Hilde Henriksen Waage

2017: «Facing Assad. American Diplomacy Toward Syria, 1973–1977», International History Review, with Lars Hasvoll Bakke.

2016: «A Balancing Pretence: The Johnson Administration’s Policy towards Jordan, 1964–1967», British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, with Joakim Aalmen Markussen.

2016: «Israel og palestinerne: Freden som uteble»[Israel and the Palestinians: The peace that never came], i: Mona Christine Fixdal (ed.), Fredsmegling i teori og praksis [Peace mediation in theory and practice], Cappelen Damm Akademisk. 

2016: “Cementing a State of Belligerency: The 1949 Armistice Negotiations between Israel and Syria”, Middle East Journal,70(1): 69-89, with Petter Stenberg.

2015: “Mission Impossible: UN Special Representative Gunnar Jarring and His Quest for Peace in the Middle East, International History Review, 24 pp, with Hulda Kjeang Mørk.

2015: “Weak Third Parties and Ripening: Revisiting Norwegian Interventions in Guatemala and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, International Negotiations,20(3): 389–413, with Ada Nissen.

2014: “The Palestine Option: Nixon, the National Security Council, and the search for a new policy, 1970”, Diplomatic History, 38(1): 182-209, with Simen Zernichow.

2013. “‘Finishing the Enterprise’: Israel's Admission to the United Nations”, International History Review, 35(3): 465-485, with Marte Heian-Engdal and Jørgen Jensehaugen.

2013.   Konflikt og stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten [Conflict and Great Power Politics in the Middle East]. Kristiansand: Cappelen Damm Akademisk, 512 pp.

• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2026). A Perpetual Spoiler? Syria in the Regional and International Game in the Middle East. Internasjonal Politikk. ISSN 0020-577X. 84(2), p. 267–282. doi: 10.23865/intpol.v84.7732. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2024). The Dream Channel The Role of Norway in the Peace Process in the Middle East. Historisk tidsskrift. ISSN 0018-263X. 103(3), p. 269–287. doi: 10.18261/ht.103.3.6. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2024). Drømmekanalen. Norges rolle i fredsprosessen i Midtøsten. Historisk tidsskrift. ISSN 0018-263X. 103(3), p. 269–287. doi: 10.18261/ht.103.3.6. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  I løpet av de siste tiår har det blitt gjort omfattende forskning på hvilken rolle Norge spilte i fredsprosessen i Midtøsten. Det har blitt undersøkt hvordan denne rollen har blitt framstilt av aktørene selv og av dem som har stått dem nær, og hvordan både de og norske myndigheter har framstilt og forklart denne rollen. Disse forestillingene har vist seg svært tunge å rokke ved, til tross for at det har blitt avdekket lag på lag med nye opplysninger om hvilken rolle de norske fredsmeglerne egentlig spilte i denne prosessen. Den nye informasjonen endrer stadig mer på det rådende narrativet om de norske brobyggerne på post i Midtøsten. I tillegg har det kommet nye avsløringer om alle de graderte dokumentene fra Oslo-prosessen som (fremdeles) er forsvunnet fra Utenriksdepartementets eget arkiv. Flere av de forsvunne norske dokumentene er og vil bli offentligjort av Det israelske statsarkivet i Jerusalem. Av alle disse grunner er det nok en gang viktig å undersøke og diskutere ikke-forskningsfaglige framstillinger av Norges rolle i fredsprosessen i Midtøsten. Disse framstillingene har hatt – eller i det minste tjent – flere overordnede politiske mål.

• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2024). Fra Israels til palestinernes beste venn. Internasjonal Politikk. ISSN 0020-577X. 82(2), p. 177–191. doi: 10.23865/intpol.v82.6474. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Etter 1948 var Norge en av Israels aller beste venner. Palestinernes skjebne vakte ingen interesse. De var glemt. Etter krigen i 1967 forandret disse holdningene seg. Israel var blitt en okkupasjonsmakt. Det palestinske flyktningproblemet var like uløst. PLO hadde også endret politikk, var blitt langt mer kompromissvillig og gikk inn for en tostatsløsning. Like fullt hadde Norge den mest restriktive politikken overfor PLO i hele Vest-Europa. Først i 1986 fikk PLO et informasjonskontor i Norge. I 1989 kom Norges første offisielle besøk til PLO i Tunis. Gjennom hele 1980-tallet var Arbeiderpartiet pådriveren for den nye norske politikken. Den var bygd på det nye tillitsforholdet til PLO og det nære forholdet til Israel. I 1993 forhandlet Norge fram Oslo-avtalen. Norges nære forhold til Israel hadde gjort Norge akseptabel. PLO skjønte også at det trengte en Israel-venn. Men i Norge var det ikke lenger noen sterk sympati for Israel. Det var den norske rollen som gjorde at Norge ikke kunne føre noen demonstrasjonspolitikk og markere standpunkter som Israel fant uakseptable. Først under Gazakrigen i 2023 har Norge hatt en ny pådriverrolle, også internasjonalt, for å få slutt på krigen og få i gang forhandlinger om en tostatsløsning.

• Engh, Sunniva; Nissen, Ada & Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2024). Norge som fredsnasjon og krigsmakt etter 1945 - Forskning, forståelse og fortelling. Historisk tidsskrift. ISSN 0018-263X. 103(3), p. 200–210. doi: 10.18261/ht.103.3.2. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2023). From Israel’s to the Palestinians’ Best Friend? Internasjonal Politikk. ISSN 0020-577X. 82(2), p. 177–191. doi: 10.23865/intpol.v82.6474. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen & Nordanger, Ferdinand (2023). Å danse etter Israels pipe. Reagan-administrasjonen og Libanon. Babylon - Nordisk tidsskrift for Midtøstenstudier. ISSN 1503-5727. 21(2). Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen & Thoresen, Emma Skovro (2023). Å gjøre opp regning uten vert. Carter, Camp David, Jordan og Syria. Babylon - Nordisk tidsskrift for Midtøstenstudier. ISSN 1503-5727. 21(2). doi: 10.5617/ba.10225. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Da amerikanerne i september 1978 inviterte Egypt og Israel til Camp David for å forhandle om fred i Midtøsten, ble verken palestinerne, Jordan eller Syria invitert. Amerikanerne skulle raskt få erfare at uten deres støtte og hjelp skulle det bli svært vanskelig, om ikke umulig, å gjennomføre resultatene av fredsforhandlingene.

• Waage, Hilde Henriksen & Solvang, Silje Gill Andeby (2023). Våre menn er gode til å skyte. Israels invasjon av Libanon i 1978. Babylon - Nordisk tidsskrift for Midtøstenstudier. ISSN 1503-5727. 21(2). doi: 10.5617/ba.10224. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  I mars 1978 krysset israelske soldater grensen til Libanon. Operasjon Litani var en reaksjon på et terrorangrep som hadde funnet sted i Israel få dager tidligere. Invasjonen ble til hodebry for USAs president Jimmy Carter, som var i full sving med å få i gang fredssamtaler mellom Israel og Egypt. Hvilken betydning fikk invasjonen for Carters fredsinitiativ?

• Waage, Hilde Henriksen & Sønsteby, Mathias Nesthun (2022). The Grimness of the Alternatives: Carter, Israel, and the Civil War in Lebanon. The Middle East Journal. ISSN 0026-3141. 76(2), p. 223–244. doi: 10.3751/76.2.14. Full text in Research Archive
• Mørk, Hulda Kjeang & Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2022). Ties that bind: the entangled relations among Israel, Iran, and the United States, 1963–1967. International History Review. ISSN 0707-5332. doi: 10.1080/07075332.2022.2141815. Full text in Research Archive
• Nissen, Ada & Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2021). Lite land, stor vilje. Norges internasjonale fredsengasjement. In Pharo, Helge Øystein; Engh, Sunniva; Bjerga, Kjell Inge; Hatlehol, Gunnar D. & Offerdal, Kristine (Ed.), Historiker, strateg og brobygger. Festskrift til Rolf Tamnes 70 år. Pax Forlag. ISSN 9788253042534. p. 241–258. Full text in Research Archive
• Sitter, Robin & Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2021). En brikke ingen turte røre: Norges fredsbevarende bidrag i Libanon 1978–1982. Historisk tidsskrift. ISSN 0018-263X. 100(1), p. 67–80. doi: 10.18261/issn.1504-2944-2021-01-06. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Hvorfor bidro Norge med militære styrker til United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) i 1978? Hvorfor trakk ikke Norge sine styrker ut da det viste seg at nordmennene ikke hadde noen mulighet til å oppfylle FNs mandat, og da situasjonen på bakken gikk fra vondt til verre og var direkte farlig for norsk militært personell? Litteraturen rundt årsakene til at norske soldater ble sendt på FN-oppdrag, har vært sentrert rundt to motiver: sikkerhetspolitiske egeninteresser og altruisme. Denne artikkelen analyserer hvordan disse to motivene kom til uttrykk vedrørende den norske deltakelsen i UNIFIL. Samtidig var det klart for norske myndigheter at de hadde et svært begrenset handlingsrom i Libanon. Norges deltakelse skyldtes i utgangspunktet FNs særstilling i norsk utenrikspolitikk. Avgjørelsen om å delta ble tatt på autopilot, men da soldatene først var i Libanon, oppfattet norske myndigheter at bordet fanget. FNstyrken ble en fast brikke ingen turte flytte på. De politiske omkostningene ved å trekke seg ut ble vurdert som for store, selv om situasjonen ble radikalt endret som en følge av den israelske invasjonen i 1982. Samtidig anså norske militære ledere oppdraget som meningsløst.

• Andersson, Magnus Seland & Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2020). Stew in Their Own Juice: Reagan, Syria and Lebanon, 1981-1984. Diplomatic History. ISSN 0145-2096. 44(4), p. 664–691. doi: 10.1093/dh/dhaa036. Full text in Research Archive
• Salberg, Mari & Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2019). Master of the Game: The Relationship between the United States and Iran Revisited, 1969-1972. Diplomacy & Statecraft. ISSN 0959-2296. 30(3), p. 468–489. doi: 10.1080/09592296.2019.1641921. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen & Huse, Geir Bergersen (2019). A Careful Minuet: The United States, Israel, Syria and the Lebanese Civil War, 1975–1976. International History Review. ISSN 0707-5332. doi: 10.1080/07075332.2019.1678507. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen & Jensehaugen, Jørgen (2018). Å forhandle bort Palestina. Babylon - Nordisk tidsskrift for Midtøstenstudier. ISSN 1503-5727. 16(2), p. 142–153. doi: 10.5617/ba.6732. Full text in Research Archive
• Bakke, Lars Hasvoll & Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2018). Facing Assad. American Diplomacy Toward Syria, 1973–1977. International History Review. ISSN 0707-5332. 40(3), p. 546–572. doi: 10.1080/07075332.2017.1334687. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  In the wake of the 1973 October War, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad led the United States and Syria in reviving their long-dead diplomatic relationship. This process began amidst the diplomatic effort that would lead to the unprecedented Syrian–Israeli Disengagement Agreement of 1974, matured in the difficult period of stalemate that followed, and produced a paradoxical diplomatic concord as Syria, Israel and the United States grappled with Lebanon's civil war. This is at once the tale of 40 months of negotiations, deceit and maneuvers, and the beginning of the troubled American relationship with the Assad dynasty. The final version of this research has been published in International History Review. © 2017 Taylor & Francis

• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2016). Israel og palestinerne: Freden som uteble. In Fixdal, Mona Christine (Eds.), Fredsmegling i teori og praksis. Cappelen Damm Akademisk. ISSN 9788202515782. p. 85–111. Full text in Research Archive
• Markussen, Joakim Aalmen & Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2016). A Balancing Pretence: The Johnson administration's Policy towards Jordan, 1964-1967. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. ISSN 1353-0194. 45(3), p. 321–336. doi: 10.1080/13530194.2016.1246243. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen & Mørk, Hulda Kjeang (2016). Mission Impossible: UN Special Representative Gunnar Jarring and His Quest for Peace in the Middle East. International History Review. ISSN 0707-5332. 38(4), p. 830–853. doi: 10.1080/07075332.2015.1091783. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen & Stenberg, Petter (2016). Cementing a State of Belligerency: The 1949 Armistice Negotiations between Israel and Syria. The Middle East Journal. ISSN 0026-3141. 70(1), p. 69–89. doi: 10.1353/mej.2016.0015. Full text in Research Archive
• Nissen, Ada Elisabeth & Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2015). Weak Third Parties and Ripening: Revisiting Norwegian Interventions in Guatemala and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice. ISSN 1382-340X. 20(3), p. 389–413. doi: 10.1163/15718069-12341314. Full text in Research Archive
• Zernichow, Simen & Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2014). The Palestine option: Nixon, the national security council, and the search for a new policy, 1970. Diplomatic History. ISSN 0145-2096. 38(1), p. 182–209. doi: 10.1093/dh/dht090. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2013). Midtøsten - konfliktenes region. In Waage, Hilde Henriksen; Tamnes, Rolf & Vik, Hanne Hagtvedt (Ed.), Krig og fred i det lange 20. århundre. Cappelen Damm Akademisk. ISSN 9788202431914. p. 114–136. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen; Tamnes, Rolf & Vik, Hanne Hagtvedt (2013). Innledning. In Waage, Hilde Henriksen; Tamnes, Rolf & Vik, Hanne Hagtvedt (Ed.), Krig og fred i det lange 20. århundre. Cappelen Damm Akademisk. ISSN 9788202431914. p. 12–18. Full text in Research Archive
• Heian-Engdal, Marte; Jensehaugen, Jørgen & Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2013). ‘Finishing the Enterprise’: Israel's Admission to the United Nations. International History Review. ISSN 0707-5332. 35(3), p. 465–485. doi: 10.1080/07075332.2013.795493. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2013). Champions of Peace? Tools in Whose Hands? Norwegians and Peace Brokering in the Middle East. In Bauck, Petter & Omer, Mohammed K. (Ed.), The Oslo Accords 1993-2013. A Critical Assessment. The American University in Cairo Press (AUC Press) & I.B. Tauris. ISSN 9781617973369. p. 29–39. doi: 10.5743/cairo/9789774167706.003.0003. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2012). Proactive Peace Diplomacy: Jan Egeland. In Fixdal, Mona Christine (Eds.), Ways out of War: Peacemakers in the Middle East and Balkans. Palgrave Macmillan. ISSN 9781137030535. p. 91–118. doi: 10.1057/9781137030542_5. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2012). Et norsk mysterium - de forsvunne dokumentene fra fredsprosessen i Midtøsten. In Krøvel, Roy Gunnar & Orgeret, Kristin Skare (Ed.), Historier om verden. IJ-forlaget. ISSN 9788271473617. p. 63–66. Full text in Research Archive
• Jensehaugen, Jørgen; Heian-Engdal, Marte & Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2012). Securing the State: From Zionist Ideology to Israeli Statehood. Diplomacy & Statecraft. ISSN 0959-2296. 23(2), p. 280–303. doi: 10.1080/09592296.2012.679478%3Fsrc=recsys%23.VQXOx46G_V8. Full text in Research Archive
• Jensehaugen, Jørgen & Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2012). Coercive Diplomacy: Israel, Transjordan and the UN-a Triangular Drama Revisited. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. ISSN 1353-0194. 39(1), p. 79–100. doi: 10.1080/13530194.2012.659445. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2011). The Winner Takes All: The 1949 Island of Rhodes Armistice Negotiations Revisited. The Middle East Journal. ISSN 0026-3141. 65(2), p. 279–304. doi: 10.3751/65.2.15. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen & Johansen, Stian Tiller (2011). Powerful State, Powerless Mediator: The United States and the Peace Efforts of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, 1949-51. International History Review. ISSN 0707-5332. 33(3), p. 501–524. doi: 10.1080/07075332.2011.595245. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2009). Fredspolitikk i Midtøsten. In Lange, Even; Pharo, Helge & Østerud, Øyvind (Ed.), Vendepunkter i norsk utenrikspolitikk. Nye internasjonale vilkår etter den kalde krigen. Unipub forlag. ISSN 9788274773608. p. 157–208. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2008). Et norsk mysterium. De forsvunne dokumentene fra fredsprosessen i Midtøsten. Historisk tidsskrift. ISSN 0018-263X. 87(2), p. 289–303. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2008). Postscript to Oslo: The Mystery of Norway's Missing Files. Journal of Palestine Studies. ISSN 0377-919X. 38(1), p. 54–65. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2007). The 'Minnow' and the 'Whale': Norway and the United States in the Peace Process in the Middle East. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. ISSN 1353-0194. 34(2), p. 157–176. doi: 10.1080/13530190701427917. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Abstract: How could a small, cosy and secret setting in Norway in any way compete with, or replace, the huge and prestigious Middle East peace process that was taking place in Washington in 1993? It was Norway – and not the United States – that ultimately contributed to the Oslo Agreement. The United States knew nothing and was kept in the dark. How can this be explained? Norway had for decades been one of Israel’s best friends. However, the explanation for the role of Norway in the Oslo peace process cannot be sought in Norway’s biased political past alone. Norway’s close relationship to Israel only explains how its involvement began. It does not explain the process and the outcome. Norway was not a mediator on equal terms with both the Israelis and the Palestinians. It could not alter the power asymmetry between the two sides. Norway was no superpower, and it could not force solutions on unwilling parties. Israel was the stronger party, with a clear national security agenda, and it was unwilling to concede much. The PLO was the weaker party, willing to accept little in order to avoid further marginalization. Norway had to be acceptable not to both parties, but mainly to the stronger party, Israel. Its mediating role demanded such a loyalty. Like it or not, there was nothing Norway could do about this situation: this was Norway’s room for manoeuvre. Indeed, Israel had found an easier counterpart in Oslo than in Washington. In Norway, there was no international pressure on Israel. Moreover, the PLO and a weakened Arafat were a much easier match for the Israelis than the international law-oriented, highly educated and stubborn Palestinian representatives in Washington. Compared with the superpower, Norway was also a much more willing instrument, one that was more prepared to accept Israeli conditions. Thus, Israel chose the weak PLO and little Norway to obtain more, to protect Israeli self-interests and, hence, to get its own way. As a consequence, the United States was deliberately kept uninformed and was even misled by two of its closest friends and allies: Norway and Israel.

• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2005). Norway's Role in the Middle East Peace Talks: Between a Strong State and a Weak Belligerent. Journal of Palestine Studies. ISSN 0377-919X. 34(4), p. 6–24. Full text in Research Archive

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• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2022). Spillet om Syria. Cappelen Damm Akademisk. ISBN 9788202762605. 443 p. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen; Tamnes, Rolf & Vik, Hanne Hagtvedt (2013). Krig og fred i det lange 20. århundre. Cappelen Damm Akademisk. ISBN 9788202431914. 395 p. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2013). Konflikt og stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten. Cappelen Damm Akademisk. ISBN 9788202408312. 512 p. Full text in Research Archive

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• Nissen, Ada; Engh, Sunniva & Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2024). Norge som fredsnasjon og krigsmakt. Full text in Research Archive
• Nissen, Ada; Waage, Hilde Henriksen & Engh, Sunniva (2023). Selektiv lesning om fredsdiplomati. Full text in Research Archive
• Nissen, Ada; Engh, Sunniva & Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2023). Hvor er de kritiske spørsmålene til norske diplomaters fremstilling av seg selv? Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2022). A Social Democratic Peace: Nils Petter Gleditsch. In Tønnesson, Stein (Eds.), Lives in Peace Research: The Oslo Stories. Springer Nature. ISSN 9789811647161. p. 65–90. doi: 10.1007/978-981-16-4717-8. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2022). From Anarchy to Enlightened Absolutism? Sverre Lodgaard. In Tønnesson, Stein (Eds.), Lives in Peace Research: The Oslo Stories. Springer Nature. ISSN 9789811647161. doi: 10.1007/978-981-16-4717-8_10. Full text in Research Archive
• Nissen, Ada & Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2021). Fredsmeglingens fallgruver. Full text in Research Archive
• Aarebrot, Frank; Waage, Hilde Henriksen; Gundersen, Kristian; Matlary, Janne Haaland; Hessen, Dag Olav & Brochmann, Grete [Show all 11 contributors for this article] (2010). Vi er ikke blitt redde! [Journal]. Aftenposten. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2008). Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the United States. The International History Review. XXX(4), p. 921–923. Full text in Research Archive
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2008). A Norwegian mystery. The missing documents from the Middle Eastern peace process. Historisk tidsskrift. ISSN 0018-263X. 87, p. 289–303. Full text in Research Archive
• Andersson, Magnus Seland & Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2021). The Geopolitics of Syria’s Reconstruction. Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). ISSN 9788234301971. Full text in Research Archive
• Colleuille, Erlend Lunde; Waage, Hilde Henriksen; Abou-Hodeib, Toufoul & Jensehaugen, Jørgen (2021). An Impossible Balancing Act. France and the Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1982. Universitetet i Oslo. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  When civil war broke out in Lebanon in April 1975, France, the former mandate power, found itself in a conundrum. Its centuries old connection to Lebanon as protector of the Maronite Christians meant much was expected from French authorities. At the same time France had established strong ties to the Palestine Liberation Organization another actor of the civil war. This thesis studies France’s involvement in the first half of the Lebanese Civil War, from 1975 to 1982. Officially France remained neutral in the conflict. The aim of this thesis is to look at the France’s initiatives and the policies elaborated towards the different actors of the war. Yet, the many initiatives worked more as a show of presence and not many, if any, had a profound impact on the war. The vague French slogan of keeping Lebanon’s integrity, sovereignty and unity became increasingly hard to follow. France also failed to deliver on its attempt to stay fully neutral. Sides were taken; however, depending on developments in Lebanon, it was sometimes towards the Maronites, sometimes towards the PLO. France found itself in an impossible balance, between old and new alliances, and as such was not able to change the course of war in any significant way.

• Jensehaugen, Jørgen; Martins, Bruno Oliveira; Waage, Hilde Henriksen & Palik, Julia (2020). A House Divided: EU Policy on the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict. Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). ISSN 9788234301018. Full text in Research Archive
• Noreng, Øystein; Hovdenak, Are; Tønneson, Stein & Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2005). Regime Stability in the Middle East. Institutt for fredsforskning. Full text in Research Archive

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