Hugo Ribeiro Mota

Image of Hugo Ribeiro Mota
Norwegian version of this page
Room 340
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Visiting address Blindernveien 31 Georg Morgenstiernes hus 0313 Oslo
Postal address Postboks 1020 Blindern 0315 Oslo

I am a PhD candidate in Philosophy at the University of Oslo under the supervision of Joey Pollock and co-supervision of Catarina Dutilh-Novaes.

My research project, Power and deep disagreement: communication beyond argumentation, is part of the New Models of Knowledge Communication project, funded by the Research Council of Norway.

My CV is available here.

Research summary

Power structures are present in all social interactions, and a particularly widespread and complex expression of them is structural oppression. Accounts of deep disagreements should not be exempt from considering how power differentials and structural oppression affect the phenomena. This is especially concerning when it comes to political deep disagreements, which may cause non-recognition and distrust or be a consequence of it. My assessment is that a reconceptualization of deep disagreement as a complex multi-dimensional phenomenon is due. Therefore, I propose a characterization of deep disagreement which highlights its interconnected cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions. This allows for going beyond epistemic attitudes and argumentative practices towards recognizing the role of attention, salience, perspectives, and values. One of the main benefits of this move is being able to use the concept of deep disagreement more adequately to account for actual political conflicts. Identifying and understanding the challenges brought to the surface by them prompts the search for more adequate theories of argumentation. Following recent contributions from the social epistemology of argumentation and my reconceptualization of deep disagreement, I propose a model of deep disagreement that updates the conditions for argument and also accounts for extra- and non-argumentative forms of communication.

Areas of research

Areas of Specialization:

Social & Political Epistemology • Philosophy of Language • Philosophy of Mind

Areas of Competence:

Social & Political Philosophy • Argumentation Theory • Philosophy of Education

Academic background

I have a BA and MA in Philosophy from the Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE, Brazil). My master's thesis investigated to what extent there was a defense of a type of foundationalism Wittgenstein's On Certainty. I argued for an anti-foundationalist reading through an analysis of the twelve key metaphors from the book.

Tags: Philosophy, Epistemology, Philosophy of language, Disagreement, Wittgenstein

Selected publications

Mejía, D.; Mota, H. R.; Baumtrog, M. D. (2022). Connecting the Americas Through Argumentation. Argumentation & Advocacy, 58 (3-4), 193-213. https://doi.org/10.1080/10511431.2022.2138182

Mota, H. R. (2021). Em que medida Wittgenstein seria fundacionista? [To what extent is Wittgenstein a foundationalist?]. Voluntas, 12 (2), e02. https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378666403

Mota, H. R. (2021). Paradoxo do Desacordo Profundo: uma abordagem relativista epistêmica [Deep Disagreement Paradox: an epistemic relativist approach]. Revista do Seminário dos Alunos do PPGLM/UFRJ; 11(1):11–28.

Silva, M.; Cavalcanti, I.; Mota, H. (2020). Linguagem e Enativismo: uma resposta normativa para a objeção de escopo e o problema difícil do conteúdo [Language and Enactivism: a normative answer to the scope objection and the hard problem of content]. Prometeus; 33:129–160. https://doi.org/10.52052/issn.2176-5960.pro.v12i33.13811

Cavalcanti, I.; Mota, H. (2019). Cognição e linguagem: seria a linguagem um desafio para abordagens enativistas? [Cognition and language: is language a challenge for enactivist approaches?]. In: A Mente Humana para Além do Cérebro - Perspectivas a partir dos 4Es da Cognição. Coimbra: Coimbra University Press. p. 139–156.

Published Sep. 20, 2021 1:50 PM - Last modified May 23, 2024 5:00 PM