English version of this page

Kim Pedersen Phillips

Førstelektor - Institutt for filosofi, idé- og kunsthistorie og klassiske språk

E-post k.p.phillips@ifikk.uio.no

Rom 406

Treffetider Torsdag 10:00-16:00 i oddetallssuker

Brukernavn

Besøksadresse Blindernveien 31 Georg Morgenstiernes hus 0313 Oslo

Postadresse Postboks 1020 Blindern 0315 Oslo

Andre tilknytninger LINK-Senter for læring og utdanning (Student)

Last ned visittkort

Faglige interesser

Jeg undersøker spørsmål i skjæringspunktet mellom erkjennelsesteori, språkfilosofi og etikk.

Hva er de erkjennelsesmessige betingelsene for overføring av kunnskap gjennom kommunikasjon? Dette spørsmålet leder videre til brede spørsmål om betingelsene for persepsjon, språklig forståelse, og kunnskap.
Hva er de sosiale betingelsene for overføring av kunnskap gjennom kommunikasjon? Dette spørsmålet leder videre til brede spørsmål om kunnskapens sosiale aspekter, sosiale normer, diskurser, forståelsesbarrierer, fordommer, og betingelsene for dygd og menneskelig blomstring.

Undervisning

Examen philosophicum

Bakgrunn

Bachelor og master i filosofi fra Universitetet i Oslo

PhD i filosofi fra Universitetet i Oslo og Universitetet i St Andrews

Emneord: Kim Pedersen Phillips

Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary & Phillips, Kim Pedersen (2026). Science miscommunication. Inquiry (Oslo). ISSN 0020-174X. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Drożdżowicz, Anna & Phillips, Kim Pedersen (2025). Linguistic understanding: perception and inference. Inquiry (Oslo). ISSN 0020-174X. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2024.2442692. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag
Consider reading the news about the recent election, taking part in a classroom discussion about injustice, or having a conversation about dinner, with your friend. In these cases, you rely on your capacity for linguistic understanding. How do we come to understand what other people communicate to us on particular occasions? In recent philosophical debates about this question, we find two broad approaches: the perceptual approach, which claims that we come to understand an utterance by employing broadly perceptual capacities to perceive or quasi-perceive the utterance’s meaning; and the inferential approach, which claims that we come to understand an utterance by employing broadly inferential capacities to infer what is being conveyed by an utterance. This paper focuses on the debates concerning these two approaches. We provide conceptual and methodological clarifications regarding linguistic understanding and introduce some of the key philosophical debates concerning its nature, including those concerning its phenomenology and underlying psychology, with a focus on the role of perception and inference. We also discuss some epistemological questions concerning the understanding of linguistic utterances and different views that try to explain its epistemological role(s). This paper is an introduction to the special issue ‘Linguistic Understanding: Perception and Inference’.
Eriksen, Andreas & Phillips, Kim Pedersen (2023). Editorial: The Research Literacy of Teachers. Professions and Professionalism. 13(2). doi: 10.7577/pp.5697. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Phillips, Kim Pedersen; Eriksen, Andreas & Mausethagen, Sølvi (2023). Educational Research Literacy: Philosophical Foundations and Empirical Applications. Professions and Professionalism. 13(2). doi: 10.7577/pp.5307. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag
The paper offers a novel philosophical perspective on how research literacy should be conceptualised in the educational domain. Standard accounts of teacher research literacy consider it merely a subset of the skills of an educational researcher. Therefore, the accounts largely ignore the need to anchor or embed the mode of engagement with research in the particular demands of the professional role. By contrast, we argue that a virtue-based account of the epistemic agency involved in receiving testimony can help deliver a normatively attractive and empirically plausible account that is tailored to the role. We support the account with an original in-depth analysis of actual teacher engagement with research.

Se alle arbeider i NVA

Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary & Phillips, Kim Pedersen (2026). Science Miscommunication. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary & Phillips, Kim Pedersen (2025). Science Miscommunication. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary & Phillips, Kim Pedersen (2025). Science Miscommunication. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary & Phillips, Kim Pedersen (2025). Science Miscommunication. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Phillips, Kim Pedersen (2024). The Communicative Duties of Researchers: A Plea for Modesty. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Phillips, Kim Pedersen & Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2023). Science Miscommunication. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Phillips, Kim Pedersen (2023). Praktisk og teoretisk kunnskap i lærerprofesjonen, En forskningsbasert skole? Forskningens plass i lærerutdanning og skole. Universitetsforlaget. ISSN 9788215065540. doi: 10.18261/9788215065540-23-0. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Eriksen, Andreas & Phillips, Kim Pedersen (2023). Editorial: The Research Literacy of Teachers. Professions and Professionalism. doi: 10.7577/pp.5697. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Phillips, Kim Pedersen & Pollock, Joanna Katharine Mary (2022). Scientific Communication and Misinterpretation. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Phillips, Kim Pedersen (2022). Testimony and Evidence. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Phillips, Kim Pedersen; Mausethagen, Sølvi & Eriksen, Andreas (2022). Teachers’ Research Literacy. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Phillips, Kim Pedersen (2020). Knowing What Is Said & Other Essays on Knowledge, Understanding, and Communication. Universitetet i Oslo. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag
The dissertation consists of five separate papers, an introduction, and a conclusion. The first paper provides an account of how we come to know what other people say to us on particular occasions. Your friend utters the sentence ‘butterflies have taste receptors on their feet’ in your presence, and you come to know right away that she said that butterflies have taste receptors on their feet. How do you come to know this fact? It is argued that we know facts about what a speaker has said in making an utterance partly in virtue of knowing other facts, including facts about what words mean, and facts about the context of the utterance. The second paper defends an account of what it is to understand an utterance. What does it take for you to understand your friend’s utterance about butterflies? And what is the relation between utterance understanding and knowledge? It is argued that understanding cannot be understood in terms of knowledge of what is said, because such knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding. It is suggested that understanding must be understood in terms of a notion closely related to that of knowledge, namely cognitive achievement. The third paper turns to testimonial justification. Suppose you adopt the belief that butterflies have taste receptors on their feet on the basis of your friend’s utterance. What does it take for you to be justified in this belief? It is argued that testimonial justification cannot be understood as a kind of immediate or noninferential justification, contrary to what many suppose. The fourth paper provides a positive account of testimonial justification. It defends a middle ground between reductionism and anti-reductionism: it agrees with reductionism that testimonial justification is not sui generis, but agrees with antireductionism that testimonial justification is not constituted by positive reasons. The fifth paper turns from issues concerning communication to issues concerning our capacity to understand the world more generally. What does it take to understand why something is the case, for instance why the Tacoma Narrows Bridge collapsed? A common answer is that understanding why something is the case is a matter of knowing a fact about why it is the case. It is argued that if knowledge is stakes sensitive, this answer cannot be true, since understanding is not stakes sensitive.