come to know its answer; others, that the aim is to attain justified belief, epistemic improvement, or some other coveted epistemic status. Still others eschew “aim” talk altogether, and instead formulate norms governing inquiry. However, virtually all extant work on inquiry has agreed on at least this much: the aims or norms of inquiry can be specified in terms of the epistemic states of the inquirer (i.e., the agent conducting the inquiry). This paper argues that this conception of inquiry struggles to account for some central features of what is arguably the most successful form of inquiry in the modern era: scientific inquiry. We show that scientific inquiry is governed by several distinctive norms that are difficult to explain if inquiry is all about achieving epistemic benefits for the inquirer. Instead, many inquiries aim to confer epistemic benefits on others. This “inclusive” conception of inquiry has important advantages and implications. It avoids some pressing counterexamples for standard conceptions of inquiry; it allows us to reconcile the epistemology of inquiry with relevant upshots of work in the philosophy and sociology of science; and it brings the “zetetic turn” within the fold of social epistemology. REFERENCES

• M., Duerr, Patrick & Dellsén, Finnur (2025). Scientific progress and modern cosmology. European Journal for Philosophy of Science. ISSN 1879-4912. doi: 10.1007/s13194-025-00686-w. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The paper examines the nature of scientific progress through the lens of the history of modern cosmology (i.e. from Einstein’s, 1917 static universe to the present-day Standard (ΛCDM) model of cosmology). We distil three novel lessons, germane to the debate between the two main accounts of scientific progress (the noetic and the epistemic one, respectively). First, it’s difficult to sharply locate—to precisely pinpoint the locus of—the epistemic content of scientific knowledge. Cosmology displays stark epistemic holism: epistemic content and evidence are typically inextricably distributed over a wider “web of beliefs”. Secondly, cosmologists employ a variety of justificatory practices and modes of reasoning. More often than not, they fall short of the fastidious standards of traditional epistemology. Thirdly, cosmological claims typically defy easy and unambiguous characterisation in terms of truth. These three lessons are shown to pose grave challenges to the epistemic account of scientific progress (on which progress consists in the accumulation of knowledge). By contrast, the rivalling noetic account (which characterises progress in terms of improved understanding) can naturally accommodate those lessons.

• Beebe, James R. & Dellsén, Finnur (2025). The Centrality of Progressive Realism to the Scientific Realism Debate. Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0031-8248. doi: 10.1017/psa.2025.10092. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  We report new findings from an empirical study of scientists from seven disciplines and scholars working in history and philosophy of science regarding their views about scientific realism. We found that researchers’ general disposition to endorse or reject realism was better predicted by their views regarding scientific progress than their views about the mind-independence of scientific phenomena or other common theses in the realism debate. Age and gender also significantly predicted endorsement of scientific realism. Implications of these findings for philosophical debates about scientific realism and scientific progress are considered.

• Dellsén, Finnur & Trpin, Borut (2025). Testing abductions from uncertain evidence. The Philosophical Quarterly. ISSN 0031-8094. doi: 10.1093/pq/pqaf104. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur; Latham, Andrew J.; Norton, James & Varga, Somogy (2025). Medical Progress: Science Versus Practice. Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy. ISSN 0165-0106. doi: 10.1007/s10670-025-00953-5. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  In recent years, notable figures within the medical community have expressed concerns about the rate of medical progress, suggesting that the rapid advances of medicine’s ‘golden age’ are now giving way to an ‘age of disappointment’. While these pessimistic pronouncements about medical progress must–implicitly if not explicitly–appeal to some criteria for what medical progress would be, the task of explicitly defining medical progress has been notably neglected. We take up this task, drawing on insights from the philosophy of science concerning both scientific progress and the aims of medicine. Among other things, we differentiate between medical scientific progress and progress in medical practice, and suggest that this distinction helps to evaluate the aforementioned concerns about the current rate of medical progress. While it is not our goal to draw conclusions relating to the state of medicine at the present time, we propose a unifying account of medical scientific progress according to which such progress leads, necessarily, to progress in medical practice, and show how this account both plausibly distinguishes between medical scientific progress and other (non-medical) instances of scientific progress, and does justice to the ‘dual character’ of medicine.

• Dellsén, Finnur (2025). Promoting scientific progress. Philosophical Studies. ISSN 0031-8116. doi: 10.1007/s11098-025-02335-7. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur (2025). Scientific progress: normative, but aimless. Asian Journal of Philosophy. 4(1). doi: 10.1007/s44204-025-00264-0. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Does science have any aim(s)? If not, does it follow that the debate about scientific progress is somehow misguided or problematically non-objective? These are two of the central questions posed in Rowbottom’s Scientific Progress. In this paper, I argue that we should answer both questions in the negative. Science probably has no aims, certainly not a single aim; but it does not follow from this that the debate about scientific progress is somehow misguided or problematically non-objective.

• Dellsén, Finnur & Norton, James (2024). Dejustifying Scientific Progress. Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0031-8248. 92. doi: 10.1017/psa.2024.32. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Stegenga (forthcoming) formulates and defends a novel account of scientific progress, according to which science makes progress just in case there is a change in scientific justification. Here, we present several problems for Stegenga’s account, concerning, respectively, (i) obtaining misleading evidence, (ii) losses or destruction of evidence, (iii) oscillations in scientific justification, and (iv) the possibility of scientific regress. We conclude by sketching a substantially different justification-based account of scientific progress that avoids these problems.

• Vickers, Peter; Adamo, Ludovica; Alfano, Mark; Clark, Cory; Cresto, Eleonora & Cui, He [Vis alle 36 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2024). Development of a novel methodology for ascertaining scientific opinion and extent of agreement. PLOS ONE. 19(12). doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0313541. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  We take up the challenge of developing an international network with capacity to survey the world’s scientists on an ongoing basis, providing rich datasets regarding the opinions of scientists and scientific sub-communities, both at a time and also over time. The novel methodology employed sees local coordinators, at each institution in the network, sending survey invitation emails internally to scientists at their home institution. The emails link to a ‘10 second survey’, where the participant is presented with a single statement to consider, and a standard five-point Likert scale. In June 2023, a group of 30 philosophers and social scientists invited 20,085 scientists across 30 institutions in 12 countries to participate, gathering 6,807 responses to the statement Science has put it beyond reasonable doubt that COVID-19 is caused by a virus. The study demonstrates that it is possible to establish a global network to quickly ascertain scientific opinion on a large international scale, with high response rate, low opt-out rate, and in a way that allows for significant (perhaps indefinite) repeatability. Measuring scientific opinion in this new way would be a valuable complement to currently available approaches, potentially informing policy decisions and public understanding across diverse fields.

• Dellsén, Finnur (2024). Probabilifying reflective equilibrium. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857. 203(2). doi: 10.1007/s11229-023-04466-y. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  This paper aims to flesh out the celebrated notion of reflective equilibrium within a probabilistic framework for epistemic rationality. On the account developed here, an agent’s attitudes are in reflective equilibrium when there is a certain sort of harmony between the agent’s credences, on the one hand, and what the agent accepts, on the other hand. Somewhat more precisely, reflective equilibrium is taken to consist in the agent accepting, or being prepared to accept, all and only claims that follow from a maximally comprehensive theory that is more probable than any other such theory. Drawing on previous work, the paper shows that when an agent is in reflective equilibrium in this sense, the set of claims they accept or are prepared to accept is bound to be logically consistent and closed under logical implication. The paper also argues that this account can explain various features of philosophical argumentation in which the notion of reflective equilibrium features centrally, such as the emphasis on evaluating philosophical theories holistically rather than in a piecemeal fashion.

• Dellsén, Finnur; Firing, Tina; Lawler, Insa & Norton, James (2024). What Is Philosophical Progress? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. ISSN 0031-8205. doi: 10.1111/phpr.13067. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  What is it for philosophy to make progress? While various putative forms of philosophical progress have been explored in some depth, this overarching question is rarely addressed explicitly, perhaps because it has been assumed to be intractable or unlikely to have a single, unified answer. In this paper, we aim to show that the question is tractable, that it does admit of a single, unified answer, and that one such answer is plausible. This answer is, roughly, that philosophical progress consists in putting people in a position to increase their understanding, where ‘increased understanding’ is a matter of better representing the network of dependence relations between phenomena. After identifying four desiderata for an account of philosophical progress, we argue that our account meets the desiderata in a particularly satisfying way. Among other things, the account explains how various other achievements, such as philosophical arguments, counterexamples, and distinctions, may contribute to progress. Finally, we consider the implications of our account for the pressing and contentious question of how much progress has been made in philosophy.

• Dellsén, Finnur (2023). Fyrir hverja eru fræðin? Ritið. ISSN 1670-0139. 23(1), s. 187–204. doi: 10.33112/ritid.23.1.10. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur (2023). Skautun, skynsemi og samfélag. Hugur: tímarit um heimspeki. ISSN 1021-7215. 30(1), s. 49–53. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2023). Interthematic Polarization. American Philosophical Quarterly. ISSN 0003-0481. 61(1), s. 45–58. doi: 10.5406/21521123.61.1.04. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf; Lawler, Insa & Norton, James (2023). Would Disagreement Undermine Progress? Journal of Philosophy. ISSN 0022-362X. 120(3). Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  In recent years, several philosophers have argued that their discipline makes no progress (or not enough in comparison to the ‘hard sciences’). A key argument for this pessimistic position appeals to the purported fact that philosophers widely and systematically disagree on most major philosophical issues. In this paper, we take a step back from the debate about progress in philosophy specifically and consider the general question: How (if at all) would disagreement within a discipline undermine that discipline’s progress? We reconstruct two distinct arguments from disagreement to a lack of progress, and argue that each rests on underscrutinized assumptions about the nature of progress. We then provide independent motivation to reject those assumptions. The upshot of these considerations is that widespread expert disagreement within a discipline is compatible with progress in that discipline. Indeed, progress can occur even as such disagreement increases. However, disagreement can undermine our ability to tell which developments are progressive (and to what degree). We conclude that while disagreement can indeed be a threat to progress (in philosophy and elsewhere), the precise nature of the threat has not been appreciated.

• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2022). Excessive Testimony: When Less Is More. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. ISSN 0031-8205. doi: 10.1111/phpr.12928. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  This paper identifies two distinct dimensions of what might be called testimonial strength: first, in the case of testimony from more than one speaker, testimony can be said to be stronger to the extent that a greater proportion of the speakers give identical testimony; second, in both single-speaker and multi-speaker testimony, testimony can be said to the stronger to the extent that each speaker expresses greater conviction in the relevant proposition. These two notions of testimonial strength have received scant attention in the philosophical literature so far, presumably because it has been thought that whatever lessons we learn from thinking about testimony as a binary phenomenon will apply mutatis mutandis to varying strengths of testimony. This paper shows that this will not work for either of the two aforementioned dimensions of testimonial strength, roughly because less testimony can provide more justification in a way that can only be explained by appealing to the (non-binary) strength of the testimony itself. The paper also argues that this result undermines some influential versions of non-reductionism about testimonial justification.

• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2022). Scientific Progress without Justification. I Lawler, Insa; Khalifa, Kareem & Shech, Elay (Red.), Scientific Understanding and Representation: Modeling in the Physical Sciences. Routledge. ISSN 9781032054957. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2022). An Epistemic Advantage of Accommodation over Prediction. Philosophers' Imprint. doi: 10.3998/phimp.4961. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2022). Scientific Progress Without Problems: A Reply to McCoy. I Lawler, Insa; Khalifa, Kareem & Shech, Elay (Red.), Scientific Understanding and Representation: Modeling in the Physical Sciences. Routledge. ISSN 9781032054957. s. 392–398. doi: 10.4324/9781003202905-35. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2022). The Noetic Approach: Scientific Progress as Enabling Understanding. I Shan, Yafeng (Red.), New Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Progress. Routledge. ISSN 9780367760557. s. 62–81. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2022). Scientific progress: By-whom or for-whom? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0039-3681. 97, s. 20–28. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.11.006. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  When science makes cognitive progress, who or what is it that improves in the requisite way? According to a widespread and unchallenged assumption, it is the cognitive attitudes of scientists themselves, i.e. the agents by whom scientific progress is made, that improve during progressive episodes. This paper argues against this assumption and explores a different approach. Scientific progress should be defined in terms of potential improvements to the cognitive attitudes of those for whom progress is made, i.e. the receivers rather than the producers of scientific information. This includes not only scientists themselves, but also various other individuals who utilize scientific information in different ways for the benefit of society as a whole.

• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf & Baghramian, Maria (2021). Disagreement in Science. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857. 198, s. 6011–6021. doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02767-0. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2021). Consensus versus Unanimity: Which Carries More Weight? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0007-0882. doi: 10.1086/718273. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf; Lawler, Insa & Norton, James (2021). Thinking about Progress: From Science to Philosophy. Noûs. ISSN 0029-4624. 56(4), s. 814–840. doi: 10.1111/nous.12383. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Is there progress in philosophy? If so, how much? Philosophers have recently argued for a wide range of answers to these questions, from the view that there is no progress whatsoever to the view that philosophy has provided answers to all the big philosophical questions. However, these views are difficult to compare and evaluate, because they rest on very different assumptions about the conditions under which philosophy would make progress. This paper looks to the comparatively mature debate about scientific progress for inspiration on how to formulate four distinct accounts of philosophical progress, in terms of truthlikeness, problem-solving, knowledge, and understanding. Equally importantly, the paper outlines a common framework for how to understand and evaluate these accounts. We distill a series of lessons from this exercise, to help pave the way for a more fruitful discussion about philosophical progress in the future.

• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2021). We Owe It to Others to Think for Ourselves. I Matheson, Jonathan & Lougheed, Kirk (Red.), Epistemic Autonomy. Routledge. ISSN 9780367433345. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2021). Understanding scientific progress: the noetic account. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857. 199(3-4). doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03289-z. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  What is scientific progress? This paper advances an interpretation of this question, and an account that serves to answer it (thus interpreted). Roughly, the question is here understood to concern what type of cognitive change with respect to a topic X constitutes a scientific improvement (to a greater or lesser extent) with respect to X. The answer explored in the paper is that the requisite type of cognitive change occurs when scientific results are made publicly available so as to make it possible for anyone to increase their understanding of X. This account is briefly compared to two rival accounts of scientific progress, based respectively on increasing truthlikeness and accumulating knowledge, and is argued to be preferable to both.

• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2020). Explanatory Consolidation: From ‘Best’ to ‘Good Enough’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. ISSN 0031-8205. doi: 10.1111/phpr.12706. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Beebe, James & Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2020). Scientific realism in the wild: An empirical study of seven sciences and history and philosophy of science. Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0031-8248. 87(2), s. 336–364. doi: 10.1086/707552. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  We report the results of a study that investigated the views of researchers working in seven scientific disciplines and in history and philosophy of science in regard to four hypothesized dimensions of scientific realism. Among other things, we found (i) that natural scientists tended to express more strongly realist views than social scientists, (ii) that history and philosophy of science scholars tended to express more antirealist views than natural scientists, (iii) that van Fraassen’s characterization of scientific realism failed to cluster with more standard characterizations, and (iv) that those who endorsed the pessimistic induction were no more or less likely to endorse antirealism.

• Beebe, James & Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2020). Scientific Realism in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Seven Sciences and HPS. Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0031-8248. doi: 10.1086/707552. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2020). Að treysta sérfræðingum: Hvað, hvenær og hvers vegna? Ritið. ISSN 1670-0139. 20(3), s. 235–258. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2020). Gildi vísinda og gildin í vísindum – á tímum heimsfaraldurs. Skírnir. ISSN 0256-8446. 194, s. 251–274. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2019). The Epistemic Impact of Theorizing: Generation Bias Implies Evaluation Bias. Philosophical Studies. ISSN 0031-8116. s. 1–18. doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01387-w. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2019). Should Scientific Realists Embrace Theoretical Conservatism? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0039-3681. 76, s. 30–38. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.09.005. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2019). Beyond Explanation: Understanding as Dependency Modeling. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0007-0882. doi: 10.1093/bjps/axy058. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2019). Rational Understanding: Toward a Probabilistic Epistemology of Acceptability. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857. s. 1–20. doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02224-7. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Sharadin, Nathaniel & Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Promotion as Contrastive Increase in Expected Fit. Philosophical Studies. ISSN 0031-8116. s. 1–28. doi: 10.1007/s11098-018-1062-2. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). The Epistemic Value of Expert Autonomy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. ISSN 0031-8205. s. 1–18. doi: 10.1111/phpr.12550. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Beebe, James; Baghramian, Maria; Drury, Luke & Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Divergent Perspectives on Expert Disagreement: Preliminary Evidence from Climate Science, Climate Policy, Astrophysics, and Public Opinion. Environmental Communication. ISSN 1752-4032. doi: 10.1080/17524032.2018.1504099. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Scientific Progress, Understanding, and Knowledge: Reply to Park. Journal for General Philosophy of Science (JGPS). ISSN 0925-4560. s. 1–9. doi: 10.1007/s10838-018-9419-y. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Scientific Progress: Four Accounts. Philosophy Compass. 13(11). doi: 10.1111/phc3.12525. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2017). Realism and the Absence of Rivals. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857. 194(7), s. 2427–2446. doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1059-3. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2017). The Heuristic Conception of Inference to the Best Explanation. Philosophical Studies. ISSN 0031-8116. doi: 10.1007/s11098-017-0933-2. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2017). Abductively Robust Inference. Analysis. ISSN 0003-2638. 77(1), s. 20–29. doi: 10.1093/analys/anx049. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2017). Reactionary Responses to the Bad Lot Objection. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0039-3681. 61, s. 32–40. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.01.005. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2017). Deductive Cogency, Understanding, and Acceptance. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857. doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1365-4. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2017). Certainty and Explanation in Descartes's Philosophy of Science. HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science. ISSN 2152-5188. doi: 10.1086/692013. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf & Sharadin, Nathaniel (2017). The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass. Journal of the American Philosophical Association. ISSN 2053-4477. doi: 10.1017/apa.2017.22. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2017). Frá skoðunum til trúnaðar og aftur til baka: Yfirlit um bayesíska þekkingarfræði. Hugur: tímarit um heimspeki. ISSN 1021-7215. 28, s. 146–162. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2017). Reconstructed Empiricism. Acta Analytica. ISSN 0353-5150. 32, s. 95–113. doi: 10.1007/s12136-016-0289-9. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2017). Understanding without Justification or Belief. Ratio. ISSN 0034-0006. 30(3), s. 239–254. doi: 10.1111/rati.12134. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2017). When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. ISSN 0004-8402. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2017.1298636. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2016). Gagnrýnin og vísindaleg hugsun. Skírnir. ISSN 0256-8446. 190, s. 321–343. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2016). Scientific Progress: Knowledge versus Understanding. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0039-3681. 56, s. 72–83. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2016.01.003. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2016). Explanatory Rivals and the Ultimate Argument. Theoria. ISSN 0040-5825. 82, s. 217–237. doi: 10.1111/theo.12084. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2016). Hlutdrægni í vísindum: Vanákvörðun, tilleiðsluáhætta og tilurð kenninga. Ritið. ISSN 1670-0139. 16, s. 9–28. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2016). There May Yet Be Non-Causal Explanations (of Particular Events). Journal for General Philosophy of Science (JGPS). ISSN 0925-4560. 47, s. 377–384. doi: 10.1007/s10838-016-9333-0. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2015). Tvö viðhorf til vísindalegrar þekkingar – eða eitt? Ritið. ISSN 1670-0139. 15, s. 135–155. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

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• Dellsén, Finnur (2024). Abductive Reasoning in Science. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781009500524. 84 s. doi: 10.1017/9781009353199. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  In abductive reasoning, scientific theories are evaluated on the basis of how well they would explain the available evidence. There are a number of subtly different accounts of this type of reasoning, most of which are inspired by the popular slogan 'Inference to the Best Explanation.' However, these accounts disagree about exactly how to spell out the slogan so as to avoid various problems for abductive reasoning. This Element aims, firstly, to give an opinionated overview both of the many accounts of abductive reasoning that have been proposed and the problems that have motivated them; and, secondly, to critically evaluate these accounts in a way that points toward a systematic view of the nature and purpose of abductive reasoning in science. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

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• Lawler, Insa; Dellsén, Finnur & Norton, James (2025). Progress and disagreement in philosophy: A brief introduction. I Joachim, Horvath,; Steffen, Koch, & Michael, Titelbaum, (Red.), Methods in Analytic Philosophy: A Primer and Guide. PhilPapers. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Guide with brief introductions on methods in analytic philosophy by experts on the relevant topics. With sections on: formal methods, argumentation, inferential methods, thought experiments, intuition, ordinary language philosophy, conceptual analysis, conceptual engineering, naturalism, analytic feminism, experimental philosophy, and progress and disagreement in philosophy.

• Hjortland, Ole Thomassen; Sivertsen, Sveinung Sundfør & Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2021). Nils Klim-samtalen 2019: Intervju med Finnur Dellsén, vinner av Nils Klim-prisen 2019. [Journal]. Norsk Filosofisk tidsskrift. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2021). Are there really no such things as theories? Metascience. ISSN 0815-0796. 30, s. 17–21. doi: 10.1007/s11016-021-00613-8. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2019). A Surprising Epistemic Advantage of Accommodation over Prediction. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2019). Why Trust a Scientist? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2019). Inngangur ritstjóra. Hugur: tímarit um heimspeki. ISSN 1021-7215. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2019). A Surprising Epistemic Advantage of Accommodation over Prediction. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Inngangur ritstjóra. Hugur: tímarit um heimspeki. ISSN 1021-7215. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Afstæðishyggja, ágreiningur og amerísk heimspeki: Viðtal við Mariu Baghramian. [Journal]. Hugur: tímarit um heimspeki. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Best Explanations: Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Expanding the Empirical: Constructive Empiricism and Augmented Observation. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Rational Understanding. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Generation-Bias Implies Evaluation-Bias. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Generation-Bias Implies Evaluation-Bias. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Generation-Bias Implies Evaluation-Bias. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Dellsén, Finnur Ulf (2018). Understanding in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: A Complicated Relationship. Metascience. ISSN 0815-0796. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

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