Faglige interesser
Mine primære forskningsområder er vitenskapsfilosofi og fysikkens filosofi, men jeg interesserer meg også for metafysikk og erkjennelsesteori.
- Vitenskapelig metode;
- Ikke-empiriske tilnærminger til teoriutvikling;
- Relasjoner mellom fysiske teorier (inkludert reduksjon, korrespondens og emergens);
- Fundamentalitet;
- Rom, tid og romtid;
- Kvantegravitasjonsteori.
For mer informasjon, inkludert lenker til offentlig tilgjengelige versjoner av publikasjonene mine, se min hjemmeside eller PhilPeople-profilen.
Undervisning
Bakgrunn
- Associate Professor; IFIKK, Universitetet i Oslo, 2019–
- Postdoctoral Associate, Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva 2016–2019
- Postdoctoral Associate, Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh 2014–2015
- PhD in Philosophy, University of Sydney, 2015
- BA. (Hons) in Philosophy, Monash University, 2009
- BSc. (Hons) in Physics, Monash University, 2008
Emneord:
Filosofi,
Vitenskapsfilosofi,
Fysikkens filosofi,
Metafysikk
Publikasjoner
-
Crowther, Karen
(2026).
Dumb holes: universality or analogy? What makes an analogue experiment an analogue experiment?
Synthese.
ISSN 0039-7857.
207(4).
doi:
10.1007/s11229-026-05538-5.
Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Vis sammendrag
Analogue experiments have been promoted as means of potentially confirming theoretical predictions about systems that are inaccessible under the relevant conditions. A focus has been on the example of potential confirmation of Hawking radiation in black holes via analogue ‘dumb hole’ experiments in fluids. Dardashti (The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68:55–89, 2017; Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 67:1–11, 2019) present arguments in support of this possibility, while Crowther (Synthese (Suppl 16):1–26, 2019) is critical that these arguments suffice. The latter analysis utilises the characterisation of analogue experiments given by the former two papers, upon which analogue experiments are supposed to differ from both conventional experiments as well as analogies. The defining feature was taken, by Crowther (Synthese (Suppl 16):1–26, 2019), to be the inaccessibility of the target system. This, however, not only rules out the possibility of such experiments being confirmatory, but also conflicts with the common belief that conventional scientific experiments can aim to provide knowledge about inaccessible target systems. So, if not inaccessibility of their target systems, what defines an analogue experiment? Here, I argue that there is nothing special about analogue experiments: Either, they are conventional experiments, or they are material analogies. Nevertheless, there remain particular challenges for the case of confirming Hawking radiation via dumb hole experiments, owing to inaccessibility issues.
-
Crowther, Karen & Mørch, Hedda Hassel
(2026).
The Emergence of Space-time and the Emergence of Consciousness: Could They Be One and the Same?: A Comment on Schneider and Bailey’s ‘Superpsychism’.
Journal of Consciousness Studies.
ISSN 1355-8250.
33(1),
s. 127–146.
doi:
10.53765/20512201.33.1.127.
Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Vis sammendrag
In ‘Superpsychism’, Susan Schneider and Mark Bailey (this issue) propose that space-time and ordinary (human-level) consciousness both emerge from a fundamental, non-spatio-temporal level of reality consisting of a network of maximally coherent, zero entropy quantum entanglement relations, termed prototime, which also instantiates a fundamental form of consciousness, termed superconsciousness. We raise some objections to this view, considered as an explanation or reduction of space-time, as an interpretation of quantum mechanics, and as a theory of consciousness, questioning the extent of its explanatory advantages in each of these areas.
-
Crowther-Telbis, Karen
(2025).
On the Motivations for Seeking a Theory of Quantum Gravity.
Journal of Physics: Conference Series (JPCS).
ISSN 1742-6588.
2948.
doi:
10.1088/1742-6596/2948/1/012002.
Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Vis sammendrag
While there are some empirical problems that could suggest the need for a theory of quantum gravity, most of these are not standardly taken as motivations for seeking a new theory. Rather, the quest for a theory of quantum gravity has been primarily motivated, guided, and constrained by philosophical and theoretical concerns. A critical examination of these can help us better understand what the theory is supposed to achieve—and, further, what it should be expected to achieve. On the other hand, there are various approaches towards finding a theory of quantum gravity, with different aims, methods, and starting-points—they disagree on what the theory is supposed to be like. A relevant question is then: what is it that unites these approaches such that we classify them as approaches to quantum gravity? This paper argues that a basic characterisation of the theory can be given in terms of the minimal shared motivation across these different approaches, and that this itself can be seen as motivated by various other problems that have been appealed to as reasons for seeking a theory of quantum gravity.
-
-
Crowther, Karen
(2022).
Spacetime Emergence: Collapsing the Distinction Between Content and Context?
I Wuppuluri, Shyam & Stuart, Ian (Red.),
From Electrons to Elephants and Elections: Exploring the Role of Content and Context.
Springer.
ISSN 9783030921910.
s. 379–402.
doi:
10.1007/978-3-030-92192-7_22.
Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Vis sammendrag
Several approaches to developing a theory of quantum gravity suggest that spacetime—as described by general relativity—is not fundamental. Instead, spacetime is supposed to be explained by reference to the relations between more fundamental entities, analogous to ‘atoms’ of spacetime, which themselves are not (fully) spatiotemporal. Such a case may be understood as emergence of content: a ‘hierarchical’ case of emergence, where spacetime emerges at a ‘higher’, or less-fundamental, level than its ‘lower-level’ non-spatiotempral basis. But quantum gravity cosmology also presents us with the possibility of emergence of context: where spacetime emerges from some ‘prior’ non-spatiotemporal state (replacing the Big Bang). I present a general conception of emergence which is plausibly able to accommodate both pictures. This is a positive conception that does not rely on a failure of reduction or explanation in any sense (indeed, reduction is a necessary feature of quantum gravity, and is useful in understanding emergence in this case). I also consider the possibility that the distinction between content- and context- based explanations is blurred, or usefully ‘collapsed’, in the case of spacetime emergence.
-
Crowther, Karen & Haro, Sebastian De
(2022).
Four attitudes towards singularities in the search for a theory of quantum gravity.
I Vassallo, Antonio (Red.),
The Foundations of Spacetime Physics: Philosophical Perspectives.
Routledge.
ISSN 9781003219019.
doi:
10.4324/9781003219019-12.
Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Crowther-Telbis, Karen
(2020).
As below, so before: ‘synchronic’ and ‘diachronic’ conceptions of spacetime emergence.
Synthese.
ISSN 0039-7857.
doi:
10.1007/s11229-019-02521-1.
Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Vis sammendrag
Typically, a less fundamental theory, or structure, emerging from a more fundamental one is an example of synchronic emergence. A model (and the physical state it describes) emerging from a prior model (state) upon which it nevertheless depends is an example of diachronic emergence. The case of spacetime emergent from quantum gravity and quantum cosmology challenges these two conceptions of emergence. Here, I propose two more-general conceptions of emergence, analogous to the synchronic and diachronic ones, but which are potentially applicable to the case of emergent spacetime: an inter-level, hierarchical conception, and an intra-level, ‘flat’ conception. I then explore whether, and how, these ideas may be applicable in the case of several putative examples of relativistic spacetime emergent from the non-spatiotemporal structures described by different approaches to quantum gravity, and of spacetime emergent from a non-spatiotemporal ‘big bang’ state according to different examples of quantum cosmology.
-
Crowther-Telbis, Karen
(2019).
Renormalizability, Fundamentality, and a Final Theory: The Role of UV-Completion in the Search for Quantum Gravity.
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
ISSN 0007-0882.
doi:
10.1093/bjps/axx052.
Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
-
Crowther-Telbis, Karen
(2018).
Inter-theory Relations in Quantum Gravity: Correspondence, Reduction and Emergence.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics.
ISSN 1355-2198.
doi:
10.1016/j.shpsb.2017.12.002.
Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
-
-
Crowther-Telbis, Karen & Rickles, Dean
(2014).
Introduction: Principles of quantum gravity.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics.
ISSN 1355-2198.
doi:
10.1016/j.shpsb.2013.12.004.
Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
-
Crowther-Telbis, Karen
(2013).
Emergent spacetime according to effective field theory: From top-down and bottom-up.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics.
ISSN 1355-2198.
doi:
10.1016/j.shpsb.2012.08.001.
Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Se alle arbeider i NVA
-
Crowther, Karen
(2024).
When theory breaks down outside of the laboratory.
Filosofisk supplement.
ISSN 0809-8220.
Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
-
-
Mjelva, Jørn Kløvfjell; Crowther, Karen & Wilson, Alastair
(2026).
Understanding Entanglement: A Realist Approach.
Universitetet i Oslo.
Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Vis sammendrag
This dissertation comprises three self-standing papers investigating the metaphysics of quantum entanglement and its explanatory role in accounting for the non-classical correlations exhibited by entangled systems. It defends entanglement realism, the view that entanglement reflects a genuine metaphysical feature of systems in entangled states.
While this position aligns with a scientific realist attitude towards entanglement, it has been argued to be undermined by entanglement swapping, particularly in delayed-choice and spacelike scenarios.
This objection is addressed in the first two papers. The first (Ch. 2) analyses delayed-choice entanglement swapping in both a collapsebased and a no-collapse framework, arguing that a realist account remains viable. It also considers spacelike entanglement swapping, concluding that it only presents a problem for a collapse account. This problem is addressed in the second paper (Ch. 3), which develops a realist-friendly relativistic collapse account of entanglement swapping.
The third paper (Ch. 4) addresses metaphysical concerns, specifically that entanglement realism challenges key elements of our intuitive worldview by implying some form of “holistic unity”. It proposes a novel approach to the link view on entanglement – a view which explicates entanglement in terms of physical relations rather than holistic unity – that addresses the main objections raised against the link view by developing it in a formalism based on the Heisenberg picture of quantum mechanics.
Taken together, the dissertation advances a positive case for entanglement realism as a straightforwardly scientific realist view that accounts for quantum correlations – even in the entanglement swapping case – which can also be made compatible with key elements of our intuitive worldview.
Se alle arbeider i NVA
Publisert
17. sep. 2019 15:34
- Sist endret
17. jan. 2025 21:58
