My doctoral project provides an account of the kind of attention that Iris Murdoch and Simone Weil put at the center of their picture of morality and its value. I investigate the under-discussed connection between such attention and death in the writing of both Murdoch and Weil, and explicate the affinity between moral attention and the kind of attention constitutive of grief. I argue for the intrinsic value of attention in virtue of the very nature of attention, which grounds a picture of normativity as not only revealed by but also sourced from attention. The dissertation I am writing amounts to a view about the normativity of attention that is reflexive (we attend for the very value of attention itself) and transformative (we attend so as to change our attention for the better). In particular, the transformative effect of attention lies in its passive receptivity that has to do with accepting attunement to death, which is typically led by certain negative saliences (e.g. perpetual absence, impossibility, inevitability, etc). I give an account of how grief is morally transformative in reorienting what is salient to us in a morally significant matter, and propose proactive grief as an imaginative practice that cultivates the kind of attention that constitutes morality.
My work lies in the intersection and interaction between philosophy of mind and value theory (in the broader sense, but in particular moral philosophy). It draws from and engages with philosophy of attention, philosophy of emotion (especially that of grief), moral epistemology, moral psychology, axiology, aesthetics, and phenomenology. It is concerned with the moral significance of experience, especially how the structure of experience might be axiologically significant and normatively generative. My current project addresses the confluence of two strands of questions central to my philosophical inquisitiveness from the start: On the one hand, how is it possible to become good? What is it to be good? On the other hand, what is the structure of experience? In particular, how does temporality structure experience?
Background
I hold an MA in Philosophy from the University of British Columbia. Before that, I received my BA in Philosophy and Psychology from Boston University. I started my undergraduate studies in clinical psychology at a medical university before I turned to philosophy.